Larmour, P., 2012 Interpreting Corruption: Culture and Politics in the Pacific Islands
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ABSTRACT

Corruption is a popular topic in the Pacific Islands. Politicians are accused of it and campaign against it. Fiji’s coup leaders vowed to clean it up. Several countries have “leadership codes” designed to reduce corruption, and others have created specialized anti-corruption agencies. Donors, the World Bank, and NGOs such as Transparency International have made it an international issue. Yet there is often disagreement about what constitutes corruption and how seriously it matters. What some view as corrupt may be regarded as harmless by others. Existing laws have proved difficult to enforce and seem out of step with public opinion, which is often very suspicious of corrupt behavior among island elites. As well as talk there is silence: People fear the consequences of complaining. The dangers of anti-corruption campaigns became apparent during the “cleanup” following Fiji’s 2006 coup.

So what counts as corruption in the Pacific and what causes it? How much is really going on? How can we measure it? What types are present? Are gifts really bribes? Is “culture” an excuse for corruption? Is politics—in particular, democracy—intrinsically corrupt? In clear and concise language, this work attempts to answer these questions. The author takes a comparative approach, drawing on economics, law, political science, and anthropology, as well as literature and poetry from the region. He looks at Transparency International’s studies of National Integrity Systems and at newer research, including events since the Fiji coup.

Interpreting Corruption is a highly accessible and approachable look at an age-old problem. Those interested in the Pacific Islands and public integrity will find it remarkably comprehensive as will students and scholars of anthropology, sociology, and political studies.
Acknowledgements

The book is based on studies of ‘National Integrity Systems’ in the Pacific Islands published on Transparency International’s website www.transparency.org. I was responsible, with Manu Barcham, for commissioning and coordinating 12 or the 14 studies, as part of a project funded by AusAID in 2004-5. We published an ‘Overview’ of the project in 2006. I am very grateful to the individual authors whose names are referenced throughout the text, and I hope I have not misinterpreted them.

Most of the writing - and the research for part of the chapter on the Fiji cleanup campaign - was done while I was a Visiting Scholar in the Pacific Islands Development Program at the East West Center in Hawaii in early 2007. Andrew Macintyre, the Director of Crawford School allowed me time away and my colleagues took up the slack. I am once again grateful to Geoff White for sponsoring my visit and to him, Sitiveni Halapua, Jerry Finin, Bob Kiste, and Tarcissius Kubutaualaka for their encouragement and the opportunity for uninterrupted writing in Honolulu. The PIDP support staff, Mona Nakihei and Titilia Barbour were unfailingly helpful. The Center for Pacific Island Studies at the University of Hawaii organised a seminar on the ‘cultural’ themes of Chapter 6. Terence Wesley Smith gave me ideas about Area Studies. Vilisoni Hereniko pointed me to literary references on corruption in the region, and I have drawn heavily on his work on clowning.

The more general material on corruption and anti-corruption comes from an Australia Research Council funded research project on ‘Transparency International and the Problem of Corruption’, carried out with Barry Hindess and Luis de Sousa. Barry has particularly influenced my thinking on the politics and anti-politics of corruption and Luis on my thinking about official anti-
corruption agencies. Chapters 1 and 2 also draw on material for a course I have been teaching with officials from the NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption, particularly Alexandra Mills, Michael Nest and Robert Waldersee. My ANU colleagues Richard Mulgan, John Uhr, Carolyn Hendriks and Janine O’Flynn have helped me with the political theory, applied ethics, and interpretivist public policy. Talks with my uncle, the Rev Dick Macdonald, helped me think if there was a distinctively Christian approach to corruption (there didn’t seem to be). Yash Ghai got me to pull together my thinking on corruption prevention for a consultancy for UNDP in Nepal. Tony Prescott helped me think about money laundering and donor policy. Anthony Regan and John Wood helped my understanding of Ombudsmen in the region. John Cox allowed me to read his paper on scams in PNG, and John Murray gave me permission to use his material on frauds.

Brij Lal encouraged me to write the book, and helped with material on Fiji’s new Independent Commission Against Corruption. Once again, Masako Ikeda was a thoughtful and persistent editor. John Murray, John Wood and Tony Prescott made helpful comments the manuscript. Two anonymous readers made very constructive comments on the structure, as well as suggesting the section I have added on humorous talk in Chapter 2. Philippe Saibiri kept me up to date with island news stories through his website voiceofmelanesia.com. I tested some of the material in a ‘Pacific leaders virtual forum’, a series of videoconferences with Pacific regional centres 2008, assisted by Ashwin Raj. He and Jon Fraenkel have been keeping me up to date with news from Fiji, as Bill Standish has for PNG. Ron Duncan has been regularly generous with his time in reading and commenting on my writing. His influence is particularly clear in my efforts to understand the logic behind indicators in Chapter 5.

Earlier versions of parts of the book have been published elsewhere, and I am grateful to the relevant editors for permission to reproduce the material here.
Parts of Chapter 3 appeared as a working paper published by CIES Portugal, and an earlier consultancy report for UNDP Nepal. Parts of Chapter 4 come from ‘policy brief’ issued by the Crawford School of Economics and Government. The material in Chapters 5 and 6 was presented to a Crawford School seminar in July 2008, and I have drawn on ideas of my economist colleagues, particularly Trevor Breusch and Bruce Chapman. Chapter 9 draws on another Crawford seminar, in October 2009, where I got particularly helpful suggestions from Janine O’Flynn. The National Integrity Studies analysed in Tables 6 and 7 were funded by an AusAID grant through Transparency International (Australia). I am very grateful to them for that support, to Peter Rooke of TI Australia, to the authors of the reports listed in the references, to Manu Barcham who helped coordinate the studies.

Chapter 7 is based on an article published in Crime Law and Social Change and revised for a book edited by Ting Gong. The late Ron Crocombe, Michael Goldsmith, Geoff White, Ashwin Raj and Raymond Apthorpe commented on earlier drafts. Material on the Fiji coup was published in an East West Center working paper, and in an issue of Crime Law and Social Change edited by Luis de Sousa and Jon Quah. I got critical comments from journal reviewers for the material on types in Chapter 6 and hope it now makes more sense in the context of the book. Chapter 8 draws on Barry Hindess’ work in the course we taught together, his comments, and the ARC project with him and Luis de Sousa.

The book is dedicated to Ron Crocombe who died in Auckland in June 2009. I had worked as an editor in the Institute of Pacific studies he founded. His book on Cook Islands Politics was among the first to deal with the issue of corruption in the region. Ron had been sending me a stream of alarming clippings and outraged comments on the issue. His influence is clear in the
comparative structure of the book and it draws on his research on the links with Asia. Ron was a founder of Pacific Studies and an exemplary public intellectual, speaking truth to power, local and international.
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<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<td>ARC</td>
<td>Australia Research Council</td>
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<td>AUD</td>
<td>Australian dollars</td>
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<tr>
<td>AusAID</td>
<td>Australian Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>BPI</td>
<td>Bribe Payers’ Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
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<td>CPI</td>
<td>Corruption Perceptions Index</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>EDF</td>
<td>Electoral Development Fund</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FICAC</td>
<td>Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption</td>
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<td>FSM</td>
<td>Federated States of Micronesia</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic Product</td>
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<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<td>IANA</td>
<td>Internet Assigned Names Authority</td>
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<td>Independent Commission Against Corruption</td>
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<td>IPSECO</td>
<td>International Power Systems Company</td>
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<td>MI</td>
<td>Marshall Islands</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-government Organisation</td>
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<td>NIS</td>
<td>National Integrity System</td>
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<td>NISPAC</td>
<td>National Integrity Systems (Pacific Islands)</td>
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<td>NLTB</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>New South Wales</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>PBI</td>
<td>Prime Bank Instrument</td>
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<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<td>PNG</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
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<td>POSF</td>
<td>Public Officers’ Superannuation Fund</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Public Service Commission</td>
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<td>RAMSI</td>
<td>Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands</td>
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<td>TI</td>
<td>Transparency international</td>
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<td>TI (PNG)</td>
<td>Transparency International (Papua New Guinea)</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>USP</td>
<td>University of the South Pacific</td>
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<td>VDC</td>
<td>Vanua Development Corporation</td>
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From the General Editor

*Topics in the Contemporary Pacific* is a new series from the University of Hawaii Press. It addresses issues of pressing concern to the Pacific Island region as a whole and is aimed at lay readers, students, researchers from within and beyond the Pacific, policy-makers and other interested professionals. While the selection of authors will be guided chiefly by the relevance and appeal of their proposed project to the overall purpose of the series, a conscious effort will be made to foster new and broad-based talent. Some studies will crystallize new problems; some will be the first comprehensive treatment of a contemporary issue; while others will tackle subjects of perennial importance for the region. In adopting this approach, we recognize the incontestable truth that the Pacific islands are no longer ‘pacific,’ if they ever were; and they are islands but in this age of globalisation and interconnectedness, islands in the physical sense alone. Our series will take not an insular but a comparative perspective informed, wherever appropriate, by the relevant theoretical literature. In this way, we hope that we will be able to connect our research to works on similar topics in other parts of the world.

Peter Larmour’s admirably succinct study of corruption in the Pacific Islands opens the series. Larmour brings to his scholarly work a wide experience of teaching and research. He is presently at The Australian National University’s Crawford School of Economics and Governance, but has taught previously at the Universities of Papua New Guinea and of the South Pacific. He also worked for some years in the Lands Department of the Solomon Islands. The topic of his volume will find wide resonance across the Pacific. Everyone seems to know someone who is engaged in some unsavoury practice vaguely defined as ‘corruption.’ There is much loose talk about it. It is said to be endemic in some places, less so in others but of its presence across the islands there is little doubt. Peter Larmour’s volume is the first scholarly attempt to explore the topic in a measured and nuanced way. The word itself, he says, is ‘strong and judgmental,’ and its meaning ‘vague and contested.’ Some provide obvious instances of corruption, such as the forestry industry in Melanesia or the saga surrounding the collapse of the National Bank of Fiji in the mid-1990s. But other examples are more subtle though not necessarily less insidious. He helps us navigate our way around the contending discourses of corruption in the islands, its definition, interpretation, meaning and context, the extent of its pervasiveness and the various legal mechanisms governments have put in place to counter it. The volume as a result is both informative as well as sobering.

Many colleagues have given us valuable ideas and advice about future lines of enquiry for the series. We appreciate their support and offers of assistance. The support of the University of Hawaii Press for the series has been invaluable; without it, we would not be here. Finally, I express my sincere gratitude to Masako Ikeda, the Managing Editor of the series, for her commitment to the project and for her unqualified encouragement.
Brij V Lal

The Australian National University
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Chapter 1

Introduction

There are now two opposite views about corruption in the Pacific Islands. The first sees a cultural misunderstanding. Behaviour that people in the West might regard as corrupt is regarded differently in the islands. What looks like a bribe, for example, is really a gift. What looks like nepotism is proper concern for one’s kin. This view tends to blame foreigners for corruption. The second more recent view sees a catastrophe. Leaders and officials are everywhere self-seeking and incompetent. The old rules have broken down, and the promise of independence has been betrayed. This view tends to blame the politicians and officials who extort corrupt payments from innocent citizens and companies. The first view is relativist, while the second we might call ‘gothic’, in the sense of grim and gloomy. Many Pacific Islanders, as well as aid donors, now incline to a gothic view of corruption.

How did this come to be? It is a fraught topic. ‘Corruption’ is a harsh word for what is often a grey area. It can be a personal affront and a national put-down, as well as a systemic diagnosis. It is hard to tell as corruption is typically secretive and so its level is prone to over-interpretation and under-interpretation. On a number of occasions Sir Mekere Morauta, former Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea, has described corruption in his country as ‘systemic and systematic’ (Vatsikopoulos 1995, Pareti 2008). According to Sir Peter Kenilorea, a former PM now Speaker of Solomons Parliament:
In most cases corrupt practices have become embedded in our way of life so much so that we do not even realize that our actions are corrupt (Kenilorea 2007).

A recent survey found 47% of people in Fiji believed ‘politics is largely affected by corruption’ (Transparency International 2006). Coup leader Frank Bainimarama, in an interview with journalists, described how ‘corrupt practise is so ingrained in our society and nobody was doing anything’ (Fiji Times Online June 02 2008 accessed 8/11/08). A survey in Solomon Islands found 62% of the rural population, and 46% of the urban population believed the government was corrupt. Yet focus groups found ‘no universal agreement on what constituted corruption (and some tendency to challenge the conventional Western view of it)’ (RAMSI 2006: 2).

Corruption is also an intriguing and implicating personal topic. We sometimes enjoy being scandalized by the misbehaviour of others. When I mention casually I’m doing research on corruption, peoples’ faces tend to light up, and tell me of terrible things they have heard. We are often ambivalent ourselves. We want officials to treat us as individual human beings, but apply the rules strictly to others. We may be implicated – or know someone who is - in petty corruption like private phone calls from the office or employing friends for casual work. We are repeatedly surprised when promising politicians succumb to dirty dealing: why don’t we ever learn? We may also be too quick to reach for corruption as an explanation for others’ success. Ivan Krastev, writing about perceptions of corruption in the transition economies of Eastern Europe noticed that ‘corruption’ offers a consoling explanation for sudden inequalities – more so than luck, merit or the workings of the market (Krastev 2002).

Corruption is, of course, a regular issue in the politics of most countries, not just those in the Pacific. There has been a sharp increase in international attention to corruption since the 1990s,
and anti-corruption activity has become a plank in several Western governments’ aid policies. But
domestic political concerns with corruption began much earlier. The exemplary model of the
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) was devised in the 1970s, and India’s
Vigilance Commission dates back to the 1940s. Modern civil service systems partly reflect
nineteenth century reforms designed to reduce corruption in appointments and promotion. The
checks and balances in modern constitutions date back to eighteenth century concerns with the
dangers of self-interested ‘factionalism’. Concern with corruption is in many ways a foundational
one for constitutional democracy – how can we design things to stop leaders abusing their power
over us?

The new international interest has been driven by the World Bank as part of campaigns for ‘good
governance’ in developing countries. This interest was stimulated and served by Transparency
international (TI), an NGO formed by disgruntled international civil servants in 1993, which now
has branches – which it calls ‘chapters’ - in four Pacific countries (in addition to those in
Australia and New Zealand). It publishes a controversial Corruption Perceptions Index, which is
supposed to shame governments into reform. We shall take a critical look at these measurements
in Chapter 5, but five Pacific Islands have been rated so far – with scores ranging from 4.5/10 for
Samoa to 1.7/10 for Tonga . TI also promotes more fine-grained studies of particular countries’
‘National Integrity Systems’: the architecture of their anti-corruption institutions, and the way
they work in practice. Fourteen Pacific Island countries have been audited in this way, and results
provide examples for this book (Larmour and Barcham 2006, Mellam and Aloi 2003, Olaks
Consulting 2001).
Corruption provides a fascinating series of stories. Vanuatu’s former Ombudsman Commissioner, for example, has produced a vivid stream of reports, targeting serious fraud to hapless incompetence. Newspapers provide us with a stream of stories of official misconduct, and they were particular active in the Fiji cleanup campaign. After a while they begin to repeat themselves. I draw on several methods in this book. I want to sift through examples, but also consider the ideas that actors and analysts use to understand what’s going on – ideas about corruption itself, but also concepts like ‘culture’ ‘politics’ and ‘the state’ with which it is associated or opposed. In the relativist view, the values associated with states – impartiality, impersonality – contradict local values of caring and sharing. In this view, culture connotes the local system of values and meaning – what is corrupt in one culture may not be so in another. The gothic view links corruption to ‘failing’ states. In the gothic view the word culture denotes its systematic, ingrained character – there is a culture of corruption, so reform will be difficult.

The book tries to answer several questions:

- Who is talking about corruption, and what are they talking about? What counts as corruption in this region?

- How do they explain corruption? Do popular explanations differ from official and academic ones.

- How much corruption is there in the region? What types are most prevalent and where?
• What is the role of culture in explaining (or excusing) corruption?

• How do ideas about politics help us understand the pattern of corruption? Is all politics somehow corrupt?

• What are the implications of differing interpretations of corruption for the implementation of policies against corruption?

In trying to understand corruption in the Pacific Islands I have several related themes or arguments in mind.

First, the word ‘corruption’ (in English) is very strong and judgmental, but its meaning is often vague and contested. It may not translate easily. That makes it interesting. So before we adopt a definition, or go ahead and analyse the phenomenon to which it refers I believe we need to pay attention to the word itself; to related or opposite words (like ‘good governance’); to how and where they are being used; and by whom. Some people talk about it; others are silent; there is more talk about it in the region than there was. The idea that the world presents itself to us through words, as a kind of text, is characteristically postmodern. Chapter 2, on ‘talk and silence’ about corruption was influenced by the literary approaches to Pacific Studies (and Politics) at the University of Hawaii, where I wrote a first draft. The late Epeli Hau’ofa’s satirical Tales of the Tikongs is particularly sharp and prescient about aid corruption and governance.

Second, an obvious change in the way corruption has been talked about since the 1990s is the use of numbers rather than words. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index gives
countries a score that can be compared and correlated with other numbers. In this approach, the world presents itself as a comparative table, rather than a literary text. Once measured, corruption can be seen as something manageable, by governments or international organisations. The numbers provide authority for policies and loans. The CPI was invented by an economist, Johan Lambsdorff. This econometric approach is familiar to the economists I work beside at the ANU, and the figures and comparative tables are discussed in Chapter 5.

Third, ‘corruption’ is a complex and confronting idea, which can be looked at from a variety of academic points of view, discussed more in Chapter 2. In this book I am more interested in understanding it in a particular context rather than explaining it in a general way. That context is the Pacific Islands, and the outside agencies dealing with it, over the last 20 years or so. My academic background is in comparative politics and public administration, and I have been interested in what is now called an ‘interpretive’ approach to public policy:

Word based methods and writing, researcher reflexivity, and the exploration of multiple meanings and their ambiguities, especially in policy contexts in which contention over the policy issue under study is common (Yanow 2007: 406, see also Hajer and Wagenaar 2003: 13-15)

Language shapes our understanding of the world. Sometimes words amount to deeds. The same events can be understood differently by different groups of people. Statements of policy made at the centres of power are reinterpreted by those supposed to implement or benefit from them. This approach seemed eminently suitable to understanding ‘corruption’.

Fourth, at the start of this chapter I distinguished an older ‘relativist’ approach to corruption from a newer ‘gothic’ one, which emphasised decay and disappointment. There are many varieties of
relativism, and here I’m using the word in three senses. The first is simply descriptive, to show that there are different understandings of the word ‘corruption’ in the Pacific Islands region. The second is more evaluative, that ‘the truth or falsity, the appropriateness or inappropriateness, of an ethical belief is relative to its socio-historical background and that moral beliefs cannot be assessed independently of their social framework’ (Baghramian 2004: 6-7). The third is political. Mark Philp (2002) argues that implicit in any judgment of corruption is its opposite, the ‘naturally wholesome’ which has become corrupted. The political point is that there may be persistent legitimate disagreements about what is ‘naturally wholesome’. It might be the free market, tradition, or the idea of ‘nation state’ that has become corrupted, but we are not necessarily all going to agree about its value. I have borrowed the word ‘gothic’ from the anthropology of Melanesian Christianity (Douglas 2001, Robbins 1998). Anti-corruption activists, like Transparency International, are strongly opposed to relativism, pointing to the way ‘culture’ is often used as an excuse for behaviour that is almost universally regarded as bad. I felt that a cultural baby was being thrown out with the relativist bathwater. Chapter 6 uses evidence from TI’s own surveys to show ways in which ‘culture’ does matter in dealing with corruption.

Fifth, I teach in a School of Economics and Government, and find with other political scientists that it is often difficult to distinguish ‘corruption’ from the normal workings of democracy in a market economy. Political scientists sometimes share the assumption that economists make that individuals are fundamentally self interested. Politicians need votes to get elected, and need to stitch together coalitions to get legislation passed. Private firms lobby governments, make political donations, and seek special treatment. Politicians need the private sector to invest to provide the jobs their constituents want. Here I’ve been influenced by the contrast my colleague Richard Mulgan makes between modern conceptions of politics as driven by self interest, with the older belief that leaders should act completely selflessly. If some self interest is allowed, there are problems of ‘drawing the line’.
Finally, the title of the Masters unit that I have been teaching since 1997, ‘Corruption and Anti-Corruption’, signals a gap between the two. Anti-corruption activity may have little impact on corruption; may serve other political purposes; and may have unintended consequences. My growing uneasiness about what political scientists Anechiarico and Jacobs (1996) call ‘the anti-corruption project’ were reinforced by my experience as a member of the NGO, Transparency International, since 1997, research on that organisation carried out with Barry Hindess and Luis de Sousa, and by events in the so called ‘cleanup campaign’ in Fiji.

Why pick on the Pacific?

The Pacific Islands consist of 14 small countries, ranging in population from about 6 million to about 1,600 (with a median of about 100,000). It is typically divided up into three main ‘culture areas’: Micronesia, to the northwest; Melanesia, to the southwest; and Polynesia to the east (see Table 1). All but two of these fourteen states are parliamentary democracies. The two exceptions are Tonga, where the government is in transition from responsibility to a hereditary monarch to responsibility to the legislature. Fiji, ruled by an unelected Interim Government since a coup in December 2006. Each country’s government is dependent to some degree on foreign aid, loans from international development banks and – in Fiji’s case – concessional access to the EU for its sugar exports. Western donors, banks and international organisations have become increasingly vocal about ‘good governance’, and increasingly willing to insist that Pacific Island governments meet standards they set as a condition for their grants, loans, and concessions. Island leaders, in
turn, are tempted to turn to ideas about ‘culture’ to explain why those external standards should not apply to them, and to turn to other donors, such as Taiwan and China, who nag them less.

Corruption can be studied in particular countries, with their own distinctive history and institutions, or as universal phenomenon. Here I take an intermediate approach – area studies – which looks at a small number of countries, with certain shared background conditions of history, geography and language. The NIS surveys lack the depth of a systematic study of each country. They are in English rather than local languages. However it is possible to draw some general conclusions from them, to use them to check on the broader validity of conclusions drawn from only one country, or only one part of it, and to compare them with the results of other cross-national applications of TI’s NIS questionnaire (eg Larmour and Barcham 2006). There is an inevitable trade-off between breadth and depth. However there are not enough cases (14) to draw statistically significant conclusions.

Area studies are not an innocent methodological choice. They have often been linked to the interests of great powers, keen to understand unruly border regions they want to manage (Wesley Smith 2000:310-311). In our case, there is a new international interest in corruption, which is seen as an obstacle to free trade and a handmaiden to terror. This international interest has led, among other things, to the funding of the country studies this book uses as evidence. The promise of area studies – as opposed to single country studies, or surveys of larger numbers of countries – is that shared history, geography and languages are likely to affect the pattern of (in this case) corruption. The Pacific Islands are linguistically diverse, but there are relevant similarities in their political systems – inherited and introduced – and in their relatively small size, compared to other modern states.
Politics in Polynesia was hierarchical and preoccupied with rank and descent. Centralised, stratified systems of government were emerging in places like Hawaii at the point when they came into contact with Europeans. Politics in Melanesia has tended to be more egalitarian and decentralized, though people still talk about ‘chiefs’, and how they should and should not behave (White and Lindstrom 1997). Systems of government based on these persist in rural areas and migrant settlements around towns. They are formally recognised in local government, and occasionally at national level (in Vanuatu, Cook Islands, and Marshall Islands and also in Fiji, where the Great Council of Chiefs was suspended after the 2006 coup). In each country arguments about the role of custom and tradition are an important part of everyday life and politics, including discussions about leadership and corruption.

The states listed in Table 1.1 were created by colonial rule, or – in the case of Tonga – indigenous reactions to the threat of colonial rule. They only became fully independent fifty years ago, and five remain in ambiguous relationships of free association with their former colonial rulers. Table 1.2 shows how many remain dependent on foreign aid from former colonial powers. While colonial boundaries were divisive, they were also inclusive, bringing together smaller cultural units, and setting up new hierarchies among them in terms of distance from colonial capitals. There was some effort to re-align states with underlying cultural differences at the time of independence, particularly in Micronesia, where Kiribati separated from Tuvalu along ethnic lines, and the US Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands dissolved into four smaller entities, one of them a federation. Bougainville continued to resist incorporation into PNG, mobilising in the 1970s and again in the 1990s in a long running civil war for its own independence as a separate nation-state.
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<tr>
<th>Colony</th>
<th>Colonial Powers</th>
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<td>Melanesia</td>
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<td>Fiji Islands</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Independent 1970</td>
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<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
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<td>Independent 1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall islands</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Free association with USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Germany</td>
<td>Independent 1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>Free association with USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Free association with New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Free association with New Zealand</td>
</tr>
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<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Independent 1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>British protection</td>
<td>Never colonised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Independent 1978</td>
</tr>
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</table>
## Table 1.2
Pacific Islands Population GNP Growth and Aid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
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<td><strong>Melanesia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>7,236,000</td>
<td>2180</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>589,700</td>
<td>1710</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>289,400</td>
<td>2960</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>891,100</td>
<td>4480</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>182,700</td>
<td>5050</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
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<td>1660</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>14,000</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>9,600</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niue</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>3800</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>3558</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Micronesia</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federated States of Micronesia</td>
<td>112,700</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>166,100</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall Islands</td>
<td>55,400</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palau</td>
<td>20,700</td>
<td>9000</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>933</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nauru</td>
<td>10,100</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Secretariat of the Pacific Community, 2005; Chand, 2003
The small island states of the Pacific are particularly dependent upon the international system. So they are particularly open to international enthusiasms such as anti-corruption. Many are what Jackson (1990) characterised sourly as ‘quasi states’, sustained by international recognition of their governments, and foreign aid, rather than domestic capacity and taxation. So - like it or not - they are more open to international pressure than larger or more self-sufficient countries. Island governments club together in regional organisations like the Pacific Islands Forum (henceforth ‘The Forum’). They also form sub regional groupings in larger organisations like the Asian Development Bank, the Commonwealth, or the Africa Caribbean and Pacific grouping in relation to the European Union. During the 1990s these international organisations became conduits for policies of ‘good governance’, including public sector reform, accountability and anti-corruption.

The Pacific Islands also constitute regions of influence for relatively powerful neighbours. Australia – also a member of the Forum - has decided to become actively and directly involved in the government of what it sees as potentially “failing” states Solomon Islands, Nauru and Papua New Guinea (PNG) (Dinnen 2004). Nauru and PNG had been colonies of Australia until they became independent in the 1970s (whereas Britain ruled Solomon Islands until 1978 and has shown little interest in it since). The success of Australia’s intervention in Timor in 1999 and its alliance with the US in its “war on terror” had emboldened the Prime Minister, John Howard. These international events happened against a steady loss of Australian official faith in more traditional approaches to aid and development in the Pacific Islands region. Economic growth since the countries became independent had been slow to negative, particularly if measured in per capita terms (See Table 1.2). Among neoconservative commentators Pacific Island governments (demonised as ‘elites’) came to be seen as part of the problem as much as part of the solution. Ian Frazer had earlier made a similar argument – from the left rather than the right - about the
Honiara elite, benefiting legally, through public service salaries, from the forestry industry (1997). John Howard explained:

The South Pacific has the enduring problems of poverty, bad governance and corruption, and what we're trying to do is do something about both. It's in our interests strategically, historically and sentimentally. If we just throw up our arms and go away, you'll end up with these places being taken over by interests that are very hostile to Australia. It's also walking away from our moral responsibility. We are far and away the most powerful and influential country in the whole area, and nobody else will do the job if we don't (The Daily Telegraph 31 December 2006).

In July 2003 Australia sent 2,000 troops, police and other officials in a “regional assistance mission” to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) to restore law and order – particularly by disarming combatants – and to rebuild institutions, particularly those dealing with finance and criminal justice. The mission was framed as an initiative of the Pacific Islands Forum, in terms of the Forum Leaders’ Biketawa declaration, and included small contingents of police and soldiers from other countries in the region. The intervention was invited by the Solomon Islands government, and regulated by a special act of the Solomon Islands Parliament.

RAMSI quickly restored law and order and turned its attention to supporting institutions involved with finance, accountability, and criminal justice, including a group specifically targeting corruption offences. According to RAMSI’s website, 6,300 people have been arrested which – as 53% of the population is aged between 15-64 - amounts to 1 adult in 50. Three thousand six hundred guns were given up. One hundred and sixty Solomon Islands policemen faced charges brought under local legislation, including of corruption. Six former ministers have been charged with corruption. Australian officials occupy some line positions in the government departments
while others advise. The first audit reports in years have been produced and presented to parliament. Government finances have been stabilized, with economic growth running at 5% per annum (after a fall of 25% through the conflict).

Corruption is also much talked about by Pacific Islanders. Local NGO activists, religious leaders, and journalists complain about corruption as much as foreign donors do. Corruption has become a theme in the literature of the Pacific Islands. Albert Wendt describes how ‘Our writing is also examining and attacking the growing corruption and abuse of power in our elites’ (1996: 9). Leaders themselves seem quite willing to talk about corruption, some since the early 1990s – before donors became preoccupied - and to characterize their systems as corrupt. Corruption has become part of the everyday language of politics in the region. Some of the NIS reports find popular anger about corruption within the region, and dissatisfaction with something about contemporary politics. People themselves seem in two minds. The anger comes from within elites, but is also directed towards them. It is expressed in occasional riots and demonstrations, such as the demonstrations or over corruption in the National Provident Fund in Vanuatu, or after the election of Snyder Rini as PM in Solomons. The Sandline affair – involving exposure of the government’s secret efforts to hire foreign mercenaries to end the Bougainville rebellion – crystallized popular feeling about corruption, and led to the formation of the first branch of Transparency International, the anti-corruption NGO, in the region.

Yet people also sometimes argue, like the Solomon Islanders interviewed by for the RAMSI survey (above) that Western definitions of corruption do not, or should not, apply in the region. The relativist argument is that traditional gifts, for example, may be misinterpreted as bribes. Caring for relatives may be misinterpreted as nepotism. Politicians are expected to help their
constituents in practical ways. So talk about ‘corruption’ may be deflected as just another way in which Western countries are insensitive to cultural differences and fail to recognize the dilemmas facing officials, or as yet another ‘problem’ through which aid donors and the multilateral banks view the region as a place of deficits and disappointment. Yet many Pacific Islanders want to talk about it. Indeed, self-accusations may be another example of the feeling of ‘humiliation’ that anthropologists notice among some peoples’ towards their own societies in PNG (Robbins 1998: 111-113).

Western leaders lecturing about corruption are easy enough to portray as hypocritical. For example, during 2006, the Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer was swapping harsh words with the Solomons PM over the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (the sponsors of the survey cited above). He was also sweating out the Cole Royal Commission, investigating the Australian Wheat Board’s disguised payments to the Sadam Hussain regime. Cole found ministers ignorant, to Downer’s relief, and widespread disbelief among political journalists. The founders of TI had avoided accusations of hypocrisy by emphasizing the role of foreign companies in domestic corruption, and by turning their gaze to corruption in developed countries. The Corruption Perceptions Index, whatever its other limitations, put all of them ‘on the same page’ (Galtung 2007).

The Fiji coup of 2006 confounded the growing domestic and international conversation about corruption. The army removed Members of Parliament, a layer of senior officials, and heads of statutory bodies and public enterprises. It demanded that institutions investigate suspicions of corruption among their executives. The army set up an office to gather public complaints about official corruption. Soldiers collected files from government departments, and brought suspects in
to the military barracks for questioning. There were complaints of intimidation, trial by media, and lack of evidence. The army also launched a crackdown on petty crime in during which three people were killed, allegedly beaten up by police and soldiers (Larmour 2008a).

Bainimarama then arranged to be installed as Prime Minister of an Interim Government. He brought in some former politicians – but not those of the former governing party – and a civilian lawyer (and board member of TI (Fiji) who became Attorney General. They quickly set up the Independent Commission Against Corruption (FICAC) that had been promised, but not delivered, by their elected predecessor (Fiji 2004). By the end of 2008 about 22 people had been charged. Among them was Lisenia Qarase, the former Prime Minister. He was accused of abuse of office at two points in his career: when, as head of the Development Bank, he had authorised a loan to his own family company to buy shares in Fijian Holdings Limited; and when, as Prime Minister and Minister of Fijian affairs, he had authorised the Vanua Development Corporation to invest rents collected by the Native Land Trust Board. The clean-up campaign provided an opportunity to settle old scores and its own arbitrary approach was itself vulnerable to corruption.

The coup divided Fiji’s chapter of TI. Transparency International was set up in the thin air of international organisations, and initially planned to stay there. It was originally planning to call itself ‘international business monitor’ until it fixed on ‘TI’. Whereas other international NGOs, like Oxfam or Greenpeace, grew out of domestic charities, TI started internationally before establishing local chapters. Activists at an early meeting in Ecuador persuaded its founders that it would mobilise no support for its international program unless it was also seen to be targeting corruption at the national level, where the results of corruption were more immediately felt. It did so by a process of franchising its name ‘TI’ to local groups who were ready to adopt its policies
of coalition building with government and the private sector, and the pursuit of systemic reform rather than individual malfeasance. Local groups were also expected to raise their own funds locally – often from aid donors, as well as large international companies.

TI (PNG) was the first chapter to be established in the Pacific Islands, and its activities illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of TI’s approach. It was formally established in January 1997. Its immediate origins lay in forum on "Ethics in Business" convened by the Business Council of PNG and the Institute of National Affairs in July 1996. It quickly gained prominence through the Sandline Affair which became an epochal political crisis in PNG (Siaguru 2001), and in some ways foreshadowed the Fiji coup of 2006).

Where I’m Coming From

It’s easy to talk as if corruption is something ‘out there’ that only other people do. My own first brush with it was a research assistant in the UK, where my co-workers encouraged me to submit inflated timesheets on the grounds that ‘everyone does it’ and that it made up for poor rates of pay. It was a good example of a ‘moral gray zone’ in which ‘official company rules are repeatedly broken with, at a minimum, a supervisor’s tacit or explicit approval’ (Anteby 2009). Then I became a young official in the Lands Department in Solomon Islands. A lunch with a local businessman, for which he insisted on paying, made him more comfortable dropping by the office, or hailing me in the street. He would ask me if the Department had any new blocks of land out for public tender. The information was already out there in public notices, so I told him
cheerfully yes or no, and didn’t help him further than that. But I was uneasy about the relationship. I felt I was being groomed. Face-to-face contacts are a typical preamble to more corrupt engagements, yet officials in a small town had all sorts of them. My contact later became an MP.

Corruption is a long-standing concern of political theory and comparative politics. I became interested in it again through teaching about ‘public sector reform’ in the mid 1990s. I have been teaching a Masters course on ‘Corruption and Anti Corruption’, jointly with officials from the News South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption for the last ten years. I have also been a member of the anti-corruption NGO, Transparency International, and coordinator of its studies of National Integrity systems in the Pacific, which provide the material for this book. I have taught training courses on it. (Anti) corruption has been kind to me. I’ve also been interested in policy transfer, of which TI’s approach is an exemplar (Larmour 2005). Yet I have become uneasy at the rapid international consensus around the evils of corruption. Zealousness self-righteousness and self glorification sometimes accompany campaigns against corruption. There is sometimes a failure of proportion, empathy and unwillingness to see that one’s own behaviour might be regarded as corrupt. Part of the global talk about corruption has been about the need (often deferred) to make it more country-specific. NIS studies were a step in that direction, though they still involved applying a global template. While welcome, these were also steps away from conversations that activists were uncomfortable and impatient with – what exactly was corruption? And what did its absence – in donor talk ‘good governance’ - consist of?

Anthropologist Steve Sampson noted ‘nobody speaks for corruption’ (2005). Environmental NGOs, for example, have their arguments tested in a battle of ideas with their opponents.
Corruption is silent and secretive, but can’t or won’t defend itself. There is an avalanche of publications and reports about the costs of corruption. However a small critical literature on the anti-corruption movement has emerged. In the US Anechiarico and Jacobs (1996) pointed out how the new layers of supervision put in place after the latest corruption scandal were preventing effective government in New York. Scholars in post-communist Eastern Europe have found externally-sponsored anti-corruption campaigns encouraging a populist style of politics that undermined the legitimacy of newly established democracies (Krastev 2004, Kotkin and Sajo 2002, Tisne and Smilov 2004). Bryane Michael has assessed anti-corruption campaigns in Africa, finding a standard model that paid little attention to variable local conditions (2004). The Clean Up campaign following the 2006 coup in Fiji confirmed my growing uneasiness about anti-corruption campaigning. In December 2006, the Fiji army took control of the country for the third time and launched what its commander, Frank Bainimarama, called a ‘cleanup campaign’. Bainimarama had what we earlier called a gothic, rather than relativist view of corruption. He saw an unfolding catastrophe that only a coup could prevent. The cleanup campaign demonstrates many of the problems we have discussed about defining corruption. It rejected ‘cultural’ excuses for corruption, and championed a more liberal political economy. Its execution demonstrated some of the perils of anti-corruption campaigns. It also put anti-corruption reformers like TI on the spot. Bainimarama’s intervention was a classic example of the argument for dirty hands discussed in Chapter 3: a coup to end the ‘culture of coups’. In short it provides a compelling and timely test, and unfortunate example, of many of the general arguments in this book.

Definitions and Words
The pervasiveness of the definition of corruption ‘use of public office for private gain’ is a tribute to the power of Transparency International, reinforced by the World Bank in defining the terms of debate. Instead we can turn to the Oxford English dictionary for four broader and older meanings for ‘corrupt’:

1 willing to act dishonestly in return for money or personal gain.

2 evil or morally depraved.

3 (of a text or computer data) made unreliable by errors or alterations.

4 (archaic) rotten or putrid.

The first meaning shares with the TI/World Bank definition a concern for private gain but it also introduces a more personal note in its reference to the virtue of honesty. The second meaning is more moralistic: it is not just bad, but evil and depraved. The third meaning is relevant to institutional borrowing and transfer in the region: institutions or processes may have become corrupted through being badly translated, subtly altered, or missing vital parts. It doesn’t have any moral overtones, though by implication it values the pure original (of, say, ‘the Westminster system’) over the impure copies and adaptations that may exist in the region (Larmour 2005). It suggests that the task is to restore reliability by reversing alterations, or going back to the original. The fourth meaning has an edge of disgust (in English). Both third and fourth add the element of time: through repeated copying, or biological processes, what once was fresh or clean has become corrupt. Neither the disgust, nor the sense of decline may translate well into other languages.
The new international interest in corruption links it to ‘governance’, a vague but sonorous word, influentially adopted by the World Bank as a coded reference to ‘politics’. The Bank’s charter prevented it commenting on the domestic politics of its members so it talked about ‘governance’ instead. In the Pacific its use is somewhat one-sided. Donors use it to talk to and about island countries. Recipients are more reluctant. Its sudden pervasiveness has generated suspicious discussion within the region of what it ‘really means’ and various donors have adopted definitions that suit their own purposes and previous commitments. The World Bank, for example, sees its ‘governance work’ as continuous with its long-standing interests in liberalisation and public sector reform. AusAID has tried to distinguish ‘political governance’ from ‘economic governance’, missing the brutal simplicity of earlier international definitions which simply saw ‘governance’ as the political conditions for private sector development.

When the word ‘good’ is added to ‘governance’ it echoes an earlier phrase, the slogan of the progressive municipal reform movement in the USA, which aimed to separate ‘politics’ from ‘administration’ to achieve ‘good government’. The populist politician Huey Long famously warned “One of these days the people of Louisiana are going to get good government - and they aren't going to like it.” Good government was also a phrase in British theory about colonial rule, while ‘peace, order and good government’ are a common purpose of constitutions.

Two other words are also related. The word ‘state’ is favoured by bilateral donors. Their officials work within ‘states’ and so are predisposed to promote this form of organisation. Talk about the state and governance is institutionalized in research programmes like my colleagues’ State Society and Governance in Melanesia project at the Australian National University, and the ‘fragile states’ unit in AusAID. The word ‘culture’, which we will look at in Chapter 7, tends to
be used by Pacific Islanders themselves, referring to something that – like ‘Kastom’ in Vanuatu or ‘fa’a Samoa’ – exists out there in the real world. By contrast the words ‘state’ and ‘governance’ tend to be more used by outsiders, referring to something that is absent or deficient, as in ‘stateless societies’ or ‘weak states’. So ‘culture’ is seen as something solid and present, and ‘the state’ as something insubstantial and absent. The words circulate between insiders and outsiders and between academics and officials, and sometimes get confused. Some anthropologists seem to have become uneasy about using the word ‘culture’ and are interested in the local manifestations of ‘the state’. Donors promoting ‘good governance’ will quickly aver to the importance of ‘culture’ and recognise its relevance to their day-to-day work in the region. The word ‘governance’ gets used to include society and culture, in contrast to ‘the state’.

We could of course brush this fuzziness aside, and define these terms for the purposes of this book (and hope to carry readers along). Yet part of the point of the book is that there are multiple interpretations, and hence misunderstandings about corruption. Ambiguity is the object of our concern, not an obstacle.

**Structure of this book**

Some corruption takes place in the open, and some in secret. People are sometimes uncomfortable talking about it. The media, by contrast, sometimes seems to talk about nothing else. We noticed that there has been an explosion of talk about corruption in international agencies that were silent about it until the 1990s. The following chapter looks at this pattern of talk and silence. Chapter 3
considers what they are talking (or silent) about: what counts as corruption, in the social sciences, law and public opinion in the region. The diagnoses made by different disciplines or professions and the practical cures they recommend are the subject of Chapter 4. The silences may be one reason why corruption is so hard to eliminate.

Aid donors, government ministers, coup leaders and NGO activists tend to get impatient with definitions and deconstruction. They want to know how much there is and what they should do about it. Chapter 5 looks critically at recent efforts to gauge how much corruption there is in the region, through surveys and counting cases.

The National Integrity Systems studies suggest there are several different types of corruption. For example the timber industry has been a persistent source of corruption in PNG and Solomon Islands. Smaller countries in Polynesia have few natural resources to exploit, and corruption has taken place in the sale of tokens of sovereignty, such as passports or work permits. It’s hard to tell how much there is, but we can look comparatively at the incidence of different types. So Chapter 6 looks at what the NIS studies can tell us about types of corruption across the region.

How, then, do we explain the patterns we have identified? Chapters 7 and 8 turn to big, loose and familiar ideas in the social sciences: culture and politics. Chapter 7 looks at what different ideas about culture might tell us about corruption. Ideas about culture are often deployed to resist external pressure. ‘Culture’ is highly valued, much talked about and displayed in the Pacific. Tuvalu’s constitution, for example requires that ‘life and laws’ should be based on ‘acceptance of Tuvaluan values and culture, and respect for them’. This provision is not empty rhetoric: has been
invoked by the established church to prevent the ‘unsettling’ introduction of new ‘sects’ (Taafaki 2004: 6). Yet TI’s influential Source book of ideas about dealing with corruption calls culture a ‘myth’ (TI 2000). The chapter argues that some kind of cultural analysis – concerned with meanings, values, representations and the word itself – is inescapable.

For some people, including coup leaders, all politics is corrupt. It is hard to think about corruption without thinking about its opposite – the good system of government that has been corrupted. The ‘nation state’ is the favoured candidate, but other models of good governance – by chiefs or kastom - still circulate in the region. Chapter 8 will look at corruption in relationship to theories about politics, the state, democracy and nationalism. The chapter argues that in some ways politics is intrinsically corrupt, but there are also dangers in ‘anti-politics’.

These two chapters do not exhaust the possibilities. I don’t say much about the psychology of corruption, or the criminology, or the theology. A long running theme in the study of corruption in China, for example, has been the question of individuals versus systems (Alatas 1968). A Christian – like the majority of the people in the region – would explain corruption in terms of sin (Schenone and Gregg 2003). There has also been a new writing about the economics of corruption, which I deal with at several points: in discussion of indicators; in the discussion of liberal theories of the role of state and society; and in the political economy of slush funds and forestry.

Corruption is an old and persistent problem of government. In almost any system – chiefly, colonial or democratic – ordinary people complain, or grumble, or keep silent about leaders
breaking the rules and serving themselves. Many people are interested in corruption because they want to do something about it. Klitgaard’s pioneering book Controlling Corruption (1988) showed that it was possible to control corruption, and provided case studies of managers who had reduced corruption in their agencies (at least for a time). Transparency international who invented the CPI, and NIS studies that form the basis of this book are activists. The aid donors and international financial institutions also want something to be done about corruption in countries they deal with. So do many Pacific Islanders. So do many Pacific Island politicians, though people may doubt their commitment. For them in particular, Chapter 9 draws some conclusions about relativism, evaluation and interpretation.

Chapter 2

Talk and silence about corruption

Corrupt payments of money, offers of jobs and contracts are often invisible, and their meaning is shaped by the language people use to describe them to each other, and to report them to others. In Solomon Islands, for example, perceptions of corruption at the time of the NIS survey were based
on ‘off-the-record word of informed insiders, snippets of official documentation, and the
occasional intimation or allegation in the media by rival politicians or community leaders’
(Roughan 2004: 9). The obligations one participant in a corrupt exchange lays on another are
often unsaid: ‘do I have to spell it out’? People rehearse their justifications to themselves. They
may be ashamed or embarrassed about it, and often offer self-justifying normalizations and
excuses: I did it for my family; I did not realize it was wrong; I am not being paid enough; I was
going to pay it back; and so on.

If there is more talk about corruption in the Pacific Islands, it is hard to tell if that is because there
is more corruption, or people are just more aware of it, or they are less reluctant to speak about it.
Then there are problems of translation. Many of the NIS reports found no local word, or
difficulties in translation. In Tongan the nearest word seemed to be angakovi (of bad character,
badly behaved, unkind) (James and Tufui 2004: 10). The Cook Islands report refers to the word
keikeia (thief) noting that the difference between sharing resources and thievery is sometimes
blurred (Ingram 2004: 11). In Kiribati there was ‘no specific translation’ for the term corruption,
but the words babakanikawai, kamangao or aonikai indicated ‘deviant and dishonest behaviour’.
In Marshall Islands the opposite was kien jimwe inmoi which translated as uprightness. With no
word for it, it’s hard to talk about. There may not be a local word, but the pijin term korapt is
used in Solomon Islands and in Kiribati people also use te corruption.

Layers of Talk (and silence) about Corruption
In this chapter I try to map the pattern of talk (or discourse) on corruption. Subsequent chapters distinguish between countries. Here we distinguish several loosely distinguished layers of talk, and silence, in different institutional settings. In some the talk is incidental. Others, like Ombudsman or the tabloid press, are more devoted to producing and disseminating talk about corruption. All of this talk (and silence) takes place in settings that encourage or discourage it, and give it shape. The settings are social and – in matters of conscience – psychological. The silence allows corrupt acts to go undetected and unpunished.

Table 2.1 distinguishes between these layers – from more internal and personal to more external and social scientific – and the settings in which it takes place. The number and order of these types is somewhat arbitrary, but they seemed to me distinct both in terms of literary style or genre (the second column), and social or institutional setting (the third). The style becomes more impersonal as one goes down the list. There may be differences between groups of people in how – and how much – they talk about corruption. The NIS reports invite us to compare the talk in different places – Fiji, say, as opposed to Palau. But there may be differences between elites and ordinary people, and between men and women, in how they talk, or don’t talk, about corruption. There is a special type of humorous and satirical talk about corruption. Then there are more organizational types of literary, legal and religious talk. The media are great engines of talk about corruption. Another layer is the policy-oriented discourse of the aid donors and development banks (Apthorpe 1997). The last layer – in which this book mostly finds itself – is the academic discourse, in which ideas about corruption differ between disciplines, wax and wane, and are deployed by different writers in different ways.
Table 1
Types of Talk about Corruption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Talk</th>
<th>Style of talk</th>
<th>Settings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>‘To oneself’, permitting, inhibiting, calculating</td>
<td>Anticipated and internalised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular</td>
<td>Gossip, information, practical advice, warnings</td>
<td>Family, friends, workplace, letters to the editor, blogs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humorous</td>
<td>Joking, satirizing, critical</td>
<td>Parties, shows, carnivals, newspaper cartoons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literary</td>
<td>Internal, emotional, reflective</td>
<td>Publication and performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>Prohibitions, definitions, interpretations, appeals</td>
<td>Legislation, cases, legal judgements, codes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>Inspiring, consoling, guiding, condemning</td>
<td>Churches, mosques, committees Social movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>Sensational, investigative, informative, crusading, scandalous</td>
<td>Newspaper editorials, TV and radio news</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Assessment, solutions, evaluations, options, recommendations</td>
<td>Plans, reports, statements, audits, contracts, consultancies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>Theory, analysis, explanation</td>
<td>Academic disciplines, research projects, theses, think tanks, autonomous universities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We could start with internal dialogues, in which people wrestle with their consciences, or imagine what others would say. The NIS reports don’t give us much access to these private reflections, though they may be important in individuals’ decision about how to behave. The Palau report suggests that President Lazarus Salii’s suicide in 1988 may have been the result of a ‘heavy conscience burden’, though not necessarily about corruption (Schuster 2004: 7). They may emerge when people try to explain themselves to friends, counsellors, journalists or police interrogators: ‘tell us why you did it’. The novels and poetry characterized as ‘literary talk’, which claim access to what their characters are thinking, do however give us an insight into private states of mind.

Popular talk and silence.

The RAMSI survey noted that ‘The focus groups concerning corruption generated much discussion, with both men and women having plenty to say’ (RAMSI 2006 Part 3). But the NISPAC studies found much variation: in some places silence, in others talk about little else. In Nauru corruption issues are ‘widely gossiped about’ and the cause of ‘heated debates in parliament’ (Kun at al 2004: 5). Yet ‘large public outcries’ are quite rare (Kun et al 2004: 9). Corruption talk in more traditionally hierarchical societies, like those in Polynesia, tends to be sotto voce grumbling, ‘like water under cliffs’ (Sahlins quoted in White and Lindstrom 1997)

Transparency International’s PNG ‘chapter’ set out to elicit popular talk about corruption in a series of eighty focus groups discussions in four rural provinces (Walton 2009). They wanted to
understand local perceptions of corruption, and invited the focus groups to consider four scenarios which

A teacher takes pads and pencils from school to give to a local community center

A political candidate offers a voter K50 to vote for him

A logging company provides free travel and accommodation to two local landowners

A group of businessmen persuade the government to, legally, reduce the tax their business pays.

A public servant employs her relative as a driver. The relative is well qualified but the appointment was made without following proper procedures.

Each scenario generated wide ranging discussion about the role of the protagonists, why the behaviour occurred in PNG, and the consequences (the method is adapted from one used by NSW ICAC). In the first case, most believed the teacher was wrong for breaking school regulations, and setting a bad example. They worried that she might be using the gifts to establish a relationship with community center workers (which might be useful in a future political career). Some felt such things happened because of inadequate funding to the community center, or
inadequate control of the school inventory. Consequences might include poorer school facilities, or higher school fees.

In the second case, people tended to blame the candidate more than the voter who accepted the money. It might have been better if he had paid the whole community, rather than an individual. The voter was wrong to take the money but many people saw extenuating circumstances in the voter’s poverty, relative powerlessness, or because any promises the candidate made would be forgotten. Many of the discussants admitted to taking money themselves. These things happened in PNG because the prizes of political victory were so large, and the government was unable to enforce laws against bribery. The consequences included poor services to villages.

In the third case, the discussants saw a timber company’s effort to divide and rule landowning groups. The drive for profit meant that companies failed to consult groups properly, and the consequences were social conflict and environmental damage.

In the fourth case, people were skeptical of government motives: who had been bribed? Business was seen as having too much influence on government, and the consequences included poorer services and higher prices.

In the fifth case, the public servant was criticized for failing to follow the rules, but there was sympathy for the support she was providing to a relative. These things happened because jobs were scarce, but the results of favoritism included the jealousy of those excluded. The researchers
also asked what the respondents understood by the word ‘corruption’, what excuses it, and what causes it. We will look at these meanings more in the next chapter.

A special kind of talk from below is by the whistleblower, who ‘speaks out’ when she feels nothing is being done to redress complaints, and so goes outside to the media, or other authorities. Whistleblowers are often lonely figures, subject to intense peer pressure, and stigmatized by those they criticize. For example Kiribati’s ‘small and egalitarian nature’ meant it was difficult for people to act as whistleblowers (Mackenzie 2004: 4). Winston Epeli, the Manager of Administrative Services in the National Bank of Fiji in the early 1990s found himself being demoted and transferred by the Bank’s new, go-getting managers. He wrote to the head of government in September 1992, detailing

... kickbacks, the giving of interest free loans to friends of executive committee members although branch managers had initially declined these loans, acceptance of non-competitive tenders for goods and services, and the approval of loans without adequate security (Grynberg, Munro and White 2002: 10-11)

He also accused senior managers of incompetence and, when he failed to apologise, was dismissed. The subsequent collapse of the bank showed his concerns had been prescient and accurate, but nothing was done about them.

International surveys, like those discussed in Chapter 5, and the focus groups convened by TI (PNG) invite people to talk about corruption. When published their reports become an occasion for another, more informed, round of talk, in a positive spiral.
University of the South Pacific political sociologist Steven Ratuva analysed the low-level rumour-mongering that ran in parallel with the high-level legal and constitutional arguments around the 2006 coup in Fiji. Rumours about the misbehaviour of leaders and their relatives, he wrote, were easy to start but almost impossible to stop. Some were based on real situations, some distorted, and some pure fantasies – but it was hard to tell which was which. Ratuva found the rumour mongering had been worse in the 2000 coup, but the availability of email had provided new opportunities for those for and against the 2006 coup. The middle class intelligentsia were the worst offenders. (Ratuva in Fiji Times 15 January 07, see also Singh in Fiji Times 2 February 07). A new form of popular talk – blogs – emerged after coup, and the regime found them difficult to counter or repress.

After the 2006 coup, the Fiji army tried to elicit complaints about corruption, and found itself almost overwhelmed. An army team opened an office in the government buildings in Suva, where people began to queue up with complaints (Fiji Times 3 February 07). Complaints provide an anti-corruption campaign with an agenda, and are obviously clues to something wrong. For example, a group of landowners, who had set up a roadblock to protest against the way the Fiji Hardwoods Corporation was preventing them selling mahogany directly said they had been assured by the army that they would look in to their grievances (Fiji Times 12 January 06). But complaints may also be vexatious, trivial, out of date and have little to do with corruption, however it is defined. The new CEO in the PM’s office described the mixture of allegations and complaints received by the unit:

They range from various issues like the provision of public services. Some people have been complaining that they had to pay a certain sum of money for certain services and
that someone has been deprived the first opportunity because they were not in the good books of some person. (Fiji Times 2 February 07)

There were complaints about individuals and about organizations, relating to management and boards. Hence, he said, they would need to be prioritised so that ‘those that can be dealt with procedurally can be sorted out straight away’ (Fiji Times 2 February 07). According to Major Leweni most were ‘old cases that have been pending for years’ (Fiji Times 13 February 07).

By the end of March the unit had received 400 complaints since it was established (Fiji Times 27 March 07). The Fiji Times noted wryly it had been a ‘spectacular success – at receiving complaints’. The editorial argued that the unit needed to set priorities and work within rules to ensure accusations held up in court. It also questioned whether it should be straying into the private sector (29 March 07). In March the Native Land Trust Board (NLTB) reported that the Military Complaints Centre had received ‘about 1300 land related complaints from members of the public against the NLTB’ (6 March 07). The acting general manager of the NLTB was reported to be waiting to hear from the Acting Military Commander Esala Teleni as to how they should tackle these complaints.

The link between complaints and investigations is tricky. Selecting what to investigate and what to drop is a highly sensitive issue for the reputation and survival of an anti corruption agency or campaign. If it is not responsive to popular concerns it loses legitimacy. It must also take on the big fish (who can afford fancy lawyers). Its resources are inevitably limited. Anti corruption agencies also need to set a test of seriousness and practicability in deciding which complaints to investigate.

*Humorous Talk and Silence*
The international talk about corruption tends to be deadly earnest, but there are long traditions, in
the Pacific as elsewhere, of joking, euphemism, irony and satire about corruption, and other
foibles and failings of the powerful. It can be vocal, or silently expressed in gestures and dance.
It can be informal as well as highly institutionalised. Writer and academic Vilisoni Hereniko
(1994) begins his comparative account of clowning (‘public behavior that causes overt signs of
mirth or laughter’) with the crisp sentence: ‘every chief needs a clown’. He cites historical
accounts of ‘court buffoons’ in Samoa, and ‘jesters’ in Tonga. In Tahiti groups of young
comedians (*arioi*) travelled from island to island, putting on shows that ‘fearlessly ridiculed’ the
powerful:

> Amusements of the *arioi* were generally held at night, with fires and candlenut tapers
providing illumination. Sometimes performances were held in the open air or on canoes as
they approached the shore, but more frequently they occurred under the cover of houses
erected for public entertainment. High stools and seats for the chief *arioi* of both sexes
were positioned on a high platform erected at one end while the comedians performed at
the center of the building, presided over by the *arioi-hi’o-niao* ‘master of ceremonies’ (1994:
7).

Hereniko’s own research focused on the female clowns who traditionally officiated in wedding
ceremonies in his own island, Rotuma. The targets of the joking were chiefs, men, foreigners (and
foreign ways).

> She prances around wielding a stick and orders people, particularly the chiefs and the men,
to do her bidding: she forces them to dance in the sun, kneel on the ground, sit down, stand
up, or do whatever she fancies. Having temporarily relinquished his powers to the ritual clown, the district chief, whom the clown would normally obey, becomes a target for the clown's antisocial behavior. Through ridicule and parody, the district chief and other dignitaries experience being "common" and being ordered around (ibid: 6).

Clowning is a form of ‘symbolic inversion’ and ‘licensed disrespect’, but these days Hereniko finds ritual clowns ‘tend to be fearful of the chiefs and reluctant to play their role to the hilt’. Some are finding new sponsors in the international donor community. The *Wan Smolbag* theatre group, based in Vanuatu since 1989, has been organizing public performances, school visits and the production of CDs and DVDs on development issues, including ‘governance’ ([www.Wansmolbag.org](http://www.Wansmolbag.org)). They have been funded AusAID and NZ Aid, among others. The cast of characters in their DVD *Vot Long Pati Ia* (Your vote Our party) includes womanising Cabinet minister and his shady white adviser who has a ‘a scheme to double the country’s money in a year if it is given to him for investment’ (Goldsmith and Barber 2001: 308).

Of course, as Hereinko points out, humour is not only or always subversive. It can be turned against the critics of the powerful, putting them in their place (the scourge of corruption for example, is typically found to be corrupt himself). And after the carnival is over, the old hierarchies are restored. Hereniko expands his conception of ‘chiefs’ to include the educated elite whose literary productions are described in the next section. He quotes the Samoan novelist Albert Wendt:

I have watched the euphoria of independence throughout the Pacific degenerate after ten years into political corruption, and how our people become involved in that. Our new
leadership, our new elite—of which I am a member, I am sorry to say—is carrying out a form of colonialism which may even be worse than what we got rid of (Wendt 1993 59, cited in Hereniko 1994: 3).

**Literary Talk and Silence**

Poems novels and political autobiographies provide access to inner worlds of people weighing up ethical dilemmas. The classic statement of the dilemmas facing officials in developing countries is Chinua Achebe’s *No Longer at Ease* (1960). The protagonist, Obi Okonkwo, is educated in England at his Nigerian tribe’s expense. He returns to a junior job in the colonial administration, but finds himself torn between the expectations of his kinsmen, and those of his new colleagues. He ends up guiltily accepting a bribe in order to pay for his new urban lifestyle.

In *Pouliuli* Albert Wendt describes a sleazy national politician brought down by family politics, deception and manoeuvre in the village *fono* (in the period when only *matai*—chiefly heads of families—had the right to vote). In his terse poem ‘Hungry Dog’ Makiuti Tongia (1977) walks through a ‘rich suburb/ full of white and black chiefs’. Dogs bark at him, and pick through overflowing rubbish tins. He warns the chiefs to

…..bury the scraps you can’t eat

So no hungry dog will come to eat at your locked gate

Chiefs beware of hungry dogs!
In ‘Greased Dinner’ Jully Sipolo (Jules Makini) describes the wining and dining of landowners in the western province of Solomon Islands. The poem (1991, in Bennett 2000: 296) ends:

I heard ‘royalty’… ‘timber rights’…
‘roads, ….clinics….schools..’

but through stuffy ears and bleary eyes.

Anyway we’d already talked it over in the village

Our politician and lawyer were present

So I didn’t have to read the ‘small print

I signed

Jully Sipolo’s poem points to inner mental states, moral ambiguity, and muffled or displaced responsibility. There is a hint of literary ‘gothic’ in both poems – locked gates, barking dogs, strong feelings and drugged states. Epeli Hauofa’s account of the corruption of aid in Tonga is less moralistic. In one of his *Tales of the Tikongs* the Fisheries Grassroots Development Adviser, an Australian, persuades innocent fisherman to sign up for Development Bank loans to buy outboard motors, boats and fishing gear from companies he represents (1984: 23). But other Tikongs know how to play the aid game to their own advantage.

Media Talk and Silence
Talk about corruption is shaped, framed and driven by the media who are also the self appointed heroes and champions of anti corruption. They trade on our interest in scandal, and our suspicions of hypocrisy. The media have a symbiotic relationship with corruption. There is a heroic tradition of investigative reporting, but media more routinely depend on official reporting and judicious leaks. When journalists take bribes, or editors shape copy to favour powerful interests, or their advertisers, the media may become corrupt themselves.

In modern newspapers, satirical cartoons are often printed on the same page as pompous editorials, nicely expressing the tension between radicalism and reaction in joking, described above. There is not yet much of a tradition of political cartooning in the Pacific, with the notable exception of Bob Browne’s work since the 1970s in PNG. His chubby politicians, blithely doing deals with shady expatriates, are contrasted with the lean and knowing figure of (Grass) ‘Roots’ (Browne 2006). They even ended up illustrating the Leadership Manual that PNG’s Ombudsman Commission designed to brief newly elected MPs on their obligations (Ombudsman Commission of PNG 1980).

In some countries, like PNG ‘the media are ‘very vocal against corruption’ (Mellam and Aloi 2003: 34). The media are unregulated, though government has twice tried to introduce regulations twice (a Censorship Board only deals with pornography and the government has not yet tried to use it more widely). There is a government owned National Broadcasting Commission, but the Word publishing company is owned by the churches. Foreign owners of the press include Rupert Murdoch, who owns the Post Courier, and Rumbunan Hijau, the Malaysian timber company which owns The National (which may explain why The National has campaigned against tighter controls on the timber industry, Robie 1995). TI is linked to the
Media Council (in the person of Peter Aitsi) and to an aid funded media campaign in favour of legislation to create stronger political parties. News editors once formed a Task Force on Anti-corruption.

In Palau talkback radio personality Alphonso Diaz acts as a watchdog, ‘sometimes too blunt in a society that values indirectness’. He has had three cars firebombed, but in each case a wealthy individual has come forward to replace it as ‘public validation of his efforts to raise public awareness’ over, for example, the battle between the Special Prosecutor and the Congress. (Schuster 2004: 17). The President has also contributed to public debate on talks on the government’s FM station, while TV broadcasts of Congress have led many people to conclude that Congressmen ‘sometimes talk about trivial matters’ (Schuster 2004: 18). The Cook Islands report commends the Cook Islands News for ‘raising questions about conflicts of interest of public servants and double dipping by politicians’. Its ‘level of investigative journalism’ has increased (Ingram 2004: 22).

In other countries, governments have tried to control the media. The publisher of the privately owned Vanuatu Daily Post (previously the Trading Post) was deported in 2001 after publishing ‘negative and baseless stories’ about the relationship between businessman Amarendra Nand Ghosh and the government. The publisher was allowed to return and his dispute with the government resolved by a ‘customary reconciliation ceremony’ (Jowitt 2002). In 2003 the publisher was assaulted and hospitalized over stories run about corruption in the Vanuatu Maritime Authority (Newton Cain and Jowitt 2004: 24). In Nauru all the media are owned and controlled by the government and ‘no stories on issues to do with corruption are routinely covered’ (Kun at al: 19). In Tuvalu the government Media Corporation is formally independent
but in practice ‘the government ruthlessly censors the news’ (Taafaki 2004: 22). In Kiribati political leaders have treated the Broadcasting and Publications Authority, which operates Radio Kiribati and a weekly newspaper, as ‘their own personal property’ (Korauba 2007: 31). Korauba was a BPA journalist and had run-in with the government over questions he raised about the airworthiness of a newly acquired airliner. He was sacked after broadcasting stories about the financial and sexual irregularities of politicians.

The media in Tonga were ‘muzzled, either by government interference or self censorship’. The government has tried to ban Taimi ‘o Tonga, which is produced overseas in Auckland, which was critical of the government, and Ko e Kela ‘a, produced by the pro-Democracy movement, which has criticized irregularities in public expenditure. The government’s attempt to ban Taimi was overturned by the Chief Justice on due process grounds. So it successfully proposed an amendment to section 7 of the constitution (which provided for ‘freedom of speech and the press forever’), to extend the grounds on which this freedom could be restricted. Then it passed two laws giving the minister new powers to licence, and revoke licences to operate media companies or publish newspapers (and to ban dealings with or subscriptions to foreign papers that did not meet the government’s standards) (James and Tufui 2004: 21).

In Samoa there is self-censorship. ‘Employees in government media organizations are constantly reminded to be sensitive to cultural standards’ (So’o et al 2004: 23), including the assumption that one should not criticize one’s matai. This deference is reinforced by a Christian belief that all authority derives from god (So’o et al 2004: 23). Private ownership seems to be no guarantee of a critical approach to government. The Cook Islands report criticizes the private Elijah Communications company (which owns two papers and the tv station) for its closeness to the PM and his advisers (Ingram 2004: 22). In Niue a weekly newspaper is owned by a politician who supports the government. (Talagi 2004: 6). In Solomon Islands, in spite of popular interest in
stories about corruption, and journalistic capacity, the media has been ‘highly docile in its
coverage’. The report attributes this to ‘the narrow ownership base of the media and its close
relations with the establishment’. Armed intimidation ‘somewhat justified this reticence but even
media insiders admit that self-censorship is a major problem’ (Roughan 2004: 11).

In Fiji, the 2006 coup in Fiji put relationships between government and the media under stress.
There were attempts by the army track down writers of letters to the editor (Fiji Times 25 March
07) and – later – bloggers. The Fiji Times reported how ‘a few journalists had been taken in by
the military on different occasions to be questioned’ (Fiji Times 13 March 07). The total number
of journalists questioned, or the number of occasions of questioning have not, as far as I know,
been collected. The Fiji Times was only closed down for a day or so, but both Fiji Times and
Daily Post publishers were eventually deported. The clean up campaign in Fiji showed how the
media are not simply a spectator but an active player in their reporting of corruption allegations.
Editors and journalists are trained to be suspicious of government power, and we are all avid
readers of reports of corruption. So on this issue the interests of the coup leaders, journalists and
readers ran together, most breathlessly in reports of the activities of the government’s new anti-
corruption unit. The downside is ‘trial by media’, where newspapers gleefully report allegations
and investigations into enemies of the coup, and reinforce the perceptions of corruption that
rganizati the military takeover. However in two cases the Fiji Times printed advertisements in
which accused officials rebutted military claims against them. In another the Chief Executive
Officer (CEO) of the Sugar Cane Growers Council told a reporter his side of the story.
Newspaper editorials also repeatedly called for the army to produce evidence for its allegations.
Legal Talk and Silence

All of the 14 countries surveyed are so-called common law jurisdictions. They adopted English case law at independence (the three formerly US territories adopting it via the US). Some also provided that their courts make take customary law into account, in varying degrees (Powles 1988). There is a common law offence of bribery, defined in a 1914 UK case ‘when a bribe is given or offered to induce a public official to fail to act in accordance with his duty’ (Crown Prosecution Service cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/bribery and_corruption, accessed 28 May 2009).

‘Public official’ is defined broadly to include someone carrying out a public duty like a coroner or member of the armed forces (ibid). Bribing electors is also a common law offence. Most of the countries surveyed also deal with bribery in their criminal codes. Fiji’s lists offences such as ‘abuse of office’ under the heading ‘official corruption’. Tonga’s Criminal Offices Act deals with bribery of government servants, and extortion fraudulent conversion and false receipts by officials (using the adverb ‘corruptly’ to describe the acceptance of them by judges, politicians or officials Ingram 2004: 11). Tuvalu and Niue’s legislation also uses corruptly as an adverb (Talagi 2004: 7). Solomon Islands penal code refers to ‘official corruption’ and also uses the word as an adverb, as in ‘corruptly gives, confers, or procures or promises’ (Section 91). However in English law it has not been very clear what the word ‘corruptly’ means, or what it adds to the description of acceptance of a payment. So a new definition of corruption was proposed in the British parliament in 2003, but the Bill was not passed (legal practioner.com/regulation accessed 28 May 2009).

Samoa’s Secret Commissions Act 1975 talks in terms of principals and agents, rather like the 2003 UK Bill would have done. It makes it an offence for an agent to receive a gift or inducement
to act, or show favour or disfavour, in relation to the principal’s business or affairs ‘without the consent of the principal’ (section 5(1)) (So’o et al 2004: 9). The Public Service Act makes it an offence for an official to ‘accept any money fee or gratuity or reward for any kind of service provided’ without the express permission of the Public Service Commission (So’o et al 2004: 9).

This principal-agent framework, also adopted by Robert Klitgaard’s influential book Controlling Corruption, by the Hong legislation that its ICAC operates under, is adaptable to both public and private sectors. In the public sector the principal is the public service commissioner, or departmental head, whereas in the private sector it might be the CEO. In both cases the offence lies in receiving benefits without their permission.

Leadership Codes are varieties of legal talk. Offences tend to be less strongly sanctioned (for example by dismissal) and more easily prosecuted (in tribunals rather than courts). In some ways they are like professional codes of practice, supposed to be enforced by example and peer pressure as well as the threat of expulsion. The idea of a Leadership Code for senior officials and politicians was introduced at independence in PNG in 1975 (from Africa), and then copied by Solomon Islands and Vanuatu (Larmour 2005b: 104-105). These leadership codes are administered by the Ombudsmen in PNG and Vanuatu and by a distinct office in Solomon Islands. The number of cases they have dealt with is discussed in Chapter 5. Amendments to Solomon Islands’ Leadership Code legislation passed in 1999 detail examples of ‘official misconduct’, including ‘the use of office for personal benefit; neglect of official business; bribery; the acceptance of loans; the non-reporting of business interests; and ownership of property which could not be expected to be attainable through known income or receipts’ (Roughan 2004: 10)
Vanuatu’s leadership code commission was set up with technical assistance from PNG, and its feisty foreign-born female commissioner produced a stream of scathing reports on the corruption and incompetence of ministers and officials. She was vilified as an outsider and a woman. Parliament, stung, repealed the legislation establishing her office in 1998. A new parliament passed new legislation limiting its powers in some ways, but expanding its responsibilities in others (Newton Cain and Jowitt 2004: 23). Marie-Noelle Ferriuex Patterson was eventually replaced with a quieter figure, who had a misappropriation charge hanging over his head (the charge was later dismissed on technical grounds, and a retrial ordered but never happened). She campaigned on in the local branch of TI. Meanwhile little action has followed her reports.

Compared to other kinds of talk – academic or religious – legal definitions are, in principle, enforceable, and courts or leadership tribunals play an authoritative role in interpreting them. Courts have been particularly important in efforts to introduce or balance traditional or customary expectations with the law. Yet the law may also be a silencer of talk about corruption. Defamation laws can silence critics of corruption in government, and have been used again and again against Akilisi Pohiva the Pro-democracy campaigner and commoner MP in Tonga. However he has won cases as well as lost them (James and Tufui 2004: 20). Pohiva also successfully sued the government for unfair dismissal over the radical content of a radio programme he broadcast (James and Tufui 2004: 20). Ten years later he and the editor and deputy editor of Taimi o Tonga were arrested over a leak of information about senior officials abusing overtime payments, and other offences but were released by the Chief Justice.

Religious talk and Silence
Most Pacific Islanders are Christians. In Solomon Islands, for example, ‘churches enjoy a steady engagement with their members, engendering a sense of ownership and involvement markedly devoid from people’s interactions with the state’ (Roughan 2004: 27). Rather surprisingly ‘corruption is one sin to which few Christian scholars or leaders have given specific and systematic theological attention’ (Shenone and Gregg 2003: 5), and the record of Christian churches in the region, in speaking up against, or silence about corruption is mixed.

In PNG, mainstream and evangelical churches have been persistently critical of corruption in government (Gibbs 2005). Talk about corruption may fit easily with apocalypticism (Douglas 2001: 627), and the ‘gothic’ view of corruption we identified in Chapter 1, though the end of the world may be a promise as much as a threat. Elsewhere, churches have been quieter. The Cook Islands report found ‘until recently the churches have been silent on corruption issues, as most of them rely on the government for significant funding’ (Ingram 2004: 23). Churches in FSM focus on biblical times do not address issues like transparency and corruption (Hill 2004: 25). In Samoa ‘the church establishment supports the government of the day’. The reason is biblical, seeing ‘earthly authority originating from Jehova the Almighty and God of the Christian faith’. However they have occasionally taken a stand against the government. Some church leaders participated in the 1998 public protest march against the introduction of the VAT and parliaments move to restrain the auditor, by reducing his term of office to three years. Some pastors have also used broadcast church services to comment or criticize government (So’o et al 2004: 7-8)

Churches in Marshall Islands were playing a more active pastoral role, and are drawn into issues (like gambling) where they have views. In Tonga the Wesleyan church has a Taulama committee
(translated as ‘to keep a lookout for’). Akilisi Pohiva is a member and, for example, the committee wrote complaining about the media legislation proposed in 2003. However the report on Tonga concludes that ‘the impact of church approval has had little effect on government decisions’ (James and Tufui 2004: 20).

**Policy Talk and Silence**

There is a large ‘grey’ literature of audit reports and commissions of enquiry dealing with corruption. Sua Rimoni’s reports on Samoa in the 1980s – initially rejected by politicians – and the assassination of a Minister named in them seem to have contributed to a shift to thinking against corruption in that country (So’o et al). The US General Accounting Office reports on the compact states (Marshall Islands, FSM and Palau). A special audit report uncovered details of a massive ‘Agriculture Scam’ in Fiji. Audit reports and Public Accounts Committee reports have started flowing again in Solomon Islands since RAMSI.

Since the 1990s there has been a new international attention to the problem of corruption. It has come on to the agenda of intergovernmental organizations like the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the OECD. The EU demands anti-corruption reforms of countries seeking to join it. There is a UN convention against corruption. Western aid donors weave anti-corruption policies into their aid programs. Twelve of the NIS studies were funded as part of this international activity (by a grant from AusAID to TI (Australia). The new international activity is exhaustively if blandly documented on the websites of these international organizations. The intergovernmental activity is closely related to the activities of Transparency International which,
as we saw, was created by Peter Eigen, a former World Bank staffer, and its first general manager was Jeremy Pope who had previously worked for the Commonwealth Secretariat. It has since franchised national chapters but its head office is still partly funded by aid donors, and has the operational style of an international organization (de Sousa et al 2009). TI makes a special claim to have brought corruption out into the open, as a suitable topic for discussion in the meetings of international organizations, and reports of consultants. Corruption was what Eve Sedgwick (1990) calls an ‘Open Secret’ in institutions like the World Bank. People might mutter about it in the corridors, but not in public plenary sessions, minutes of meetings, reports and declarations.

These aid and development organizations have generally shied away from campaigns against particular corrupt individuals. They are not Interpol, assisting police activity across national boundaries against particular villains. Nor do they want to act like an international court of appeal against local acts of corruption. TI decided to avoid pursuing individuals out of prudence and strategy. Its local members might be subject to litigation or violent retaliation. Its strategy of coalition building, and engagement with government and business might be undermined if it was to criticise current individual leaders. Intergovernmental organizations prefer prevention to investigation, and approach the harsh word ‘corruption’ diplomatically, through the softer language of ‘transparency’, ‘governance’ and ‘accountability’.

Policy talk is mostly interested in solutions to problems. Its speakers are impatient with academics’ concerns with definitions, and want to read recommendations at the end of the document. Raymond Apthorpe argued that its style is part of the way it aims to attract, please and persuade its reader (1997: 44-46). It appears confident, plain and common sense but it also steps around awkward evidence, and papers over conflicts that took place its drafting. The NIS studies report on what their authors find. But they are also part of the policy game. After all that is why
they were commissioned, to provide ammunition for TI groups to use in lobbying governments and donors.

Policy talk waxes and wanes. ‘Corruption’ may be subject to an ‘issue –attention cycle’ (De Sousa et al 2009). From being ignored and downplayed, it becomes the focus of policy makers’ attention. New initiatives are taken against it, but eventually disappointment and boredom sets in. New issues displace official attention and funding. Corruption reverts to becoming part of the background – a regular feature of life, but not susceptible to ‘policy’. Changes of government help drive the cycle, as new governments seek new issues to differentiate themselves from their predecessors. The Rudd government in Australia, for example, has been cooler towards the international ‘good governance’ agenda of its conservative predecessor, and keen to mend fences with Island governments earlier criticized for corruption. In a global process he called the Copenhagen Consensus economist Bjorn Lomborg called together a group of colleagues to identity and rank the top challenges facing the world, and rank solutions in terms of their cost-effectiveness. ‘Corruption’ made it on to the list of the top ten challenges in 2004 but governance projects failed to make the experts’ grade of cost effectiveness (the top projects were control of HIV/AIDS, providing micro nutrients to children, trade liberalization and control of malaria) (Lomborg 2004). In 2008 it was no longer even listed as a challenge.

Pacific Studies Talk

The late Ron Crocombe – a founder of Pacific Studies - devoted a new chapter in the latest edition of his survey of the region to ‘Corruption’ (Crocombe 2001). He provides a hair-raising
series of examples of abuse of office by senior officials and politicians. He links the rapid growth in corruption to the exploitation of natural resources in the region, aggravated by decay in the institutions, such as audit offices, meant to check official corruption. His latest book on Asian interests in the Pacific Islands (2007) deals with corruption in the context of crime, and trade in sovereignty. With independence and free association, Pacific Islands governments have looked for new political and commercial partners in Asia. Several of these countries have poor reputations for corruption in their business dealings abroad, as we shall see in Chapter 4. The tendency to bribe individuals (illegally) and countries (quite legally, through foreign aid) has been aggravated by competition for diplomatic recognition between China and Taiwan. The Pacific Islands’ reorientation towards Asia has been facilitated by small Chinese and part-Chinese communities long resident in the islands, but increasingly influential in post-colonial democratic politics. The most distinguished member of these has been PNG’s former Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan. He had been an opponent of a tough leadership code at independence, and was later forced to step down at the height of the Sandline crisis, where the army backed popular complaints about corruption. It was no surprise that the riot that followed the election of Snyder Rini in Solomon Islands in 2006 targeted Honiara’s Chinatown. There was widespread popular suspicion that the election had been swayed by bribes paid by Chinese business interests (Moore 2006).

Asafo So’o (1998) one of the authors of the Samoa NIS report, earlier described election campaigns in Samoa, particularly the highly structured and transparent process of gift giving to village leaders. But he carefully avoided being judgmental about ‘corruption’. Scott MacWilliam argues that corruption, particularly in Fiji, is ‘just a synonym for the use of personal contacts and knowledge’ particularly by local entrepreneurs who use it in their commercial struggles with multinational rivals’ (2002: 138). Mark Findlay’s work on law and corruption in the Pacific describes how local leaders distort interpretations of their corrupt activity as appropriate to
traditional leaders, and beyond the reach of law or regulation (1999: 81-93, see also 2003)).

Maxine Pitts (2002) relates crime and corruption in PNG to the capacity of state and civil society. Henry Okole and David Kavanamur (2003) provide a thorough overview of political corruption in PNG, identifying different types and the coping mechanisms PNG has in place. They draw on Ombudsman and Audit reports to provide short case studies of examples of ‘grand’ corruption.

The most well-researched case study is that by Roman Grynberg, Doug Munro and Michael White on the National Bank of Fiji (2002). When new managers took over after the 1987 coup, the Bank rapidly increased its lending to indigenous Fijians, Rotumans, and particular favoured businesses who failed to repay it. The supervisory authorities failed to act, and the government failed to respond to warnings that the bank was heading for insolvency until it was too late. The rescue eventually involved $220 million of government funds. Some of that was raised by selling part of the governments share in Amalgamated Telecoms Holdings Limited to the National Provident Fund. That sale took place at a higher price than private tenders had offered, so some of the costs of the rescue were shifted to members of the fund. The study is based on publicly available documents, including parliamentary debates and leaked audit of the Bank carried out by two senators who also happened to be chartered accountants. But as the authors recognise this sober approach meant

We are unable to link specific loans with corruption, incompetence or disregard for prudent banking practices (Grynberg, Munro and White 2002: xv).
And turning to the failure to act on warnings, the authors say they did not attempt to unravel a linked system of corruption, cronyism, nepotism and abuse of office, where everybody looks the other way (ibid, citing The Enquirer December 1995).

Several writers emphasise this embedded and invisible character of corruption, and the difficulty of distinguishing it from incompetence, mismanagement and inattention. In forestry scams, and the sale of passports, Crocombe argues ‘there is no clear line between the criminal, the naïve and the improper use of power’ (Crocombe 2007). A similar diagnosis animated Bainimarama’s ‘cleanup’ campaign after the 2006 coup.

Writing about the ‘ethics of corruption in PNG’, philosopher David Lea argues that the absence of certain virtues may have economic as well as political consequences: ‘virtues like honesty, trustworthiness, self-control, sympathy and fairness, rather than familial and clan loyalties, may not only be socially beneficial but they may be a source of private economic benefits as well (Lea 1998:80). These market virtues, he remarks, ‘are not endemic to subsistence or feudal societies’ (ibid)

Political scientist Elise Huffer has argued that ‘no satisfactory framework for analyzing corruption in the Pacific context has been developed’. Huffer argues that we need to ‘find out how people of all sections of society define and understand corruption, and how they think it can be dealt with’ (2005: 123). Since then, there is some comparative evidence about patterns, meanings and causes of corruption in the region, particularly in the studies of National Integrity

Why talk or silence.

What factors determine why corruption gets talked about then forgotten, researched or ignored, or why people complain, or don’t? Self interest is clearly a motive: newspapers stay quiet because they don’t want to offend governments, advertisers or owners with, for example, interests in the forestry industry. Waden Narsey, reflecting on the NBF scandal to an audience of accountants asked ‘Is ours a culture of silence?’ (quoted in Grynberg, Munro and White 2002: 137). He argued there were ‘material incentives to those who remain silent’. Bainimaramas’s focus has been on the deals among the Fiji elite which Grynberg Munro and White described as a ‘carousel’ of individuals jumping from company board to company board and trusted to ‘err on the side of their patrons’, who were the politicians who appointed them (ibid: 138)].

Others refer to fear, or retribution or embarrassment. Crocombe argued that people were often inhibited to talk:

Few will publicly denounce or prosecute those who are corrupt, for exposing others is seen as mean in close-knit societies, and dangerous, for no one is safe from reciprocal accusations. Retribution may strike the accuser or his relatives or associates. Moreover, the obligation to help one’s kin is deep, so corruption is tolerated even when not approved. (2001: 516)
The chairman of PNG’s Gaming Control Board was said to have had ‘a bounty of $250,000 on his head’ for opposing illegal gambling (Crocombe 2007: 178). In 2009, PNG’s Chief Ombudsman, Chronox Manek was shot and left for dead in an apparent assassination attempt outside his home in Port Moresby (AAP 14 December 2009). The PNG media has suffered from attempts to intimidate journalists reporting on corruption cases. In 2007 Gorethy Kenneth was reporting on a passport and visa scam in the PNG Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. She tells how her office was ransacked several times and her house broken into by armed men who threatened to kill her (The Australian June 14 2007. Even without fear of physical intimidation people may not like what’s going on, but they don’t feel comfortable saying it. Or they don’t think it will make any difference if they do.

However the pressure is not always to silence. Tabloid media coverage encourages talk about corruption. So, now, do aid donors. At first TI faced a hard slog getting international organizations to listen to them. Now through some process of information cascading (Andvig: 2005) or cumulative advantage, like a blockbuster movie, the idea is everywhere. There is now more funding for policy talk about corruption: the NISPAC studies, funded by AusAID, which we use as the empirical basis for this book are a good example. These engines of talk about corruption tend to be located outside the region. It is only recently, for example, that Pacific Island countries have started appearing in TI’s famous CPI. TI has been very successful in raising awareness about corruption. Political scientist Peter Bratis finds it ‘striking that so many disparate and competing discourses all agree that corruption is the problem, often times the problem’ (2003: 1). There has been, in the words of another analyst, a ‘corruption eruption’. The Pacific Islands have lately joined this global talk. New questions are being raised. Long standing local issues – disappointment with government, failures of development, suspicion of foreign investment - are also being reframed in its terms – both by insiders and outsiders. Its is also
possible that there is now too much talk about corruption, and we should start talking more about
the other development issues identified in Lomborg’s Copenhagen consensus, described under
‘policy talk’ above. ‘Corruption’ is what sociologists Hirsch and Levin call an ‘umbrella
concept’: ‘a broad concept or idea used loosely to encompass and account for a broad set of
diverse phenomena’ (1999: 200). As such it may be subject to the life cycle they identify: initial
excitement until the ‘validity police’ move in, questioning the concept’s assumptions, coherence,
and predictions. The concept may prosper, collapse, or simply be pushed aside as scholarly
attention moves elsewhere. The life cycle of umbrella concepts is only loosely linked to the ‘issue
attention cycle’ of policy makers. Concepts may prosper in one world even as they are embattled
or abandoned in another.

Speaking up, and silence are not the only alternatives. You can simply walk away from
corruption, if the service you want is available elsewhere, and you can afford to go there. Some
talk about corruption sometimes amounts to ‘voice’ in the sense that the economist A. O.
Hirschmann (1970) distinguished two kinds of response to declines in quality of a firm’s output:
voice and exit. In ‘voice’ the disappointed consumer complains. But she may also walk silently
away, taking her business elsewhere (exit). Voice is a kind of political response, and exit a market
response. They were moderated by a third factor, loyalty. However, disgruntled clients of
government monopolies, like those in many of the Pacific Islands, don’t have the choice of voice
or exit: all they can do is complain, but they have nowhere else to go. So talk and silence are at
least partly determined by the possibility of exit, and Hirschman’s arguments link the talk we
have described in this chapter to characteristics of the political system – what kind of democratic
voice it allows – and economic system – whether market alternatives are available.
Chapter 3

What counts as ‘corruption’?

What is all this talk (and silence) about? Discussions of corruption often stall over definitions. Activists and officials, wanting to do something about it, are often impatient of discussion. But definitions matter when they differ, when people try and mobilize others against something they see differently, and when they are enforceable. Some of this defining and explaining is done by powerful specialised institutions, like the courts interpreting the law, the media uncovering scandals, aid donors promoting good governance, and churches promoting morality. Some is more popular. Some is sporadic and coalesces around events: the demonstrations around the Sandline affair in PNG, after which TI (PNG) was founded; the formation of the Civil Society Network in Honiara which successfully insisted that elections be held as scheduled rather than postponed as the government proposed (Roughan 2004: 27); or the April 2006 riots following the election of Snyder Rini as PM in Solomon Islands.

People may define corruption more widely or narrowly than the law, or than the World Bank’s ‘use of public office for private gain’. ‘Samoans sometimes generally use the term corruption to describe any action or activity that is unacceptable or where the motive of such action or activity is suspect’ (So’o et al 2004) 10). In Nauru it also includes ‘leaders who do not go to church, and who party and travel overseas frequently’ (Kun et al 2004: 9).

In several countries the word tends to be used about people ‘within the introduced political system’, rather than ‘traditional or grassroots leaders’ (Kun at al 2004: 9). For Vanuatu, the
authors found the term corruption was too ‘out there’ abstract and not internalised. Ordinary people in Vanuatu saw corruption, and concern about it, as irrelevant to their everyday life. In Palau people associated corruption with the public sector, rather than what they see as the better-disciplined private sector (Schuster 2004: 9). In Vanuatu, oddly, the introduction of a new tax (the debit tax) was regarded as corrupt (Newton Cain and Jowitt 2004: 11)

In Solomon Islands the meaning has shifted. About the time of independence, talk about corruption focused on the ‘wantokism’, ie ‘social pressures to use power for the benefit of one’s kin and family’ (Roughan 2004: 9). Now the meaning has broadened to include ‘official and political collusion with fraudulent schemes, unlawful resource extraction or grossly inequitable exercise of executive prerogative’. It now applies to ‘personal as well as official indiscretions of public servants and elected representatives’ (Roughan 2004: 9). However ‘concerns about island based favouritism (ie so-called ‘Malaitan dominance’)’ remained strong in relation to the police (Roughan 2004: 22).

Anti corruption campaigners often talk of ‘public’ or ‘civic education’, suggesting that corruption is not self-evident. The population must be educated to recognise it, perhaps report it, vote against it, but at least take it seriously.

The rural Papua New Guineans who formed TI(PNG)’s focus groups were asked what the word ‘corruption’ meant to them.

Those who spoke Tok Pisin and understood what corruption meant saw corruption as bad social behaviour which included acts ranging from lies, gossip, prostitution and womanizing. Corruption was also referred to as misusing entrusted position (within government, non-government organizations and business) and as a form of structural
inequality (which included unequal distribution of resources, low wages, and a lack of government services) (Walton 2009: 16)

Comparisons with ‘the West’, as in the RAMSI survey, tend to assume the West speaks with one voice, often a legal voice. Yet in Sydney the NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption carried out its own research on what public servants in New South Wales identified as corrupt (Gorta 2005). As we have seen in Chapter 2, this method was modified for use in the TI(PNG) focus groups, above. Angela Gorta used a series of scenarios or vignettes (such as giving a qualified friend a job, accepting a gift from a supplier, and so on) and asked whether officials regarded them as corrupt or not (or bad, but not corrupt). She found wide variation between individuals, and it was hard to predict an individual’s views from their gender, seniority or other characteristics. People also differed in how capa-ciously they regarded the category of corruption. Some people regarded a wide range of bad things as corrupt. Others reserved the category of corruption for a smaller number, and used other categories such as theft or fraud or misconduct. ICAC repeated its research a few years later and found more people were regarding more of the situations ‘corrupt’ – a measure of the ICAC’s success, perhaps, in ‘raising awareness’ or justifying its existence.

Grand Corruption

In the anti-corruption literature, grand corruption refers to the secretive abuse of their position by senior officials and political leaders, in contrast to the more visible small payments for services, often regarded as legitimate, called ‘petty corruption’ (Moody-Stuart 1997). The distinction gained some force as multinational firms argued they should be exempt from censure for paying
the latter, as it was a necessary cost of doing business. TI has tended to see the distinction as a matter of degree.

If grand corruption comes to light in the Pacific Islands, it is usually as the result of a Leadership Code investigation (in Melanesia), or the work of a Special Prosecutor (in Micronesia), or an audit report, such as the report on the so-called ‘Agriculture scam’ in Fiji. A good example that had a long impact on politics in Palau, was the bribe paid by the international Power Systems Company (IPSECO) to five senior Palauan officials. IPSECO got a contract to build a power plant without competitive bidding or a feasibility study. The officials were paid 750,000 US dollars. The US General Accounting Office identified conflicts of interest, bribery and misconduct. But no criminal or civil suits were brought against them. Palau’s conflict of interest laws did not seem strong or comprehensive enough for the task (Schuster 2004: 6).

The Audit report on the Agriculture Scam in Fiji refers to the provision of farm implements, fertilizer, plant materials and other items to indigenous farmers and various middlemen in 2000-2001. Large quantities of public money were involved: two million Fijian dollars in 2000, and 16 million Fijian dollars in 2001 (about $US 8.6 million in the second year or 42 percent of the Department of Agriculture’s budget). The politicians presiding over the scheme have occasionally given speeches or statements to defending themselves and the scheme, but so far have escaped formal charges. It has similarities with the National Bank of Fiji scandal a decade earlier.
The special audit report in 2002 detailed multiple breaches of the Finance Act by officials involved, from the Permanent Secretary, Peniasi Kunatubu, downwards. Its findings were summarised by political scientist Asinate Mausio (2003: 443):

…unethical practices including the expenditure of $194,000 on non-farm implements; the purchase of farm implements at greatly inflated prices from the major supplier, Suncourt Hardware Limited; the restriction of supplier options to only two hardware outlets, Suncourt hardware and Repina Wholesalers; the non-issue of tenders to the Government Supplies Department which could have supplied materials at a much cheaper price; and the failure to obtain three competitive quotations before purchasers were made. The largest supplier, Suncourt, netted $4 million worth of purchases by Local Purchase Orders.

Kunatubu was eventually charged and convicted of abuse of office and breaches of rules and regulations in November 2006. Bainimarama cannot take the credit for this case as it took place before he launched his coup. The Ministry’s Principal Accountant and two junior civil servants were convicted of ‘official corruption’ in September 2008. Pita Alifereti, the owner of Repina Wholesalers, who had supplied some equipment to be distributed to the farmers, and paid kickbacks to the officials, was also convicted. The directors of Suncourt were also charged but at the time of writing the case is bogged down in legal arguments.

Petty corruption
The corruption literature defines petty corruption in terms of small, visible, payments made to get officials to do their jobs (some senior officials have to pay junior officials in Tonga to fetch files). The Palau report defines it more widely and finds it widespread:

Consistently coming to work late or leaving early, the hiring or promoting of people without justifiable performance or testing, and using government property for private purposes

(Schuster 2004: 15)

Routine payments for services that officials already received salaries to perform were an issue in seven countries. In Kiribati customs officers and police officers were particularly vulnerable to bribes, because of their low wages, rising costs and heightened aspirations of urban living (Mackenzie 2004: 10). The PNG report provided a list of types of petty corruption. Officials were “hinting their willingness to be bribed,” either an invitation to lunch or “six packs” [of beer] and “bus fares” in return to speed up inquiries and service delivery processes.” Police and other enforcement officials extorted bribes by threatening to impose fines. Officials helped friends and relatives find places in favoured schools for their kids, and helped them jump other queues. Officials were also using their official vehicles to carry out private businesses (Mellam and Aloï 2003: 15).

Under the headings of “kickbacks” the Fiji report found public officials “imposing/demanding extra levies for services they are expected to deliver in the normal course of their duties,” particularly in the issuing of passports, work permits, driving licenses and vehicle certification (Olaks Consulting 2001: 6). Tactics used to extract payments from clients included ‘demanding
unreasonable/irrelevant types of information’, ‘intentionally delaying’ and ‘sending vibes through “agents” that passports, licences and permits can be expedited if payments of extra monies are made’. Customs officers were also undervaluing goods in exchange for bribes. (Olaks Consulting 2001: 7). In Solomon Islands ‘at the depths of governmental collapse in 2002 official permissions could be granted for as little as AUD 2.50 from junior officers, such was the level of economic hardship amongst public servants’ (Roughan 2004: 10)

Policy Corruption

A third type, policy corruption or state capture is, unlike the others, entirely legal. The World Bank introduced the concept to refer to the capture of state in central Asia by oil interests. The idea of policy corruption has been used about the Thaksin government in Thailand, changing the law to suit the interests of the Prime Minister and his cronies. It also might apply to ‘mogul-friendly’ media legislation in Australia and other countries, carefully designed to avoid threatening the interests of press barons and others with the power to punish government at the polls.

As the Pacific cases will show it is often difficult to distinguish corruption from other administrative and political failings. Some people may define corruption widely to include all sorts of bad behaviour. Others may restrict the word to occasions when a particular breach of public trust is involved. The Fiji government, for example, turned a blind eye to the reckless behaviour of the NBF allowing corruption – and other forms of financial mismanagement - to persist. When the military took over in 2006, some of them seemed to have this failure to deal with corruption in mind.
Fiji’s military rulers suggested failure to deal with the problem amounted to a type of corruption in itself. There are two questions to ask about corruption: why it happens and why nothing is done to prevent it from happening again. Fiji’s 2002 audit report detailed both kinds. The individuals and organisations supposed to act against such misbehaviour failed to do so, or did so too slowly. The interim government did not authorise expenditure until it was well underway. The PSC failed to discipline the officials. The Commission of Enquiry cabinet agreed to in August did not happen (though the audit did). Police investigations faltered. Legal arguments frustrated prosecution. Part of Bainimarama’s critique of the deposed Prime Minister, and the system of government more generally, was of the failure to act against the wrongdoing they (and everyone else in Fiji) knew was going on. According to a military spokesman who was under pressure from the media to show results:

People usually think corruption is centred on the exchange of money and that’s why people like Qarase are asking for proof. The other facet of corruption which takes time to prove is what we are working on – that is management or leadership corruption. Corruption in government was so rife and they did nothing to address it… (Fiji Times Online 14 November 07)

The idea of ‘policy corruption’ captures the persistent suspicion that the network of Fijian-only institutions benefited the indigenous chiefs who created them, and the particular allegation of insider trading in relation to FHL. The word ‘policy’ raises particular questions about the Agriculture Scam. The 2002 audit asked whether the Agriculture Scam was actually a ‘policy’, meaning an authorised, purposeful activity. Had it been authorised by a Minister or Cabinet? (Evidence of Minister Tora’s approval could not be found, but the Cabinet approved it retrospectively just before the election). Had the funding been approved by parliament in the budget? (It hadn’t – the money was diverted from other programmes). Had it followed the financial guideline requiring farmers themselves to contribute one third of the cost? (They didn’t).
It also found other policy failures: ‘lack of forecasting and planning, poor channels of communication and co-ordination and no means of performance monitoring and control’. It was hard to tell if any of the expenditure had got through to farmers, though Kunatubu – exercising his right of reply – listed examples of farmers’ projects that had benefited from the distribution of plant materials.

The audit report did not address the substantive rights or wrongs of the policy, or evaluate its consequences. It just asked just whether the policy had been authorized and implemented properly. It has been strongly criticised as a particular kind of ‘Affirmative Action’ policy (part of the broader ‘Blueprint’ originally presented by Qarase to the Great Council of Chiefs). It was discriminatory against Indo-Fijians, inconsistent with free trade, and only befitted an indigenous elite. In any case, the 1997 constitution provided for Affirmative Action on the basis of poverty rather than race. It might also be criticised as a bad Agriculture policy simply to hand out tools to farmers.

In the case of forestry policy in PNG and Solomon Islands there seems to be a clear link between personal interests of some ministers and their inaction and unwillingness to implement their own statements of forestry policy. Again these were sins of omission. The ten audit reports produced by Solomon Islands Auditor General, reinvigorated by the RAMSI intervention are also focused on failure to act on information, to follow up on problems, and to correct mistakes.
Definitions by social scientists typically incorporate one or more of the following overlapping types: Legal; Public Office; Public interest; Public opinion; and Market-centred (Philp 2002, Hindess 2004: 3-7). Mark Warren (2004) has recently introduced a sixth, which addresses the issue of democracy. These have different implications for understanding and dealing with corruption.

*Legal.* The first, legal, definition is the most straightforward, but runs into two problems. As we saw in Chapter 2, many countries’ legal systems don’t talk of corruption as such, but instead refer to instances of it – bribery, perhaps conflict of interest, and so on. For comparison, the New South Wales ICAC legislation does both, defining corruption in terms of the ‘dishonest and impartial’ use of public office, and then listing all the things that might be included, like bribery.

The audit report into the Fiji Agriculture Scam identified multiple breaches of the Finance Act but only used the word ‘corruption’ once, murmuring ‘the possibilities of fraud and corruption can not be ruled out’ (2002: 23). Fiji’s Penal Code lists a number of such offences: official corruption (section 106); extortion by public officers (section 107); having a private interest in property ‘of a special character’ that the officer has administrative or judicial responsibility for (section 109); making false claims (section 110); abuse of office (section 111), and so on. There is also another set of offences dealing with ‘corrupt practices’ and ‘secret commissions’ (sections 375 – 379). FICAC is working within the existing penal code though the interim Attorney General has recently talked about introducing a new offence of ‘misconduct in public office’ reportedly because ‘it is wider in some respects than the statutory offence of Abuse of office, in that it is not necessary to prove any prejudice or detriment to the rights of another person’.
However we may also want to say the law is corrupt, or encourages corruption, or that the law doesn’t cover certain types of corruption. So we need some independent standard against which to judge the law. Legal definitions are particularly problematic in the Pacific Islands, where the bulk of law is inherited from the colonial period, and may be discredited by that association. Several countries constitutions have set up Commissions to review the law (and Fiji’s Commission looked at the law on corruption in 2004). It is often argued or expected that law and custom or tradition may conflict.

*Public Office.* The second looks more broadly at the responsibilities of public office holders, seeing corruption as a falling away from the standards expected of them. A good example is TI and the World Bank’s influential definition of corruption as ‘the use of public office for private gain’. In this vein, the Audit report refers to public service values, and the failure of the Public Service Commission (PSC) to uphold them in this case. However we might have different expectations of politicians compared to public servants. The Fijian institutions are shot through with traditional expectations of how chiefs should behave. It is possible that we might have different expectations of people in different circumstances: as a banker, a soldier and as a Prime Minister.

The distinction between public and private runs into difficulty in monarchical systems like Tonga’s, and in concepts like ‘crown land’. It relies the so-called ‘two bodies’ theory of the monarchy – that the person of the king can be separated from the role. It runs into difficulty among the extended families on monarchs: the princes and princesses who claim the privileges and immunities of the monarchy, without performing any governmental function. Its more general difficulty in the Pacific is the recent introduction of centralized bureaucratic states, and hence (it is argued) the weakness of the idea of public office. However centralized indigenous systems, like the Hawaiian monarchy, may have developed their theories about the role of advisers. And indigenous and neo-traditional ideologies of chieftaincy contain plenty of ideas.
about the way good leaders should behave. So a public office definition of corruption should be adaptable to chieftaincy. However it faces the general difficulty that the powerful are well placed to change the rules to favour themselves, as in the ‘policy corruption’ described above.

*Public Interest.* The third moves from rules and roles to effects or consequences. Corruption is defined in terms of the way it harms ‘the public interest’. However in many cases it is difficult to define or agree upon what that interest is. There are legitimate differences about where the public interest lies. There is a question of who should have the power, or authority to define it. In the opportunity that the Fiji Audit report gave him to reply to criticisms, the Permanent Secretary in the Agriculture Ministry defended his role in the scam in terms of public interest rather than legality. He mentioned the unworkability of the regulations, and the urgency of circumstances. He may have broken the rules, he implied, but he was acting as a public officer should in difficult circumstances, in the long term public interest. This difficulty may be compounded by globalization, where the (global) public interest may transcend and contradict national spokesmen, used to having the last word on the subject.

*Public Opinion* The fourth has democratic appeal: corruption is whatever people say it is. It enters into all the previous ones: does the law correspond to public opinion? what do people expect of leaders? What do they judge is in the public interest? If there is a gap between the law and public opinion, we also want to know what the latter involves, as the law is more likely to be enforced if it is in sympathy with opinion. In this way Marilyn Strathern found differences between legal penalties for sexual offences, and the way that Papua New Guineans assessed their gravity – rating adultery more seriously than the legal system did (Wuillemin 1986). TI’s focus groups found the discussants critical of individual failings, but also finding systemic reasons why individuals were tempted to behave badly (they also occasionally blamed themselves). (Walton 2009). Differences in opinion are likely to be large in the Pacific islands, where there were large social distances between colonizers and colonized, chiefs and commoners, between ethnic groups,
and between diasporic and resident populations. There is a continuing social distance between educated elites and others. The ‘education’ function in the ICAC model suggests that governments don’t simply reflect public opinion but seek to change it.

This definition raises also questions of whose opinion – the elite? The masses? Which class or gender or ethnic group? These opinions may change as a result of education, or loss of faith in institutions. Fiji Holdings Limited’s Lyle Cupit was alluding to this type of definition when he defended the share dealings of the kind that Lisenia Quarase, the deposed Prime Minister, was eventually charged with: ‘Those deals are clean’ and ‘its people’s imagination that’s getting them wrong’ (quoted in Pareti 2005). In relation to corruption, we can also ask how expert that opinion is – is it based on people’s own experience, or their suspicions? As we shall see in Chapter 4 TI (Fiji)’s survey of popular opinion in Fiji found 47% of a sample of 1,024 believing that politics was largely affected by corruption but noted:

Many of the views seemed to reflect the experiences of others because few people said they had paid bribes themselves though corruption takes many forms other than bribery (TI (Fiji): 2007)

We may also want to be able to say popular opinion is corrupt itself, or complicit in corruption.

Market-Centred. A fifth market-centred definition points to the buying, selling and hiring out of public office. It reminds us that in Europe, at least, public offices used to be bought and sold. Officials would live off a share of the revenue they collected, rather than relying on a salary from the central government. Officials in Indonesia are said to distinguish between ‘wet’ and ‘dry’ positions, and seek out the former for the corrupt opportunities they provide. Analytically, the distinction also depends on a clear line between public and private. It enters grey areas around privatization. So called ‘market centred’ definitions, Philp (2002) argues, are really a variety of the second. They take a division between public and private as given and are subject to the same difficulties.
For example, Bainimarama’s approach is market-centred in so far as he wants to remove special privileges that Fijian-only institutions had been granted, and so level the playing field. At the same time Qarase is being accused of practices such as borrowing to buy shares, and investing rental revenue that might be acceptable in the private sector. So Bainimarama is wanting to draw a clearer line between ‘public’ and ‘private’ ethics, following the second definition of corruption, above.

These types are not exclusive. TI’s new ‘use of entrusted power’ is based on the second, public office definition, but raises the question of whose power is entrusted. It might be the government’s, entrusting the provision of a service, like electricity, to a privatized entity. It might just be another example of the principal-agent problem that institutional economists see in corruption, and which Hong Kong’s anti-bribery legislation penalized as ‘unauthorised receipts of benefits’, or Samoa’s ‘secret commissions’. Or it may have a broader democratic implications (with government envisaged having power entrusted in it by the people). TI’s breakaway group TIRI adopted a public interest approach, raising other questions about who interprets what that interest is – judges, independent professionals like those who join TI, or democratically elected politicians.

_Duplicitious Exclusion._ Political scientist Mark Warren (2004) makes the argument that the modern definition of corruption – the use of public office for private gain – dates back to a pre-democratic period, when reformers sought to protect individual rights against absolute monarchies. Their fear was of an overweening and interfering state. There is nothing wrong with that liberal conception of corruption, Warren argues. It helps with institutional design, for example, along the lines suggested by Klitgaard’s formula, or TI’s National Integrity System. However it does not grasp the democratic aspects of modern states which have ‘outgrown’ it (Warren 2006: 803). Twelve of the fourteen Pacific islands states are democracies, while Tonga is
the throes of becoming more democratic, and Bainimarama has promised, eventually, to restore democracy to Fiji.

First, he argues, the standard definition has nothing to say about the processes of creating norms such as those of public office. Meta-norms of openness, publicity and inclusion are what distinguish democracy from other ways changing norms about, for example, public and private behaviour. Definitions of what counts as corruption might be expected to change in a democracy, but these meta-norms should persist.

Second it provides little help in deciding about the duties of politicians rather than officials. Politicians in a democracy are, after all, expected to be responsive to public opinion ‘Partiality, legislators remind us, is part of their job’ (2006: 804). Warren particularly draws attention to the role promises play in the way we monitor the integrity of elected politicians.

Third, it emphasises rules, and their even handed application. That’s’s fine, but their downside is rigidity, inflexibility, and lack of responsiveness that may – as Anechiarico and Jacobs found in their (1996) study of the anti-corruption project in New York – stymie and frustrate the work of government agencies.

Fourth, it speaks to the abuse of power within the executive branch of government, but has less to say about judicial and legislative processes, and corruption in other sites of power in modern democracies, such as the media or civil society.
Warren argues that the point of political corruption is that it harmfully excludes people from decisions that affect them. He is not against not all forms of exclusion, but those that are hidden, and contradict the professed values of the officials in charge of them. An example might be a job application or public tender that is professed to be open to all, but is in fact decided in advance in favour of particular applicant who has bribed an official. Or a court case in which the judges are secretly biased. Or a law making process in which legislators claim to be acting as they have promised, but are secretly creating exceptions for favoured interest groups. The democratic norm, Warren argues, is inclusion of those affected by a decision in deliberations about it (they may win or lose, but they should expect to be heard). Corruption lies in the exclusion that is both duplicitous (ie hypocritical) and harmful (to the interests of those excluded, and the legitimacy of the system more generally).

Cutting across these definitions are tests of seriousness. Anti-corruption commissions, and ordinary police, typically have thresholds below which they will not take on cases (‘warranting dismissal’ is the test used by the NSW ICAC). Solomons Leadership Code Commission is trying to restrict its own jurisdiction to senior officials and political leaders, as the caseload was overwhelming it. Similarly the electoral act in Kiribati defines customary gifts of tobacco in terms of weight and value: ‘containing 30 sticks of tobacco and not weighing more than 500g or its equivalent in cash of not more than $20.00 or such other higher figure as inflation may allow’ (Mackenzie 2004: 9).
The study of ethics (ways of living well; the good) is in many ways the opposite of the study of corruption (how things go wrong; the bad). Among the Pacific Islands, Marshall Islands government talks particularly about ‘ethics’. Its Ethics in Government Act was passed in 1993 (Pollock 2004: 13). Arguments about ethics and integrity among officials tend to concentrate on individuals rather than systems. The international community, by contrast, has tended to concentrate on systems: reducing risks or providing more constitutional checks and balances.

The debate about whether corruption is caused by ‘bad people’ or ‘bad systems’ has a long history, which Alatas (1968) traces back to ancient China. It also has practical consequences. A believer in ‘good people’ will focus on character, biography, selection criteria, and training. A believer in good systems will focus on procedures and risks, assuming some people are always going to behave badly.

The study of ethics suggests corruption can be seen as unethical in at least three ways – first as a violation of rules (of public office etc), second as bad in its consequences (for the public interest, or the economy), and third as an absence of personal virtue (such as honesty or integrity or acting in good faith).

The first predominates in law enforcement – corruption is bad because it is against the law, and needs to be investigated and punished. It was also found by TI(PNG)’s focus groups, when they criticised the protagonist in a scenarios for not following proper procedures (Walton 2009: 7).

The second is well expressed in a speech given by Sir Peter Kenilorea to Solomon Islands ‘International Day Against Corruption’. Corruption means “goods and services are misallocated away from the general public, toward a few often wealthy individuals’. Corrupt governments, he
said, become preoccupied with staying in power, rather than implementing policies, and are open to bribery from ‘foreign interests and corporations to allow operations or undertakings in this country which may not be in the best interests of the public’ (Solomon Star 10.12.08 p 10). He is also making a nationalist point which we will return to in Chapter 8. A consequentialist approach is common among aid donors or development banks who justify their new interest in corruption because of its bad consequences for development. Susan Rose Ackerman argues from the consequences of corruption for economic development (her 1999 book is subtitled ‘causes consequences and reform’). TI (PNG) also asked its respondents to comment on the consequences of the type of behaviour set out in its scenarios. Social conflict and lack of public services were often cited (Walton 2009: 11, 13, 15). If corruption is seen to be bad in its consequences we can see all sorts of processes being corrupted. We can see corruption on both sides of the public/private line (and in the non-government sector). To start close to the present writer’s home: plagiarism corrupts university assessment; price fixing corrupts markets; and misuse of funds in NGOs corrupts the processes of charity.

In the Pacific various social processes may have become corrupted in this consequential sense. Aid may have become corrupted by being used to buy support in elections (the consequence of which is that it is more difficult to persuade individuals in rich countries to support it). Conservatives supported the move to universal suffrage in Samoa in part because it reduced the corruption of the titles system. The process of paying compensation in Melanesia seems to have been corrupted by excessive demands over minor slights.

A third approach to ethics emphasises ‘virtue’ rather than rules and consequences. Virtue is a personal characteristic. Honesty, for example, is a virtue. Following scandals in the UK, a Committee for Standards on Public Life (the Nolan Committee) came up with an influential set of principles that dealt mostly with individual characteristics: selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership. We might hope people would behave honestly
not merely because there were rules about it, or because the consequences of dishonesty are bad. Rule-and consequence-based approaches to ethics can't provide a compelling reason why we should obey the rules, and avoid the consequences, especially if we stand to gain personally and get away with it (Lynch and Lynch 2003: 370-374). Virtue ethics finds that compelling reason in the achievement of personal happiness through living a good life. Personal characteristics, such as honesty and trustworthiness are, in this view, not given, or determining of how we should behave in all circumstances. Rather, as Socrates argued, they are the result of leading a reflective, prudent life. Virtue ethics may be particularly relevant to leaders, who are in a position to make their own rules, and may not have to suffer the consequences of their corrupt behaviour.

In the Pacific Islands, ideas about ‘chiefliness’ as a collection of personal virtues, achieved through a lifetime, are of this ‘virtue’ kind. Bainimarama was also arguing in terms of virtues (rather than rules or consequences) when he accused Fiji’s leaders of ‘lack of moral strength or incompetence or abuse or power and privileges: Basically they were corrupt’. The reports of Vanuatu’s first ombudsman commissioner, Marie-Noelle Ferriex Patterson were also particularly critical of the lack of virtue of politicians and officials – their imprudence and dishonesty – as much as their breaking of the law, or the utilitarian consequences of their actions. The Melanesian leadership codes combine rules with virtues. They must also deal with specific practical dilemmas faced by each profession (a code for politicians is therefore likely to be different to a code for judges or public servants) (Brien 2001). Caiden and Dwivedi combine the practical and development aspects of virtue ethics in the idea of a ‘vocation’:

No amount of laws, codes of conduct and threats of punishment can force public officials to behave ethically and promote just government. Unless they are guided by a sense of vocation,
serving others, and accountability, it is impossible to expect a moral government (Caiden and Dwivedi 2001: 252)

While donors often talk of consequences, they often propose ‘integrity’ as the positive virtue from which corruption is a falling away. TI studies National Integrity systems. Ideas of ‘integral human development’ appear in PNG’s Constitutional Planning Committee, and the work of Bernard Narokobi (1983), and the thinking of Frank Bainimarama, Fiji’s coup leader. TI points to the wholeness and coherence of a national system. In the Australian NIS study it is pictured as a cosy ‘nest’ (Sampford et al 2005). The word integrity in English implies coherence and wholeness (even holiness). It has to do with reputation and trustworthiness (perhaps the bankers’ ‘soundness’). But it may not be relevant to some Pacific Islander sense of self-hood. Marilyn Strathern, for example, talks about Melanesian ‘dividuals’, seeing themselves first as a bundle of relationships, rather than a coherent self (1988). A ‘dividual’ might find it difficult to register conflicts of interest. Relationships might have to be juggled, but they did not conflict. As we shall see in Chapter 7, the philosopher Thomas Kasulis (2002) argues that in some cultures, ‘intimacy’ may be more valued than ‘integrity’.

Politicians may face more ethical difficulties than the rest of us. Machiavelli counselled well-intentioned politicians that on rare occasions they would have to overcome their scruples, and learn ‘how not to be good’ if they wanted to succeed. Philosopher Michael Walzer wrote an influential account of the problem the problem that philosophers call ‘dirty hands’ after a play of that name by Jean Paul Satre that has a Communist leader say “I have dirty hands right up to the elbows. I've plunged them in filth and blood. Do you think you can govern innocently” (quoted in Walzer 1973: 161). He began with the ‘conventional wisdom to the effect that politicians are a
good deal worse, morally worse, than the rest of us’ (ibid: 162). Walzer argues that we tend to regard them as so for three reasons. First they claim to be acting on our behalf rather than for themselves and we are suspicious whether that is possible. Second they rule over us which is frightening. Third, they deal in ultimately in force and violence, against us and well as against our putative enemies. One of his examples involves corruption:

In order to win the election the candidate must make a deal with a dishonest ward boss, involving the granting of contracts for school construction over the next four years. Should he make the deal? (Walzer 1973: 163)

Walzer argues that we would want him to show some scruples, and perhaps avoid the decision if he could, but at some point we might think getting this good man into government was more important than refusing a corrupt deal. At least we would want him to feel guilty afterwards – and, in fact, to win, and go on to do good things in government. In his lecture on ‘Politics as a Vocation’ Max Weber argued that politicians live in a different ethical world through their dealings in power and violence. He went on to contrast an ‘absolute ethic of the gospel’, such as always tell the truth, with an ‘ethic of responsibility’, in which case one has to an account of the foreseeable consequences on one’s action’ (1946: 32). In the political world of violence and war, these might be unpredictable and dangerous. Walzer comments that Weber may be overemphasising the violence (‘The stock figure is the lying, not the murderous politician though the murderer lurks in the background’ 1973: 163). However it seems quite relevant to our judgement about the sponsors of coups d’etat in the region, such as the politicians behind the Eagle Force who forced the Prime Minister out of office in Solomon Islands and – with more public hand wringing – Commodore Bainimarama in Fiji.
More generally, political theorist Mark Philp in an influential recent review of the issues around defining corruption argues that the word implies a falling away from some idea of the ‘naturally wholesome’ state of affairs (Philp 2002). A good example of Philip’s point is on the World Bank’s website where ‘anti corruption’ is yoked together with ‘good governance’. ‘Good governance’ is naturally wholesome, and corruption is a falling away from that ideal. In this idealistic vein the head of Fiji’s Chamber of Commerce enthused that the clean-up campaign provided a ‘common vision for the future’ (Fiji Times 29 December 06). However whatever is ‘naturally wholesome’ is likely to vary, and it is in this variation that he sees the inevitably political nature of corruption. It is essentially contested, and we are never all going to agree about it. For some economists it seems that the ‘naturally wholesome’ condition is the freely competitive market: interference with it corrupts its benign effects, and more competition also acts as a cure for corruption. For monarchists, the naturally wholesome condition is a wise king. For democrats it is rule by the people, for the people and of the people. And so on. Philp’s arguments points towards a kind of political, rather than cultural, relativism.

Wholesomeness is also linked to cleanliness, and so to Mary Douglas’ (2002) arguments about purity and danger. Robert Klitgaard (1997) talked of ‘bureaucratic hygiene’, referring to efforts to ‘cleaning up and reinvigorating the civil service. Commodore Bainimarama used the phrase ‘cleanup’ more threateningly. The CPI uses cleanliness and freedom from corruption interchangeably (its scale of 1-10 is described as one between ‘clean’ and ‘not clean’). As Douglas (2002) points out cleanliness is not an intrinsic quality of an object, more a problem of being in the wrong place. Shoes get covered with mud, but only ‘dirty’ when they are brought inside the house. Cleanliness involves keeping them outside the house. It is an effect of putting
things in categories, rather than a characteristic of objects themselves. Similarly, looking after the interests of your family is appropriate in some circumstances, but ‘out of place’ in the office. A more complex example of corruption involving ‘home’ and ‘office’ would be the Land and Titles Court in Samoa which had an unwritten policy that it would only accept gifts if they were offered by all the parties to a dispute, or after the decision. A gift offered at home had been refused (So’o et al 2004: 10). Mary Douglas famously understands food taboos in these terms. Bratsis (2003) extends this argument to our understandings of corruption as miscategorisation, and uses the US House of Representatives code of ethics as an example. It’s not that selfishness and self-seeking are intrinsically wrong. It’s just that they have to be kept in their place. They are disturbing in the wrong place.

Conclusions

Corruption is not a simple idea. The literature identified three types of it, with one type – policy corruption – that may be entirely legal. There are at least six ways that social scientists have defined it. Most of these draw on a distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ that has emerged in the particular historical circumstances of the West, but only one – Warren’s idea of ‘duplicitous exclusion’ – addresses modern concerns with democracy. And the study of ethics suggests at least three ways in which corruption is wrong – consequentialism being influential among donors and international institutions. Talk about corruption implies thinking about its opposite, the ‘naturally wholesome’ state of affairs that has become corrupted. But context matters here too: what is unwholesome in some contexts, for example in professional work, may be wholesome in others, for example within the family.
Chapter 4

Explaining Corruption

Corruption is often talked about as a disease, particularly a cancer. For example, an Australian Minister for Pacific Island affairs argued

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\text{Corruption is a cancerous thing and there is a developing crisis of government in some parts of Melanesia. If the leaders of a country do not have the best interests of their citizenry at heart and don’t act in those best interests, then no amount of aid will save them’ (cited in Bennett 2000: 352)}
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That familiar metaphor suggests the possibility of a treatment, even cure. But it also raises the question of diagnosis, or misdiagnosis. What kind of a disease is corruption – is it a cancer, perhaps, or a virus, or merely indigestion? If the former, the cure may be in surgery. If the latter, an aspirin – or patience until it cures itself. It’s clearly important to get the diagnosis right, before a cure is prescribed. The disease metaphor helps to relate diagnoses to practical remedies.

There are many diagnoses of the causes of corruption in popular opinion, newspaper editorials, in churches, mosques or temples, and in professional doctrines. Some diagnoses are fatalistic. Nothing much can be done about it. Or we must wait for long term social changes to reduce it. Some remedies are quite utopian – zero tolerance, a revolution, or a change of heart. Some
diagnoses are paired with practical cures or treatments that follow logically from them. The diagnosis provides a rationale for the cure. That cure may also serve other purposes. As in Fiji after the 2006 coup, Anti-corruption campaigns may serve as a form of intimidation, or as a way to discredit political opponents. It may even be – as in the history of medicine – that the cure is worse than the disease.

The early Greek philosophers had a dualistic worldview that contrasted an ideal world truth and goodness with the real world of change and decay. The ideal world was used as a standard against which to judge the real. All existing regimes were thus to some extent corrupt. The Greeks also expected their leaders to be wholly committed to the common interest. They were expected to have no legitimate private interests (whereas we now tolerate some kinds of private interests among leaders, as long as they declare them and don’t let them interfere with their jobs, Mulgan 2006). The Greek remedy for the inevitable corruption of the real world was inevitably second best: the rule of law. Any law even if it favoured one group over another was better than no law at all, as it limited the scope for arbitrary ad hoc decisions. They also argued that the strongest source of political stability was a law-abiding middle class, preoccupied with making money, rather than aristocrats or the unemployed who had time on their hands to cause mischief.

The Greek philosophers provided the foundations for modern Western thought. They also influenced Islamic thinkers. Sociologist Syed Alatas (1968) cites the Muslim historian, Ibn Kaldun (AD 1332 – 1406), diagnosing corruption as caused by ‘loose living among the elite’. There was a quite separate tradition of Chinese thinking about corruption, turning on the distinction between ‘laws’ and ‘men’. The Chinese philosopher Wang an Shih (AD 1021 – 1086) bringing both sides of the long running Chinese debates together in the argument that corruption
was caused by bad systems and bad individuals. Both of these diagnoses have clear practical implications.

For example, PNG’s Ombudsman Commission, which administers its leadership code, used to distribute a booklet setting out their responsibilities to new MPs (Ombudsman Commission 1991). It showed cartoons of politicians receiving cash in brown envelopes, but also dancing with girls who didn’t look to be their wives. Solomon Islands Leadership Code Commission has also shown similar anxiety about adultery. The Commissions were concerned with reputation as well as behaviour, and saw sexual misbehaviour as within its remit. Ibn Khaldun’s definition of corruption as ‘loose living among the elite’, described above, points to suspicion to the foreign travel and four wheel drives. Ostentatious lifestyles can provide clues to unofficial sources of income: the so called ‘car park test’ which asks if officials are driving better cars than they can afford from their nominal salaries. Conversely, successful leaders often cultivate personal modesty, and the corruption of nomenklatura behind the sober exteriors of communist leadership. The diagnosis also points to the popular anger at elite immorality that sometimes lies behind campaigns against corruption.

International anti corruption practice tends to emphasise laws over men, partly out of prudence. Members of NGOs taking on powerful individuals are likely to face litigation, or worse. Transparency International’s doctrine specifically eschews the pursuit of bad individuals in favour of systemic and preventive approaches. These are contrasted with older approaches that targeted individual rotten apples as a way of avoiding systemic reform. Yet clearly individual predispositions or virtues will determine how individuals respond to the opportunities an organization presents them with. According to Hong Kong’s ICAC, officials with gambling debts
will, for example, be more disposed to corruption. Selection procedures can ask about an individual’s ethical history, and training programs can try sand change predispositions. More generally, the talk of ‘moral individuals’ points to the role of religious morality in predisposing officials against corruption, and hypocrisy in condoning it.

In this chapter I want to identify several diagnoses of corruption in the Pacific Islands. Some but not all suggest cures. My aim is to show the range of possibilities, and that older approaches are still relevant today. Behind these practical concerns is an interest in the two way street that runs between theory and practice. The relationship between diagnosis and cure is not direct and one-way. Cures may come before diagnosis, doctors have got medicine wrong in the past, and anti-corruption campaigns may have unintended side effects.

First we look at what TI’s focus groups and the NIS reports diagnosed. Then we consider four broader diagnoses: constitutional; economic; anthropological; and criminological. Political and cultural explanations deserve a chapter each, later in the book. They suggest why the cure may be difficult to apply.

**Popular Diagnoses**

The popular opinion tapped in TI’s focus groups in PNG tends to blame corruption on individual moral failings and difficult economic circumstances. For example some people criticised the teacher who took note pads and pens from the school for ‘lack of morals’ such as ‘selfishness, greed, disrespect and irresponsibility’ (Walton 2009: 7). Others pointed out that she probably
hadn’t got paid by the government, and the community centre needed the materials she took for them. Still others suspected her motives: she might have been trying to build a reciprocal relationship with the community centre in order to further a future political career. Similarly the candidate who offered the voter a bribe was condemned for his ‘weak character’, but others pointed that this was the system in PNG: unfamiliar candidates had to buy support. If the government did not have the resources to help the people, then it was right that the candidate did so. In the case of the logging company, the offer of trips to (some) landowners was explained in terms of its willingness to cut corners in a desire for profit, and condemned for its divisive impact on local social solidarity. The landowners who took the trip were condemned as ‘greedy, selfish and having little regard for friends, relatives and wantoks (Walton 2009: 12). The tax exception for a particular business group was condemned for its unfairness and ‘imaginations worked overtime with people trying to ascertain who was bribing whom (ibid: 13). In the last scenario – Mary offers a job to her wantok – Mary was condemned for not following the rules, but there was sympathy for her wantok, in tight economic circumstances, for taking the job.

In the ethical language we introduced in Chapter 3, people were arguing about rules, consequences and the virtue of individuals. There was an empathy, and willingness to excuse or forgive people who - like the members of the focus group - faced difficult economic circumstances. There was also suspicion of the motives of, particularly, government officials and logging companies. The absence of government provision was often invoked to justify people taking what they could from where they could: grub first, then ethics. Popular opinion was not unitary: there were differences among people, and some of their views also seemed to emerge, or perhaps become modified, during the deliberative process of a focus group. It may also have been unconsciously shaped by the views of the people organising the focus groups, or writing up its reports.
TI’s PNG’s research questions did not include what should be done about corruption. TI seems to be keeping that job for itself (ibid: 2). However some suggestions were made and the report concludes that the most often cited strategy against corruption was ‘direct physical or verbal abuse’ of offending individuals. Many doubted legal action would make any difference, but others suggested less confrontational ways of showing their displeasure, such as not paying fees to the offending teacher’s school (Walton 2009: 19).

Diagnoses offered by the NIS Reports

Though not asked to do so, some of the NIS studies also offered explanations for the corruption they found. The Solomon Islands report blamed the colonial character of the state for corruption, pointing to the way its structures of accountability ‘flowed upwards to political masters, rather than downwards to the people’ (Roughan 2004: 22). It was thus wide open to abuse by the politicians who took over after independence. The discretion that the colonial legal system offered to its officials – like Commissioners of Lands or Forests in Solomon Islands– also created opportunities for official corruption. So did the absence of democratic or judicial review. Colonial rule typically involved governing communities kept distinct: indigenous, trading minorities like the Chinese; and European settlers or traders. Close sympathies and social interactions between colonial officials and settlers provided plenty of opportunities for systematic unfairness – and suspicion of unfairness - in the allocation of jobs land and business licences.
Smallness was also often offered as an explanation for corruption: as encouraging personalism; role conflicts; and a tendency to forgive behaviour amongst people you will have to live with in future. For example the Cook Islands NIS report talks about ‘the small size of the Cook Islands population means that ‘people are likely to be related to each other which can lead to lack of objectivity and integrity’ (Ingram 2004: 6). The Pacific Island states are with the exception of PNG, remarkably small by world standards. The median (typical) population is just over 100,000. Characteristic problems of small states include ‘weakness in both public and private sector capacity’ (Commonwealth Secretariat 1997). The government of a small state may be carrying out trading or investment tasks that in larger countries would be carried out by the private sector.

The authors of the book on the National Bank of Fiji scandal also consider arguments about smallness to explain the inertia on the board, and agencies that were supposed to be supervising it. They describe Fiji’s small financial elite as a ‘carousel’ of individuals who are trusted to ‘err on the side of their patrons’.

A small society generates only a small number of individuals who are technically competent enough to sit on such boards. But the number of such posts is almost as large as would be found in a large society, and appointments to such positions are determined by a handful of politicians. Those unwilling to live by the code of silence and compliance towards those in a position to grant such patronage find themselves excluded from the lucrative carousel of board positions (Grynberg, Munro and White 2002: 138).

Writing to Fiji Times, the Rev Akuila Yakabi of a pro-democracy NGO the Citizens Constitutional Forum worried about independence and impartiality of the anti-corruption commission proposed by the military government:
The problem of personal grudges looms large in a small country such as ours. Anti-corruption officials overseas are frequently accused of bias in the conduct of their investigations, and how such accusations are dealt with can determine whether the agency gains or loses public credibility (Fiji Times 7 February 07).

However smallness may work both ways. The NIS report on Tonga, for example, noted:

> The small number of people in the outer islands leads to a more personal approach: people directly meet officials, there is greater transparency, and fewer opportunities for corrupt practice (James and Tufui 2004: 8)

Smallness could lead the kind of detailed mutual supervision that the novelist Albert Wendt describes in his accounts of village life in Samoa.

While relatively small, the populations of the Pacific Islands are typically highly scattered across archipelagos, or in high mountain valleys. Epeli Hau’ofa’s (1993) book, subtitled ‘rediscovering our sea of islands’ argued that the ocean linked as much isolated, but in any country the authority and values of centralized bureaucratic states tend to wane with distance from the capital. It is more difficult to implement centrally defined policy. Conversely, local government often seems particularly vulnerable to corruption. The colonial form of indirect rule made it difficult to impose laws and standards on local chiefs and elders who are recognized as having authority in local matters. Field officers depend on local communities for information, resources, compliance and support, particularly in crises like natural disasters.
The cure for smallness, or its ills, include appointing officials from abroad, and regional institutions. Potential cures for scatteredness and isolation are suggested in Kaufman’s classic (1962) study of *The Forest Ranger* described how the US Forest Service has developed hard and soft controls to counteract centrifugal tendencies, and ‘policy capture’ by local communities and logging interests. Without them, ‘policy’ comes a distant second to the day-to-day pressures on teachers, agriculture officers, and engineers living and working locally. The NIS reports were themselves constrained by scatteredness. Constraints of time and funding meant the authors only conducted interviews in the capital cities (though the authors of the Tonga report went to Vavau, where they found problems associated with smallness).

Constitutional Diagnoses

Three specific constitutional diagnoses have been made for the Pacific Islands. Each has their characteristic set of remedies. The first is embodied in Transparency International’s image of the ‘national integrity system’ that provided the basis for the studies on which this book draws. The second has to do with the possibility and desirability of drawing a line between ‘polities’ and ‘administration’. The third has to do with ideas about the state, and state building, and has influential among both academics and donors in the region.

Transparency International’s National Integrity System (NIS) model pictures ‘integrity’ supported by a number of pillars, the executive, the legislature, constitutional office holders and so on, and resting on a basis of values. It was designed by Jeremy Pope, a constitutional lawyer from New Zealand, and it embodies the idea that goes back to the US constitution, that we need
not only rely on good individuals to ensure good government. Theorists of the US Constitution, particularly James Madison, argued that self-interest and sectional interests could cancel each other out. In the right circumstances, such as open debate and freedom of association, the self interest of one group might checked by the self interest of another that emerged to counter it. Indeed ‘an institution can be better than the individuals who constitute it’ (Warren 2004 citing euben).

The constitutional separation of powers limits opportunities for corruption, or increases opportunities for its exposure. Thus the legislature may supervise the executive (eg through a Public Accounts Committee), while the judiciary ensures that police don’t abuse their power. Accountability becomes mutually reinforced. There may be gaps as well as overlaps in this system of mutual accountability that a constitution should fill, for example by creating an Anti-Corruption Commission. Studies of the National Integrity System in Australia have distinguished between core institutions – the ICAC, Ombudsman, Auditor General, Police – and the wider responsibilities of government departments and statutory bodies to prevent corruption in their own activities (Sampford et al 2005). Anti Corruption Agencies are typically small, and can’t be expected to deal with each and every incident. Part of their task is to take on the serious cases, set an example, and ensure that civil service managers, and officials down the line, take responsibility for their own agencies.

A particular separation – between ‘politics’ and ‘administration’ - is emphasised in a number of the NIS reports. The idea that it is possible and desirable to draw a strong clear line between ‘politics’ and ‘administration’ was crystallized in Woodrow Wilson’s essay ‘The Study of Administration’ first published in 1897, and was promoted by the so-called Progressive
movement. Yet American research since regularly shows that full time officials are intimately and regularly involved in ‘politics’, almost however defined (Rohr 1988). They authoritatively determine the allocation of values, they determine who gets what, and they pursue some version of the common good (Rohr 1988: 36). They do this through the wide exercise of discretion, which was the third of the risk of corruption in Klitgaard’s formula ‘corruption = monopoly + discretion - accountability’, described above. Permanent officials propose as well as implement policies. And they judge and determine who will get benefits and who will not. The huge expansion of the modern administrative and welfare state has multiplied these political tasks. It came to the Pacific in the form of the postwar ‘developmental state’, and to PNG in the expansion of Australian bureaucratic activity in the 1950s and 1960s – cut short by Independence. The power of officials is limited, like that of politicians, by law and popular opinion, but the only sense in which public servants are not involved in politics is in standing for elections.

Neither colonial nor monarchical rule drew a line between politics and administration. Highly political Governors and Commissioners made laws, interpreted them, and exercised discretion within them. In Vanuatu, just before independence, there was civil service position called ‘political officer’, a kind of Wilsonian contradiction in terms. On a grander scale, in what became PNG, Paul Hasluck, the Minister for Territories was an ambitious and forceful politician, with strong and detailed view about how the country should be governed. Colonial administrations then handed over authority to a new group of locally elected politicians. These politicians faced a civil service, largely controlled by their compatriots, but reluctant to cede authority to them. Written constitutions created independent public service commissions to protect the autonomy of the civil service, but politicians typically picked away at them through control of top appointments, and the budget. Powerful bureaucrats resigned to enter electoral politics. In PNG, for example, there were struggles over the independence of the Public Service Commission.
Politicians and officials sometimes allied to share the spoils of office, as when Kavanamur (nd) blames a ‘nexus’ of officials and politicians for corruption in PNG. And at local level, as Carol Kidu claimed in her latter to The National, cited above, politicians were providing an alternative to bureaucratic government at local level, as much as a corruption of it (though many were doing the latter as well). Ketan (2007) shows that the Electoral or constituency funds – over which politicians rather than officials have control – were not always and everywhere corrupt in the sense of private or partisan use. In many cases politicians were spending money on development projects, and in cooperation with local committees. Academics and aid donors (and TI) have sometimes been too quick to take sides on behalf of ‘good’ bureaucrats against ‘bad’ politicians.

The pioneers of a critical approach to anti-corruption campaigns, Anechiarico and Jacobs (1996), were sceptical about the Progressive movement’s anti-corruption platform. They showed that the system of political patronage the Progressives sought to overthrow was itself a reaction against an earlier form of ‘corruption’: the stranglehold on government jobs held by an Eastern elite. Right or not, the Progressive project of separating politics from administration was hard to implement as states became larger and more interventionist in the twentieth century. Government officials were involved in distributive tasks and politicians were unwilling to surrender all control to them. Scandals proliferated as the scope of government action grew. The Progressive answer was new layers of bureaucratic and judicial supervision which put in place after each corruption scandal. These new layers began to make cities like New York hard to govern effectively: too many approvals were required, and too many firms were disqualified. Anechiarico and Jacobs argue that by 1970s the Progressive movement had run out of steam. It was challenged on grounds of its inefficiency by what in the US was called ‘reinventing government’ and in Australia, New Zealand and the UK, the New Public Management. These anti-progressive movements were suspicious of civil service autonomy, and restored some authority to democratically elected
politicians, for example by putting department heads on short-term contracts. The New Public Management became influential on some Pacific Islands governments, particularly through the New Zealand aid program, and reforms promoted by the Asian Development Bank. In Cook Islands, for example, the heads of public service agencies were dismissed and their jobs readvertised, while ministers gained powers to determine the contracts.

The self-image of an autonomous professional civil service continues to be attractive to civil servants (and to the officials in donor institutions who promote good governance abroad). Current ‘capacity building’ tends to follow an old ideal of an effective, impartial civil service, free from political interference. The remedies from Progressive diagnosis include various kinds of insulating and strengthening institutions. Personnel, audit, financial management and contracting functions need to be insulated from external interference. The exercise of discretion needs to be limited by law. Outdated and contradictory legislation needs to be modernized, courts and anti-corruption agencies need to be strengthened.

A third group of constitutional diagnoses turn on ideas about the state, and state failure. The first of this group is historical and juridical in its approach, conceptualising the state in terms of Weber’s famous phrase the ‘monopoly of the legitimate use of violence’. Its emphasis on law and enforcement is consistent with definitions of corruption that emphasize its rule breaking character. The ‘naturally wholesome’ condition to which it aspires is a cadre of officials, separate from society, whose salaries and full time careers allow them to develop a professional ethos and competence. In some ways the Weberian bureaucracy is a machine against corruption.
The second celebrates the economic efficiency and political freedom of markets, and takes a dim view of even well-intentioned state action. It was crystallised (and demonised) as ‘neoliberalism’ and became particularly influential after island states began facing financial crises in the late 1990s, and so became open to the policy recommendations of international financial institutions. It sees corruption as a persistent risk in any kind of state action. The naturally wholesome condition to which it aspires is the ‘freely competitive market’, from which any derogation is a kind of ‘rent seeking’ or worse. It is not against the state as such, but believes its activities should be sharply limited to correction of market failures, and subject to competitive testing.

The third theory of the state is influential among social scientists in the regional universities. It tends to see political institutions – including the state – as an effect of these, or an arena in which more fundamental social conflicts are played out. Less concerned with legality, neo-Marxist analysis of corruption tends to see corruption as continuous with other forms of capital accumulation. It is summed up in the title of Colin Leys influential 1960’s article ‘What is the problem with Corruption’, where he made the point that the economic development of the United States took place through, and in spite of rampant corruption. Nevertheless Leys (2002) recognised the way that corruption provided a moral critique of capitalism, noticing the role of puritans in ensuring capitalism’s legitimacy and development. Some of this moral critique persists in NGO hostility to corruption (and to the form of development in the Pacific, and state complicity in it). Leys asked where the puritans would come from in Africa. We now know it is in the local chapters of TI, and their alliances with sections of the bourgeoisie interested in long term development rather than short term, illegitimate profit.
The neo-Weberian and neoliberal diagnoses provide clear and partly consistent recommendations about what should be done about corruption. In the Weberian framework it is a matter of ‘state building’. In the neoliberal framework it is a matter of reducing state interference in the workings of the market. The neo-Marxist message is less clear, but emerging in donor driven research like the UK DFID’s ‘Drivers of Change’ project, or the ADB’s work on ‘political economy’.

**Economic Diagnoses**

The current international concern is partly a result of a shift in opinion in the economics profession, from acceptance of corruption as greasing the wheel, to a concern with its distortionary impact. Economists tend to see corruption as increasing the costs of doing business, and distorting public investment into areas that will give officials the greatest opportunities to rake off corrupt benefits for themselves. Military expenditure, for example, is often socially useless but creates opportunities for officials to connive with arms dealers in favour of one weapons system over another. Economists have been effective in straddling the line between academic and policy talk. Susan Rose Ackerman (1999) is the most influential. She analysed the impact of corruption on the distribution of the costs and benefits of government action. First, where governments are allocating benefits for free, or at below market prices, bribes can divert those services towards those willing to pay for them. Bribes in this sense ‘clear the market’. Second, people may be prepared to bribe to overcome delays in the provision of services like driving licences or passports. In this sense bribes act as an incentive to sluggish public servants to perform. Third, bribes may help reduce a firm’s costs, for example if it is cheaper to buy off an inspector, rather than install safety equipment. Illegal firms may buy protection, and in the extreme case organised crime dominates the police: “Bribes permit criminal activity’ (1999: 9-10)
Robert Klitgaard (1988) summarized his analysis of the causes of corruption in the pithy formula ‘monopoly + discretion – accountability = corruption’ that has been adopted by the World Bank in its studies of corruption in particular sectors (Campos and Pradhan 2007). The new term in this diagnosis is ‘monopoly’, the opposite of competition. It offers another way of thinking of the power of which corruption is an abuse. According to Klitgaard it is the monopoly power of government that gives its officials the power to extort bribes from their clients. Without that monopoly clients could go elsewhere, shopping around, until they could get what they wanted without paying a bribe. The privatization and deregulation of telephone services is a good example of the effects of ending monopolies. When only the government can install phones, there are typically delays and opportunities for officials to extract bribes to install connexions. When several companies provide the service, none can extract a bribe as ‘rent’. You tend not to hear of corruption in the sale of mobile phones, though there may be plenty of new corruption in the allocation of mobile phone licences to companies. The other elements of Klitgaard’s formula are more familiar. Discretion provides opportunities to grant or withhold a service, or apply or exempt from a charge that provides officials with an opportunity to extort a bribe (again it is the official rather than client who tends to get the blame – a reversal of the old civil service model). The third term, accountability has become a panacea for all sorts of ills of governance.

Economic diagnoses are influential among international organizations, like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, and through them, aid donors. Susan Rose-Ackerman was a member of the board of the US Chapter on TI, and in 1995-6 she was a visiting fellow at the World Bank. Johan Lambsdorff devised the CPI that became TI’s signature product, used and sometimes abused by economists ever since (Abramo 2007). Daniel Kaufmann developed his own governance indicators at the World Bank, and showed particularly the ill effects of
corruption on economic growth (Kaufmann et al 1999). Another economist, Bryane Michael (2004) has theorized about the process of translating academic ideas about corruption into practice. This work is well documented on these institutions’ and individuals’ various websites.

The remedies simply reverse the formula: end monopolies, reduce official discretion, and increase accountability. These fit easily with programs of public sector reform and good governance that international institutions were promoting in the 1990s. Following her economic diagnosis Rose Ackerman suggested ways of reducing the benefits or increasing the costs of corrupt behaviour. These included eliminating particularly risky programs, such as subsidies or licensing, that create opportunities for corruption, privatisation and civil service reform (1999: 39-88). However, liberalisation in some countries seems to have increased the amount of corruption (eg India). And looking back to the political arguments for democracy, democratisation in some countries seems to have made no difference or made things worse (eg Russia, Thailand). Gordon White (1996) coined the phrase ‘New Corruption’ to describe these unwelcome and unexpected consequences of reform. The remedies suggested were strengthened regulatory regimes and property rights.

Anthropological Diagnoses

Anthropologists of the state have paid particular attention to low level corruption’s workings in Africa, Asia, and the former Soviet Union, but so far not in the Pacific. For India, Gupta (1995) describes the how a local land official, and his sidekick, deal with people’s requests to subdivide land, record a change of ownership, or settle a boundary dispute. Getting each of these done required public payment of a small bribe at a well known going rate, and this low level corruption
is linked upwards to more senior officials who profit from larger deals. It’s a kind of game in which people know the rules, and when they are broken. Gupta describes how clients, frustrated at the action or inaction of local officials in a development, might appeal higher up the chain. Or they pool their money to bribe a higher official to install, in this case, a generator. For Africa, Harrison (2004) argues that there is little evidence about how corruption works in practice, particularly in the agency of local level officials. She looks at the role of Development Agents, low level officials who deliver farmer training and collect repayments of loans. Now they are also expected to act as conduits for participatory forms of planning preferred by donors. In practice they defer to locally powerful people, and turn a blind eye to local ‘redistributions’ of food aid to people who collect it on behalf of others, or give to people not on the list. Whether this amounts to corruption is open to interpretation, and hard to tell. For Russia, the sociologist Elena Ledeneva (1998) draws on anthropological thinking in her discussion of blat, the system of mutual exchange of contacts and favours that helped people ‘get by’ through the scarcities of the Soviet Union.

These anthropological accounts have been reluctant to promote remedies. They point to extenuating circumstances, and unintended consequences of insensitive central government action. What outsiders as might see as corruption is not understood as such by the participants – or at least there are mitigating circumstances. The anthropologists and sociologists tend to take the side of the people they are studying – empathy is, after all, part of their method. And they are inherently sceptical of the local impact of the grand designs of donors and central governments.

The examples above are each of what the political scientist Bernard Schaffer characterised as ‘access’ where individuals interact with institutions to get licences or subsidies, and some are favoured and some rejected. In the last paper he wrote before he died Schaffer (1986) used
Hirschman’s ‘voice’ and ‘exit’ framework that we discussed at the end of Chapter 2 to ask questions about corruption. He took as his example the relationship between Indian sugar growers and the mill that processes the cane they bring to it. Access is controlled by issuing a limited number of permits. Growers need permits at particular times, or the cane they have cut will perish. They perceive the whole process as ‘corrupt’ and biased against them. Where they can they exit and make their own molasses or sell the cane on an informal market. Or they employ their own touts and brokers. Paradoxically, perceptions of corruption in the official process lead to acts of corruption to get around it. In the similar case of a milk cooperative, however, the role of intermediary is traditional middle man, who also helps framers with credit. He charges more than the market price, and pays less for the milk, but his role is accepted as legitimate, without indignation. Schaffer argues there are different kinds of voice in play – the voice of the broker who speaks for the client as an individual, or for the growers as a group, and the voice of the farmer who grumbles, complains, or joins a riot. Schaffer wonders why some brokerage is regarded as legitimate and some is regarded as corrupt, and why and some voice is indignant and violent, and some is not.

Popular corruption may be like or linked to various popular scams, gambling and get-rich-quick schemes. The Solomon Islands’ report mentions ‘fraudulent schemes’. These have been rife in the region, with varying degrees of legality and sanction (and participation) by regulators. Nancy Sullivan lists a few that have bubbled up in PNG recently:

…Money Rain, U-Vistract, Papaslain, Windfall and Hosava. Hosava was said to be an alternative stock exchange, Windfall was a grassroots ‘Investment and Management Company’, while most of the others have been based on the pyramid model which allows
only the first investors to see healthy profits, after which any and all returns simply evaporate (Sullivan 2007: 71)

The economic anthropologist John Cox has studied U-Vistract in particular. It was founded by a Bougainvillean, Noah Musingu, and was initially open only to Bougainvilleans as a kind of alternative, regional bank. It had religious connections: investors had to get a reference from a minister attesting to their Christian character. U Vistract veered off into separatist politics, and Musingu became a kind of outlaw folk hero. Some investors are still hopeful of recovering their money.

In PNG these popular schemes have attracted government funding and got official support. Nancy Sullivan describes how, by getting in early, senior civil servants invested public money in the schemes and ‘made excellent profits before returning the capital to the public coffers’ (2007: 71). The Clerk to Parliament invested ‘K300,000 of public funds’ into the Money Rain project (Sullivan 2007: 71). The head of the National Research Institute was prosecuted when he invested K800,000 of the Institute’s funds into an African scam. Politicians were said to be putting their EDF funds into the scheme. The Ombudsman, whose office was concurrently investigating misuse of electoral Development funds was putting his own money into several schemes, including U-Vistract (he later resigned) (Cox 2008: 6). The Treasurer to the Skate government in PNG exempted the schemes from certain financial regulations (Cox 2008: 9). PNG officialdom later turned against the schemes. Nevertheless, it is often hard to draw the line between these popular schemes, the dubious projects ministers get attracted to, and national get-rich-quick schemes that get domestic legal sanction, like tax havens in Vanuatu, Cook Islands or Nauru.

Cox analyses the schemes in terms that would also be useful in analysing the sociology of corruption. The first is ‘relationality’. The schemes spread through pre-existing kinship and
religious networks. The second is ‘rationality’: Cox finds investors in these schemes acting with deliberation and calculation, citing the evidence of early payouts, and blaming the government rather than the perpetrator when the money failed to materialise. The third is ‘religiosity’ – the schemes were similar, and often related, to the campaigns of new pentecostal churches, and their theologies that theology celebrated prosperity rather than the ‘old Protestant ethic of frugality and hard work and thrift’ (Cox 2008: 24). Corruption combines these three factors in a different way. It is quintessentially relational, trading on personal contacts and family ties. In its ‘grand’ forms it is the product of deliberation and calculation, but petty corruption seems more reflexive and unthinking. It is the butt of moralism rather than religion – and indeed churches seem to be vulnerable to it.

Criminological Diagnoses

Economic and political approaches are dominant in international organizations donor policy and academic writing, but the doctrines of domestic anti corruption agencies tend to be located in older concerns with policing and criminal justice. The original ICACs were set up in response to police corruption, in Hong Kong and then Sydney. Sydney’s ICAC is typically headed by a judge and the investigative side staffed by ex police.

Corruption is, after all, a crime in most jurisdictions (or at least some types of corruption, such as bribery are criminalized). Angela Gorta, the ICAC’s research director reviewed the criminology literature for the light it might shed on corruption control (Gorta 2005). First, crime depends on situation, not the fixed personality of the offender. There are no criminal types. Second, people choose to commit crimes. They are often a matter of calculation rather than impulse. Third, there
are different types of crime – crimes against property, crimes against the person, and so on.

Fourth, offenders try to justify and neutralize what they do, to themselves and their accusers: ‘I did it for my family’ ‘pressure of work’ and so on. Fifth, organisational factors affect whether crime takes place: the presence or absence of opportunities, the examples set by others, peer pressure and so on.

These findings from criminology have implications for a particular crime, or type of crime, corruption. The first suggests that everyone is capable of acting corruptly, in the right circumstances, and so anti-corruption campaigns must view all officials as potentially corrupt (including those at the top, who traditionally commissioned anti-corruption campaigns without making themselves subject to them). Second, if they decide to act corruptly its worth trying to understand why they did it (exercising suitable scepticism about the self justifications they may offer). The third principle suggests we need to take different approaches to different types of corruption. Lumping them all together may obscure important differences in incidence, seriousness and remedies. Bribery of officials needs to be dealt with differently from political campaign financing, for example. The fourth principle suggests investigators must be ready to challenge the self-justifying and neutralizing explanations that corrupt officials offer to explain their behaviour (low pay may be one of those). The organizational factor that the NSW ICAC has taken most seriously is organisational culture – the expectations set by peers, particularly in induction routines, and the examples set by leaders. New recruits to the police for example were typically told to forget what they had learned at police college, and join in corrupt activity, apparently condoned by those at the top.
Conclusions

I have summarised these various diagnoses, and the cures they suggest in Table 4.1 (where there is no obvious cure I have put a question mark). It would be hard to say that one diagnosis is truer than the other; they conceptualise the problem differently, and suggest different – though often overlapping – remedies. There are some disciplinary and professional biases. Lawyers favour constitutional explanations and cures. Economists are generally suspicious of government action. Political scientists are sympathetic to the difficulties faced by politicians. Anthropologists tend to take the side of the people they do their fieldwork among. Journalists have a professional commitment to investigative journalism, and a professional scepticism about the motives of the powerful. While mainstream churches in PNG have been critical of corruption in government, the theologies of some of the newer Pentecostal churches seemed to be endorsing get rich quick schemes that drew public officials into corruption.

The criminological approach, in particular, suggests that different types of corruption needed to be treated differently. It also suggests a multidisciplinary approach within anti-corruption commissions. Comparison of diagnoses and cures suggests some scepticism about professional and disciplinary doctrine which has been wrong in the past. Anti-corruption campaigners need to ask for systematic empirical evidence for the effectiveness of the remedies offered by particular professions or disciplines, rather than anecdotal evidence for preconceptions. Unfortunately there is little systematic empirical evidence available on the success of failure of anti-corruption policies and more is badly needed, but we shall look at some of it in the collusions. While there is a multiplicity of local and popular explanations for corruption, and different academic disciplines suggest different remedies, two theories dominate international discussions: TI’s NIS, and
Klitgaard’s risk based model. Where international organizations and aid donors are relatively powerful, as they are among the aid dependent states of the Pacific Islands – their theories, like them or not, tend to dominate the discussion.

Table 4.1 shows that some diagnoses are more suggestive of cures than others. The constitutional diagnosis, currently embodied in TI’s NIS, is full of constructive ideas – separation of powers, operational independence, checks and balances. And it is simple to read off recommendations from Klitgaard’s institutional formula (C = M +D-A)

But the medical analogy (diagnosis – cure) should also remind us that neither the number of cures, nor their superficial plausibility, is a good guide to their validity or effectiveness. Think of the plethora of over-the-counter remedies available for the incurable common cold. A desire – and a demand – to ‘do something’ about corruption can keep anti-corruption campaigners busy but not necessarily effective. However, as we shall see in Chapter 9, some evidence is now emerging about the effectiveness of the common cures on offer.

Some diagnoses are more reluctant to propose remedies than others. The cures suggested by anthropological diagnoses are often a little muffled: perhaps ‘bottom up’ or participatory policy making, of the kind inaugurated by the TI (PNG) focus groups described in Chapter 2. But close attention to local understandings and circumstances sometimes suggests official passivity: ‘do no harm’ or ‘leave well alone’. Schaffer’s subtle account of the role of middlemen ends with a
question rather than a recommendation, wondering why the actions of some kinds of middle men lead to popular fury, while others engender respect.

In a different direction, it is also difficult to read cures off Marxist diagnoses. If corruption is just another form of ‘accumulation’, and its legality not a matter of great concern, then as Leys asked ‘what’s the problem?’. It may be a little glib, or utopian, to list ‘revolution’ as the cure in Table 4.1. However it points us towards Bainimarama’s avowedly revolutionary project for Fiji, with its accusations of corruption against the old regime, and the suspicions of corruption among the new, post-revolutionary, elite.
### Diagnoses and Cures for Corruption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Diagnosis</th>
<th>Cure</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PNG focus groups</td>
<td>Individual moral failings; Difficult economic circumstances</td>
<td>Punishment; Jobs, price control, subsidies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIS Studies</td>
<td>Colonial character of state; Smallness; Gaps in NIS.</td>
<td>Decolonisation; Regionalism; Hiring offshore; Anti Corruption Agency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional</td>
<td>Absence of checks and balances; No line between politics and administration.</td>
<td>Construction of NIS; Draw and patrol line; Strong PSC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State theory</td>
<td>Weber; Hayek; Marx</td>
<td>Career public service; Deregulation; Revolution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Rose Ackerman; Klitgaard C= M + D - A</td>
<td>Public sector reform; End monopolies, reduce discretion increase accountability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthropology</td>
<td>Use of agents/middlemen; Access (Schaffer)</td>
<td>Bottom-up policy making; Do no harm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminology</td>
<td>No criminal personality</td>
<td>Suspect everyone;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Choice to commit
Different types
Offenders try to neutralize
Organizational factors (including culture) (Gorta)

Understand reasons;
Different strategies for each type;
Challenge their statements;
Reorganise and change organisational culture.

Chapter 5

How much corruption is there?

New ways of measuring corruption are being used to assess the performance of governments in tackling the problem. The Pacific Islands Plan, for example, envisages a ‘control of corruption (integrity) indicator’, that could be used to assess a government’s progress towards achieving good governance (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 2008:33). This chapter reviews the kinds of measures that are becoming available for the Pacific Islands.

National Anti-Corruption Agency Statistics
In most countries of the region the criminal code creates offences such as abuse of office, misappropriation, secret commissions, and the bribery of public officials. The police may investigate more serious cases, and a government prosecutor take the case to court. So investigations and successful prosecutions are one measure of corruption. Yet they don’t really tell us how much is going on underneath. The number of cases and prosecutions reflects the competence and zeal of the justice system (and the incompetence and carelessness of those it catches). Figures are difficult to compare as cases proceed slowly through the justice system, often stalling. Stepping back, police and court records are rarely gathered together into statistics that can be monitored for trends.

Fortunately there are now some specialised agencies devoted to enforcing laws against corruption, and there are some figures available about their performance. The Independence constitutions of PNG, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu provide for ‘leadership codes’, governing the behaviour of senior officials and politicians and insisting that they declare assets, avoid conflicts of interest in their private business dealings, and generally avoid bringing the offices they hold into disrepute. These laws are administered by the Ombudsman Commission or (in Solomon Islands) a separate Leadership Code Commission. Recently there has been a new wave of interest in anti-corruption laws and institutions. Tuvalu adopted a leadership code in 2007. In the same year Fiji’s Interim Government established the Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption. Tonga set up an Anti Corruption Commission in 2008.

Since 1982 32 Members of Parliament (MPs) have been charged under PNG’s Leadership Code, and another seven under both Criminal and Leadership Codes (Ketan 2007 Appendix 1). Nineteen of the charges involved misappropriation of funds, usually those for local expenditures
like road building and school subsidies. Another three involved the receipt of payments of K100,000 from ‘the Prime Minister’s discretionary fund’ as ‘compensation for being replaced during a ministerial reshuffle’ (in 1992). Two involved payments and favours from logging companies including a Jaguar car for a minister. Two involved failures to comply with the procedures of the commission itself – submitting returns. Two MPs were also charged with rape, and one for drunkenly endangering airline passengers. Of the outcomes, 9 involved the leader going to prison, and another 16 involved the MP being suspended or dismissed from office. However three leaders were returned by forgiving voters at subsequent elections and another managed to retain his seat in the 2007 election from prison (pending an appeal). In six cases the leader resigned from office to avoid charges under the leadership code, though resignation provided no escape from charges under the Criminal Code.

About half (35) of the 75 reports produced by the Vanuatu Ombudsman Commission between 1996-2000 involved misbehaviour by ministers, ranging from the issue of phony letters of credit to foreign fraudsters, through to awarding themselves compensation, and favouring their relatives (Hill 2001). The most egregious offender was Barak Sope, who was convicted of fraud then pardoned by the President (Forsyth 2003). About 15 cases involved appointments and promotions of individuals in the public service or statutory bodies. Another 15 involved the abuse of other kinds of discretion over funding, housing, sale of government assets or contracts. The National Provident Fund was the agency provoking most attention, including a riot in Port Vila (3 reports).

Solomon Islands Leadership Code Commission took a less aggressive approach towards politicians, and was unable to get to grips with the large number of financial returns it solicited
(Larmour 2000). Fiji has recently taken a more aggressive approach after the 2006 coup. In June 2008 it announced that a total of 22 public officials had been charged with corruption offences prescribed in the Penal Code, mostly ‘abuse of office’. They included CEOs and Board members of statutory bodies, a senior policeman, and district level officials. The former Prime Minister was charged with abuse of office during the time he had been director of Fijian Holdings Limited, and when (as Prime Minister) he had been responsible for the Native Lands Trust Board. At the time of writing none of these post-coup cases had been decided.

Other agencies provide evidence of corruption without necessarily leading to prosecutions. The most important, after the event, have been Auditors General. Sua’ Rimoni’s audit reports on Samoa in the mid 90s had a great impact. New to government, having worked in the private sector, he documented abuses of power and machinery by the Works and Agriculture Ministers. He was vilified in parliament and his contract cut short. In the turmoil that followed a Minister named in the reports was assassinated.

The Solomon Islands Auditor General, with the help of Australian officials, produced a burst of 10 audit reports between 2005 and 2006. They estimated that over the years an amount roughly equivalent to the country’s annual GDP had gone missing (Roughan 2004: 4). In the absence of record keeping, it was hard to tell where it had gone. Shortcomings included non-compliance with legislation, acting without authority, and breakdowns in financial management. Among them were acts that would come under narrower definitions of ‘corruption’, such as ‘officials using positions of influence to assist family and friends to gain from their positions’ and ‘loss of revenue through poor management, corruption and fraud’ (Solomon Islands 2007).
In a similar way Fiji’s Auditor General had reported on what became called the ‘Agriculture scam’ that took place under the Interim Government created after the 2000 coup. Agriculture equipment, plant material and other items were bought and distributed to Fijian (but not Indo-Fijian) farmers. A special audit report found the expenditure had been unauthorised, and the equipment had been bought at inflated prices from favoured suppliers without going out to tender (Fiji 2002, Mausio 2003). There had been ‘lack of forecasting and planning, poor channels of communication and co-ordination and no means of performance monitoring and control’ and ‘fraud and corruption can not be ruled out’ (Fiji 2002: 3, 23). After long-drawn out police investigations a mid ranking official was charged and convicted of falsifying invoices in 2005, and the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture was convicted of abuse of office in November 2006 (just before the next coup and the creation of the Fiji ICAC). The Ministry’s Principal Account and two more junior officials were convicted in September 2008. They had been receiving kickbacks from the favoured suppliers. The owner of one of the favoured companies was also convicted.

International Figures

The anti corruption laws and agencies described above have been national in scope though they have looked overseas for inspiration: to Africa, in the case of the Melanesian leadership codes, and Hong Kong and Malaysia in the case of FICAC. Since the mid 1990s, however, there has been an explosion of international interest in ‘good governance’ in general, and ‘corruption’ in particular. The Pacific Islands Forum made several attempts to adopt a model leadership code for
its members. This international interest has been precipitated and serviced by Transparency International, the NGO founded by disaffected international civil servants in 1993. Initially resistant, World Bank has become convinced of the risks of corruption to development. Its researchers – particularly Daniel Kaufmann – developed increasingly sophisticated measures of perceptions, and experience, of corruption. As the studies have become available – include the NIS studies – they have gradually begun to include the Pacific Islands in their calculations. Tables 5.1-5.7 show the results.

Table 1 is an extract from TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index. The CPI did not survey corruption directly but relied on answers to questions about corruption in other surveys and assessments already carried out by ratings agencies, think tanks and so on. These were processed into a score, which then could be used to compare one country with another. The key figure in Table 5.1 is the country’s score, out of 10, where 10 is ‘clean’ and 0 is ‘dirty’. This score is derived from the findings of at least three independent surveys – the absence of such surveys has delayed the inclusion of Pacific Islands until the mid 2000s. The ranking in column 1 is of the country in relation to all the other countries counted that year. In 2008 Samoa does best and PNG the worst.

The CPI is a measure of perceptions. TI was originally uneasy about adopting the CPI, proposed by an academic economist Johan Lambsdorff (Galtung 2007). It feared the public rankings might antagonise the very governments they were seeking to influence. TI were reformers, and the index was also silent about what countries should actually do to improve their performance. When Tonga, for example, was listed the Prime Minister’s advisor complained ‘it has no meaning because the report they produced has not pointed out exactly where the corruption is’ (Radio New Zealand 29 January 2008). Nevertheless, international league tables are irresistible to the media,
even if their reports miss the distinction between perceptions and experience or reality. TI
stooped to conquer, but has also gone on to produce other measures that responded to criticism of
the CPI and are described more below: detailed country level studies; a ranking of bribe givers
(China, France etc); and a barometer of popular opinion, rather than opinions of than business
leaders. It has also provided much more detail on its website about how the CPI is assembled
(Lambsdorff 2008).

In Table 5.2 ‘control of corruption’ is only one of several governance indicators developed by
Kaufmann and his colleagues at the World Bank. As with the CPI it is based on ‘a large number
of business citizen and expert surveys’ (World Bank 2007). Table 2 shows results for Pacific
Islands countries for which such data was available. The ranking in this case is of the countries
against each other, rather than the world. Among a larger group of countries than those measured
by the CPI, Guam does best and New Caledonia does worst (both, incidentally, are overseas
territories of, respectively, the US and France). Of the independent states Cook Islands does best
and Tonga the worst.

The TI and World Bank indices rely on varieties of opinion and (occasionally) experience
processed to produce a single score – or range of scores - for corruption. They have to rely on the
definitions of corruption adopted by these surveys, and the respondents to them. Lambsdorff
describes how his sources used various definitions, covering different forms of corruption, but
which he believes ‘can be said to aim at measuring the same broad phenomenon’ (2008: 5).
Kaufmann and his colleagues emphasise the complexity of governance, the imprecision of their
measures, and the limitations to comparison.
A group of economists at the University of the South Pacific (USP) (Gani and others nd) have tried to get around the problem of relying largely on perceptions. Like the other sponsors of the global indicators, they were interested in influencing governments, and anticipated that negative opinions could easily be shrugged off by politicians. Instead they looked for hard data, mostly already available in official statistics which were updated each year. They used the standard definition of corruption as ‘abuse of public power for private benefit’. They mention the opportunities that price fixing, import restrictions, complicated taxes and ‘regulations about types of workers to hire’ provide for unscrupulous officials to extract bribes. So its really a measure of risks rather acts of corruption they are talking about. They looked for indicators of that risk, and believed they had found it in the proportions of ‘economic services’ and ‘recurrent’ expenditure to total expenditure. (I wondered what counts as ‘economic services’ in each country’s budget, and might not some of those services reduce rather than exacerbate corruption? Why is capital expenditure regarded as less risky than recurrent expenditure?). These proportions were then scaled and averaged to produce an annual index for each of the seven Pacific Islands countries they surveyed. This approach allows them compare countries with each other and see trends, and find some good news stories. In aggregate, between 1995 and 2006, they found ‘substantial improvements in governance quality’ for Cook Islands, Fiji, Vanuatu and Samoa’ (ibid:4). Solomon Islands governance quality, however, declined over the period. The authors suggest that the improvements were the results of the economic reform programs supported by donors.
Table 5.1
Transparency International 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Rank (out of 180 countries)</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>CPI Score 2008 (10 is best)</th>
<th>Confidence Intervals</th>
<th>Number of Surveys Used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.4-4.8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96</td>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.5-3.4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.4-3.7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.5-3.2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>138</td>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.9-2.6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.6-3.3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TI 2008

Table 5.2
World Bank ‘Control of Corruption’ Indicator

2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentile Rank (1-100)</th>
<th>Governance Score (-2.5 - +2.5)</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cook Islands</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federated States of Micronesia</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall Islands</td>
<td>-0.53</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>-1.13</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>-1.29</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Caledonia</td>
<td>-1.33</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 5.3

**Rankings Compared**

(for countries that appear in every survey)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Samoa</strong></td>
<td><strong>Samoa</strong></td>
<td><strong>Vanuatu</strong></td>
<td><strong>PNG</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>Samoa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>PNG</td>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>Tonga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNG</td>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>PNG</td>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 5.4

**CPI Scores and Rankings in Different Years**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Score (/10)</td>
<td>Score (/10)</td>
<td>Score (/10)</td>
<td>Score (/10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rank (/180)</td>
<td>Rank (/180)</td>
<td>Rank (/163)</td>
<td>Rank (/159)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>4.4 (62)</td>
<td>4.5 (57)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fiji  
Kiribati  3.1 (96)  3.3 (84)  4.0 (55)
Solomon Islands  2.9 (109)  2.8 (111)
Vanuatu  2.9 (109)  3.1 (98)
Tonga  2.4 (138)  1.7 (175)
PNG  2.0 (151)  2.0 (162)  2.4 (130)  2.3 (130)

Tables 5.3 and 5.4 make some comparisons between rankings and scores, between surveys, and over time. There is a temptation for governments, and their critics, to grab hold of changes in the score and ranking as evidence of the success or failure of their efforts to reduce corruption. The USP’s indicators show a striking reversal in relative performance in the 10 years since 1995, with Samoa and PNG going from worst of this group to best: it would be hard for them to resist crowing. The tables shows how this temptation should be resisted, but how hard it is to resist.

The CPI is first of all a perceptions index, and perceptions may lead or lag behind changes in policy, and their effects. Second, as the data on popular perceptions discussed below suggests, there may well be embedded prejudices, favourable or unfavourable, that are impervious to policy changes. Third, it is designed to move slowly. The CPI ‘includes previous two year’s score in calculating this year’s (Galtung 2007). Lambsdorff notes that the CPI ‘provides a snapshot of the views of business people and country analysts, with less of a focus on year-to-year trends’ (Lambsdorff 2008: 3). Fourth, the rankings depend not only on a country’s score, but on whether other countries have joined or left the ranking above or below it. A country’s ranking may go up or down whatever you do, as other countries join or leave the table above or below you (this effect will reduce as more and more countries are regularly included). Fifth, the rankings are a
treadmill of reputations. It is not possible to improve your ranking if everyone else is perceived to be improving at the same time.

Fiji was the first to be scored and ranked (in 2005), but has dropped out since. TI’s website mentions an insufficient number of surveys. Table 4 shows it then got a relatively high score for the region (4.0), lower only than Samoa in later years, and its global ranking of 55 was then shared with Bulgaria, Colombo and Seychelles. That middling score invites question: was Fiji’s corruption glass half full or half empty? The years of the coup, the cleanup campaign, and FICAC are unscored, and no doubt much will be made of the figures by the interim government, and its critics, when they appear. Here it needs to be said that the local branches of TI, which tend to be victimised by governments when poor rankings are reported in the local press, have nothing to do with the production of the CPI, which is the responsibility of the organisation’s HQ in Berlin.

Blaming the Victim?

Developing countries tend to cluster towards the bottom of TI’s global rankings. Their governments are often tempted to throw the accusation back in the face of the West. Why blame us when it is your companies that are doing the corrupting? Corruption is a two way street. Mindful of these objections to its CPI TI commissioned another survey of bribe payers rather than recipients. The latest survey, in 2006, asked ‘business executives’ from 125 countries about the behaviour of firms from 30 countries doing business in their country. The question was about experience, and defined what it meant by corruption:
In your experience, to what extent do firms from the countries you have selected make undocumented extra payments or bribes?

However there was a sting in the tail: those bribed by foreigners were also bribing each other:

All the data indicated that domestically owned companies in the 15 countries surveyed have a very high propensity to pay bribes – higher than that of foreign firms (Transparency International 2002/6?).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Margin for Error (95% confidence)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>7.81</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>7.62</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>7.59</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>7.46</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>7.39</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>7.34</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>7.28</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>7.22</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>7.22</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>7.10</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>6.78</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>6.63</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>6.62</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>6.47</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>6.45</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>6.01</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>6.01</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Score</td>
<td>TI Score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>5.94</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>5.83</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>5.65</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>5.61</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>5.59</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>5.41</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>5.23</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>5.16</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>4.94</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>4.62</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Transparency International (accessed 3 July 2008)

The results of the 2006 BPI in Table 5 helps explain the corruption in the forest industries of PNG and Solomon Islands. Malaysian and South Korean timber companies were involved and rank their countries rank low on TI’s survey (21st and 25th, respectively). China and Taiwan, whose official competition for diplomatic recognition has also aggravated suspicions of corruption throughout the region, do even worse. Russia’s companies (28th) feature in US concerns about money laundering in Nauru. The Table also explains Australia’s interest in the matter: Australia’s companies have a reputation for cleanliness which may put them at a competitive disadvantage in global trade. However, from being ranked top in 2002 Australia has slipped to 3rd in 2006.

We find another, quantifiable, picture of international corruption in John Murray’s memoir of his ten years in charge the Australian Federal Police’s Pacific Islands desk (Murray 2007) The main problem he identifies is ‘premeditated opportunism by white-collar fraudsters and widespread domestic corruption’. Of the 69 scams he describes much the largest number (25) dealt with
various forms of banking and investment fraud. The iconic fraud is what is called the Prime Bank Instrument (PBI) Fraud

premised on the so-called existence of a secret market within which the world’s prime banks are said to trade financial instruments on a daily basis in billion dollar volumes and at huge, irreversible and perpetual profits (NZ Serious Fraud office, accessed 29.1.08).

Vanuatu’s Certificates, signed by ministers and top officials, are the best example. Passport scams come second (7), followed by the tourist hotels and resorts (6) which leave physical ruins, such as the Sheraton in Cook Islands, and Royal International in Tonga, and the Grand Pacific in Suva (a victim of Nauru’s collapse, not Fiji’s). Casinos and gambling (4) real estate (3) and shipping registers (3) were also popular. Nineteen targeted government officials, and 22 targeted ministers. This gives them their ‘corrupt’ inflection. Only four seemed to target local individuals, and in four cases the Pacific Island was merely the base for defrauding individuals elsewhere. There is thin and permeable line between these scams, and more legitimate money-spinners promoted to, and by, island governments. Among these are investment incentives, tax havens, and sales of passports.

Public Opinion

However international organisations define it, and whatever the law says, public opinion also matters in democracies like those in the Pacific Islands (Warren 2004). Elected politicians need to be mindful of their constituents’ opinions. Anti-corruption campaigns need to attract popular
support. Differences between the law and public opinion may lead to changes in the law (or ‘public education’ campaigns to bring citizens back in line). The surveys tend to show public opinion as highly critical of corruption, finding it widespread and growing.

A pilot survey carried out in Solomon Islands found 62% of the sample of the rural population, and 46% of the urban population believed the government was corrupt. However focus groups found ‘no universal agreement on what constituted corruption (and some tendency to challenge the conventional Western view of it)’ (RAMSI 2006). In Chapter 7 we look at evidence the NIS surveys provide of the way culture affects perceptions of corruption, its seriousness, who is to blame and what should be done about it. The PNG Ombudsman commission cites surveys in Port Moresby, Lae, Arawa and Buka in 2005 showing

between 70% and 80% of the people surveyed in the Community Crime Surveys considered that corruption nationally was increasing. In fact, very few people considered it to be decreasing (Ombudsman Commission 2006: 6).

Transparency International (PNG)’s 2009 survey of rural peoples’ perceptions of corruption in Papua New Guinea’ (Walton 2009) was more concerned with understanding what they understood as corruption, than with amounts.

Public opinion in Fiji was surveyed as part of TIs Global Corruption Barometer before the 2006 coup. Like the BPI, and unlike the CPI, the barometer is based on interviews conducted for the purpose. It asks ordinary people rather than business people about their perceptions and
experience of corruption in particular sectors, so answers from particular countries can be compared with responses around the world. The perplexing results are shown in Table 5.6.
Table 5.6

Perception of Corruption and Bribes Paid by Sector in Fiji

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>% who perceived the sector as ‘extremely corrupt’</th>
<th>% who paid a bribe (of those who had contact with the sector)</th>
<th>% who paid a bribe (worldwide average inc Fiji)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tax revenue</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registry and Permits</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Services</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal/Judiciary</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education system</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tebbutt Research 2006 and Transparency International 2006

Table 5.6 shows a gap between perceptions and experience. For example 25% of people thought the tax system highly corrupt, but only 3% of people who actually dealt with the system actually paid a bribe. Maybe they are underreporting their experience, or maybe it is higher level ‘grand’ corruption they have in mind. Maybe also they are reporting indirect knowledge, or common knowledge in a small society. When presenting the survey, the head of TI (Fiji) commented ‘many of the views seemed to reflect the experience of others because few people said they paid bribes although corruption took many forms other than bribery’ (*Fiji Times* 24 March 07). Yet it was bribery that the Fiji’s ICAC would target.
Experienced academic observers of Fiji like Brij Lal or Jon Fraenkel mostly concurred, in a qualified way, with these popular perceptions. Lal referred to the ‘massive scam’ in the Ministry of Agriculture before the 2001 election, and commented that ‘evidence’ of corruption (or mere incompetence and sheer carelessness) was everywhere (2007: 137). Fraenkel argued that ‘In one sense, corruption under the deposed government was well known; especially in the government tendering process, in the immigration department, in the Native Lands Trust board, in the affirmative action campaigns and at the interface between foreign investors and government’ (2007: 429).

Suspicions and allegations are aggravated by gossip and rumour – what Myrdal (1968) calls the ‘folklore of corruption’. The lawyer Richard Naidu argued that, in deciding who to investigate and interrogate, ‘The military seems to be relying on gossip and rumour, just as everyone else in Fiji tends to do’ (Fiji Times 18 December 06). Fiji also has a lively independent media, ready to report on untested allegations of corruption – part of its willing participation in anti-corruption campaigns discussed more below.

However the gap between popular perceptions of corruption and reported experience is not unusual. Claudio Abramo of Transparencia Brazil has looked at the statistical relationships between experience and opinions in the Corruption Barometer worldwide. He finds ‘perceptions are not good predictors for experiences’, and vice versa (2007: 7), However perceptions of corruption correlate with other opinions about prices, poverty, the environment and so on. Reviewing ten years of cross national comparisons David Triesman reaches similar conclusions. There is a strong correlation between the surveys of peoples’ perceptions of corruption. But the link between perceptions and experience is much weaker, particularly in poorer countries
In the developed democracies of Europe and North America, reported bribery is rare and the corruption level is consistently perceived to be low. But among the countries perceived to have the highest corruption, there are some (e.g., Paraguay and the Cameroons) where a large proportion of residents report paying bribes, whereas in others (e.g., Venezuela and Nicaragua) very few do so (2007: 219).

Treisman suspects that the indices measure

Not corruption itself but guesses about its extent in particular countries that experts or survey respondents have derived by applying conventional theories about corruption’s causes. These same conventional theories inform the hypotheses of researchers, which turn out – surprise! – to fit the data well (ibid 241).

Rather than try to resolve this question in principle, Stephen Morris (2006) has looked empirically at the relationship between measures based on perceptions (like the CPI) and measures based on experience (like victimization surveys). He suggests there might be three possible relationships: inductive, in which first or second hand experience influences a person’s perceptions; deductive, in which expectations about the prevalent level of corruption affect a person’s participation in corruption (perhaps their readiness to offer a bribe); and the third possibility, that perceptions and experience are largely unrelated (ibid: 391-392). His cross national data from Latin America finds little relationship between perceptions and participation. At the individual level, citizen perceptions of corruption are far more pronounced than experience, and depend more on ‘general assessments of the economic situation facing the country’ (ibid:}
402). Though weakly related, and differently determined, both perceptions and experience are important.

National Integrity Systems Surveys

As we have seen in earlier Chapters, TI’s surveys of ‘National Integrity Systems’ focus on the country’s anti-corruption architecture, rather than corruption as such. The theory behind it is that a country’s integrity (the opposite of corruption) is upheld by a number of ‘pillars’, such as the legislature, the executive, oversight agencies and so on. It is a plausible theory that can be traced back to the designers of the US constitution, who believed that institutional checks and balances could reduce corruption. So far 14 Pacific Island countries have been surveyed. Manu Barcham and I coordinated the surveys of 12 of them (Larmour and Barcham 2006). We found widespread popular perceptions of corruption (as Abramo and Triesman would have expected among poorer countries) but our Table – reproduced here as table 5.7 - showed most of the pillars of a National Integrity System were in place. The pillars seemed to be ‘hollow’.

It now seems to me the surveys were running ahead of themselves: focussing on the presumed remedies before analysing the corruption problems they were meant to solve. So I later reanalysed the surveys, looking at types (rather than amounts) of corruption identified in each country. There were 25 different types, summarised in Table 5.8. They can be clumped into seven broader types: general administrative corruption; vulnerable branches of government; risky distributions of cash; guarding the guards; political corruption; corruption outside government; and sovereignty sales. This data, summarised in Table 5.8 shows a richer texture, and more
internal variation than Table 5.7, but plenty of empty cells showing ‘don’t know’. It also shows some institutions (like courts and electoral commissions in many countries) were not corrupt.
Table 5.7
Pillars of the National Integrity System In Pacific Island States

( ) Indicates the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ is qualified in some way

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Source: Larmour and Barcham 2006
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Conclusions

Corruption is often, but not always, a complex secretive phenomenon. Particular acts – a gift, a meeting, or a conversation - can be interpreted and recalled in different ways. So it is no surprise that it is hard to measure, and that measures disagree. Their limitations of the surveys need to be recognised if they are going to be used as a basis for withholding aid, as the Pacific Plan proposes, as arguments for economic reform, or as justifications for military coups. Based on the comparisons above, I try to summarise their relative strengths and weaknesses below:

Definitions. The national agencies use relatively clear legal definitions, and the BPI was on strong ground when it explained its definition to respondents. The CPI and World Bank surveys have to skate over differences in what respondents might mean by corruption, or assume their respondents have been talking about the same thing. As we shall see in Chapter 7, the NIS surveys have picked up local differences in people’s understanding of corruption, and the seriousness with which they regard it. People answering the public opinion surveys may be talking about wider systemic and moral failings as well specific acts like bribes: we don’t know until we ask them more closely, as the NIS researchers could.

Scope. The TI/World Bank definition limits attention to ‘public office’. The USP research was extremely suspicious of public sector failings. In the Pacific Islands a focus on the public sector maybe apposite, as private sectors are relatively small. The barometer found public opinion suspicious of ‘business’, after ‘parliament’ and ‘political parties’. The NIS researchers were asked to look for corruption in the private sector, and among NGOs. However the BPI and Murray’s memoir turned attention to the international
givers as well as the receivers of bribes. While the national agencies focus on a subgroup of leaders, or a wider group of public officers, some national legislation allows them to charge the private sector people who conspired with them, as in the Agriculture Scam cases in Fiji.

**Precision** Figures for confidence intervals (in Table 5.1) and standard errors (in Table 5.2) show that the range of possible scores for each country often overlap with their neighbors’. Kaufmann and his World Bank colleagues are particularly alert to the imprecision of the data, and the danger of making too much of small differences in numbers. They urge readers to think of countries as falling into broad bands (good bad and in-between, coded like traffic lights – green, red, yellow) rather than steps on a ladder. The audit reports, carried out after the event, had a more precise, forensic style than the more discursive NIS reports, though they had difficulty in distinguishing ‘corruption’ from a background noise of incompetence, mismanagement and poor record keeping.

**Aggregation** The CPI BPI and NIS are produced by international organisations, and tend to treat countries as the natural unit of analysis. This can create the impression that corruption is a characteristic of a whole population, the entire territory, or the whole system of government. No wonder they provoke angry nationalist responses: ‘what, all of us’? The NIS provides more sectoral detail, but its theory compels it to systemic answers. However it can be disaggregated (as in Table 5.7) to show how particular sectors are more prone to corruption than others, showing more variation between and within countries, and perhaps breaking the problem down into something more manageable.

**Perceptions and experience.** Some experience data is folded into the World Bank data (World Bank 2007: 18). The 2002 BPI actually probes experience. When asked in the first such survey done in 2002 where
their knowledge came from, 52% per cent of the respondents cited ‘personal experience’, and 34% ‘direct experience of people in your company’ while others cited the media, or information from colleagues and friends. In the barometer, experience and perceptions seem quite disconnected, especially in poorer countries.

Recycled data. The CPI and World Bank data is second hand, collected for other purposes, and some of the similarities between scores and rankings in Table 5.3 probably have to do with being derived from the same original data. The results are a little muffled and indirect – like a sausage, or a financial derivative – and it is not very clear how much good data is being combined with bad data. You have to take a lot on trust. The BPI and the barometer do their own survey work. The NIS studies are also based on original, though uneven, fieldwork. So are the national audit reports, and Ombudsman Commission reports. The USP relies on budget data produced for other purposes. Its difficulty, for me, lies in the distance between the proxy measures it uses – ratios between types of public expenditure - and the phenomenon (corruption) which it seeks to measure.

Theoretical prejudices. Triesman’s review of global studies concluded that perceptions of corruption are shaped by the observer’s expectation of what may be causing it, or associated with it. Theory comes before evidence. To some extent this is an inevitable problem of human perception: we bring prior frames to our understanding of events. But we also need to be open to falsification. The CPI and USP surveys were most theory driven. The CPI started with an assumption that corruption was caused by the absence of a functioning ‘integrity system’. The USP data started from the idea that public expenditure created risks for corruption. Both of these theories are plausible, and well regarded, but they won’t explain why corruption takes place in spite of the presence of the NIS (ie in most of the Pacific), or in some recurrent expenditure but not others.
*Expertise.* Tables 5.1-5.7 are bedeviled by problems of definition, knowledge and expertise. What do the investigators or respondents actually know about corruption? The CPI assumes businessmen and financial journalists know best. It was often criticised on nationalist grounds – what did these foreigners know? Lambsdorff replies that the surveys he uses question both foreigners and residents, and correlate well with each other (Lambsdorff 2008: 6). The Fiji army was criticised for acting without sufficient evidence in its ‘cleanup campaign’, but now FICAC has started bringing evidence to court (Larmour 2009). Expertise is more professionalised in audit reports and police work, and could be tested in adversarial courtroom procedures. The barometer assumes ordinary people know best, yet Abramo and Triesman found strong opinions floating freely of direct experience. When does ‘common knowledge’ become ‘folklore’ (Myrdal 1968)? The researchers commissioned to carry out the NIS studies had local knowledge, but were not specialists in corruption and only had funds for a couple of weeks fieldwork. Table 5.7 is full of ‘don’t knows’. A more relativistic defence of the perception indicators is that their relationship to reality is to some extent irrelevant. Business perceptions determine decisions to invest. And popular perceptions determine the legitimacy of governments. But that conclusion sits uneasily with the positivistic tone of the surveys.

*Reform* The new international interest in corruption is motivated by a desire for reform. Hence the interests in comparisons across time, so that progress can be measured. The CPI is a poor register of change and the effects of reform. The score is deliberately damped down, to avoid sharp year on year changes. Changes in ranking depend on what happens in other countries, and whether they are surveyed, as well as what any country does itself. Rankings are potentially treadmills. The USP approach shows change most sharply (and explains it in terms of economic reforms). The Abramo/Triesman arguments about popular opinion have unsettling implications for donor sponsored campaigns to ‘raise awareness’
about corruption. Awareness is likely to be high anyway, and related to a wider sense of injustice, but not a good guide to where corruption is actually taking place. The data produced by national anti corruption agencies provide a depressing account of bad behaviour: in a grim kind of positive feedback, the better they are at the job the more corruption they uncover. The USP data has some good news to tell about Samoa and PNG, though the CPI takes a dimmer view of the latter. Murray’s memoir of his Pacific experience also suggests something is working: of 69 scams he described, 36 were rebuffed or resisted.

5973 words 16 March

Chapter 6

Seven Types of Corruption:

In its desire to be useful, it may be that the NIS approach was running ahead of itself. It was looking for signs of plausible remedies, before analysing the disease it wanted to cure. So this chapter reanalyses the reports of the surveys focusing on the types of corruption their authors report. These were summarized in Table 5.8, which also includes earlier surveys of PNG and Fiji. The chapter concludes that it may be more useful – for purposes of understanding and preventing corruption – to disaggregate corruption into several types or sectors.

‘Lumping’ and ‘splitting’ are alternative approaches to classification of phenomena like ‘corruption’. Lumpers stick to one big idea, and assimilate everything to it while splitters follow a number of ideas, and are less concerned about whether they all add up (Berlin 1953). International surveys have tended to lump
many things together as ‘corruption’. Lambsdorff, the pioneer of the CPI, sees his sources ‘measuring the same broad phenomenon’ (2008: 15). Kauffman aggregates ‘several hundred’ variables into six quite abstract ‘dimensions of governance’ (2007: 13). Other surveys focus on an obvious form of corruption, usually bribery, and let it represent what they see as a single broader phenomenon. Here we try some splitting instead. Corruption may be prevalent in some sectors, but absent in others – and it is useful to know this. There may be more similarities between sectors across countries – for example, in forestry - than between sectors within them. The criminological approach to corruption proposed by Angela Gorta (1998) also suggests it may also be useful (as with ‘crime’) to break the phenomenon up. Crimes against property have different motivations and consequences from crimes against the person. They may require different kinds of solution. It may also be more sensible to compare regions, cities, or sectors rather than countries. Splitting, rather than lumping, may make the problems more manageable, less overwhelming, and point to where they actually occur.

The NIS researchers – academics and former officials - tended to adopt the TI/World Bank definition of corruption as the ‘use of public office for private gain’. Table 5.8 listed 25 sub-types (rather than amounts) of corruption the researchers identified, and whether or not that type was present in each country. Countries are ranged from left to right in terms of population size. The blanks mean ‘don’t know’. There may be suspicion that more is going on than the NIS researchers found or that their findings are naive, unfair, based on rumour etc. There is a temptation to try and fill these columns with other evidence, or hearsay. But making judgements about the real or underlying rate of corruption is hard: who is really expert (Huberts et al 2006)? Here I have taken a conservative approach: if the NIS reports don’t mention it, I have not included it. This approach allows some broad patterns (and exceptions) to emerge. Table 5.8 introduces some variation in the data, which is practically absent from Table 5.7, which finds all the elements of the NIS present in nearly all the countries. In Table 5.8 we can see some wood from the trees.
The report carried out in 2001 by a local consulting firm for Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer identified several types of corruption ‘prevalent’ in Fiji, and provided examples or instances:

- **Kick backs.** Extra payments for permits and licences were ‘widely known to exist’ though people were reluctant to come forward and complain. Sometimes services were deliberately provided slowly to elicit payments.

- **Greasing the palms.** Bribes to officials in the Land Transport Authority (which certified motor vehicles), the inland revenue and customs authorities (for example, a customs official who died accidentally was said to have been found with large amounts of unexplained cash).

- **Nepotism/Cronyism.** Favouritism in recruitment, promotion, contracting and outsourcing, facilitated by the public sector reforms of the 1990s, which delegated authority from the Public Service Commission.

- **Rank Pulling.** Individuals used their high political or social status to bend the rules in their favour.

- **Unfair and Unethical Decisions on Procurement.** Decisions were plagued with political manoeuvring and interference.

- **Misuse and Abuse of Public Funds.** Delegations had not been clearly communicated or monitored (for example in the National Bank of Fiji scandal) (Olaks Consulting 2001: 8).

There was also said to be corruption in the private sector, particularly overpricing by importers, by purchasing though offshore entities. Supervising officials were also being bribed (ibid: 8-9).
In this chapter I group the 25 sub-types identified in Table 5.8 into seven broader types and draw some implications about preventing corruption. Under each type, I give examples of the subtypes identified in the NIS studies. The aim of the Chapter is to give a broad overview of the pattern of corruption in the region, and some typical examples.

**Type 1. General Administrative Corruption**

*Procurement.* The PNG report described how procurement processes begin with interference in the number of pre-qualified bidders, where firms can pay off officials to restrict the list of potential bidders. This is often followed with paying for information and restructuring bidding specifications to favour a bidder. Towards the end of the process the contractor, who would have been the initial corruptor, will provide the service or sell the goods but at an inflated cost. Examples include the redevelopment of Port Moresby’s airport (funded by a concessional loan from Japan) the Poreporena Freeway, and Port Moresby water supply (Mellam and Aloi 2003: 29).

*Nepotism.* *In the FSM public servants are supposed to be appointed on the basis of merit but ‘personnel managers and others have found ways to put relatives and friends ahead of more qualified applicants’* (Hill 2004: 14). Two techniques were common: appointing the favoured candidate in an acting position so as to be in a stronger position when the permanent position was decided; then ‘applications of more qualified candidates go missing’ (Hill 2004: 21). In Kiribati there were many allegation of nepotism in civil service appointments on the basis of affinities such as village, island or ‘even, nowadays, religious denomination but none investigated or proven’ (Mackenzie 2004: 10).
Abuse of travel. Misuse of travel funds (or merely unnecessary travel) is a common complaint in a region where senior officials frequently find reasons to be ‘off island’ at conferences convened by donors, or in training programmes that aren’t available locally. In Palau the Office of the Special Prosecutor threatened lawsuits against nearly every member of Congress for illegal use of travel funds (Schuster 2004: 11-12). The Tuvalu report identifies a ‘per diem mentality’ in relation to the attendance at meetings in country and overseas, with Taiwan particularly generous. In PNG clan leaders are taken on sightseeing trips to Cairns or Singapore in exchange for agreements to harvest logs (Mellam and Aloi 2003: 14).

Type 2: Vulnerable Branches

Local Government. Grants to local government have been the subject of number of corruption cases in Palau, some involving officials owning companies that benefited from local government construction projects. In the Enga provincial government in PNG ‘almost all public officials’ down to the janitor were related by ‘tribal affiliation’ to the governor, who was himself a political appointee (Mellam and Aloi 2003: 15).
Land Titles. In the FSM one politician was able to extract payments for easements to allow drains to run under his land to a new courthouse (Hill 2004: 22). Another politician who owned property leased to a government school resisted proposals to move the school to a better location. And in a third used his insider knowledge to buy up land he knew would be required for the expansion of a college campus. These are all routine examples of municipal corruption, but the link to land, particularly where politicians are also senior members of traditional landowning groups, makes them distinctive to the Pacific Islands. Land tenure is also a field of competition and overlap between two systems and sets of values, each ethical in their own way.

Natural Resources

Corruption in the forest industry is well-documented in both PNG and Solomon Islands. The Barnett Commission in PNG found that the government’s statement of forestry policy in 1974 ‘was being followed in hardly any respect at all’ (Asia Pacific Action Group (1990: 11). Profits were being hidden in transfer pricing, and mis-specification of the species being exported. Ministers and officials were receiving gifts from timber companies. PNG’s NIS report criticises the natural resources industry for generating windfall profits that leading to waste and corruption in particular contributing to party funding (Mellam and Aloi 2003: 9), In both countries forestry policy and legislation offered many opportunities for corruption, and other bad behaviour. It recognised customary ownership of land by requiring companies, once they had a licence from the government, to negotiate with local committees (in Solomon Islands called ‘Area Councils’) whose job it was to decide who owned the land in question, whether they wanted it to be logged, the price and how the profits would be shared among themselves. However
Inadequate state supervision, ambiguous laws, corrupt and divided community negotiators, corporate funding of Area Council (Timber right) meetings, and highly trained corporate negotiators have generally allowed multinational timber companies to negotiate favourable agreements (Dauvergne 1998: 151)

The provincial government and the national forestry department were supposed to supervise the negotiations but they proved to be as easily manipulated as Area Council members themselves. The Solomon Islands Ombudsman commented

…. junior provincial officials and politicians appear to have been bullied or persuaded to sign documents when full drunk. It is hard to blame these people. Their take-home pay may be worth less than a couple of cartons of beer a fortnight and they are easy prey to people who may wish to compromise them by hospitality, food, drink transport and other favours. ....Many of their masters appeared unable to resist suasions, too, and some had compromising trips to Asian cities. Influence on senior public servants also came in the form of ministerial command, petitions from provincial politicians demanding concessions from the central bureaucracy, or resource holders who welcomed the loggers’ promises (2000: 233-234)

Malaysian timber companies entered Solomon Islands the early 1990s and ‘state officials have succumbed to corporate pressures (and sometimes bribes) stalling environmental reforms, eroding implementation of forest management rules, and leading to generous tax breaks’ (Dauvergne 1998: 15). There was a brief period of attempted reform under Prime Minister Billy Hilly in 1993-4. Corporate pressure and bribery was stepped up in when the government raised log export taxes, intensified regulation, and announced a plan to ban log exports. Dauvergne quotes the Solomons Star describing how ‘integrated forest Industries distributed SIS7 million and supplied generous perks to government
ministers and powerful bureaucrats’ (ibid: 153). The government was brought down by defections from its own side. It was accused by Solomon Mamaloni, who had become leader of the opposition, of frustrating landowners, introducing ‘foreign concepts’, and – over a proposal to swap debt for conservation – of kow towing to Australia. (Bennett 2000: 317). Joses Tuhanuku, who became Minister for Forests, blamed bribery by Malaysian interests for its fall (ibid: 345). When Mamaloni returned to power his government reduced the duty on log exports, and the percentage paid to landowners. Local companies, often fronts for the overseas loggers, with politicians among their directors received further remissions. As a result of tax concessions, and under-recording, government revenues fell while volumes rose. Log production doubled between 1991-1995, a rate of extraction that would have logged the country out in 10-13 years.

Senior ministers faced conflicts of interest throughout. In Solomon Islands in 1982 the Minister of Lands Energy and Natural Resources, Peter Salaka issued a timber licence to SOLMAC against what the senior official in his ministry described as ‘all legal, technical and professional advice’ (Larmour 1983: 271). The Secretary to the Governor General (an expatriate) and the Secretary to the Investment Division of the Office of the Prime Minister (a Solomon Islander) were listed as directors of the company. Solomons Prime Minister Mamaloni was a director of Soma, a landowner company granted a duty remission (only 10% on 50m cubed) and timber levy exemption in 1995 (Bennett 2000:46 and Appendix 7). PNG Prime Minister Michael Somare initially denied, then acknowledged that he was chair of the Sepik River development Corporation which had a logging agreement with Hey Bridge Pty Ltd, in which his son Arthur, then also a Minister, was a shareholder. The PM said he had a logging concession in the Angoram district and the logging ‘had generated revenue for communities which allowed them to invest in agriculture and health clinics’ (The Australian June 20 2007).
Retirement Funds. *In the Cairns Observatory deal the officers of the PNG Public Officers Superannuation Fund managed to rip off both their members and the PNG government. They bought an office building in Cairns Australia at several times its market value, and then got the PNG government to lease it from them at an inflated rent. The building had been sold several times ‘within the same group of people’ the year before it was sold to the POSF. The Ombudsman found ‘discernable connexions between politicians, public servants and business associates’, and the director of the fund testified to ‘political pressure’ from the top (Mellam and Aloi 2003: 17). In Vanuatu the Ombudsman found that while 33,000 people were members of NPF the majority of the 150 housing loans it made were to Ministers, members of parliament, Vanuatu Provident Fund Board members and staff, party supporters, political appointees and families of these groups. Many of the favoured groups had loans approved without even submitting applications, while many applications were never considered (Newton Cain and Jowitt 2004: 14).

Sir Peter Kenilorea’s autobiography (2008) describes how the money sitting in the National Provident Fund (NPF), compulsorily deducted from the pay of civil servants, and a target for international fraudsters. The vehicle was a proposed Insurance Company that the NPF would partner in. The international consultants – particularly Sivakumaran Sathasivan, who had been rebuffed over a similar scheme in PNG - would get a free shareholding in exchange for unspecified ‘management services’. A High Court case brought by some NPF members found that that about 60% of the NPF’s Reserve Fund had been spent over nine months to establish the insurance company (ibid: 416). In a related scam a company called AMCO managed to get a Minister’s signature on a contract that would have bought 80% of the country’s development bank – and through it the NPF-backed insurance company – in exchange for, again, ‘management services’. Kenilorea concludes there was ‘a conspiracy between some smart and insincere lawyers and some imposter insurers, deliberately playing on the ignorance of some of our leaders, while other political leaders were receiving direct financial benefits’ (ibid).
**Type 3. Distributions of Cash**

Ex Gratia and Compensation Payments. *These payments often look like barely concealed bribes*. The Kiribati government, for example, made ex-gratia payments to illegal strikers twenty-two years after the event (Mackenzie 2004: 10). A ‘compensation industry’ grew up after the ethnic conflict in Solomon Islands, funded from Taiwanese Exim bank loans, and senior ministers were first in the queue for payouts (Roughan 2004: 13). In Vanuatu, the Finance Minister Barak Sope (who had a history of scamming) claimed that government joint ventures with businessman Ghosh would be used to ‘fully compensate people for losses incurred during the Santo rebellion in 1980’ (Morgan 2006: 220). Threats of lawsuits in PNG brought showers of ex gratia payments on complainants sometimes with the complicity of the officials responsible for authorising the payouts.

Disaster Relief. *Hurricane relief funding is a similarly discretionary and unaccountable activity*. In a rare case of accepting responsibility, Sir Peter Kenilorea resigned as Solomon Islands Prime Minister over claims that French hurricane relief aid had gone disproportionately to his village. More recently former Finance Minister Gordon Darcy denied an accusation by the Prime Minister that he had not gone through the proper tender procedures for the supply of building materials after a tsunami leveled the capital of the Western province (Solomon Star Online 19 November 2007).
Foreign Aid. Taiwan and China compete for diplomatic recognition in the region, and Taiwan contributes directly to the ‘constituency development funds’ of MPs in Solomon Islands (Maesulia 2006). Japan has also contributed to the travel costs of Solomon Islands delegations to international whaling conferences, ensuring the country lines up on its side. More broadly, and legally, in the interests of ‘strategic denial’ the US underwrites the economies (and the salaries of the elite) among the freely associating states of Micronesia. Australia’s presence in the region, though AusAID and (in Solomons by RAMSI) is pervasive and underwrites a system of international training, conferences and seminars that bolsters the incomes of favoured members of local elites and the Australians (including, declaring an interest, the present author) who provide the seminars and training.

Type 4. Guarding the Guards

Courts. The courts provide positive findings of the absence of corruption. For example in PNG ‘the judiciary stands out in being ruthless against corruption’ and its performance is judged ‘impressive’ (Mellam and Aloi 2003: 40, 25).

Police. The development of anti corruption agencies has been related to problems with corruption in the police. The ‘Independent’ in the ICAC model originally meant independent of the police who – in Hong Kong – could not be relied on to guard themselves. TI’s Global Corruption Barometer shows police the most bribed sector worldwide. In the Pacific Islands, however, the reports are more of police incompetence than of corruption.
Sandline International is a British firm of military mercenaries that was secretly contracted by the PNG government to end a long running rebellion in PNG’s Bougainville province. PNG’s military commander, Jerry Singirok, denounced the government, and arrested the Sandline contingent. Singirok was then sacked by the government, but the army continued to put pressure on the Prime Minister and Defence Minister to resign (Ivarature 1998). They found strong popular support in demonstrations outside parliament, protected by the army, that eventually forced the Prime Minister, Julius Chan, to step down. Allegations of corruption played an important, if ambivalent, role in the crisis. Singirok suggested there had been corruption in the deal with Sandline, and he and his supporters – including those in the NGO community - saw the case as symptomatic of wider corruption in the government. The local chapter of Transparency International, which has been mooted earlier, was galvanized into action. Singirok himself was later found to be receiving money improperly from a different firm of military suppliers (Mellam and Aloi 2003 15).

The Fiji army had been complacent about corruption in its own ranks: ‘busting spending limits and failing to obey repeated court judgements requiring an audit of its regimental funds (Fraenkel 2007: 429). But it shamelessly used anti-corruption rhetoric to justify its coup in 2006. There were many complaints against the military clean up campaign. In February an un-named Non Government Organisation (NGO) released documentation of about 200 cases of ‘human rights abuses, breaches of the constitution and rule of law since December 5’. People were taken up to barracks, humiliated, made to perform physical exercises, and warned against repetition of a range of often petty offences (on the one hand) and criticism of the military or interim government (on the other). Soldiers were described as ‘short-fused’ and ‘younger soldiers are reported to be assaulting, arresting and detaining persons without any justifiable reason’ (Fiji Times 25 February 07). Lawyers also described military interference in civil and commercial litigation. Eventually this arbitrary, sometimes violent, harassment seems to have led to a death of a youth in
military custody (Fiji Times 26 February 07). The army, lamely, asked people to complain to it about mistreatment by soldiers. Bainimarama later apologised for excesses of the soldiery. The army complaints of its own against ‘civilians verbally abusing soldiers’ (Fiji Times 18 February 07). Indeed, complaints flew in all directions. In responding to the 400 popular complaints against the previous government, the army found itself provoking 200 complaints (as collated by Non Governments Organisations) and having 81 complaints of its own against the public (Larmour 2008a).

Electoral Offices. Even if not constitutionally independent, Electoral Offices were generally found to be uncorrupt.

Type 5: Political Corruption

Conflicts of Interest. In PNG ‘politicians begin their business careers as ordinary persons, or civil servants, and graduate as entrepreneurs’ (Mellam and Aloi 2003: 8). ‘Most medium scale business activities in PNG are owned or partly owned by politicians and ex-politicians’. In Samoa four of the seven members of the Tenders Board (which approves contracts above a certain limit) are politicians (So’o et al 2004: 15).
Slush Funds. Papua New Guinea’s system of ‘Electoral Development Funds’ began as politicians tried to grab control of public expenditure on transport and agriculture in their constituencies (Ketan 2007: 6). A similar discretionary fund was introduced in Solomon Islands in the late 1980s. It became a vehicle for foreign government support of individual politicians when Taiwan agreed to fund part of the constituency fund, under the rubric of ‘bottom up development’. Taiwan was accused of supporting candidates in the 2006 general election, and the subsequent election of the Prime Minister, which was followed by a riot and the burning down of part of the capital, Honiara.

Political Appointments. In PNG ‘retrenched public officers, ex-heads of departments with terminated contracts, and unsuccessful party-sponsored candidates comprise a bandwagon of party-loyalists who are then given jobs in return for their loyalty and support’ (Mellam and Aloi 2003 12). In Cook Islands ‘Ministerial Support Staff’ are appointed ‘on the basis of political affiliation and family ties’ (Ingram 2004: 13).

Political Interference. Several NIS reports complain about politicians interfering in administrative matters that were properly the concern of civil servants. The PNG report is particularly worried about the way ‘the political world has penetrated the administrative world’ (Mellam and Aloi 2003: 13), while in Fiji Ministers were ‘involving themselves in the day to day running of government thus usurping the role of public servants’ (Olaks Consulting 2001: 9). Ministers in Niue, for example, ‘have stepped out of the policy arena and involve themselves in the ‘nuts and bolts’ area of statutory bodies and government departments’ (Talagi 2004: 7).
Party Funding. The NIS reports were divided about the role of political parties in preventing or promoting corruption. Several argued that ‘stronger political parties’ might reduce the corrupt practices of horse trading among politicians, and vote buying in elections. Party discipline rather than payments and promises would solidify majorities behind prime ministers, and allow governments to get their legislation through. Voters would choose between the policies offered by parties, rather than promises of benefits for themselves or their villages. This belief in stronger parties was embodied and enforced in PNG’s Organic Law on political Parties and Candidates which reduced the power of oppositions to call votes of no confidence, and reduced MPs’ ability to cross the floor.

Party dominance. The NIS reports disagreed about whether having a single party in power encourages or discourages corruption. The dominance of a single party in Samoa has led to continuing suspicion of corruption, and cover ups. In Cook Islands there is the opposite concern with instability: ‘The main cause for corruption is the instability of government, and the need for MPs to change parties and alliances and form coalitions in order to stay in power’ (Ingram 2004: 12). In PNG TI supported the campaign for an Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates because it believed it would reduce corruption by strengthening party control over MPs.
Vote Buying. In Samoa candidates for parliamentary elections are expected by their constituencies to provide gifts in the form of food, money and other material goods’. (So’o et al 2004 16). In Nauru ‘it is common for people to go to their Members of Parliament to ask for money and other favours and if their member is a minister the greater their expectations will be’ (Kun et al 2004: 5). Gifts in return for voting ‘may be the only actual return that some voters expect ever to see out of the State political system’ (Kun et al 2004: 10). In Marshall Islands ‘chiefs and the elite are expected to offer services and gifts when available. Workers expect care and attention and material gifts from the elite’ (Pollock 2004: 11). A second order kind of vote buying takes place after elections when MPs are offered ministries, or other executive positions such as Special Advisers, Governors or positions on the boards of statutory bodies or public enterprises in exchange for supporting particular candidates in votes to become Prime Minister.

Type 6: Corruption Outside Government

Private sector Corruption extends beyond politicians and public officials to include professionals such as ‘lawyers, accountants, financial advisers, bankers, stock brokers, IT specialists, businessmen, chemists… and media personnel’ (Macfarlane 2005: 59). The international focus on public office, rather than corruption in the private sector, makes sense in a region where the public service dominates formal employment, and the small private sectors are heavily dependent on public expenditure. In Niue, for example, neither the private nor civil society sectors wielded ‘any form of political clout’ (Talagi 2004: 6). In Kiribati employment in the private sector was sometimes regarded as demeaning in itself. However some reports did identify examples of corruption within the private sector. In Vanuatu ‘Gifts are [also] given, or loans which are then not required to be paid back’ (Newton Cain and Jowitt 2004 27). In Fiji
private companies were accused of using transfer pricing to avoid taxation. Goods were received at a branch offshore, and marked on to a related company in Fiji at an inflated price that then depressed taxable profits.

Privatization was favoured by the donors, as it might reduce political interference in what should be technical, market or financial decisions. It was also a practical necessity as governments, strapped for cash, looked for assets they could sell to pay their wage bills. However the process of privatization was particularly vulnerable to favoritism and insider dealing. By the time PNG’s NIS study reported, the Morauta government was accused by activists of ‘selling of the PNG Banking Corporation at a deflated price’ (Mellam and Aloi 2003 18). Efforts to privatise, liberalise and deregulate were found to be ‘dragging’ in PNG (Mellam and Aloi 2003: 9). While ‘mass demonstrations … ride on the emotions of public ownership’, commissions of enquiry found faults in the process (Mellam and Aloi 2003: 9). In Fiji ‘a number of sales of public enterprises were not carried out with proper due diligence’ (Olaks Consulting 2001: 11) with ministers involved in the bidding. Their boards and CEOs became targets of Bainimarama’s cleanup campaign.

Churches. Churches have always been a vehicle for external funding, and for the amassing of local funds through contributions from their members. A competitive atmosphere of fund raising and church building pervades Samoa. In Tuvalu, church ministers benefit from ‘huge sums of tax free money donated by church goers on that island as a parting gift’, and respectful officials ‘rarely check their baggage when they return from overseas trips’ (Taafaki 2004 22).
NGOs. As donors get more concerned about corruption in government, and state capacity, they are channeling more aid through NGOs. In Niue participation in voluntary activity seems, of itself, to arouse suspicions of corruption (Talagi 2004: 7). The Vanuatu report notices how NGOs will move around money they have received for one project to cover expenditure in others, or simply to cover the overheads donors are more reluctant to fund. ‘This is not perceived as corruption. Instead NGOs tend to see themselves as ‘good guys’ who are using money for the good of Vanuatu, not for personal gain’ (Newton Cain and Jowitt 2004 26).

Type 7: Sovereignty Sales

The rights a country acquires through its membership of the international community may be turned into cash for national treasuries, or individual politicians and officials. The most significant payments among the Pacific Islands now occur in the competition for diplomatic support between Taiwan and China. Taiwanese aid went to the fund supposed to compensate people displaced by the ethnic conflict in Solomon Islands, from which ministers disproportionately benefited, and also went to individual constituency funds for MPs. In another example, Prime Minister Sogavare denied any impropriety in an arrangement whereby he borrowed $SI2.7 million to buy two ‘executive houses’ in Honiara on the strength of a Taiwanese government promise to rent them from him (Solomon Star Online 19 November 2007).

The Cook Islands NIS report pays particular attention to the offshore finance companies (Ingram 2004: 9). They provide fees and taxes (but not income tax) to the Cook Islands government and are not subject
to exchange controls. Cook Islands tax haven became the subject of parliamentary scrutiny, a commission of enquiry, and subsequent appeals to the courts in New Zealand. However, the New Zealand authorities decided they could not look behind the veil of Cook Islands sovereignty, and had to take the certificates certifying that New Zealand companies had paid tax in Cook Islands at face value.

Two more technological cases of sovereignty sales are Tongasat and Tuvalu’s ‘dot tv’ schemes. In the first case, Tonga uses its membership of the international body regulating the use of space to license its entitlement to orbital positions for communication satellites. The fee goes to a Tongan Princess. The Tuvalu report describes the country’s official attempts to lease out its internet domain suffix, ‘.tv’, granted to it by the Internet Assigned Names Authority (IANA). The suffix might have value for companies in the television business, so the Tuvalu government has been dealing with a series of US and Canadian companies to ‘exploit’ this virtual ‘asset’. These offshore deals were hampered by ‘lack of knowledge and capability about the internet industry’, and ‘it is not possible to know whether there were bribes involved’ (Taafaki 2004 8). Secrecy and vagueness about the mix of personal, political and national benefit, and the high overheads all round, give rise to suspicion, not least among people back home.

Similar secrecy and vagueness apply to sales of passports. Some passport sales were found out and condemned as illegal freelancing by officials, for example when five senior Samoan officials were suspended after advertisement that appeared in a Hong Kong newspaper offering Samoan passports for sale (So’o et al 2004: 13). In other cases the government legislated to allow passports to be issued to potential foreign investors and the revenues went (presumably) into Treasury.
Conclusions

Table 5.8 could be sliced up in different ways. I have tried to avoid making premature judgements about causes, such as the absence of ‘pillars’ (in TI’s theory) the presence of risks (in the World Bank’s) or any of the other causes suggested by different academic disciplines in Chapter 4. The approach has been inductive, though it may help generate hypotheses, or hunches, about causes that could be tested by further research.

Lumping or splitting types is a matter of intellectual preference, but even if all the examples are part of a deeper national malaise a number of distinct treatments for corruption may still be required.

The first consists of types of general administrative corruption (procurement, nepotism, abuse of travel). These might take place in any part of government, and most parts of government were at risk. This type requires some kind of action across the civil service, perhaps by a civil service commission. But such a general approach is not going to get at the specific vulnerabilities of particular agencies in the second type.

The second includes particularly vulnerable branches of government. Local government and land administration were particularly vulnerable, because officials were often working far from the capital, under intense local pressure. Management of natural resources also involved forestry or fisheries officers working far away from headquarters and close to the industries they were supposed to be regulating. They point to the special problems of implementation and decentralisation across scattered archipelagos, and in
mountainous regions. Kaufman (1960) suggests ways to ensure the values of its field officers remained aligned with those of the centre, including staff rotation, and the cultivation of an *esprit de corps*.

Retirement funds headquartered in the capital were vulnerable to plunder for different reasons. The wrongdoing was easy to hide in technicalities, and might not become visible until a person reached retirement. Corruption may be hard to distinguish from the perfectly legal salaries, luxurious offices and perks that the fund members reward themselves with. The remedies may involve regulations that apply to private companies, such as detailed reporting to clients, independence of boards, and a competitive environment.

In the third type, uncertain criteria and queue jumping mean the officials distributing the compensation payments are well placed to favour themselves, their relatives and their areas. Greater publicity, clearer criteria, transparency, audit and use of non-government organisations to deliver such benefits, freer of electoral pressures, may help reduce this third type.

The potential for corruption in anti-corruption agencies (police, army, ICACs) needs another kind of distinct attention. The solution may become part of the problem, creating new opportunities for corruption as they try to close off others. These agencies also may be abused by leaders against their domestic enemies. The solution may be to encourage professional discipline and autonomy, perhaps through closer links with counterparts with similar organisations in other countries, cemented by common training.
The fifth category, political corruption includes vote buying, mentioned in nine countries; conflicts of interest, in six countries, political appointments in four countries, and party funding, party dominance and ‘slush funds’ less frequently among others. Slush funds are those budgeted for distribution by individual MPs. Some of this seems to me hard to distinguish from the everyday workings of democracy, and as we argued in Chapter 4 anti-corruption reformers should not automatically take the side of bureaucrats against politicians. For example some of the PNG ‘slush fund’ money gets spent on roads, school fees, and so on (Ketan 2007). Some degree of self-regulation is going to be necessary, as it is the politicians that finally write the rules. It is not impossible: there are votes in anti-corruption. In PNG, again, politicians have made themselves more accountable to local committees and provincial governments in ‘slush fund’ expenditure decisions, and they passed an Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates which requires parties to account for their funding.

The NGO sector is now often invoked as a counterweight to government and TI – the client for the NIS studies - is of course an NGO itself. To be credible critics of government corruption, NGOs need to demonstrate they are reducing risks of corruption – and the appearance of corruption – in their own processes, including how and who they hire for what are often relatively well paid jobs.

The sovereignty scams (China vs Taiwan, tax havens, passport sales etc) involve senior officials as well as ministers, and it is sometimes hard to distinguish personal from political and national budgetary benefits. Involving nine countries, it tied with ‘vote buying’ as the most widespread type of corruption mentioned. In principle it can be tackled - as the Anti Money Laundering initiatives show – at an international level by (for example) withdrawing recognition of dodgy passports, tightening the rules regarding membership of international organisations, or limiting the trade in corruptly harvested timber. Donors might look at the way their own funding of conferences and workshops was contributing to the
risks around travel. The quickest way of damping down corruption in Solomon Islands or Kiribati would be for Taiwan and China to agree not to compete among small countries for votes in international forums. Whereas there may be little that donors can do about domestic sources of corruption, they have more scope for action in the international arena.

6957 words Hawaii

Chapter 7

Corruption and Culture

Ideas about ‘culture’ have often been used to explain, or excuse, acts of corruption. Gift giving, it is sometimes said, is ‘part of our culture’. Outsiders should not confuse it with bribery or corruption. Such a relativistic approach has been strongly criticized by academic writers on corruption, such as Sayed Alatas in his classic Sociology of Corruption and by activists, such as Transparency International. Alatas (1968) saw cultural relativism as another kind of Western naiveté and condescension towards non-Western societies. The West, he argued, imagined them to be incapable of telling right from wrong. He provided copious evidence of concern about abuse of public office in different periods (ancient Rome) and cultural traditions (Muslim and Chinese). Just because leaders violated local norms, he argued, did not mean those norms did not exist.

Cultural practices are used for the purposes of corruption rather than being the cause of corruption

(1968: 96-97)
More recently, Transparency International (TI) takes a robust stand against what it calls the ‘myth’ or ‘excuse’ of culture. Its influential Source Book quotes one of the organization’s founding fathers, who went on to be elected President of Nigeria. Talking of the distinction between gifts and bribes Olusegun Obasanjo says

I shudder at how an integral aspect of our culture could be taken as the basis for rationalising otherwise despicable behaviour. In the African concept of appreciation and hospitality, the gift is usually a token. It is not demanded. The value is usually in the spirit rather than in the material worth. It is usually done in the open, and never in secret. Where it is excessive, it becomes an embarrassment and it is returned. If anything, corruption has perverted and destroyed this aspect of our culture. (quoted in Transparency International 2000a: 8)

Nevertheless, ideas about culture and corruption won’t go away easily. Transparency International is an international organization and whatever its universalistic beliefs, it has, in practice, to defer to claims of national difference. Initially reluctant, its founders were persuaded to set up national ‘chapters’ of the organisation. Meanwhile ideas about culture have become more and more influential in the social sciences, particularly in the burgeoning field of Cultural Studies. This chapter suggests ways in which concepts of culture in general, and gift giving in particular, may still be useful in understanding corruption and the problems of controlling it. The authors of the NIS reports were also asked to comment generally on the corruption situation in each country. The authors of 12 of the 14 reports were specifically asked to comment on the role played by culture (and the authors of the two earlier reports discussed culture without being prompted). ‘Culture’ according to Raymond Williams is ‘one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language’ (1976). In his influential book Keywords he distinguished three broad usages. The first describes a process of intellectual spiritual and aesthetic development, related to the idea of civilization. The second applies to particular ways of life. It was the mainstream
anthropological approach and includes the practical and material aspects of a way of life, as well the signifying and symbolic ones (Kuper 1999). The third applied more narrowly to artistic and intellectual endeavour: theatre, dance, music and film.

The first usage dealt with intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development, rather than the economic development which currently concerns aid donors. The second Williams’ usages of ‘culture’ seems most relevant to the possibility that something regarded as corrupt in one particular culture, or sub-culture, might not be regarded as corrupt in another: the issue of ‘cultural relativism’. The third usage has to do with the expressive arts, and is particularly relevant in the Pacific Islands. Collective performances cost time, money and other resources, and participation in cultural events is part of the role of leaders, and hard to distinguish from the politics of alliances, and democratic electioneering. The Samoa report, for example, talks about ‘pressure to contribute to cultural functions’ (So’o et al 2004: 5).
A recent update of Williams’ Keywords begins by warning ‘there is now a good deal of hesitancy over the value of the word culture’ (Bennett et al 2005, but see Sahlins 1999). It notes the gradual triumph of Williams’ second, anthropological meaning – culture as a way of life but a parallel rejection of the idea that these ways of life might be fixed, uncontested from within, or clearly distinct, as colonial governments in the Pacific Islands are said to have made them. Dominant approaches to social science – Marxism and rational choice – have tended to deal with ‘culture’ indirectly. Marxism tended to treat it as an effect of more fundamental economic processes, while rational choice theories try to grasp it through individual attitudes and dispositions. Writing in a Marxist tradition, Colin Leys famously wondered in the 1960s ‘what is the problem with corruption’, reminding us that corruption was the foundation of what is now regarded as prestigious ‘old money’ in the US (Leys 2002).

More recently, Johann Lambsdorff, the inventor of TI’s influential Corruption Perceptions Index has reviewed what he calls empirical research on cultural determinants of corruption (Lambsdorff 1999). It tends to be concerned with individual attitudes and dispositions. In a survey of 33 countries Porta et al find that trust has a significant negative impact on corruption. The same survey also found some correlation between membership of a hierarchical religion (Catholic, Orthodox or Muslim) and corruption. Protestantism also seems to be negatively correlated with corruption. Lambsdorff concludes his review:

Culture can only explain a certain fraction of the level of corruption and there remains sufficient room for improvements of a country's integrity. Moreover cultural attitudes can also be a reflection of the organizational patterns that led to their formation (1999: 2).

Believing that ‘culture matters’ Thompson et al concede that ‘the trouble with taking explicit account of culture is that explanation tends to go out of the window’ (2006: 32). They identify three typical misuses of the concept that seem relevant to understanding corruption. First, culture is invoked as an ‘uncaused
cause’. We might hear that someone acted corruptly ‘because of her culture’. But what caused her culture
to be like that? Second, culture is invoked as ‘an explanation of the last resort’. Having exhausted other
more favoured explanations for corruption – political, economic, ethical etc – we turn to culture as a kind
of residual category, or noise. Third, culture is invoked as a ‘veto on comparison’. You can’t compare,
say, corruption in Australia with corruption in China because each can only be understood in its own
terms. Some statements about culture in the Pacific have that blocking and checking character. For
example, when PNG Prime Minister once said, in reply to a question about a payment made to another
MP in exchange for political support, ‘corruption is part of a culture’ he may simply have been saying:
‘back off: this is none of your business’.

In this chapter we look at what the NIS reports have to say about ‘culture’, and identify points at which
cultural factors enter into the recognition of corruption, and reactions to it. We go on to look at culture
and corruption’s opposite, integrity, and at the differences between elite and mass culture in their attitudes
to corruption.

Culture in the NIS Reports

Each of the National Integrity System (NIS) reports makes some general points about culture and
corruption. The authors’ discussions typically express tension, contradiction or dilemma around the
relationship. The Solomon Islands report remarked that for some village people impartial treatment from
an official whom they were related to would be regarded as ‘culturally unacceptable’ even ‘an insult’
(Roughan 2004: 9). But others, more familiar with relatives in professional positions, would not.

The Fiji report talks of the ‘cultural dilemma’, in which the official role of public servants are interwoven
with and often compromised by their traditional obligations’ (Olaks Consulting 2001: 9). In Nauru ‘it
may be that tradition and culture also causes corruption’ (Kun et al 2004). Both the Tonga and Vanuatu reports use the phrase ‘hide’ or ‘hiding behind the culture’ (Newton Cain and Jowitt 2004 23, James and Tufui 2004: 5). The Vanuatu report stresses that ‘Melanesian culture does not cause corruption – it does not condone behaviour that benefits an individual at the expense of the community. Instead there is a mismatch between introduced notions of corruption and local culture’ (Newton Cain and Jowitt 2004: 12). The PNG report finds ‘certain aspects of the culture which seem to be more compatible with corruption’ but is quick to say ‘this does not mean that PNG has a corrupt culture’ (Mellam and Aloi 2003: 8). In a similar zigzag way the Samoa report says ‘Although Samoan culture does not necessarily teach corrupt behaviour, the propensity to use public resources and misuse entrusted power have sometimes been associated with the pressure to contribute to cultural functions’ (So’o et al 2004: 5).

Two reports use the positive phrase ‘caring and sharing’ to describe the local culture (Nauru, PNG). In PNG ‘sharing and caring is synonymous with leadership in Melanesian culture’ while ‘mobilisation and distribution of wealth is an essential component’ of a leader’s responsibilities (Mellam and Aloi 2003 11). The Fiji report also talks about ‘the friendly and forgiving nature and extreme tolerance inherent in the culture’ (Olaks Consulting 2001: 12). The Tuvalu report listed important values: ‘reciprocity, status, gift giving, family ties, and community’ (Taafaki 2004: 4). Kiribati culture was characterised as egalitarian. In Cook Islands, by contrast there was a predisposition to obey superiors. Marshall Islands culture was described as being overridden by ‘American ideologies and materialism’ (Pollock 2004: 12), while the Tuvalu report also contrasts the ‘confrontational’ style adopted by ministers, and associated with the Westminster system, contrasts with the ‘Tuvaluan search for agreement, consensus, value for respect and cooperation’.

Some reports did identify differences within countries. The report on PNG pointed to its cultural diversity, and noted, for example two provincial exceptions to its statement that traditional leadership had
little impact (these were in Milne Bay and New Ireland.) The report on FSM also found strong cultural
differences between states, and different levels of corruption between them (highest in Chuuk).

Culture was not always regarded as a factor mitigating or softening accusations of corruption. In Kiribati,
particularly, local councils of elders deployed ‘the force of culture as the informal anti-corruption system’
(Mackenzie 2004: 19). Similarly village councils in Samoa (called fono) deployed sometimes-draconian punishments as part of the ‘traditional integrity system’. It bore heavily on the consciences of men in Palau:

Strong traditional awareness of right and wrong brings its own pressures, as some suicides of middle-aged men may have resulted from the heavy conscience burden resulting from involvement in corrupt practices that generated quiet, but powerful scorn (Schuster 2004: 8).

In the Pacific Islands there is often talk of the ‘corruption’ of traditional cultures, and a loss of standards once upheld in the past. Samoa posited a ‘traditional integrity system’ (So’o et al 2004: 6). In Nauru ‘heads of families who take bribes and do not distribute them may be seen as corrupt’ (Kun et al: 9). Thus chiefs today are said to behave more badly because of the influence of Western culture institutions or opportunities (and the Vanuatu report described how TI was busy training chiefs to prevent corruption).

In Polynesia, where particular societies have split off from each other fairly recently, it may make sense to talk about a single ideal of traditional leadership (Kirch 1989). The Tuvalu report suggested that civil servants’ reluctance to be frank with ministers might reflect a ‘cultural problem’: Taafaki 2004 9). In Melanesia there is great diversity with archetypal ‘big-men’ expected to behave with self-confidence, and distribute what they receive. For many societies in PNG, argue Kavanamur and Okole ‘a credible leader is often defined by the volume of wealth at his disposal and power that he is able to wield’ (Mellam and Aloi 2003: 9). A chief who hoarded what he had might therefore be regarded as behaving badly, even
‘corrupt’. Early examples of chiefly corruption, impersonation, or ignorance, bitterly criticised today in Solomon Islands, include the chiefs who signed documents alienating land to Europeans. Similar failures of leadership or trusteeship are reported in relation to timber rights acquisitions today.

The structure of their task forced the NIS authors to treat culture as something of a residual category, outside the framework of the questionnaire, and literally added on to it. They tended to treat it as an uncaused cause – one of the misuse of the concept identified above. However three of the reports offer the ‘smallness’ as an explanation for these cultural characteristics (Samoa, Palau, Tuvalu) (see Larmour and Barcham 2006). Smallness led to ‘lack of anonymity’ (James and Tufui 2004 2004: 43), the prominence of particular personalities (Taafaki 2004), and the fact that people were ‘bound to be related’ (So’o al 2004:12).

The reports also use culture in two more specific senses. First, culture was seen as something attached to particular institutions, for example a ‘civil service culture’. This corresponds to the Raymond Williams second usage of culture as a ‘way of life’ in relatively closed and total institutions like the police or the civil service. Similarly, the Solomon Islands report talks of a public service ‘ethos of procedure’ which (the report argues) was the object of ‘active subversion’ by politicians like Solomon Mamaloni (Roughan 2004:10). Second it was seen as something pervasive and entrenched, such as a ‘culture of corruption’ in the forestry industry in Solomon Islands (Roughan 2004: 28), ‘culture of permissiveness’ in Solomon Islands or a ‘culture of welfare’ in Marshall Islands. The Fiji report quotes the Ombudsman’s remark about a ‘culture of silence’ that inhibits complaints (Olaks Consulting 2001: 21). Here the socialised aspect of culture is being emphasized, inviting questions about how that culture was learned or could be unlearned. Culture was also a professional role for the ‘cultural officer’ in Kiribati, where the job presumably dealt with the organizing of dancing and cultural shows – Williams’s third sense.
Olusegun Obasanjo, quoted from TI’s sourcebook above, argued that it was simple to distinguish a gift from a bribe. Samoa’s Prime Minister – interviewed by the authors of that country’s NIS study – argued similarly. ‘What determines an acceptable gift is five per cent policy/law and 95% common sense’. He gave as an example ‘a bottle of whisky or ten tala ($US 3.60) would be regarded as an acceptable gift while a gift of say 3,000 tala ($US 1,080) would certainly be regarded as unacceptable and there would be seen as a bribe’ (So’o et al 2004: 10). It was a matter of drawing the line. The NIS Reports, however, suggested that drawing the line would not be easy. ‘Gift giving’ says the Samoa report ‘has always been a means of obtaining and maintaining political support in Samoa’s traditional society’ (So’o et al 2004: 5) Morgan Tuimaleali’ifano (2006) provides a vivid personal account of his and other family’s efforts to assemble to the mixture of cash, food and fine mats necessary to acquire a title in Samoa. The title secures the families’ right to land and a political voice in village affairs. In this case the cost was about $35,000, gathered from small enterprises and wages earned by relatives, and paid to the existing, elderly, title holder and his supporters and dependents.

The NIS report from Samoa talks of ‘the quality and quantity’ of gift giving driving the recipient to follow the donors wishes (ibid: 10). ‘It is quite normal for a customer to give the employee who is serving him/her during normal duty hours a small amount of money’ (ibid: 10). Ministers are expected to bring gifts to functions like school or church dedications that they are invited to attend. The ministry would pay for these. The presents made in return (‘food, fine mats and money’) might be apportioned among staff members of the Ministry – particularly perishable food (So’o et al 2004: 21) For NGOs, like an Old Pupils Association, board members might use their own money to pay for the expected gifts, but also keep the reciprocated gifts for themselves (So’o et al 2004: 21). In Tonga, for example, relations of respect ‘require the presentation of a gift when making a request of another person, especially a social
superior’ (James and Tufui 2004: 5), and ‘educated people are well aware that gifts act as bribery’ (ibid: 25) though ‘the point at which a traditional gift becomes a bribe is hazy’ (ibid: 10). Churches also engage in fundraising through ‘annual public displays of free gifting’ (ibid: 22). Under the cover of tradition in FSM politicians may make ‘strategic donations to leaders and customary chiefs, sometimes in relation to a wedding or funeral’ (Hill 2004: 5).
Marcel Mauss’ anthropological classic, The Gift, uses anthropological evidence from Melanesia and Polynesia (as well as North America and India) to understand social systems based on systematic and repeated exchanges between collectivities – clans, tribes and families, often acting through chiefs – rather than individuals. The most extended form is the famous Kula Ring in what is now Papua New Guinea where various prestigious forms of shell money are given and received in expeditions around a ring of islands – bracelets moving from West to East and necklaces from East to West (Mauss 2002: 27-39). The most intense form of gift giving did not take place in the Pacific Islands, but in the North West of what is now America. In ‘potlatch’ chiefs engage in intensely competitive gift giving. Prestige and honour depend on how much you can give, and on the repayment (with interest) of gifts received. At the extreme, valuable goods are publicly destroyed to demonstrate ones wealth, and humble one’s rivals’. The point – as Mary Douglas sums it up in her introduction to a recent edition of Mauss’ classic – is that there is no such thing as a free gift. Gifts create obligations – that’s the point of giving them, and a reason one might want to refuse them. They may look voluntary, but are in practice compulsory, if one is to survive with honour intact. A milder Western version might be birthday presents: receiving one creates the obligation to reciprocate in due course – and the implied exchange may be unwelcome, but hard to politely refuse. And from small exchanges of gifts more substantial exchanges might follow. Mauss sums up the three obligations that underpin a gift economy:

1. The obligation to give. Leaders are always at every moment obliged to invite their friends, share their food and so on.

2. The obligation to accept. Refusal offends, even if it means an added burden.
3. The obligation to reciprocate, often with interest. Objects must be passed on, not hoarded. A gift of one blanket must be reciprocated with two (Mauss 2002: 50-55). For economists, Mauss estimate rates of interest of ‘30-100% per year’ in potlatch (ibid: 53).

Some, but not all, of the features of this ‘war of property’ between competitive chiefs seem to be continued and reproduced throughout the Pacific region. In Samoa, politicians are expected to provide gifts of ‘food money and school fees’ to voters. They also pay fine mats and money. In Niue candidates make ‘donations’ (Talagi 2004). More generally, in Marshall Islands, ‘chiefs and elites are expected to offer services and gifts when available’ (Pollock 2004). Ministers also give gifts between elections, for example when a minister visits an outer island in Tuvalu, local people might offer a feast and expect one of their ‘pet projects’ to be funded, or shipping schedules be altered in their favour in return (Taafaki 2004: 14).

These gifts are hardly token, spiritual or undemanded in Olusegun Obasanjo’s sense of the African gift, above. The who make them often feels them excessive. And there are no examples in the reports of gifts deemed so excessive that the recipient returns them. The gifts are also transparent, felt to be legitimate and sometimes quite legal. In Fiji gifts to voters and chiefs are ‘an integral part of election campaigns’, and in Nauru a ‘legitimate part of the electoral system’ (Kun and Togome 2004). They may involve traditional items – like the fine mats in Samoa but also non-traditional ones, like ‘fairy lights, stereo and small car’ (Pollock 2004) in the example from Marshall Islands.

The third obligation of gift giving is to pass it on, and this is an under-studied aspect of corruption. It tends to be assumed that corrupt payments are wasted, consumed (or sent overseas to buy real estate, or hidden away in a Swiss bank). It is true conspicuous waste is part of the North West American potlatch
culture. It may also be that the money exchanged is usefully invested. The logging company bribes a politician who builds a road – though it may be ‘in the wrong place’ according to planners. Or the politician pays the school fees of the child that then goes to university. We don’t yet know enough about the grey or black economy in this region. The ‘potlatch’ aspect is especially obvious in gift giving beyond government. The Tonga report worries about public ceremonies of ‘free gifting’ to churches. The Tuvalu report worries about competition between villages over the size of gifts to retiring church ministers.

**Points of Entry for Cultural Factors**

Culture can be a little broad as an explanation. To narrow it helps to think about points at which cultural factors might matter in different ways. The academic study of Public Policy often has recourse to the idea of a ‘policy cycle’, in which problems move through stages of identification, definition, legislation and implementation. A similar framework helps identify the points at which culture seems to matter in the Pacific Islands.

*In a general suspicion of corruption* Gunnar Mydal (1968), writing about South Asia, talked of the ‘folklore of corruption’. The Samoan report talks of a general public suspicion of corruption, not based on particular evidence, but a result of the governments ‘secure grip on power’ and its track record in the 1990s which included constitutional amendments to increase the size of cabinet, and to reduce the term of office of the auditor, and the assassination of a Minister named in the auditor’s reports (So’o et al 2004: 11). This suspicion was hard to shake off.
Similarly the Solomon Islands report coins the phrase ‘insidious tolerance’ in which ‘people express suspicion of corrupt activity at the slightest indication, but at the same time are willing to accept inaction concerning that suspicion’ (Roughan 2004: 9). The culture here may be a culture of suspicion, which may be exaggerated or well founded. Its opposite might be the ‘trust’ that writers on social capital give importance to.

*In the identification of particular people or behaviour as corrupt* This is the point at which people have to consider whether they think a particular action – or inaction – is corrupt, or not. They may also consider it bad for other reasons, but not corruption. It looks like a solitary decision, but it is in fact a social event. It involves language, and in practice is likely to involve the to-ing and fro-ing of discussion with colleagues or friends or family (or some kind of internal dialogue reproducing these interactions). This process may refer to what others have done before, or would do – and involve role models, childhood injunctions, and the examples set by characters in folktales, literature or film.

In Vanuatu and Nauru, for example, it seems that only the givers, not the receivers of bribes are perceived as acting corruptly. In Vanuatu ‘ordinary people who receive bribes are not ‘corrupt’. ‘Chiefs who tell individuals how to vote after receiving bribes or goods for their villages are sometimes perceived as corrupt, but not always. The person offering the bribe is, however, acting corruptly’ (Newton Cain and Jowitt 2004 10). Similarly in Nauru, people encouraging or benefiting from corruption tend not to be regarded as corrupt themselves. Where people are paid to vote one way or another ‘The blame attaches to the person who offers the temptation rather than the person who accepts it’ (Kun et al 2004: 9).
In the seriousness with which it is taken. Corruption may be taken less seriously than it is (now) by donors. As we saw in earlier chapters, Epeli Hau’ofa created several tales around the fun of fooling donors in an imaginary Pacific Island country very like Tonga (1994). NGOs now imbue any discussion of corruption with a deadly earnestness. Some assessment of seriousness is going to be necessary for any practical action, which will have costs in fractured social relationships, and police time. Assessment of seriousness is an important part of anti corruption policy. It is easy for an agency or campaign to get bogged down in trivial examples, and miss the more serious manifestations.

In FSM people don’t see that misappropriated money is ‘taken out of the pockets of citizens’ (Hill 2004: 12). In Nauru carelessness may have been higher when people thought ‘resources were in abundance’ (Kun at al 2004: 11). In Vanuatu ‘grassroots’ people saw the activities of law and government as ‘irrelevant to their everyday life’ and as a consequence ‘did not place any burden of expectation on their leaders’ (Newton Cain and Jowitt 2004: 5). People only got concerned when they saw their own money was at stake, as in the riots that followed revelations about National Provident Fund money.

In willingness to criticise and report The Cook Islands report talks of ‘fear of reprisal: ‘people would rather live with the consequences of corrupt politicians than face losing their jobs’ (Ingram 2004: 12). In Palau people find it difficult to correct or discipline or even report that a friend, relative or co-worker is behaving in a corrupt manner’ (Schuster 2004: 9). In Tonga people won’t report others because of ‘shame to the family involved, damage to the social fabric, and the breaking of relationships’ (James and Tufui 2004: 10). In FSM ‘it is very improper to question or openly criticize others or cause someone to lose face’ (Hill 2004: 11). In Palau ‘quiet and subtle scorn’ was preferred to overt rebuke, and ‘indirectness’ was a virtue.
In Solomon Islands there has been ‘lack of public or institutional pressure to redress blatant corruption acts’. The report points to ‘a marked unwillingness of leading individuals’ in the relevant institutions (Roughan 2004: 11). The Fiji report argues that in small societies with strong cultural ties “everyone knowing each other makes the act of ignoring illegal practices” easier than “blowing the whistle”’ (Olaks Consulting 2001).

The Cook Islands report talks of ‘the traditional practice of respect for elders and leaders that leads to reluctance to question their actions’ (Ingram 2004: 5 and 12). In FSM there is ‘reluctance to openly criticize others, particularly chiefs’ (Hill 2004: 8). Similarly the Nauru report ‘traditionally, Nauruans do not question the actions and behaviour of their chiefs out of respect or fear or both (Kun et al 2004: 12). The ‘welfare and cohesion of the extended family’ is held more dearly than the putative cost to the country (ibid). And in Vanuatu’ tradition discourages the criticism of leaders’ (Newton Cain and Jowitt 2004: 5). In FSM ‘traditional deference’, for example, might make a customs officer ‘unlikely to closely question or search a chief arriving in the country from abroad’ (Hill 2004 12).

However in FSM it was suggested that people were reluctant to report less from fear of reprisal than from the expectation that they will ‘get their chance’ to benefit corruptly next (Hill 2004 12).

_In reaching authoritative judgments_ The report on Tonga found that people can ‘hide behind the culture’ because there were no authoritative guidelines to ‘distinguish between cultural practice and corruption’
though a planned Code of Conduct for Public Servants might help (James and Tufui 2004: 5). The courts in Kiribati have been particularly engaged in drawing lines between appropriate and inappropriate gift giving in Kiribati. The courts are required to take custom into account in deciding cases (Mackenzie 2004: 6). Following a series of cases involving ministers and campaigns the Kiribati electoral ordinance was amended as follows in 1997.

Any person making a customary offering to a Maneaba (meeting house) referred to in i-Kiribati as ‘Mweaka’, ‘Moanei’ or ‘Ririwete’, with the sole intention of showing respect for the customs and traditions of Kiribati shall not be guilty of bribery (Mackenzie 2004: 9).

The courts have also got involved in distinguishing between ‘respect for customs and tradition’ and ‘intention to influence voters’. For example, in the custom of bubuti it is acceptable for someone lacking in [certain] resources to make a specific request to another who is better endowed’ (Mackenzie 2004: 9, quoting Chief Justice Williams). Such requests were being made in the form of a fine demanded of a candidate visiting a Maneaba, and had involved (for example) a chainsaw or a video set. The court decided the issue depended on the intention of the giver. In the case before them the High court found the gifts ‘were made because of custom. The candidates had no choice’ (Mackenzie 2004: 9).

In a similar case in Tuvalu - that the candidate had provided chiefs with food and drink prior to a bye election, and that chiefs had promised the votes of their villagers in return – the High Court found the feasting to be in accordance with custom rather than ‘corrupt practices’ (Taafaki 2004: 15).
In implementing authoritative decisions Police typically have a great deal of discretion as to whether or not they investigate and – later – go on to prosecute offences. Police may be corrupt themselves, though the complaints in the NIS studies tended to be more about competence and professionalism than corruption. However, police were not implementing the law against relatives in FSM, and in PNG police performance was ‘watered down by lack of capacity, political influence and regionalism’ (Mellam and Aloi 2003: 27).

In punishment The Cook Islands report notes a recent successful prosecution for Secret Commissions that ‘public attitudes are often sympathetic’ to the person found guilty. It rehearses what people often said: ‘We feel sorry for his children’, ‘How much did the community lose from his criminal actions?’ and ‘The community did not suffer any loss’ (Ingram 2004: 12). There are no obvious victims, so the principles of restorative justice might suggest leniency. In Nauru, as in PNG, people who are the subject of headlines or gossip ‘continue to be re-elected’ (Kun at al 2004: 9). In FSM there was ‘a willingness to ignore or forget transgressions by leaders’ (Hill 2004: 8). In Vanuatu, people who have been damned in Ombudsman Commission reports ‘continue to get elected’ (Newton Cain and Jowitt 2004 10). And in Nauru, every time a new President is elected, there is a batch of presidential pardons (Kun at al 2004: 18). In Kiribati, however, a decline in cultural sanctions – in this case ostracism of those involved in theft – was contributing to the rise of petty corruption among junior officials (Mackenzie 2004: 10).

Culture and Integrity
Cultural arguments can be excessively deterministic, treating people as ‘dopes’, just following orders. Corruption often presents itself as a dilemma between two ethical claims (the claims of office versus the claims of family, for example). Acting properly is often a matter of reflection and calculation rather than passion – ‘weighing up’. Some of the calculation involves rehearsing how you will explain or justify what you did – if it comes out – the silent conversations with yourself we mentioned in chapter 2. But cultural factors may determine the factors that people take into account, and the weighting they give them. In this vein, Barbara Reid (1990) studied how Samoans and Europeans weighed a series of vignettes she gave them of ethical dilemmas they might face in New Zealand. She was looking for differences in ethical style. She identified reasoning processes, justifications and implicit ethics. Generally she found people in different cultures were equally principled in their moral reasoning, but there were differences in the contexts to which particular principles were applied. There were differences among Samoans according to differential acculturation within New Zealand society, and to ‘lack of consensus in Samoan culture’ about how certain moral problems should be solved. Finally – and here is the crunch - ‘cultural differences in moral reasoning are due to a contrast between a sociocentric world view on the part of Samoans and the more ego centric world view of Europeans’ (Reid 1990: 53). Samoans, other things being equal, tended to give more weight to the social consequences of actions and Europeans tended to give more weight to individual consequences.

Contrasts with ‘the West’ are part of the comparative philosopher Thomas Kasulis’ arguments about ‘integrity’ which we earlier saw treated as the opposite of corruption. He was contrasting the West with Japan but elements of his argument also seem relevant to the Pacific Islands. Kasulis identifies the historical roots of the word as related to the Latin ‘integer’ meaning ‘indivisible whole (thus numbers which are integers can’t be further divided into fractions), and to the Latin ‘tangere’ meaning touch, so ‘untouchable’. So:
That which has integrity is untouched, uncorrupted, pure. A person of integrity will not sell out. The integrity of a ship’s hull will keep it afloat. In short, the etymological meaning of integrity suggests “being whole, indivisible, and inviolable” (2002: 25).

For Kasulis that is not necessarily, or always, or everywhere a good thing. He contrasts it with another value, which he calls ‘intimacy’, and argues that important differences in (in this case) Japanese and American culture can be explained by the different emphasis they give to these values. The word intimacy derives from the Latin for ‘what is innermost’ or ‘a close friend’ and Kasulis characterises it as involving inseparability, belonging together and sharing

We have many friends and advisers, but only a few intimates. Many things are in relation but only some are intimately related. We know many things but have intimate knowledge of only a few (ibid: 24)

Kasulis goes on to present integrity and intimacy as alternative worldviews, not absolutely incommensurate, but addressing the same world in which we all live as humans. As worldviews they shape how people sharing them think about themselves, the world and so on. They differ in several ways.

First, they differ in epistemology: how we know. Integrity takes an objective, public view of knowledge. The person who knows and the thing they know about are separate and independent of each other. Any other person in the right position could also know the same about that thing. Intimate knowledge is also
objective, but seen to inhere in the person of the knower. A different person would not necessarily know
the same thing. Kasulis’ example is of an Olympic judge on a sporting event – making objective
judgements of athletes’ performance, but based on years of experience watching that sport.

Second, they differ in their picture of relationships – integrity emphasising separation and distinctness,
intimacy recognising overlap and interdependence. In an intimate relationship it is sometimes hard to tell
where you and the other person start and stop. There is a similar intimacy between a craftsman and his
tools, or a sportswoman and her equipment. Third and fourth intimacy involves emotions and the body. It
is embodied, practical, and felt as ‘second nature’. The latter relates to the fifth and the most complex
difference. Kasulis argues that integrity and intimacy differ in the openness, clarity and reflectiveness of
the basis for their claims. Intimacy tends to the dark and esoteric – its basis is not advertised, or open for
examination. The grounds of integrity are clear, bright and open for inspection.

Kasulis argues that these different emphases do not only distinguish Japanese and US cultures, but can
help understand differences between other cultures and subcultures within them. There are echoes here
with the Pacific rhetoric of caring and sharing, the somatic emphasis on cultural practice (dance, tattoos,
the body), and knowledge as a private resource to be hoarded rather than displayed for all to see. He goes
on to consider the ethics associated with integrity and intimacy. In a system of integrity – to borrow TI’s
phrase from another context – people should recognise and preserve each others integrity. They should
not treat each other as means to ends. They should apply the same principles to others as they would wish
to be applied to themselves. From an intimate perspective, the individuals are not so distinct – in hurting
you I may be partly hurting myself. They rely on empathy, and an appraisal of the practical situation
rather than general principles.
Kasulis does not deal explicitly, or in his examples with corruption. And Japan is not the South Pacific. But his work does suggest that people who value integrity are likely to see corruption rather differently from people who value intimacy, and that policies towards it need to take these background differences into account. For example a society that values intimacy might balk at the impersonality that integrity requires of public officials. It might look for ways of distinguishing ‘corrupt’ and ‘non-corrupt’ intimacy, while preserving the latter. In doing so it might rely less on the promulgation of general rules to suit everyone, in favour of a focus on risky relationships (like that between police and criminals).

So far we have been treating ‘cultures’ as specific to particular countries (Samoa, Tonga etc), but similar within them. In fact most countries in the world, and many of those in the Pacific Islands are multicultural. Suspicions and accusations of corruption occur along social frontiers, and mark differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The Cook Islands report refers to dubious foreigners – New Zealanders in this case - with financial connections to politicians, who protected them from scrutiny by the immigration department. The Solomon Islands report connects the arrival of Asian logging companies with a sharp increase in the level of corruption (including a leadership code case in 1994 in which a logging company was alleged to have bribed two ministers to defect from the government, Roughan 2004: 29), while the Marshall Islands report blames ‘Asian business procedures’ for increases in corruption in, particularly, the fishing industry.

Evers and Mehmet (1994) proposed that accusations of corruption in South East Asia arose in a distinct division of labour between ‘trading minorities’ (such as the Chinese) and indigenous cultures, which valued caring and sharing, redistribution and honour over profit. The latter faced a ‘trader’s dilemma’ – how to prosper economically, while preserving respected subsistence-based traditions. The answer to the dilemma, say Evers and Mehmet, was the partnership with ethically suspect traders, who ‘did the dirty work’. Similar divisions of labour seem to have been taking place in relations between Chinese,
Vietnamese and other Asian minorities and indigenous leaders in many parts of the Pacific (Sir Julius Chan in PNG, Ah Koy in Fiji, MP Kwan in Solomon Islands, Dinh Van Thanh in Vanuatu). Similarly, the ideological contrast between competitive Indo-Fijians and ‘caring and sharing’ indigenous Fijians is often belied by business alliances between them. In these cross-cultural circumstances, corruption is interpreted broadly as an undignified pursuit of profit, best carried out at arms length through ethically (and ethnically) distinct intermediaries. In the terms of Mauss, above, honour acquired in the gift economy needed to be insulated from contaminating investment in the money economy. And a tight system of exchange and indebtedness underlies the apparently voluntary friendship of the indigenous leader and their adviser. Each desperately needs the other.

Conclusions

In spite conceptual difficulties, ideas about ‘culture’ seem indispensable to understanding corruption, particularly if we go beyond the problems of ‘defining’ corruption to the everyday practices of responding to, ignoring, or forgiving it. Gift giving – which we introduced in Chapter 1 as the characteristic case of cross cultural misinterpretation (‘that’s a gift not a bribe’) - can also be understood in more universal and political terms. Gifts, following Mauss, can be aggressive means of creating unwelcome obligations, which one might seek to avoid.

Morgan Tuimaleali’ifano left the ceremony he describes, above, heavy hearted. The subheading to his conclusions is ‘seeds of corruption’. If gifts were not eventually returned, conflict might spill over into other areas. The introduction of cash had created a spiral of rising and deferred expectations of cash returns.
These gifting events have a life of their own and have significant consequences. As remembered events, they are transmitted a re-lived at the next crisis such as a title installation or funeral. If the payback is not matched or bettered, the sponsoring family is stigmatised. The consequences are transmitted to a future generation of matai titleholders and their families. As the opportunity arises, they will demand no less than what was determined of them as their ‘just due’ (Tuimaleali’ifano: 370)

He was not objecting to gift giving as such, but to its monetization and inflation. There was nothing intrinsically corrupt in the gift, but the amounts required put financial pressures on the participants that might make them tempted to behave corruptly in other contexts, perhaps at work, to come up with the money.

Culture shows little sign of going away under pressures of colonialism or (now) globalisation. Marshall Sahlins (1999) has analysed the way Pacific Islanders have been using introduced materials to amplify their indigenous ways of life, rather than abandon them (though he concedes they eventually they may do the latter). Chris Gregory (1982) talked about the ‘efflorescence’ of traditional culture on contact with Western goods – people could have bigger funerals, wider circuits of exchange, more costly political campaigns, and more remittances then ever before. The upsurge of anxiety about corruption may reflect this upsurge in the volume and visibility of traditional practices, amplified by cash and new technology.

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Chapter 9

Conclusions

At the start of this book we identified two views of corruption in the region: gothic and relativist. The NIS reports, and other more recent sources, provide plenty of evidence for both views. The gothic view was widely held, by local as well as international opinion, though the surveys analysed in Chapter 5 pointed to a disquieting gap between perceptions and experience. Though it was hard to tell how much corruption there was – and to distinguish it from a background of non-corrupt mismanagement – the number of types and examples listed in Chapter 6 was alarming. The forest industry in Melanesia and the National Bank of Fiji were the best-documented examples.

Yet we also found reasons to adopt certain kinds of relativism. In Chapter 1 we distinguished three kinds. The first was simply descriptive. The NIS reports found that people did, in fact, have different views about what was meant by corruption, how seriously it should be regarded, and who should be blamed for it and what should be done about it. The differences were not just of misunderstanding, which might be cleared up by better translation, or by more use of vernacular languages. Some Pacific Islanders were blaming different people from those the law singled out: the offerers of the bribes, rather than the recipients; foreigners rather than locals; businesspeople rather than bureaucrats. Some kinds of corruption (petty, some gifts) seemed to be regarded as acceptable, even justified among the non-elite. Others
(grand, other gifts) were strongly condemned in, for example, the PNG focus groups. Both were typically already illegal, though the law was hard to enforce. These differences are challenge to policymakers seeking to reduce corruption as they, or the international community, saw it.

The second kind of relativism was stronger: that these differences were the consequences of different world views, each worthy of respect, but leading to different conclusions about the value of particular behaviour. The issue of gifts versus bribes is the most familiar one, discussed in Chapter 7. Morgan Tuimaleali’ifano found an amplified style of gift-giving created an overhang of future obligations that contained ‘the seeds of corruption’. Barbara Reid’s research found Samoans and Europeans reasoning differently about common ethical dilemmas – the Samoans taking more account of group over individual consequences. And Thomas Kasulis suggested that some groups of people might give more attention to what he called ‘intimacy’ than to ‘integrity’. These different ways of thinking and feeling might lead to different conclusions about what counted as corruption, was bad about corruption, and what should be done about it. For example several of the NIS reports noticed a distinctively ‘forgiving’ approach to those accused of corruption (even in Fiji, the senior official convicted over the Agriculture Scam in is now promoting forgiveness as part of a ‘yellow ribbon’ campaign supported by the Prison Service). However we found the biggest differences in thinking and feeling about corruption were less ‘vertical’ ones between nations or ethnic groups, than the ‘horizontal’ ones between elites and ordinary people: in broad terms, not so much ‘culture’ as ‘class’. Suspicions of elite TI’s focus groups were forgiving of corruption felt to necessary for ordinary people to get by in difficult economic circumstances. Their remedies including punishment for particular individuals, and more jobs and services for all (Table 4.1). Aid donor advice to elites, by contrast was systemic, institutional, and in favour of less interference with business.
The third kind of relativism was political, deriving from Mark Philp’s point that corruption implies falling away from some ‘naturally wholesome’ state of affairs. It might be explicit or implicit, but we can’t all be expected to agree on what that consists of. The Fiji cleanup campaign was praised for providing a ‘common vision’, but differences soon emerged about what that vision consisted of. We found many competing and overlapping ideals—tradition, modernity, the market, ‘caring and sharing’—against whose standards of ‘wholesomeness’ particular actions were judged corrupt. The Weberian ideal of ‘the state’—aloof, impersonal, impartial, well-resourced and competent—was pervasive, but then so were ideals of ‘caring and sharing’, fa’á-Samoa and kastom. Immigrant ideals differed from indigenous ones in Fiji, but everywhere there were tight business and personal alliances between indigenous leaders and Chinese or other minority businessmen. Peoples’ expectation of how leaders should behave—as chiefs, soldiers, public servants and politicians—determined what they regarded as a failure to meet those ideals, and thus ‘corrupt’. These expectations were often unstated, self-contradictory, and in a state of flux, for example as countries became Independent, or more democratic, or more pluralistic, or more commercialized. In Chapter 8 we particularly found concerns about corruption around business dealings with foreigners, and policies of Affirmative Action.

In this final chapter we look at ways anti-corruption campaigns have been evaluated, by insiders and outsiders, at the implications of different interpretations for policy and draw some conclusions about the relationship between the corruption literature and the Pacific Islands evidence.

**Evaluation**
Sir Anthony Siaguru identified several successes in his review of the first five years of TI (PNG)'s operations. They had helped develop an anti-corruption curriculum. The legislation dealing with the integrity of political parties had been passed, while preferential voting would be introduced at the next election, though it would be hard to say how much of that was due to TI's campaigning. There had been less success in the National Integrity Pledge, the introduction of an ICAC, in the introduction of professional codes of conduct, and in efforts to persuade the Privatisation Commission to adopt Integrity Pacts.

Siaguru reflected on the reasons some of TI’s initiatives had not succeeded. Some seemed to drift into a kind of 'fog of war'. The ICAC proposal 'was not presented to Parliament for reasons we could not quite fathom' (Siaguru 2001). The Privatisation Commission rejected the advice for 'technical reasons which we could not fully understand or accept'. Behind these obscurities, Siaguru identifies 'fundamental self interests' and 'vested interests on the part of many political leaders’ in the parliament's failure to proceed with an ICAC. He also worried that the successful Integrity legislation might yet be subverted for 'Machiavellian purposes'.

However PNG’s Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties was passed by the PNG parliament and a system of registering political parties was introduced. Once registered, parties qualify for government funding. They must also act consistently through the term of the Parliament: if they vote for a candidate as Prime Minister, they cannot later turn against him in a vote of no confidence, or over the budget. It certainly has led to more stable government, but it is less clear that it has had any impact on corruption. Political scientist Henry Okole (2008) worries about the downside: it has strengthened the executive and disabled the opposition. It has allowed an aging Michael Somare, leader of the largest party, but with acknowledged connexions to the forestry industry, to remain in power uninterrupted for a whole
parliamentary term. For comparison, parties have been strong in Fiji, but no one argues that this helped inhibit corruption – indeed Bainimarama singled out the SDL, and its political operatives, for particular attention. Samoa suggests an uncomfortable choice. It has been economically successful, with that success often attributed to a long period of rule by the single party – the HRPP. The NIS report also acknowledges the suspicions of corruption that such hegemony engenders.

Siaguru’s report was a brave but rare example of systematic self-evaluation by an agency of its own activities. In Fiji Bainimarama has relied more on bluster and sophistry. The interim government gave itself strong credit for its campaign. In four-page advertisement in the Fiji Times Bainimarama list of the ‘major achievements’ of his ‘first 100 days’ included establishment of the anti corruption unit, giving the unit teeth and funding and anti–bribery legislation. In December 2007 a spokesman reassured the media that the army would not sack people without evidence, and the facts would be revealed ‘in due time’ (Fiji Times 19 December 07). Challenged to provide results, Bainimarama offered the purges themselves:

All you have to do is follow the events of the last six months and see who has been removed from their posts. They have been removed for corrupt practices (Fiji Times Online 17 June 07).

Lt. Col Langman, a retired army officer who was appointed Deputy Commissioner of the new FICAC in July 2007 set about distancing the agency from the excesses of the ‘cleanup campaign’ and began to assert his agency’s autonomy and claims to professionalism. He acknowledged that ‘there are innocent people whose names have been dragged in to some of the cases who have later been found innocent’. Staff members were recruited by advertisement and received training from experts from Malaysia and Hong Kong. Two staff members who had leaked information were dismissed. The investigation against Nadi Town Council was called off and the files taken were returned. The son of the Interim Finance Minister was charged with obstructing a FICAC investigation into the Sports Council. He was acquitted,
but the fact that the charge was brought to court was a sign of independence from the government.
Bainimarama showed signs of impatience, complaining in September 2007 that he was ‘not satisfied’
with the speed at which it was working.
By November 2007 FICAC had received 1,056 complaints of which 236 were ‘officially registered’.
September 2008 the number of complaints had roughly tripled to 3,000, of which 450 were registered. On
the output side, FICAC reported it had brought 10 cases to court by February, rising to 17 by April. In
June 2008 it announced that a total of 22 public officials and 2 businessmen had been charged. As the
cases eventually came to court they were mostly the targets of his original campaign: board members of
statutory bodies, public enterprises and of course the former Prime Minister himself. Meanwhile charges
brought against officials in the Agriculture Scam were leading to convictions (Larmour 2009). But these
investigations and prosecutions had begun before the coup. The FICAC also undermined its earlier efforts
to distance itself from the regime by becoming involved in prosecuting a minor, non-corr upt, offence
committed by an opponent of the military government. In January 2010 human rights lawyer Imrana
Jalal was charged by FICAC with operating a restaurant without a licence (Radio New Zealand
International 5 January 2010). FICAC’s spokesperson denied she was being singled out, referring
ominously to FICAC’s ‘far-reaching powers’ and its Commissioner’s discretion (Radio Australia Pacific
Beat 8 January 2010).

What Works?
There is now a small but growing literature of evaluation produced mainly for the international agencies
that fund anti-corruption campaigns – the donors, the World Bank and so on. It does not cover the Pacific
Islands, but much of this is critical of the ICAC model that has been advocated by TI in the region, and
adopted in Fiji and Tonga. Research on anti corruption commissions in Africa by Alan Doig and his
colleagues (1995, 2005) questions the value of independent anti-corruption agencies. A specialised,
dedicated agency, they argue, can provide a focus for anti corruption activity, including activity by
donors. It may be given special powers and resources. It may develop expertise and provide advice to other parts of the government. The downside is that it may be only a symbol. Governments may deliberately keep it weak, by limiting its budget or appointing uncritical heads. It may get involved in turf wars with other anti-corruption agencies, including the police, and divides resources. It may allow heads of departments and other managers to claim dealing with corruption is no longer their responsibility. Too much is expected of the agency, with limited resources, so it is almost bound to fail. This may explain the ‘hollowness’ on the NIS noted in our discussion of Table 5.7: almost all the pieces were in place, but they didn’t work. Adding another underfunded piece, such as an anti-corruption commission, was not going to make much difference. Such a commission may also be abused as a weapon against the government’s opponents, as in Fiji.

In a more general way, the economist Daniel Kaufmann, whose statistical work for the World Bank was discussed in Chapter 5, argues that it is a ‘fallacy’ to think that corruption can be reduced by ‘yet another anticorruption campaign, the creation of more “commissions” and ethics agencies, and the incessant drafting of new laws, decrees and codes of conduct’:

Overall such initiatives appear to have little impact, and are often politically expedient ways of reacting to pressures to do something about corruption, substituting for the need for fundamental and systematic governance reforms (Kaufmann 2005).

Writing for the World Bank, Jeff Huther and Anwar Shah (2000) argued that where corruption was endemic people were often well aware of it, and so awareness campaigns were unnecessary, or merely increased popular frustration. Similarly, understaffed and underfunded commissions might have little effect. In these circumstances, they argued, the anti corruption effort was best focussed on public service reforms that reduced opportunities for corruption in procurement and increased capacity to deliver services.
There is now also some research on the effectiveness campaigns involving prevention and TI-style awareness rising. Bertram Spector, Johnston and Dinino (2005) have looked for common factors in successful anti-corruption campaigns. They compared reports on 35 cases of anti-corruption strategies or programs adopted across Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europe. About one third of the cases were enforcement programs, one-third prevention programs, and one third was public awareness campaigns. In about 80% of the cases corruption was regarded as widespread. Eighty-five per cent of the cases were reported as successful: laws were changed (47%), behaviour changed (18%), and awareness was raised (20%). Surprisingly, two thirds were seen as having brought corruption under control.

The researchers cautioned that the data were poor (and reports of success might be self-serving) but went on to draw implications from their findings. They found much depended on the situation, but in general public awareness and transparency strategies may not be as effective as other strategies in the long run. Nevertheless, civil society (NGOs and business) plays an important role in motivating action, and awareness programs may build support that is necessary for more intrusive strategies to work. Important situational factors included as public tolerance and economic trends. Crises and transitions are the best time to initiate anti-corruption programs, but without political commitment there is backsliding and ‘recorruption’. A slightly different analysis of the same cases found that strategies aimed at grand corruption tended to be less successful. Strategies that improved accountability did better than those dealing with transparency, awareness prevention and enforcement. However the political significance of the corruption had a chilling effect on opposition to it.

Nicholas Carron’s econometric research (2009) for the University of Gothenburg’s Quality of Government Institute has similarly upbeat conclusions about international action against corruption. He expected both time and source of aid would matter, comparing the periods before and after the mid 1990s, when donors started getting serious about corruption, and comparing bilateral with multilateral aid. For corruption he used the Political Risk Services Group’s ‘Country Risk Guide’, which ‘is primarily
concerned with accounting for “excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations”, “favor-for-favors”, “secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business” (2009: 11-12). It is a perceptions index, like those discussed in Chapter 5, that gives countries score from 1-10 (ibid: 12). Unlike the World Bank and TI corruption data it went back to before the mid-1990s watershed (though Carron also used the World Bank and TI data to check his findings about type of aid in the latter period). Carron found that the change in international norms did make a difference, but only to the impact of multilateral aid on levels of perceived corruption. Bilateral aid was not associated with reductions in corruption (ibid 1: 11), a conclusion that might give pause to Australia and New Zealand’s efforts in the Pacific. He cautions that the relationship may work both ways – multilateral aid determines levels of corruption, and levels of corruption determine multilateral aid – but concludes ‘worldwide attention to overall “good governance” and more specifically to fighting corruption has been rather effective from a multilateral standpoint’ (ibid: 23).

In relation to coups Stephen Riley (1998: 132) noted that cleanup campaigns in Africa ‘have not had much success’, pointing out that ‘the problem of corruption does not disappear with the removal of those key officials identified as corrupt’. Gillespie and Okruhlik concluded from their survey of cleanup campaigns in the Middle that it was ‘unclear’ whether or not cleanups ‘actually reduce the incidence of corrupt transactions’ (1991: 92). They nevertheless had political benefits for coup leaders, particularly through ‘short term weeding out of specific opposition leaders and the diversion of attention from more pressing socioeconomic problems’. More recently, cleanup campaigns have failed in Nepal, Bangladesh and Thailand and the politicians have come back in as, hopefully, they will do in Fiji (The Economist August 27 2007: 13-14).

All this research focuses on effectiveness: does the anti-corruption activity achieve its goals of reducing corruption? This is important, and may be difficult to assess for reasons we discussed in earlier chapters: much corruption is invisible, there are differences in what is counted as corruption, and it will be hard to
disentangle the effects of a particular campaign from other factors that may be determining its incidence. ‘Does it work’ might be the first question we might want to ask of an anti-corruption campaign, but it is not the only question. Like any other public policy, anti-corruption campaigns – domestic and international – need to be tested by other criteria as well. The South Pacific cases suggest that criteria of efficiency, equity, sustainability and popularity are particularly relevant.

Efficiency may be of two kinds: technical and allocative. The first looks at the ratio or inputs to outputs, and asks if similar results could have been achieved with fewer resources. Would appointing more or fewer officials to the Ombudsman Commission, for example, have any affect on the number of successful prosecutions? The second asks about competing demands on resources – could those officials have been more productively employed elsewhere in government. The tripartite structure of an ICAC regularly poses questions of allocative efficiency. Its managers have to decide if extra resources would be better spent on prevention, rather than investigation or education. Or the question may be posed in the negative: how should cuts in budget be allocated between them most efficiently? More broadly, we could ask of Fiji’s coup: it may have brought more corruption cases to court, but could that have happened at less cost to the economy, human rights, Fiji’s international reputation and so on?

Anti-corruption campaigns also raise questions of equity. Did the campaign get the big fish, or were only junior officials targeted? We have already noticed deep popular suspicions of government in poorer countries. Was the process fair? Why were some people targeted for investigation, rather than others, perhaps equally corrupt? Did those accused get opportunities for a fair trial? The newspaper reports of the cleanup campaign in Fiji show an unfair and unjust process (Larmour 2008a). And while FICAC has been bringing cases to court, the suspicion that it has been targeting enemies of the regime is reinforced by the prosecution of Imrana Jalal on a non-corruption offence.

RAMSI demonstrates another criterion for good policy, sustainability. RAMSI restored law and order, and quickly got the government running again. In many ways effectiveness has been the least of its problems. The political tensions between the Solomon Islands and Australian governments in 2006/7
showed the difficulties of sustaining political support on both sides. And it is not clear how the ‘rebuilt’ institutions will survive without continuing Australian assistance.

Finally both Fiji and Solomon Islands raise questions about popularity. Surveys in both countries show a large block of the population is suspicious of corruption in government. So anti corruption campaigns are popular. That is why coup leaders turn to them, in the absence of the legitimacy provided by popular election, or international support. They ‘work’ politically. But the cleanup campaign in Fiji shows they may score badly on other criteria, including effectiveness.

**Interpretation**

The NIS reports focused on differences of interpretation between officials and members of the public. Definitions matter in designing effective campaigns against corruption. In Australia, for example, the acting head of the federal police recently complained to a parliamentary inquiry “I don’t think there is any universally declared understanding or corruption “. While some things were “quite clear” other things referred to the unit dealing with police integrity fell into a “grey area”. He told MPS: “Draft a definition of corruption and get it to us” (AAP October 23 2009). Interpretation is particularly difficult as many definitions of corruption turn on drawing fine lines, and being highly sensitive to context. Corruption is often a ‘grey area’ and decisions that turn on fine differences depend on interpretation. A gift or less than 100 is OK; a gift of more is not. Certain kinds of travel expenditure are allowable, other kinds are not. A gift on a religious holiday is OK, but after the signing of a contract is not. A small project in the minister’s constituency is OK, but a big project is not. And so on. Implementation becomes even more difficult if these fine lines are in motion. The standard definition of corruption as ‘the use of public office for private gain’ becomes particularly difficult to implement during the public sector reform the region has been undergoing. When public services are being privatised is behaviour that was once unacceptable
now OK? Is the use of private office for private gain OK? And so on. A sense of corruption may increase when lines become blurred, and Bainimarama’s anti-corruption campaign was partly about restoring clearer lines between government, business and indigenous institutions.

There will also be differences of interpretation within governments. Studies of street level bureaucrats (Lipsky 1980) have shown that ‘policy’ as promulgated from headquarters is only one of the things that busy officials take into account in managing their workloads. The immediate problems of clients, and the need to process them, were given much higher priority. The same is true for isolated, under-resourced officials, scattered across the archipelagoes of the Pacific. They are likely to interpret, misinterpret, and reinterpret and discount whatever comes down from the central government. And they are likely to give greater attention to solving local problems in local – possibly ‘corrupt’- ways. The Solomon Islands ombudsman graphically described the pressures felt by forestry officers. Similar pressures face officials monitoring catches on commercial fishing boats. They depend for many practical and personal matters on the people they are supposed to be regulating.

The argument so far has suggested that top down campaigns against corruption meet misunderstanding or indifference. But in the Pacific Islands the flow is two ways. Bottom up, people-driven projects also founder on elite indifference and complicity. The surveys of popular opinion in PNG and Solomon Islands confirm high level of perceptions. In Fiji, once invited to complain, people turned up in large numbers but most were turned away as their complaints didn’t meet the official definition of corruption. The figures cited above for FICAC imply a rejection rate of 78% or 85% (Larmour 2009). Still fewer of those registered will be found to have substance or - eventually – taken to court. Reasonably enough, agencies must apply legal definitions to popular perceptions, deal with more serious matters, manage their caseload, and refer matters outside their jurisdiction to other agencies. Courts must decide on the evidence
brought before them. These reasons make sense to government officials, but constitute a built in mechanism for disappointment and suspicions of further corruption. Frustration may also lead people to hiring their own intermediaries, as in the Indian cases analysed by anthropologists of the state in Chapter 4. The wronged client must engage in corruption to achieve justice.

Corruption is a strong word, in English, carrying with it all sorts of connotations of disgust and decay. It is a tempting weapon for a politician to pick, and can be deployed across ideological, regional or ethnic divisions. It can also be turned against inconvenient members of your own side. Accusations immobilise enemies. ‘Anomalies’, ‘discrepancies’ and ‘irregularities’ take time to investigate. Meanwhile those accused are tarnished and can be sidelined and preoccupied with defending their reputations. The meaning of the word is capacious enough to include unlikely bedfellows. Both the World Bank and anti-globalisation NGOs can agree they are against corruption. In the Pacific islands the word ‘corruption’ has given a popular moral overtone to ideas that might otherwise be hard to sell to the public, such as privatisation and deregulation. Yet it is also divisive. The international rankings play on nationalist sentiment. Suspicions of corruption follow social fault lines, between ethnic groups and against minorities.

Allegations are also easily turned against those who make them, contributing to the tendency of anti-corruption campaigns to ‘eat their tails’. In the Russian politics of ‘compromat’ (compromising materials), for example, politician’s trade accusations of corruption, and everyone has some kind of skeleton in their closet. The US equivalent is ‘Gotcha’ politics as Republicans and Democrats bring down scandals on each other (Davis 2006). As we saw in Chapter 8, democratic politicians, who must make deals, fund campaigns, and satisfy public opinion, are always vulnerable to charges of corruption. Their anti-political critics don’t do any better. Fiji’s post-coup government fought against corruption, but
Mahendra Chaudhry, the interim Finance Minister fell foul of ‘compromat’ politics when his tax returns were questioned in the media, while the coup leader Frank Bainmarama was criticised for awarding himself enough back pay to buy a house. In PNG the military leader denouncing government corruption in the Sandline affair was found to be in the pay of another group of arms suppliers. The multilateral institutions are also vulnerable to counteraccusations. The World Bank president campaigning against corruption is forced to resign over charges he favoured his girlfriend (Cassidy 2007: 46-47). Differences about meaning contribute to the explosiveness of the concept: I accuse you of corruption; you accuse me of being corrupt in another way. As Ivan Krastev found in Eastern Europe, the accusations proliferate. Sponsors need to be sure that their own their own practices unimpeachable in their own terms. It requires more imagination to ensure they survive scrutiny from critics who may have quite different understandings of corruption.

What is New?

This book has brought together some long standing arguments about corruption, mainly in the West, with some recent empirical material from the Pacific Islands. How has each illuminated the other? Readers will bring different mixes of knowledge and experience of one or the other, but the following seem to me most interesting or worthy of further investigation.

Chapter 2 found some surprising silences about corruption, among some newspapers (whose journalists often see themselves as scourges of corruption) and some churches (who otherwise offer moral guidance). For both, fear of offending governments may be part of the reason for silence. For the churches, the absence of much relevant Christian theology (noted by Shenone and Gregg 2003) may be
another part. For journalists, there is a strong ideology of ‘investigative journalism’ among its practitioners, however much they may depend on deliberate leaks and government handouts to get their job done. Both callings are vulnerable to corruption themselves – part of the general problem of ‘guarding the guards’. Will newer, less established religions have more to say about corruption? The link between prosperity gospels and pyramid schemes, noted by John Cox (Chapter 7) suggests not. Islam is growing in Melanesia, and may be less tolerant of government corruption. And old-style newspapers are being bypassed by the bloggers who have contributed so much to the talk about the coup and cleanup campaign in Fiji.

As we saw in Chapter 2, donor attention to corruption may have reached its apogee. That would be a pity, as Pacific Islanders were worrying about corruption a decade before the donors got involved. The research described above has found many types of campaign showing signs of success and multilateral action seems to more successful than bilateral action. After the initial excitement around the umbrella concept, the academic ‘validity police’ are already worrying away about its assumptions, coherence and usefulness. This book is part of that reaction. But neither corruption (the activity) nor corruption (the umbrella concept) looks like going to go away soon. In the real world there are vested interests among police and journalists in enforcing the law. Popular suspicion of corruption is well entrenched in poorer countries, regardless of evidence. And in the academic world, the new measures of corruption – however much they are criticised have become grist for the econometric mill of international comparisons. If the data is there, someone will use it. The CPI has proven particularly resistant to academic criticism, and particularly appealing to the media.

For all the celebration of whistleblowers, Hirschman’s ‘voice and access’ framework reminds us that speaking up and silence are not the only alternatives: we can, if we are able, simply walk away from
corruption. That option is not so easily available to Pacific Islanders, particularly on small islands where government monopolies are pervasive. But it points us to the role emigration can play in the politics of corruption and anti-corruption in the islands. Islanders in countries in free association with the US and New Zealand can, in fact, leave if they like (and criticize corruption from the safety of abroad). Those bottled up in the independent states, mostly in Melanesia, have to choose between voice and silence.

Chapters 2 and 3 found difficulties of translation, and different meanings of ‘corruption’. The liberal definition of corruption as the ‘use of public office for private gain’ is now widely accepted among the elite in this region, courtesy of the donors, international institutions and their economist advisers. Warren’s democracy-based definition – duplicitous exclusion could be deployed more often, turning as it does on a sense of exclusion and hypocrisy that was uncovered by TI’s focus groups, rather than its NIS reports (which were typically written by members of the elite themselves). Some idea of corruption might indeed be universal, but the NIS reports showed people routinely ignoring or responding to instances of it and condemning or forgiving those practicing it. We also found there has been little discussion, among donors and within Island governments about ethics: the good. The literature on ethics shows donor arguments about corruption to be consequentialist – corruption is bad because it is bad for development - while police and local lawyers naturally focus on the rules, though these are hard to enforce in so-called ‘weak states’. It may be worth trying to get leaders thinking about virtue, and the ill effects corruption may have on its perpetrators as well as its victims. More work needs to be done on what report described as ‘traditional integrity systems’ – not so much because they were old, but because they were informally enforced, including self-enforced.

Fiji’s coup was a deliberate example of ‘dirty hands’: Bainimarama knew he was doing bad in order to achieve a greater good (the coup to end coups). The evidence from Africa and the Middle East, described
above, suggests that removing corrupt individuals won’t end corruption, and Bainimarama acknowledges this in his arguments for systemic reform. Walzer’s article, discussed in Chapter 3, also suggests a particularly Catholic form of contrition for leaders (Bainimarama went to a Catholic school, and has had support from Catholic supporters of social justice). Recognising they have done bad, even if they achieve good, Walzer proposes they should offer themselves up for punishment rather than - as coup leaders have routinely done in Fiji - seeking amnesty (1973: 178-180). That might be a way for this coup to end coups.

Chapter 4 used the metaphor of diagnosis and cure, following the metaphor about corruption as a ‘cancer’. The conclusions are more about general health and resistance, rather than a specific diagnosis for a particular illness. To press the metaphor further, a public health approach – preventative, educative – seems more likely to succeed than a curative one – after the event, investigative and punishing particular individuals. No doubt both are necessary, but principles of allocative efficiency, described above, might help set the right balance. ‘Zero tolerance’ is clearly out of place when, as we have seen, the law applies tests of seriousness, and small amounts of gift giving, helping your friend get access to services she is entitled to, and so on, are tolerated, but large amounts of the same are condemned. Corruption in the Pacific Islands also takes place against a background of underdevelopment, low skills, isolation, and bad management, and is often hard to distinguish corruption from these more systemic failings. This should be no surprise in, for example, Australia where the NSW ICAC finds its anti-corruption recommendations to the State Rail Authority to be quite similar to those of an earlier commission of enquiry into a rail disaster: better management, clearer lines of responsibility, improved training; more frequent inspections and so on (Michael Nest pers comm). And the problem (as the Fiji army diagnosed) is not so much why it happens, as why it keeps happening, and no one seems to want to do anything about it. These systemic failings also may be linked to high levels of perceived corruption, irrespective of whether people have any direct or indirect experience of it. It is striking, for example, that Solomon Islands rural population –
where government services are often non-existent – have higher levels of corruption perception than those interviewed in town, where they are presumably interacting more with government officials.

The CPI and other indices have come relatively late to the Pacific Islands, in part because of the absence of other surveys on which to base them. The difference between perceptions and experience already noticed in other developing countries was also found in Fiji, the only place that opinion polling has been carried out as part of the Global Corruption Barometer (Table 5.6). The example of Fiji also confirms the concerns of East European scholars that an inflated rhetoric of corruption may damage the legitimacy of new democracies.

The invisibility of much corrupt can lead to over-theorisation. We can’t see it, so we rely on theories, implicit or explicit, of what might be causing it. Table 5.8 provided an inductive alternative to the deductive approach of the NIS surveys, which assumed that corruption depended on the absence of elements in a ‘National Integrity System’. (Klitgaard’s influential formula \( C = m + d - a \) in Table 4.1 is similarly deductive, from economic rather than constitutional first principles). Table 5.8 depended on NIS fieldwork (albeit brief), rather than the processing of data (often unreliable) collected for other purposes. There were plenty of examples of different types of corruption but also some surprising absences of corruption: in most police forces; and among electoral commissions, even if these were not constitutionally independent. Table 5.8 also recorded a lot of ‘don’t knows’, which is less a weakness of the method than a reminder of the questions raised at the end of the chapter: who does actually know how much corruption there is? Foreign business people? Popular opinion? The police? Everyone? (Huberts et al 2006). As Triesman (2007) argued, in the absence of knowledge people go looking for corruption in places they expect to find, and use those expectations as measures of what they can’t, in fact see. An
inductive, fieldwork based approach advocated in this book at least gives pause to this circular process, and comes up with the unexpected.

Chapter 7 tried to rehabilitate ideas about culture, tainted by abuse by leaders for behaviour that even they themselves knew was bad. But it did not rehabilitate gifts, which could be used in an aggressive way to create obligations, and whose inflation might drive participants towards corruption in other spheres of life. The Chapter moved from definitions (Chapter 3) and perceptions of corruption (measured in Chapter 5) to concrete practices: how people responded to particular behaviour that might be frowned upon; how seriously they regarded it; how uncomfortable they felt; whether they joined in; and so on. These practices may be compared with what sociologist Alena Ledeneva, from her studies of corruption in the former Soviet Union, characterizes as ‘informal practices’: ‘peoples’ regular strategies to manipulate (or exploit) formal rules by enforcing informal norms and creating personal obligations in formal contexts’ (Ledeneva 2006, 2008). The Chapter also treads into the relativistic territory of ‘world views’, noting research on how Samoans reasoned about ethical dilemmas, and how ‘integrity’ might not be a universal value (some people preferring a systematically different world view that Kasulis labels ‘intimacy’).

Chapter 8 attempted another rehabilitation, of politics and politicians, who are widely denigrated, in this region as elsewhere, as ‘corrupt’ (Stoker 2006). Discussion of corruption in the Pacific, by analysts and aid donors, has been preoccupied with the image of the Weberian state, aloof from ‘society’, and dealing impartially and impersonally with its citizens. The chapter showed that nationalism also had a role to play in arguments about corruption. The former Prime Minister of Fiji is being prosecuted for breaches of his official duties, and is accused of using his office for private or family gain, but both offences took place in the context of a Fijian nationalist policy of Affirmative Action. In this chapter the rehabilitation of politics was incomplete. There may be something inevitably or unavoidably corrupt about politics, but this is not
necessarily or always a bad thing. Anti politics, as the Fiji coup has shown, can also have disastrous consequences.

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