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**DIASPORA CRITICISM.** Diaspora Criticism, as a genre of academic analysis, came about in the decade spanning the 1980s and 1990s, although a seminal paper on the subject had been written by John Armstrong as early as 1976. It emerged from earlier forms of migration and mobility studies but took as its focus dispersed groups, or diasporas, as they recomposed themselves in another territory. The new scholarship sought to learn how these groups managed their politics, economics, social, religious, and familial networks, their sense of allegiance as well as their cultural and aesthetic practices. Diaspora Criticism continued to be a relevant form of cultural analysis in the second decade of the twenty-first century. Derived from *diaspeirein*, which is Greek for “scattering” or “sowing” (*speirein*), and originally used to refer to the botanical phenomenon of seed dispersal (hence *dia* [completely] + *speirein* [sow]), the root meaning of diaspora, while illuminating in a broad figurative sense, fails to capture the complex and fluid character of this modern analytical framework. Diaspora Criticism is concerned, above all, with the causes and consequences of human mobility, whether voluntary or induced, brought about by an historic transformation in the economic and political spheres in the time of modernity, classical as well as advanced. It holds up to scrutiny cultural, communicative, affective, and aesthetic practices as evidence of this changed logic. While there is no lasting consensus among scholars on the issue of definition or designation (which groups, for instance, to accommodate and which to omit), there is general if grudging acceptance that diasporas are minority populations with a shared history living in a permanent state of unsettlement. Armstrong, for instance, argues that “any [minority] ethnic collectivity which lacks a territorial base within a given polity” counts as a diaspora (Armstrong, 1976, p. 393). Some scholars have tended to draw a line between pre-modern types of dispersion (such as that of Jews, Greeks, Armenians, and Parsis) and modern ones (such as that of Africans, Turks, Indians, and the Chinese) which they regard as exemplary products of transnational practices resulting from socio-economic upheavals in the time of modernity. In this picture, modernity is conflated with the different stages of capitalism (mercantile, monopolistic, advanced, and transnational) and, consequently, with the changes in social relations and related practices that accompany these vicissitudes. Diaspora scholars have focused overwhelmingly on the last of these stages and built their models around delinked or permeable accounts of globalization as distinct from hemmed-in or bounded narratives of nation-states.

**Between Territories.** Diaspora Criticism has, so far, generated three methodological strands or scenes (see Mishra, 2006). The first, which may be labeled the scene of dual territoriality, features a triadic framework in which diasporas are sandwiched snugly between a homeland and a hostland. They operate as “trans-state networks” in the gap

between two territories, expressing split types as well as degrees of affinities and practices, and they exert leverage on both the political and economic fronts (see Sheffer, 1986). Ethnically homogenous, not overly vexed by variations in gender, class, sexual orientation, generation, or religious belief, diasporas are seen to emerge in the constitutive tension between tangible geopolitical points and life-worlds. The constitutive tension shows up in their psychological anxieties, in their cultural, aesthetic, and economic practices, in their identity politics and in the relations they keep with the two territories—living without belonging in one (hostland) and belonging without living in the other (homeland). Possessing a type of consciousness and agency not commensurate with bounded national communities, they embody a new social species marked by a different logic of modernity. In this way, diaspora refers simultaneously to a “social form,” a “type of consciousness,” and a “mode of cultural production” (Vertovec, 1997, pp. 277–278). Distinctiveness at the three levels of the social, the subjective, and the cultural is a feature of the tensional yet constitutive split between stable geopolitical reference points. Identities and forms of identifications, not to mention cultural and aesthetic creativity, are bound up with the incompatible demands of the imagined communities of homeland and hostland. In a move that recalls structuralism’s reliance on stable signs and coordinates, the two territories, together with the diaspora they spawn between them, are seen as internally unified categories. This position is predicated on a reading of the nation-state as classically auto-centered, racially self-evident, and ideologically homogenized.

Apart from Gabriel Sheffer, the main contributors to this scene are Walter Conner, William Safran, and Robin Cohen. While adopting Sheffer’s triadic relations framework (homeland-diaspora-hostland), Conner elects to draw a distinction between visceral homelands and political states. Any “segment of a people living outside the homeland,” according to him, qualifies as a diaspora (Conner, 1986, p. 16). This move allows him to characterize dispersed groups in terms of the noncoincidence in a physical territory of the two concepts of homeland and state. Whereas Sheffer and Conner put stress on the constitutive role played by dual territories in the emergence of diasporas, Safran imagines them in terms of their special state of consciousness vis-à-vis home and host societies. In what is a peculiar inversion of the triadic relations framework, it is consciousness (collective ethnic memory, idealization of homeland, myth of return, estrangement in hostland, and so on), assessed against an ideal Jewish norm, that assigns different affective and relational values to the two territories (see Safran, 1991). Cohen takes exception to Safran’s recourse to an ideal Jewish norm for assessing diasporas, contending that Jews were never a monolithic group and evinced different migration patterns and histories (see Cohen, 1997). Although he makes a brave bid to shift the debate beyond ethno-national categories by proposing a

typology based around victim, labor, trade, imperial, and cultural diasporas, Cohen ends up adopting a modified version of the dual territorial framework.

**Routes over Roots.** The second strand, which may be dubbed the scene of situational laterality, dispenses with the triadic relations framework by focusing on crabwise detours and nonlinear pathways with only nominal references to stable home and host territories. The central trope here is the rhizome, suggesting peripatetic excursions, digressive pathways and crooked lines of flight. The stable image of roots (vertical, temporal, concerned with determinate beginnings and ends, with home and host countries) is replaced by the relatively unstable image of routes (horizontal, spatial, concerned with indeterminate transits and mid-points, with multiple dwelling-sites). Origins and end-points no longer play a pivotal role in constituting diasporas or in distinguishing them from other social forms. Identities, politics, and cultures are not simply co-extensive with bounded terrains, nationalist myths, circumscribed philosophies, unalloyed linguistic communes, or homogenized aesthetic practices. Stress is placed on context-specific becoming, nonterritorial or multiple forms of identification (vocational, familial, religious, or institutional) and on hybridized aesthetic forms (music, architecture, painting, literature, etc.) and not on the tensional pressures exerted by bipolar nation-states. Adopting a poststructuralist approach to movement and identity, this second scene is deeply suspicious of stable signs and categories and insists on mapping the lateral or transversal motion of bodies, cultures, goods, and information across multiple geographical points. One immediate outcome of this departure is the rejection of the first scene's reliance on methodological nationalism. The main contributors to the second framework are Paul Gilroy, Kobena Mercer, Stuart Hall, Roger Rouse, and James Clifford.

Gilroy rejects any absolutist account that conflates race with ethnicity, culture, nationality, and the nation-state. The black diaspora that emerged in the wake of slavery, now distributed across different territories washed by the Atlantic, is the product of intricate political, social, and aesthetic transmissions taking place among America, Europe, and the Caribbean. These maritime transmissions, which include antagonistic discourses that have shaped "western" modernity and post-Enlightenment aesthetics, exceed bounded, linear, and exclusivist conceptions of the nation-state, nationalism, ethnicity, race, and culture. Constricting narratives of the nation-state, which rely on the antiquated idiom of frontiers and limits, cannot account for the points of convergence that unite the dispersed populations of the black Atlantic. British blacks, it follows, are not simply British. They are the products of historical alliances, struggles, and creolized practices that span the Atlantic Ocean and which are so profoundly transnational in character as to defeat all talk of territorial origins and ends.

Gilroy turns to the chronotope (space-time image) of the ship—that "living, micro-cultural, micro-political system in motion" (Gilroy, 1993, p. 4)—to describe the traffic in ideas, politics, and cultures that creates continuities and kinships across national divides. Mercer, similarly, sees the conflation of race, culture, nation, and language as a consequence of the exclusivity of a nationalist monologue that resists the creolized idioms and dialogic practices of the black diaspora. The everyday dialogism of black cultures, he suggests, affords a way of pluralizing the personal as well as the political without recourse to hegemonic positions or territorial nationalisms (see Mercer, 1988). Mercer is also an early commentator on queer sexualities and non-heteropatriarchal forms of sociality in diaspora. Stuart Hall, for his part, posits differences alongside continuities in his analysis of the black Caribbean. He thinks of cultural identity in terms of "being"—which takes cognizance of the past—and future-directed "becoming." *Being* refers to the adoption of common experiences, sharing of cultural frames, social codes, and worldviews even in the face of actual historical anomalies and variations, whereas *becoming* captures the rifts and breaks that haunt any totalizing claim to a common experience, culture, or history. Hall conceives of Caribbean cultural identity in terms of similarities (being) and differences (becoming) as they get played out in the movement of *différance*. Differences may move toward sameness, but any ultimate point of convergence and self-recognition is ultimately deferred. So the various aspects of Caribbean identity (European, African, and American) pursue each other without fully settling into sameness and familiarity. Hall deploys difference (between multiple territories) as well as delay (spatial detours) in formulating an internally split notion of cultural identity delinked from unitary understandings of homelands and hostlands. He points to Tony Sewell's photo-documentary project which, in its bid to reconnect with Africa and African identity, detours through London and the United States, and concludes, "not in Ethiopia, but with Garvey's statue in front of the St. Ann Parish library in Jamaica: not with a traditional tribal chant but with the music of Burning Spear and Bob Marley's 'Redemption Song'" (Hall, 1990, p. 232). In his work, Roger Rouse argues that the old social-spatial tropes of center-periphery, rural-urban divides, provincial-metropolitan contexts, and the equating of a bounded territory with identifiable communities and shared life-worlds, belongs to an outdated style of sociology that fails to do justice to modern forms of mobility, interaction, and accumulation. He cites the case of Aguilillans in Mexico and the United States who, being spatially disaggregated populations, subsist according to the logic of circuits. Rouse observes that kinship and friendship networks within these mobile constituencies facilitate an ongoing circulation of persons, ideas, goods, and funds, thereby rendering any discrete links between this multi-locale community and a

centered nation-state largely untenable (see Rouse, 1991). Similarly, Clifford's antiterritorial approach to diasporas is built around theories of nonlinear travel. He was, in fact, the first scholar to employ traveling chronotopes—buses, hotels, airports, and ships—to discuss the hypermobility and hybrid life-worlds of dispersed groups. Clifford's strength is his alertness to class, gender, sexual, professional, and power differentials that inflect diasporic modes of travel, engagement, and settlement. The female refugee and domestic worker, he implies, travels and lives very differently from the high-flying businessman (see Clifford, 1994).

**Discontinuous Archives.** In spite of their insistence on nonterritorial alliances and multidirectional kinships, Gilroy and others focus primarily on intra-diasporic networks and coalitions at the expense of historical disjoints and discontinuities. Scholars making up the third framework—or the scene of archival specificity—are interested in precisely the absence of historical commonalities and affinities within specific diasporas. Suspicious of the emphasis given to ahistorical alliances and spatially dispersed linkages, they pay close attention to the archives of deracinated groups with the aim of mapping breaks and ruptures that put at risk the shared *ethnonym*, defined as the ideological conflation of an ethnic name with the territorial nation. This scene's argument with the second framework concerns the latter's encouragement of the impression that the historical continuum and the ethnic continuum (as distinct from gender, class, language, sexual, situational, and other continuums) are essentially one and the same. Gilroy, for instance, builds an oceanic theory of the black Atlantic on the *longue durée* of an unfinished modernity. Consequently, he understates or even underrates the significance of historical and generational breaks within narratives of dispersal and translocation. By plotting routes across the Atlantic Ocean, he builds a macro web of filiations and affiliations whereby blacks, hailing from divergent historical, cultural, linguistic, and territorial points of dispersal and relocation, form an epidermal-cum-historical continuity under the banner of modernity. Scholars of the third scene resist the surreptitious conflation of the ethnic (via the epidermal) and historical continuums. They insist on observing historical and archival principles and perform archaeologies on specific diasporas with the aim of mapping internal differences and fractures. The main contributors to this third scene are Vijay Mishra, Donna Gabbacia, and Brent Hayes Edwards.

Mishra, for instance, points out that the Indian diaspora cannot be regarded as a unified entity if we take note of the two major phases of emigration which have occurred over distinct historical and economic periods, involving different classes, castes, linguistic communes, regions, religions, and levels of skill and education. Is it possible, he asks, to compare the life-worlds of indentured peasants sent to various hinterland colonies in the nineteenth century with that of

post-1960s petit bourgeois migrants to the overdeveloped nodes of the West? He notes that classical industrial capitalism informed the shipment of "sugar coolies" to assorted backwater plantations while globetrotting "cyber coolies" of the information age are motivated by advanced systems of accumulation. The practices and politics of the former are internally coherent, exclusivist, and decoupled from the homeland, whereas that of the latter reveal border, hyphenated, and cosmopolitan features—and these features are manifested in the political, aesthetic, and sexual spheres—that do not exclude the homeland (see Mishra, 1996). Thus the diaspora is fragmented as a result of historically motivated differences. These include economic forms (plantation capital as opposed to delinked capital), class groupings (illiterate landless Ahirs and Dhangars as distinct from computer-savvy professionals), slow versus accelerated forms of cultural reproduction (pilgrimages to virtual shrines are far less laborious than those to hill temples), and distinct patterns of migration (from rural to backwater colonies as distinct from rural/urban to metropolitan heartlands). The ethnonym—Indian—is no longer a rigid designator of continuities, alliances, and shared life-worlds. If the old diaspora is visibly disengaged from the homeland, the new is not; if the new is driven by territorial or ethno-national interests, the old is not; if the old maintains itself as a cultural fossil, the new celebrates hybridity; both, nonetheless, are internally fissured as a result of historical variations in the causes, classes, regions, and patterns of migration.

Donna Gabbacia, by contrast, rejects "Italian" as the starting point for her study titled *Italy's Many Diasporas*. She comments that any nation-centered analysis of the Italian diaspora, and she never speaks in the singular, is historically fraught as there was no Italian nation or a corresponding imagined community prior to 1861. She remarks that the founding of the Italian political state did not mirror an emergent national consciousness. This came about much later. Since they were disjointed by historical, regional, political, professional, and other differences, Italy's diasporas had no national consciousness or a unified nation-state as their reference point. Their affinities and allegiances, if any, were to a village (*paese*) or a locality, a city, or a family. This view is strikingly at odds with the usual understanding of the political state as the holy grail of a maturing national spirit. To be sure, one has to speak in terms of a plurality of Italian diasporas as they emerged at different periods in history, evincing different forms of attachment, dwelling, and association. Gabbacia draws a distinction between elite nationalists working toward achieving a political state and pre-nationalized migrant networks. She employs this distinction, and the tensions arising from their lack of convergence, to institute historical or diachronic breaks in the story of migrants and migrations. Her diachronic segments correspond to fragmentary horizons within which synchronic or spatial differences among diasporas—gender and class divisions,

left and right politics, departure and destination points—are listed alongside the differences resulting from temporal breaks (see Gabaccia, 2000). In the final count, Italy's diasporas constitute discontinuous formations both in relation to their different points of historical emergence and with regard to their diverse social, class, regional, vocational, and ideological kinships.

Brent Hayes Edwards, for his part, thinks of intra-diasporic disjoints against the backdrop of metropolitan locales and with specific reference to the dispersed figures of black internationalism. He challenges Gilroy's thesis on the black Atlantic as the "changing same" or what he sees as the law of continuity predicated on an "oceanic frame" (Edwards, 2003, p. 12). Upending Gilroy's account of linked chronotopes, he proposes the idea of *décalage* (or lags and disjoints in time and space) where the stress falls on the "changing core of difference" (Edwards, 2003, p. 14). While he accepts Gilroy's view that black internationalism mounts an antagonistic response to modernity, thereby constituting it in the first instance, Edwards disagrees with the conclusion that this gave rise to convergent discourses and consensual politics. He points out that the black internationalists were made up of diverse communities, cultures, languages, and actors and that their encounters, which he refers to as arenas of entanglement, were characterized by dissenting standpoints, dissimilar politics, and divergent cultural practices. Mapping disjoints in the conversation taking place among Francophone *noirs* and their Anglophone counterparts in the first fifty years of the twentieth century (which forms his diachronic segment), Edwards critiques Gilroy's heavy reliance on a male-dominated Anglocentric archive. He subverts the unity of the epidermal framework by highlighting differences obtained through other modes of interpellation—gender, class, vagabondage, and so on. Moreover, his anti-abstractivist approach—where every cultural and political linkage is haunted by the practice of difference and *décalage*—puts emphasis on the part played by specific historical events (such as Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935) in mobilizing black internationalists. Any dialogic encounter among black internationalists has, consequently, to account for the practice of linguistic, ideological, and cultural differences that arise from disjunctions in space and time.

Diaspora Criticism, as an academic mode of analysis, has been complemented by lived practices at the ground level. Aside from musical forms (for example, that of hybrid Samoan hip-hop bands operating out of Auckland) and artworks (for instance, that of the Liverpool-based "Singh Twins" who paint multi-referential postmodern miniatures in the Mogul tradition), public spaces and curatorial customs, too, have changed as a consequence of diasporic practices. San Francisco, for instance, has a space dedicated to the African diaspora (MoAD), the Chinese Immigration Museum on Melbourne's Little Bourke Street showcases

the cultural history of that community's settlement in Victoria, and there is a National Museum of Mexican Art in Chicago with the clear philosophy of exhibiting cultures without regard to frontiers and borders. While all three frameworks discussed above continue to be employed by diasporists, there is a perceptible trend away from the first scene of dual territoriality. The more probing studies in recent times tend to stress multiple experiences of otherness via digital forms of transnationalism (see Nedelcu, 2012), intra-diasporic political and ethical fractures as a consequence of online mobbing and digital outcasting (see Conversi, 2012), and the different ways a shared religious icon (such as the Peruvian "Lord of the Miracles") finds lodging in the different territories inhabited by a diaspora and with different ends and uses in mind (see Paerregaard, 2008).

[See also Caribbean Aesthetics; Decolonizing Aesthetics; Globalization; Postcolonialism; and Poststructuralism.]

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SUDESH MISHRA

**DICKIE, GEORGE** (b. 1926), contemporary American philosopher specializing in aesthetics. Since the early 1960s George Dickie has made numerous important contributions to the philosophy of art. Among the most influential of his contributions are his attacks on key aspects of widely held aesthetic theories and his creation and critical development of the *institutional theory of art*. His critique of aesthetic theory addresses a number of theses about what is involved in people's experiencing something's aesthetic qualities (and associated theses about aesthetic objects), whereas his Institutional Theory provides an account of the concept of art that locates art's essence within a special category of social practices attributed to a social group Dickie calls *the Artworld*.

A widely held view among aesthetic theorists is that someone must in some way invoke a special mode of perception in himself or herself in order to experience something's aesthetic qualities (or in order to experience something as an aesthetic object). Invoking this special mode of perception is commonly equated with adopting a special attitude toward what is being experienced—a disinterested attitude, for example. Speaking generally, Dickie shows that experiencing aesthetic qualities cannot require adopting a special attitude by providing counterexamples to the various attempts philosophers have made to show that there is a distinct kind of experience (properly classified as aesthetic experience) that people must have in order to experience something's aesthetic qualities and that having this kind of experience requires adopting a special attitude.

Early on in his attack on aesthetic attitude theorists, Dickie argued against the view that experiencing something's aesthetic qualities required attending to it disinterestedly. He did this by providing examples to show that the difference between people who are experiencing something's aesthetic qualities and people who are experiencing the same object without being aware of its aesthetic qualities merely is a function of which characteristics of the thing each person is paying attention to, regardless of the interests motivating his or her attention. Since the difference in what is experienced is explained by what is being attended to, not the mode of attention, it is not necessary to introduce notions like disinterested attention or other special modes of perception (identified in terms of the perceiver's interests, purposes, or motives) in order to understand the experience of something's aesthetic qualities.

Acknowledging Dickie's criticism of aesthetic theories that made disinterested attention the special attitude neces-

sary for experiencing aesthetic qualities, aesthetic attitude theorists replied that the relevant distinction was between aesthetic and nonaesthetic perception, where these two modes of perception are distinguished by reference to three things: the perceiver's motives, purposes, and interests; the qualities of the thing attended to; and attention. Dickie pointed out that since attention is common to both aesthetic and nonaesthetic perception, and since nonaesthetic qualities can be the object of aesthetic perception, the perceiver's motives, purposes, and interests are what must distinguish aesthetic from nonaesthetic perception. He then provided examples to show that someone whose motives, purposes, and interests concern only something's nonaesthetic qualities can nonetheless notice its aesthetic qualities and that someone concerned only to discover something's aesthetic qualities nonetheless can fail to do so.

In regard to those versions of aesthetic theory that attempt to characterize aesthetic perception in terms of someone's perceiving without regard for practical ends (as distinct from someone's perceiving in an altogether disinterested way), Dickie noted that qualities that aesthetic attitude theorists agree are not aesthetic, such as being square, are perceivable without regard to practical ends. To this he added that someone with a practical end in mind (Dickie's example is someone intending to write a critical article) can perceive the qualities aesthetic attitude theorists agree are aesthetic. Dickie concluded that the notion of a special kind of aesthetic perception or aesthetic attitude does not work in aesthetic theory. Taken together, Dickie's arguments seriously undermine attempts by various aesthetic theorists to hold that someone's experiencing something's aesthetic properties requires his or her adopting a special sort of psychological state.

Not limiting himself to revealing flaws in the theories of others, Dickie developed his own theory about the nature of art. He credits Paul Ziff and Morris Weitz with correctly rejecting the traditional method that seeks to discover art's essence in some function common to all works of art. Ziff and Weitz (separately) argued that the attempt to define art in this way invariably fails and on this basis concluded that art lacks an essence. Dickie agrees that the traditional method is flawed, but he does not conclude from this that art has no essence (that there can be no necessary and sufficient conditions for something being art). Instead, he maintains that the traditional method fails because in each case it concentrates on a single, simple relation (such as the relation between an artist and her emotions). He says that art's essence can be discovered if we adopt an approach that "places the work of art within a multi-placed network of much greater complexity than anything envisaged by earlier theories." The network of relations Dickie has in mind is presumed to be instantiated by "the artworld." Dickie's institutional theory of art is his account of the network of social practices that he believes make works of art possible.