Key issues and drivers affecting coastal and marine resource decisions: Participatory management strategy evaluation to support adaptive management

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ARTICLE INFO

Article history:
Received 26 February 2015
Received in revised form 12 August 2015
Accepted 15 August 2015
Available online xxx

Keywords:
Adaptive management
Cognition
Decision-making
Management strategy evaluation
Multiple-use management

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2015.08.011
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1. Introduction

Changes in the landscape and seascape to accommodate and support human development worldwide are known to be eroding natural resources with flow-on effects on socio-cultural and economic values (Boulding, 1966; Costanza et al., 1995; Holling, 2001; Holling and Meffe, 1996). Because of the feedbacks and inherent uncertainty in social-ecological systems, it is generally difficult to provide one ‘best’ (or optimal) policy to improve the condition of the resource (Rittel and Webber, 1973).

However, decision frameworks that assist decision-makers on a course of action to regulate natural resource-use have been successfully developed and implemented to improve natural resources management (NRM) issues in coasts and oceans. This includes adaptive management, a decision framework that has been mainly applied to marine fisheries management (Walters, 2007) and a subsequent but related approach, management strategy evaluation (MSE) (Smith, 1994), a framework that accounts for multiple objectives by comparing the trade-offs of alternative management strategies. Improving socio-economic wellbeing and environmental conditions are expected outcomes of successful adaptive management and MSE initiatives. It is recognized that ‘success’ in NRM depends not only on improving our understanding about the resource dynamics (e.g. population dynamics, harvest efforts, and physio-chemical drivers) but also of governance and behavioral components; i.e. the way actors make decisions, develop rules to mediate resources-use, and implement and enforce these rules (Dutra et al., 2014; Fulton et al., 2013; Gutierrez et al., 2011; Westgate et al., 2013).

There are limited studies identifying decision-making drivers in coastal and marine NRM settings. These studies mostly look at specific aspects of decision-making, such as leadership, engagement and scales of governance (Dale et al., 2013; Fulton et al., 2013; Gutierrez et al., 2011). The objectives of this paper are therefore: (1) to review the literature to identify and understand the key drivers affecting NRM decisions, and (2) to use the key learnings from this review and the experience from the authors to examine how formal participatory approaches used in MSE can assist in addressing these drivers. The focus of the review and analyses is on coastal and marine management (NRM) issues in coasts and oceans. These studies mostly look at specific aspects of decision-making, such as leadership, engagement and scales of governance (Dale et al., 2013; Fulton et al., 2013; Gutierrez et al., 2011). The objectives of this paper are therefore: (1) to review the literature to identify and understand the key drivers affecting NRM decisions, and (2) to use the key learnings from this review and the experience from the authors to examine how formal participatory approaches used in MSE can assist in addressing these drivers.

4. Conclusions
Acknowledgements
References

1.1. Key issues affecting NRM decisions

Maintaining or improving the condition of underlying resources and ecosystem services in coasts and oceans is difficult for many reasons. Firstly, resource use and exploitation frequently lead to a polarization between the need for economic development and the need to preserve or conserve the resource base of this development in the long-term, often because the beneficiaries are different groups to those that are impacted by development (Lichatowich, 1992). Secondly, decision-making often involves a diverse set of government organizations (local, state, federal) that control or regulate access to or use of the resource (e.g. fisheries, forestry, land for urban development, agriculture and conservation) (Acheson, 2006; Bella, 1992). This control in turn influences the decisions of resource users who derive economic benefits from harvesting or using natural assets, with impacts on others who use resources for recreational, social and cultural purposes. Thirdly, because of the diverse stakeholder groups affected by coastal and marine NRM decisions and involved in the decision-making process, values and management objectives (environmental, socio-economic and cultural) are often divergent, not well articulated, or not made explicit to the wider society (Burt, 2011; de Geus, 1988; Ludwig, 2001; Walters, 2007). This can lead to tensions within and between stakeholder groups due to lack of transparency in the decision-making process, which also affects the way actions are chosen and implemented.

1.2. Adaptive management and management strategy evaluation as ‘rational decision’ frameworks

Adaptive management treats policy choices as deliberate, large-scale scientific experiments (Walters, 1997, 2007), for which the decision-making process generates relevant and reliable information about the natural resource system. Adaptive management requires a set of objectives (what managers and stakeholders want to achieve and by when), as well as an effective monitoring protocol to evaluate the consequences of decisions — in relation to objectives — to adjust actions based on the feedback received via the monitoring protocol. In principle, adaptive management can help managers understand the current state, and make explicit the desired states of the resource, also considering uncertainty and a limited understanding of key underlying processes (Bennett et al., 2005; Cinner et al., 2006; Sainsbury et al., 2000).

MSE supports the design and implementation of adaptive management by enabling experimentation with alternative management strategies in a ‘safe’ computer environment rather than in the real world. The approach has been assisting coastal and fisheries managers in dealing with uncertainty and multiple objectives by allowing the comparison of (often conflicting) social, environmental and economic trade-offs, while testing multiple management strategies (Bunnefeld et al., 2011; Dichmont et al., 2006b, 2013a; Fulton et al., 2013; Fulton et al., 2011b; McDonald et al., 2006; Moeseneder et al., 2015; Smith, 1994).

The presumed effectiveness of adaptive management and MSE is based on the assumption that a manager acts as a single agent that manipulates a set of regulatory levers to achieve objectives, with more or less well-known consequences on the natural
resource system being managed, and does so in response to the information (and uncertainties) received from the system via monitoring and assessment models (mental or computer-based models). Adaptive management regards decision-making as ‘rational’. That is, it assumes that improved information necessarily leads to improved decisions, and that the aim is to identify and adapt pre-determined courses of action depending on the feedbacks received about the system’s response to past actions (refer to Arthur, 1992 for more on ‘rational decision-making’).

Under the paradigm of rationality, it is expected that scientific recommendations on resource use should seek to provide the best possible assessments of the natural resource, which is expected to play a key role in decision-making (de Oliveira et al., 2009; Walters, 2007). However, coastal and marine decision-making usually involves a number of complex drivers related to governance structures and group dynamics, including leadership (Dutra et al., 2014; Gutierrez et al., 2011), stakeholder engagement (Fulton et al., 2013; Triantafyllou et al., 2014), values (Armitage, 2005; Dutra et al., 2015; Failing et al., 2013), and institutions (Gutierrez et al., 2011; Herrfahrdt-Pahle and Pahl-Wostl, 2012), which also influence which management decisions are chosen and how they are implemented (Dutra et al., 2014). In addition, decisions are dependent less and less on information alone, as individuals often appear at first glance to decide in ‘irrational’ ways (see for example Ariely, 2008). This can be explained by cognitive and psychological factors. Hence individual-level responses may themselves have strong driving influences on collective decision-making.

Even though adaptive management principles have been widely referred to in coastal and marine NRM, their practical implementation is still limited (Westgate et al., 2013). The MSE approach has been successfully implementing adaptive management in complex settings, such as fisheries (e.g. Butterworth et al., 2010; Dichmont et al., 2006b, 2013a; Mapstone et al., 2008; Pascoe et al., 2013; Plaganyi et al., 2012a, 2012b; Punt et al., 2001; Smith, 1994), environmental conservation (Bunnefeld et al., 2011), coastal water management (de la Mare et al., 2012; Dutra et al., 2014; Moeseneder et al., 2015; Myers et al., 2012) and coastal multiple-use management (Fulton et al., 2013; McDonald et al., 2008; van Putten et al., 2014). Given the limited practical applications of adaptive management and the successful history of MSE in operationalizing adaptive management principles we use MSE as the framework for our analysis.

2. Methods

Our review focuses on literature from adaptive management (as defined in Section 1), organizational learning, and decision-making to identify drivers that function as enablers of effective coastal and marine management. Organizational learning (OL) is defined as an information management strategy designed to detect and correct errors and transfer knowledge and learnings throughout organizations (Argyris and Schön, 1978; Spector and Davidsen, 2006). Identifying enablers of effective management and understanding how they operate within NRM organizations is therefore a significant contribution of our study. Decision-making is an important aspect of organizational learning but it goes beyond the OL domain. The identification of formal decision-making processes (in particular structured decision-making) draws on principles from decision analysis theory (Failing et al., 2013; Keeney and Raiffa, 1976) and has strong commonalities with adaptive management (Failing et al., 2013). Both encompass a process that includes problem definition, description of objectives, strategy development, estimation of consequences, implementation of actions, trade-off evaluation based on a monitoring system, and re-definition of objectives (Failing et al., 2013). Hence, there is an explicit link in our review between decision-making, adaptive management and OL.

The literature reviewed describes a number of drivers that contribute to decision-making, which we aggregated into categories based on their similarities. These are: (i) governance structures, (ii) power and leadership, (iii) psychological processes and (iv) cognitive processes.

3. Results

3.1. Categorizing decision-making drivers

Decision-making drivers identified in the literature were aggregated into four broad categories (Table 1). These are:

- **Governance structures**: refers to organizational drivers affecting the process of making and implementing decisions, such as well defined roles and responsibilities, flexible institutions and management processes, explicit jurisdictions and mandates over ecological boundaries, cooperation, engagement and collaboration between actors, organizational incentives, integration of knowledge, and time delays between problem identification and action implementation.
- **Power and leadership**: refers to how leaders interact with other actors to make and implement decisions. Drivers identified in the literature are leadership, politics and power relations, trust, transparent decision-making and management processes, communication, and resources (human and financial).
- **Psychological processes**: involves drivers affecting decision-making at the individual level, such as anxiety and unconscious defenses, values, individual attitudes and group dynamics.
- **Cognitive processes**: refers to how individuals perceive, store and structure information, thus influencing their way of making decisions (Boschetti et al., 2012).

The detailed description of categories and drivers identified in the literature are presented in section 3.2.

3.2. Drivers affecting individual and collective decisions

The existence of multi-stakeholders involved in decision-making processes may be the cause of many of the practical limitations of the standard adaptive management framework. Examples from fisheries management suggest that adaptive management provides insights about how decisions ought to be made when based on new information (Dichmont et al., 2013b; van Vugt, 2009). Where the decision-maker can be seen as (a) a single agent with a consistent and stable set of objectives, (b) able to consistently seek to achieve these objectives, but (c) likely to experience a degree of uncertainty as to what the potential impacts of alternative courses of action might be, a rational, adaptive management approach should strengthen the decision-making process by allowing managers to learn from experience in a reinforcing feedback cycle (‘the more I know the better decisions I can make’) (Stacey, 1996: 196). However, people operating within Coastal and marine management organizations are influenced by other people, they often use emotions in their decisions, and unconscious motivations drive the way they interpret information and make decisions (Arthur, 1994; Keeney and Raiffa, 1976:11; Stacey, 2007; Sterman, 2000:26; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, 1983; Walters, 2007). Below, we present a brief review of how each of the above drivers (Table 1) is expected to affect the process of making NRM decisions in coastal and marine settings. The review provides important insights as to how MSE could be applied to address each category of drivers.

3.2.1. Governance structures

Management problems in coasts and oceans are fundamentally governance problems (Acheson, 2006; Brondizio et al., 2009;
Decision-making drivers identified in the literature and corresponding categories used for analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Driver</th>
<th>References</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governance structures</td>
<td>Well defined roles and responsibilities</td>
<td>Borrini-Feyerabend et al. (2006); Hajer (2003)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Explicit mandates and jurisdictions over ecological boundaries</td>
<td>Acheson (2006); Clarke et al. (2013); Fidelman et al. (2013); Folke et al. (2007); Hajer (2003); Izurieta et al. (2011); Pauly (2007); Smith (2004)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Cooperation, collaboration and engagement between actors</td>
<td>Adger et al. (2005); Axelrod (2006); Brede et al. (2008); Brondizio et al. (2009); Clarke et al. (2013); Dale et al. (2013); Douglass (2002); Dutra et al. (2015); Fulton et al. (2013); Leith et al. (2012); Meinenz-Dick (2007); Selnes et al. (2006); Stocker et al. (2012b); van Vugt (2009); Vollan and Ostrom (2010)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Organisational incentives to filter out negative information about the status of natural resources</td>
<td>Bella (1992:19); Buchanan (1983); Tollison (1982)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Knowledge integration</td>
<td>Costanza (1991); Folke et al. (1998); Folke et al. (2005); Leith et al. (2012); Roberts and Jones (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Time delays between identification of problem and implementation of decisions</td>
<td>Pister (1992:7); Sterman (2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power and leadership</td>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Dale et al. (2013); Dutra et al. (2014); Fidelman et al. (2013); Folke et al. (2005); Gutierrez et al. (2011); Lockwood et al. (2012); O’Keeffe (2002); Walters (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Power relations</td>
<td>Arvai (2003); Dutra et al. (2015); Kothari (2006:544); Stacey (2001); Van Vugt (2002)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>Bainbridge et al. (2011); Berkes (2009); Borrini-Feyerabend et al. (2006); Leith et al. (2012); Leith et al. (2014); Mackelworth et al. (2013); Ostrom (2010); Sneid (1997)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Transparency in decision-making and management processes</td>
<td>Herrfahrdt-Pahle and Pahl-Wostl (2012) Arvai (2003); Brock and Carpenter (2007); Dutra et al. (2015); Dutra et al. (2014); Folke et al. (2005); Gutierrez et al. (2011); McNie (2007); Stacey (2001); Timmerman et al. (2010)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Cundill (2010); Dutra et al. (2015); Stocker et al. (2012b:30); Walters (2007)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Values</td>
<td>Argyris and Schön (1978); Ariely (2008); Axelrod (2006); Boschetti et al. (2012); Boschetti et al. (2012); Bots et al. (1999); Finger and Assin (2001); Isenberg (1988); Slovic (2007); Stacey (2001); Stacey (2007:89)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Individual attitudes and group dynamics</td>
<td>(Argyris and Schön (1978):28). A coastal community, or fisheries management bodies are examples of organizations, which may shape and alter institutions (Hodgson, 2006). The focus of this paper is restricted to organizational aspects related to governance. Consequently, ‘governance’ and ‘organizations’ are used as synonyms. Coastal and marine organizations can often be represented as nodes in networks operating at multiple levels (e.g. international, national, state, local) (Brondizio et al., 2009). They consist of many centers linking many levels of government (e.g. national, state, local, departments/sectors), industry, community and NGO, each with its own jurisdictions, interests, goals and means. Few of the nodes are capable of solving NRM problems in isolation (Selnes et al., 2006). For example, at a national level, NRM commonly involves a lead agency (e.g. ministries of fisheries) that operates within a management/development plan or Act (Pauly, 2007). A ministry of the environment, or a similar organization, is also usually indirectly involved in resource management. It is often surrounded by NGOs, industry groups and civil society who influence (or lobby) individuals and agencies involved in decision-making (Dutra et al., 2014). In most cases this structure places stakeholders in various influencing positions, resulting in hierarchical structures or polycentric networks of governance in which power is dispersed leaving areas of responsibility unspecified (Hajer, 2003). Other examples of network governance systems relevant to coastal management include indigenous/traditional systems, which emphasize the intertwined distribution and exercise of a group’s decision-making and leadership to achieve collective goals. These traditional nodal governance arrangements seem to be more responsive and effective in terms of NRM (Smith, 2004), but there is no guarantee that these structures will achieve the intended management goals, especially if these are part of or embedded in different governance systems (Acheson, 2006; Izurieta et al., 2011); Axelrod (2006); Boschetti et al. (2012); Dutra et al. (2014); Failing et al. (2013)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Cognitive processes</td>
<td>(Boschetti et al. (2012); Dutra et al. (2014); Failing et al. (2013)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Worldviews</td>
<td>Bainbridge et al. (2011); Boschetti et al. (2012); Innocenti and Albrito (2011); Simpson and Gill (2007); Stocker et al. (2008)</td>
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Dichmont et al., 2013b; Folke et al., 2005; Ludwig, 2001; Olsen, 2003; Ostrom, 2009; Selnes et al., 2006). Governance refers to processes related to decision-making and power sharing where actors (e.g. non-governmental organizations (NGO), government, industry) and market, education and regulation incentives work together to guide society towards desirable outcomes (Brondizio et al., 2009; Folke et al., 2005; Hajer, 2003; Jones, 2013; Selnes et al., 2006).

Governance consists of two interacting components: institutions (rules) and organizations (people) (Dutra et al., 2015). Institutions are the laws, policies, regulations, norms, and customs that shape human action and define opportunities and constraints in which organizations operate. Organizations are the actors, or an organised body of people with a particular purpose, where its members develop the rules for collective decision delegation and membership (Argyris and Schön, 1978:28). A coastal community, or fisheries management bodies are examples of organizations, which may shape and alter institutions (Hodgson, 2006). The focus of this paper is restricted to organizational aspects related to governance. Consequently, ‘governance’ and ‘organizations’ are used as synonyms. Coastal and marine organizations can often be represented as nodes in networks operating at multiple levels (e.g. international, national, state, local) (Brondizio et al., 2009). They consist of many centers linking many levels of government (e.g. national, state, local, departments/sectors), industry, community and NGO, each with its own jurisdictions, interests, goals and means. Few of the nodes are capable of solving NRM problems in isolation (Selnes et al., 2006). For example, at a national level, NRM commonly involves a lead agency (e.g. ministries of fisheries) that operates within a management/development plan or Act (Pauly, 2007). A ministry of the environment, or a similar organization, is also usually indirectly involved in resource management. It is often surrounded by NGOs, industry groups and civil society who influence (or lobby) individuals and agencies involved in decision-making (Dutra et al., 2014). In most cases this structure places stakeholders in various influencing positions, resulting in hierarchical structures or polycentric networks of governance in which power is dispersed leaving areas of responsibility unspecified (Hajer, 2003). Other examples of network governance systems relevant to coastal management include indigenous/traditional systems, which emphasize the intertwined distribution and exercise of a group’s decision-making and leadership to achieve collective goals. These traditional nodal governance arrangements seem to be more responsive and effective in terms of NRM (Smith, 2004), but there is no guarantee that these structures will achieve the intended management goals, especially if these are part of or embedded in different governance systems (Acheson, 2006; Izurieta et al., 2011); Axelrod (2006).
as an ‘institutional void’, where ‘there are no clear rules and norms according to which politics is to be conducted and policy measures are to be agreed upon’ (Hajer, 2003). One consequence of the ‘institutional void’ associated with the often ill-defined multi-nodal governance structures usually encountered in coastal NRM is that there is no clear process to define what kind of information is required for management, and how or whether the information should be used and acted upon (Dutra et al., 2014). A second consequence is that there may be a long delay (years to decades) between problem recognition and the gathering of financial and administrative support from governments to address NRM problems (Pister, 1992:7). The third consequence is that these governance structures may become dysfunctional, as they tend to filter out negative information and use only favorable assessments about the status of the resources (Bella, 1992:19). According to Bella (1992), this happens for two reasons:

- The norm can be for individuals on management teams or their leaders to take decisions to advance their welfare and career development, thus impeding changes in management and governance that may be necessary in coastal and marine management (this is further examined in section ‘Power and leadership’ below).
- Completing the tasks for changing governance systems when such tasks are outside the norm can be seen as lacking the prospect of reward (on the nature and consequences of such incentives in organizations see also Buchanan, 1983; Tollison, 1982).

Consequently, organizations tend to have a self-sustaining structure with a reinforcing feedback loop. This can only be disturbed when leaders consciously make additional personal effort to promote the necessary changes, and/or when there is a change in political leadership (Walters, 2007). This may lead to a high level of resistance to change, which will only be beneficial if the existing structure effectively deals with NRM problems.

Enabling adaptive management systems to respond quickly to NRM problems and avoid filtering out negative information would seem to entail a strong need for incentives that encourage, rather than deter, innovation and risk taking. At a management level, coastal and marine NRM organizations are bound by the existing legislation, but the actual decision-making processes are not always explicit (Dutra et al., 2014). They are also influenced by power relations and leadership styles and are affected by the behavior of decision-makers when facing management challenges. This in turn affects how decision-makers choose and interpret the information available to them.

3.2.2. Power and leadership

Empirical evidence suggests that making and implementing decisions about coastal and fisheries issues is often related to strong leadership and/or to the influence of power groups (Dutra et al., 2014; Gutierrez et al., 2011; O’Keeffe, 2002; Walters, 2007). Strong leadership has also been associated with successful management initiatives in catchment-to-coast (water quality), fisheries, and marine biodiversity management (Dutra et al., 2013, 2014; Gutierrez et al., 2011; Lockwood et al., 2012). For our discussion, we define leaders as middle-level staff from a regulatory agency who have the power to persuade as well as the ability to negotiate and implement decisions (Dutra et al., 2014; Walters, 2007). These leaders are expected to source funds to build teams to deal with coastal and marine problems under the existing legislation and organizational structures. Not surprisingly, leaders and the management teams they create often share beliefs, values and objectives, resulting in decisions that conform with the values of the leader (this is similar to organizational culture, see Argyris, 1999; O’Keeffe, 2002; Stacey, 1996).

Walters (2007) suggests that changes in management processes or structure in fisheries organizations are only possible when a leader creates additional work for themselves ‘in terms of setting up new regulations and enforcement procedures, designing and staffing (funds, equipment, people) new monitoring initiatives, and organizing the oversight processes (committees, administrative procedures) typically required for any new management program in today’s highly bureaucratized management systems’. The way leaders interpret information and act upon these is critical in the process of choosing decisions when management objectives conflict or when it is not clear whether the management actions will achieve desired objectives (i.e. managing under uncertainty).

In the absence of complete information and certainty, the choices of the management team are often based on support from the existing leadership (Folke et al., 2005; Gutierrez et al., 2011; Stacey, 1996:196). Vested interests are part of this process and are unlikely to be disturbed if leaders and the individuals in their team share similar beliefs about how the management system should work. This may be another reason for stability in governance structures, which may be beneficial if the coastal/marine resource is being managed adequately. However, instability may be created when individuals keep moving within and outside the organizational structure as this is sometimes the only way for civil servants to get promoted.

Implementing decisions often depend on how well leaders communicate issues and decisions with their teams (Folke et al., 2005; McNie, 2007; Timmerman et al., 2010) and how much team members trust their leaders (Berkes, 2009; Ostrom, 2010). Transparency in management decisions (Herrfahrdt-Pahle and Pahl-Wostl, 2012) and adequate resourcing (human and financial) (Cundill, 2010; Walters, 2007) are also important factors identified in the literature that support leadership.

3.2.3. Psychological processes

When there is a change in leadership and the management team no longer shares beliefs with the new leader, team members (or the new leader) may experience internal conflicts and contradictions in the form of unconscious defenses against anxiety and uncertainty (Argyris, 1991; Stacey, 2007). For example, a ‘green’ politically oriented leader working with a ‘pro-development’ team will most likely become anxious if she/he chooses to implement decisions that do not conform to the team’s and/or higher level leadership values and beliefs. Values are important because they reflect ‘what’ stakeholders want the system to be and ‘how’ they want to implement it. Values provide the principles that underlie decisions as well as the metrics to evaluate progress (for more comprehensive definitions of values refer to Bardi and Schwartz, 2003; Bottom, 1992:1; Keeney, 1992:4; Maio, 2010; Schwartz and Bilsky, 1990). According to Stacey (2007:285–287), anxiety resulting from a conflict in values may influence a person’s perception of future opportunities and management strategies. In other words, contradictions and the consequent anxiety due to differences in values and beliefs may limit individuals’ capacity to identify a problem and also their ability to choose and implement management decisions.

Even though clearly defined management objectives are key to NRM, their articulation can be difficult, especially in coastal management problems where the trade-offs between alternative objectives are difficult to avoid (Mackenzie et al., 2006; Rittel and Webber, 1973). Defining management objectives in NRM settings results from negotiations between interested parties and forms
part of the purpose and outcome of activities such as modeling and data analysis that support NRM (Boschetti, 2007). As a result, decision-makers often need to surmise the likely behavior of others to filter and choose which information to use and also which objectives to achieve.

Another psychological factor influencing decision-making is how individual attitudes and group processes respond to the risk of failure (Stacey, 2007:89). Individuals tend to ignore recognized deficiencies and uncertainties in the management and/or biophysical systems to maintain control, which leads to the development of defensive routines. Stacey (2007) suggests that under these circumstances it is common for the management team to be aware of the problem but all agree, tacitly, not to discuss it. Fear of failure is noted as a strong influence on the willingness of individuals to act, which has been reported in coastal Australia (Dutra et al., 2014). Individuals may apply ‘organizational defensive routines’ to constrain the process of making and implementing decisions by not acting due to the fear that these actions will not produce the expected results (Stacey, 2007).

3.2.4. Cognitive processes

Context, personal preferences, time delays, values and cognitive styles all have strong influences on decision-making. The context for the decision is highly relevant because it influences decision-makers’ judgments about the available information (Dutra et al., 2014). The acceptance of decisions also appears to be highly contextual, depending on the type of problem, the social, political and economic implication of the message; the type of audience, and the charisma and reputation of the messenger (Boschetti et al., 2012). For instance, for environmental decisions people tend to accept certain options (e.g. nuclear power) better when these are described as being the result of wide public consultation (Arvai (2003) calls this ‘context dependence’). Empirical results (e.g. Dutra et al., 2014) support the context dependence hypothesis, where certain types of controversial water quality management decisions (e.g. the construction of infrastructure to recycle water in coastal Australia) have greater chances of being implemented when the context (e.g. long drought) is favorable. Context dependence leads to the possibility, for example, that individuals ignore information and base their choices on transitory perceptions influenced by their current context.

Individuals assess problems and make decisions based on their expectations of the performance of a choice, when compared to the performance of alternative choices. In particular, certain outcomes will usually be given greater weight in decision-making than others, despite appearing ‘irrational’. This is the case, for example, with options which carry small expected probabilities of sustaining extremely high losses or making extremely high gains. Individuals have also been shown to grant greater weight in their decisions to perceived gains than to the equivalent gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Interestingly, these general results regarding human behavior were validated in the context of environmental management decisions, where ‘losses’ were presented as a need for ‘restoration’, while ‘gains’ were framed as a possibility for ‘improvements’ in environmental conditions (Gregory et al., 1993). Prospect theory asserts that the way the information (on regulations, on incentives, on political decisions and also from data and models) is communicated to the public and leaders can strongly influence the actual decisions. This implies that communication methods—as applied in examples on biodiversity conservation and water quality management in the coastal zone (Dutra et al., 2014; Westgate et al., 2013)—are critical to adequately present information necessary to anticipate such cognitive reactions of stakeholder groups.

Time delays in the interactions between management and natural resource systems also influence the process of making decisions. Resource management decisions always involve time delays between a decision made to improve the resource condition, its implementation and when it actually produces the desired outcomes. For example, the revegetation of riparian zones or reduction in catches of a certain fish species involves the decision itself, the planting of trees or the reduction in catches, and when these actions actually start producing desired outcomes (e.g. reduction in sediment runoff or increase in fish stocks). Accounting for these time delays is important because managers often continue to intervene (e.g. planting more trees, implementing actions to reduce or increase fish catches) even after sufficient actions have been implemented. This happens simply because they did not account for the inertia between action implementation and response and also because of the belief that by repeating the action it would eventually work as anticipated (Arvai et al., 2006). This not only wastes resources (human and financial) but in management situations, Sterman (2000:23) suggests that such behavior leads to ‘overshoot and oscillation, which reduce the ability of managers to control for confounding variables and discern cause and effect, further slowing the rate of learning’.

Cognitive styles influence the way individuals perceive, store and structure information, thus influencing their decision-making (Boschetti et al., 2012). Consequently, they have a direct influence on how individuals decide which information is true and how this is used to make choices. Cognitive styles affect the process of making decisions because they determine what kind of information decision-makers want, how much information they wish to receive, how much they want to receive it, how much effort they dedicate to understanding the details, how willing they are to change their attitudes and opinion in the light of new information and how comfortable they are to account for uncertainty in their decision-making (Boschetti et al., 2012). This means that decision-making for coastal and marine management should explicitly consider the diversity of cognitive styles (and values) from the various stakeholder groups in a transparent manner (Failing et al., 2013; Simpson and Gill, 2007). This view acknowledges that, for example, economic prosperity is just as much, if not more, a part of people’s cognitive styles and preferred visions of the future as is the sustenance of natural systems (van den Belt, 2004:2).

3.3. MSE as a participatory decision support approach

MSE requires the representation of two systems to assess management strategies: the resource system and the management strategy system (Fig. 1). The resource system is usually represented by an operating model (OM) (which includes an observation model represented as ‘data’ in Fig 1), which simulates plausible hypotheses about how the resource system works and how it is impacted by resource use (Dichmont et al., 2006b). The OM is used to test the robustness of management strategies given current knowledge and what can and cannot be controlled. The management strategy system usually includes an assessment sub-model from which to derive estimates of performance measures or system state, based on simulated observations, as well as a set of decision rules or heuristics which modify the controls imposed on components of the OM. Outputs from the assessment model inform these decision rules (Dichmont et al., 2006b; Kell et al., 2007). Typically, the

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1 Organisational defensive routines are the policies or actions individuals put in place to prevent them from experiencing embarrassment or threat. For example, individuals can make a decision and not implement it to avoid the risk of it going wrong and being ridiculed by their team Argyris, C., 1991. Teaching smart people how to learn. Reflections 4, 1–15.
With such components included, it is expected that MSE increases leading to a divergence between a planned course of action and the management model may also include a degree of what has often been described as ‘implementation uncertainty’, that is, processes leading to a divergence between a planned course of action and the management actions effectively implemented (Fulton et al., 2011a). With such components included, it is expected that MSE increases the knowledge base on the consequences of management actions, ultimately improving management.

MSE and the associated approach of management procedures have been applied worldwide to fisheries management based on the theoretical background of system dynamics and its control. Somewhat contrary to the intuitive idea of controlled dynamic systems, from the early days these applications have included a strong stakeholder participation component (Smith et al., 1999). Although this may be the result of the intuition of researchers or fisheries managers in the early applications, the importance of participatory approaches incorporated in MSE has increasingly been formally acknowledged. The objectives of engaging and interacting with coastal and marine stakeholder groups is seen as a key to success in fostering learning about NRM issues (Boschetti et al., 2011a; Dutra et al., 2014; Fulton et al., 2013, 2011a). This has even led to dedicated efforts to improve the interactivity of MSE tools, which requires the underlying simulation models to run faster (e.g. de la Mare et al., 2012; Moeseneder et al., 2015). In what follows, we examine why MSE as an adaptive management approach has progressively involved increasing stakeholder participation. We relate this back to the observations of limitations to the rational adaptive management metaphor when applied to NRM, as discussed in Section 1.2 and, based on recent examples of MSE, we present a staged and formalized description of how MSE can be considered as a participatory decision-support approach (Fig. 1 and Table 2). In particular, we consider how the approach

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<td>Engage with representative NRM organizations, stakeholder committee or bridging organization</td>
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<td>‘Simple’ models (Bayesian belief networks)</td>
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allows managers to (i) identify and deal with governance structures, (ii) identify key values and management objectives held by stakeholders and how they impact the ranking of alternative performance measures, (iii) develop methods which fully consider the available information, (iv) recognize avenues for choice under uncertainty that limit the sources of individual biases, and (v) provide incentives to respond to perceived changes in performance.

3.3.1. Dealing with governance structures

Solutions for coping with governance issues and therefore sustainability in NRM require stakeholder-driven approaches to accommodate the differences in values, cognitive styles, and perspectives of the resource managers, as well as to promote social learning (Akkerman et al., 2004; Fidelman et al., 2012; Folke et al., 2002; Gunderson et al., 1995; Stocker et al., 2012a).

Values are the principles or standards that guide the definition of objectives, which in turn determine the goals to be achieved. Values and objectives are sometimes used interchangeably in the literature, so we clarify our definitions in the following example. An initial objective of a hypothetical marine park might be to increase coral trout populations by 50 per cent. The reason (or value) underlymg this might be to increase larval dispersal to areas outside the park, thus increasing the potential catch and the wellbeing of fishers who depend on the resource. Another reason might be to increase biodiversity within the park. These reasons (or values) are much more fundamental principles than the objectives: they relate to concerns of the national park for human wellbeing and biodiversity. How the objectives are to be achieved will therefore depend on stakeholder values held. Permanent or temporary spatial closures and change in target species are potential management actions that could achieve the objective of increasing coral trout populations; but the choice will depend on values.

Lessons learned from MSE projects applied in fisheries and coasts (Dichmont et al., 2014, 2013b; Dutra et al., 2011a; Fulton et al., 2011b; Smith et al., 1999; van Putten et al., accepted) suggest that using stakeholder-driven committees or bridging organizations (defined as organizations that bring together science and local knowledge, also providing an arena for knowledge co-production, trust building, sense making, learning, vertical and horizontal collaboration, and conflict resolution, Berkes, 2009) is critical to MSE. This is the case because the membership of such committees/organizations already contains key stakeholders and leaders to help direct MSE activities and developments. In addition, stakeholder committees and/or bridging organizations can help identify and engage with other key actors, including the general public. Examples of representative stakeholder committees and bridging organizations are the Healthy Waterways Partnership in South East Queensland (Australia) (Myers et al., 2012), local marine advisory committees (Great Barrier Reef, Australia) (Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority, 2013), and resource assessment groups under the Australian Fisheries Management Authority model (AFMA, Smith et al., 1999). These organizations were critical to the development of MSE because: (a) they help build social capital and allow participants to build or maintain reciprocity and trust, also facilitating vertical and horizontal collaboration (Berkes, 2009; Brondizio et al., 2009; Fulton et al., 2013), and (b) the broader stakeholder group and possibly the general public will perceive the decisions that come out of the MSE process and models supported by representative bodies as credible, salient and legitimate for management.

Failure to use stakeholder committees (or establish one for MSE projects) or bridging organizations may well result in a model-building exercise that can produce credible information. However, the lack of legitimacy and limited salience of modeling outputs will most likely result in no or very limited application of MSE results in real-world decisions (Fulton et al., 2011b). The application of MSE in the coastal zone of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park (Australia) suggests that creating a ‘steering committee’ of decision-makers and stakeholders as well as the (lead) MSE analyst is a good practice when seeking to engage effectively with decision-makers and stakeholders (Dichmont et al., 2014).

In addition to working closely with stakeholders, MSE researchers must understand: (1) ‘What are the institutional arrangements, legislation and jurisdiction boundaries in place to manage the natural resource?’ This helps identify who will use the MSE tool (which actors are involved in decision-making), and (2) how the decisions are actually made at the management/operational level. This is a more practical question that aims to identify how MSE can be used in the existing governance structure.

Methods previously applied to identify the above include engagement with NRM organizations and stakeholders (Smith et al., 1999), institutional analysis (Fidelman et al., 2012; Hajer, 2003; Ostrom, 2009) and assessments of the legal framework in place (Sporne and Dale, 2009). MSE projects are often initiated through some pre-existing defined management process where the initiators are likely to brief the MSE practitioners on the governance context (Dichmont et al., 2014; Dutra et al., 2018; Smith et al., 1999). It is often the case that practitioners want to test the advice by discussing it with likely stakeholders if they are not already familiar with the system being investigated and its management structures. This approach helps identify the main institutional drivers, key actors and stakeholders affected by the decisions, and existing collaborative institutional initiatives that can be used to support the development and use of MSE models and methods, thus avoiding duplication of management processes (Table 1 provides MSE stages and selected methods with references that have been or have the potential to be used in various instances of implementing MSE).

Institutional analysis can identify the behavior of and relationships between the norms and rules for managing the resource. This can help, for example, identify the governance network, the power distribution in the network as well as any existing formal decision-making process. An assessment of the legal framework helps identify the existing relevant legislation and its physical and institutional boundaries and overlaps. The legal framework assessment can also support the identification (and may be the establishment) of management boundaries, responsibilities, roles and rules to manage the natural resource (i.e. the identification of ‘institutional voids’). This will guide development of MSE models for identifying spatial boundaries and management rules, as well as how MSE will be used to manage the resource and by whom.

Interviews, surveys and consultations with relevant stakeholders and decision-makers can help elucidate the decision-making process and identify key actors/institutions involved in decision-making (Dutra et al., 2014; Horigue et al., 2012). Engaging with key actors in the early stages of MSE development facilitates organizational collaboration when jurisdictions overlap or are not well defined, or when ‘institutional voids’ are identified. Methods to identify and characterise governance structures have been used in coastal and fisheries MSE projects (Dichmont et al., 2014; Dutra et al., 2011a, 2014; Fulton et al., 2011a).

3.3.2. Identification of key values and management objectives to guide decisions

The most common techniques for eliciting management values and objectives are interviews, questionnaires, literature reviews and surveys (Fig. 2). A literature review can help identify an initial list of implicit and explicit objectives from government, industry, and community groups (see Boschetti et al., 2012; Dichmont et al., 2014, 2013b; Pascoe et al., 2013; van der Heijden, 1996; van Putten
Fig. 2. Graphical representation of the methodological MSE framework. The framework considers the following stages: (1) dealing with governance; (2) identification of key management objectives and values to guide decisions; (3) methods to synthesize available information; and (4) avenues for choice under uncertainty. The investigation of governance structures (1) is informed by all the other stages: values, management objectives and strategies (2), consideration of available information (3) and choice under uncertainty (4) are the proposed stages to develop participatory MSE. The dashed-line boxes are the necessary activities, such as the construction of conceptual models, elicitation of scenarios and indicators for use in the MSE, as well as the construction of “simple”, quantitative and process models. Note that all stages/activities are connected. Each stage has its specific methods (in grey; see also Table 2), such as scenario planning and participatory modeling under “Participatory Methods”, questionnaires and interviews under “Interviews, Surveys and Consults”.

3.3.3. Methods for synthesizing information

Methods for synthesizing available information are used to deal with uncertainty and limited data and also to address the leadership, psychological and cognitive processes involved when selecting which information to use to make decisions.

Scenario planning has been used to examine and incorporate the uncertainty that may have developed over many years in businesses organizations (Bohensky et al., 2011; Burt, 2011; Morecroft and van der Heijden, 1994; van der Heijden, 1996; Wack, 1985). It aims to broaden the thinking among members of organizations and requires an intensive process of structuring and restructuring of perceptions, based on negotiation and agreement of meaning between participants, while also accommodating their diverse cognitive styles and worldviews (Eden, 1992). The process helps participants understand differing perceptions about resource use (without necessarily reaching consensus), and facilitates individuals and group cooperation and commitments, thus improving the group’s social capital.

Information generated through scenario planning can be used to construct conceptual models to inform the design of the operating models and tools used in MSE (refer to Barker, 1990; Checkland, 1999; Dutra et al., 2011b; Levins, 1966; Ozesmi and Ozesmi, 2004). The clustering outcomes from the conceptual models are the negotiated representation of emerging concerns and help identify information that is perceived by the group to be credible, salient and legitimate. The output of the scenario planning exercise is a storyline on how participants perceive the future and includes detailed information on the major events (e.g. climate change, politics, status of the resource) that led to the future scenario. Management scenarios from previous MSE applications have used elements of the scenario planning approach along with biophysical scenarios (e.g. climate change) as part of model simulations. These scenarios assess the effectiveness of different management strategies against objectives and values under uncertainty (Dutra et al., 2010; Fulton et al., 2011a, 2014; Pantus et al., 2008; Woodward et al., 2010). MSE models, both conceptual and operational, can therefore be used as effective communication tools to support stakeholder discussions and engagement.

Other methods for considering the available information include ethnographic studies and photo elicitation, which can be used in isolation or in conjunction with the scenario planning exercise. Ethnographic methods are used to gain detailed insights about the resource management through observing what people do in their work and by interviewing them in a social group (Pommeranz et al., 2012). For example, researchers may participate over a long period in the daily activities of NRM organizations to gather personal experiences about how individuals in this organization interact with other stakeholders, and how they consider the information available in individual and organizational decision-making processes. In the case of fisheries, researchers were already deeply embedded in management processes (e.g. as members of advisory groups in AFMA) and were also involved in similar arrangements in coastal MSE applications (Dichmont et al., 2014; Dutra et al., 2014; Fulton et al., 2013, 2014). The method helps identify internal organizational processes that affect the psychological and cognitive processes of leaders or management groups, which may hinder decision-making.

Photo elicitation techniques have been successfully used in participatory modeling projects to gather further information about a resource and its use (Dray et al., 2006a). Compared to ethnographic surveys, this technique may be a quicker and less expensive solution. Photo elicitation involves using photographs to discuss management issues with managers and/or stakeholders to determine the aspects of the natural resource they find important, what they value, what they consider as salient and credible information and how they should go about producing and sharing information (Dray et al., 2006a; Harper, 2002; Pommeranz et al., 2012).

3.3.4. Avenues for choice under uncertainty

Multiple modeling approaches used in MSE projects have helped stakeholders choose informed courses of action (Fulton et al., 2011a; Moeseneder et al., 2015). The aim is to try to identify solutions that are robust to known uncertainties using the available information. Coastal and fisheries MSE applications have used a range of methods that help tackle a number of the difficulties of collective decision-making under uncertainty, as depicted in Table 2 and Fig. 2. These methods are: (1) the construction of ‘simple’ and interactive models as ‘learning laboratories’ for decision-makers to observe possible system trajectories and/or detect extreme changes (Brugnach et al., 2008), and (2) the
development and trial runs of full ecosystem models with refined spatial and temporal scales. These two methods can operate as parallel processes, each informing the other.

3.3.4.1. Using ‘simple’ models. Conceptual models represent people’s understanding about cause–effect relationships in the managed system, and may also include individual perceptions and understanding on how the management system operates. As a result, multiple conceptual models with various structures are expected to be constructed as part of the process to ‘consider the available information’. Qualitative modeling techniques have been used to assess if the different structures of the management system are relevant to manage the resource (Dambacher et al., 2003a; Fulton et al., 2011a; Metcalf et al., 2014). For example, do the management strategies perform similarly (despite the uncertainties) no matter how the conceptual model is structured? Qualitative modeling also enables participants to both test a range of management actions and/or strategies as well as to qualitatively assess the effectiveness of management decisions against objectives by quantifying the interactions of positive and negative feedback loops on the variables of interest (end points) (Dambacher et al., 2007, 2003a). Other examples of ‘simple’ models include system dynamics techniques (Boschetti et al., 2011b; Dutra et al., 2011b; Forrester, 1961; Meadows et al., 1974; van den Belt, 2004; Vennix, 1999), and Bayesian belief networks (Hosack et al., 2008; Lynam et al., 2010; Pesles et al., 2008). The exercise of constructing and showing these models to stakeholders is itself a critical step to elicit understanding, communicate research findings and explore possible future directions under different management actions and scenarios. The MSE team can also discuss ways to better communicate results from the model as it develops over time.

Allowing stakeholders to help develop MSE models strongly supports model building exercise and the stakeholder learning experience (Dutra et al., 2010; Fulton et al., 2011a; Myers et al., 2012). This is similar to the concept of the ‘learning laboratory’ (Senge and Sterman, 1994), also used in experimental economics (Gintis, 2000; Tisdell, 2007), where participants can conduct experiments to assess the effects of decisions on their objectives. Simulating the system to be managed allows time and space to be compressed or dilated and management actions can be repeated under the same or different conditions (scenarios and model structures). One can stop the action and reflect about doing things differently in order to learn more about possible outcomes. Learning laboratories provide an environment in which decisions that are dangerous, impractical, or too costly in the real system can be taken in a computer simulation (Sterman, 2000:34). Interactions between individuals via group dynamic processes used as part of the ‘learning laboratory’ may affect the way individuals and groups select and use information to make decisions and also affect commitments and cooperation towards issues learned in the exercise with potential practical applications to real-world coastal management (Dutra et al., 2011a). This reinforces the potential of using MSE in a participatory setting to build social capital by facilitating social learning.

Some previous MSE projects with ‘learning laboratories’ use simulation models to allow participants to explore the range of available management options and their impacts on both stakeholders and the natural resource without fear of negative consequences, and then discuss the issues learned (e.g. Boschetti et al., 2011a; Dutra et al. 2011a; Fulton et al., 2011a). In ‘learning laboratories’ participatory modeling techniques can also be used to elicit, change and communicate values. However, care must be taken not to push individuals or groups into provocative situations that risk undermining the engagement process and trust between and among stakeholders and researchers.

Role-playing game techniques (D’Aquino et al., 2003; Dray et al., 2006a) have been used in previous MSE projects (Dutra et al., 2011a; Woodward et al., 2010) to allow participants to acknowledge the challenges faced by those in positions other than their own. This helps stakeholders understand how their behavior and interaction with other stakeholders affect the process of making and implementing decisions. In previous coastal MSE projects, such understanding led to the discussion of potential solutions on how to overcome the issues identified with governance, leadership, behavioral and cognitive barriers. In this context, MSE has been used successfully to communicate the existing knowledge, to promote shared understanding about the system, and to mediate and encourage stakeholder engagement and dialogue (Dutra et al., 2011a; Fulton et al., 2011a; Myers et al., 2012; Woodward et al., 2010). MSE is therefore effective in nurturing a learning culture within management groups and organizations by fostering experimentation and innovation within the (virtual) management system and by collaboratively reframing concerns (O’Keefe, 2002).

3.3.4.2. Using quantitative models fitted to data. Quantitative models fitted to data are used to support fisheries decision-making either strategically (‘big picture’, direction-setting and contextual) or tactically (focused on management under different scenarios and timescales), with some strategic models informing the development of tactical models (Plagányi et al., 2012a; Punt and Smith, 1999). Such models are referred to as ‘models of intermediate complexity for ecosystem assessment’ (MICE), examples of which exist worldwide (e.g. Moore et al., 2009; Plagányi et al., 2012b). These models are context- and question-driven. They limit complexity by restricting the focus to the components of the ecosystem needed to address the main effects of the specific management question. Similar to other model applications used in MSE, developing MICE involves extensive stakeholder participation and dialogue (Plagányi et al., 2012a). These quantitative models fitted to data are able to address many of the impediments to greater use of ecosystem models in strategic and particularly tactical decision-making for marine resource management and conservation, but they have not yet been successfully applied to tactical decision-making (Plagányi et al., 2012a).

3.3.4.3. Using process-oriented MSE models. Depending on requirements, data availability, and time and budget of the MSE projects, end-to-end models with refined spatial and temporal resolution have been successfully developed for fisheries and multiple-use coastal MSE (see Dichmont et al., 2013a; Fulton, 2010; Fulton et al., 2005; McDonald et al., 2006; Plagányi et al., 2011). These models represent entire systems by coupling physical, biological and human components to more explicitly evaluate the performance of various strategies against social, environmental and economic indicators (e.g. ecological, hydrodynamic, human and biogeochemical models). Process models are useful in dealing with uncertainties, such as climate change, because of their fairly rigorous approach tailored to represent the key physical and chemical processes of concern (Plagányi et al., 2011). However, process-based models have relatively long (years) development periods and run times in the order of hours to days to simulate a single year (e.g. Dichmont et al., 2006b; Fulton et al., 2007; Fantus et al., 2008). Running these models requires an experienced team of scientists who can make recommendations to management bodies or provide potential system trajectories (and their uncertainty) according to the tested strategies under different scenarios (Dichmont et al., 2008, 2006a; Fulton et al., 2011b). Due to time constraints (days to weeks) to run full ecosystem models, it is not possible to perform live trials with them. However, selected strategies previously trialed with ‘simple’ models can be tested in the
full ecosystem models. This provides the management body with further information on possible system trajectories and improved spatial and temporal resolution to allow for a better assessment of the impacts of management actions and therefore their policy recommendations for a range of fisheries and coastal management issues (Fulton et al., 2011a, 2007; Mapstone et al., 2008; McDonald et al., 2006; Pantus et al., 2011; Stoeckl et al., 2013). Interactive videos of process-oriented models are often used to communicate outputs to stakeholders (e.g. Wild-Allen et al., 2010). Outputs from full ecosystem models can also be used to refine the ‘simple’ models and vice versa.

4. Conclusions

Our research suggests that coastal and marine management decisions are influenced by a limited number of drivers related to governance structures, power and leadership, and cognitive processes. Personal motivations and institutional constraints affect both individual and collective (organizational) decision-making processes, thus influencing the way natural resources are exploited and managed. Effective management of coastal and marine resources is complex not only because of challenges in biophysical data collection and analysis. Its complexity also results from intense negotiations between stakeholders from multiple organizations with different, divergent and often overlapping mandates. Leaders of such organizations have varied cognitive styles, perceptions and expectations about the current and future state of the resource. We found that their motivations may go beyond their formal mandates and, as a result, necessary changes in resource management are the result of personal, rather than organizational efforts.

The literature reviewed suggests that improving the information base about the natural resource, its dynamics and its use alone is necessary but will have limited effect on the way decisions are made and implemented. A formal participatory MSE approach supports resource management in coasts and oceans by combining modeling techniques, cognitive aspects of human decision-making and behaviour and stakeholder engagement to facilitate social learning and shared understanding. In addition, participatory approaches used in MSE strongly support stakeholder negotiation processes by helping participants make their values and objectives explicit and clarifying the inevitable trade-offs involved in coastal and marine management decisions. Actively engaging with and interviewing stakeholders, analyzing institutions and the legal framework in which they operate, and prioritizing management objectives help unravel and address governance processes, political and socio-economic drivers, and power influences. These, combined with the identification of values and management objectives and integrated biophysical and socio-economic assessments, provide a strong basis for decision-making with respect to coastal and marine resource management. It also offers more transparency in the management process, thus promoting acceptance and support from the broader stakeholder group.

Participatory MSE approaches can also clarify some of the underlying assumptions and reduce internal conflicts and contradictions at the individual level as it allows for policy testing via modeling before it is implemented. This is important to evaluate whether the outcomes of these decisions match their intended purposes. This may also reduce anxiety among leaders and decision-makers, thus reducing the risk that they adopt defensive positions.

There are, however, challenges to participatory approaches, especially if the engagement approaches are not adequately designed. Stakeholders may suffer from ‘consultation fatigue’ when there is ‘too much’ consultation around management issues with the same groups or individuals (Jackson et al., 2008). This may result in lack of interest from key participants and consequently limited input and representation in MSE projects.

Acknowledgements

This project was funded by CSIRO Oceans and Atmosphere as part of the project “Social complexity, incentives, adaptive learning and responses to policy changes”. We would like to thank Dr Ingrid van Putten and Dr Eva Plaganyi-Lloyd (CSIRO) for reviewing an earlier version of the manuscript.

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