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Island and Archipelagic States' Policymaking for Human Mobility
in the Context of Climate Change

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Island and Archipelagic States’ Policymaking for Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Change

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Acronyms

ARS	The Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CCA	Climate Change Adaptation
CCAM	Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation
CCCCC/5Cs	Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre
CCC	Climate Change Commission
CCICD	Climate Change and International Cooperation Division
CDB	Caribbean Development Bank
CDEMA	Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency
CDERA	Caribbean Disaster Emergency Agency
CDM	Comprehensive Disaster Management
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women
CERD	International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination
COP	Conferences of the Parties
CPH	Census of Population and Household
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
CROP	Council of Regional Organisations in the Pacific
CSME	CARICOM Single Market and Economy
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
CTCN	Climate Technology Centre and Network
DA	Department of Agriculture
DAR	Department of Agrarian Reform
DILG	Department of the Interior and Local Government
DRMB	Disaster Risk Management Bureau
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction

DRRM	Disaster Risk Reduction and Management
ESCAP	Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FRDP	Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GRULAC	Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries
HMCCC	Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Change
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMRF	International Migration Review Forum
INDC	Intended Nationally Determined Contribution
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IVA	Integrated Vulnerability Assessment
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
LGU	Local Government Unit
LPA	Low Pressure Area
NACCC	The National Advisory Council on Climate Change
NAP	National Adaptation Plan
NCI	National Convergence Initiative
NDC	Nationally-Determined Contribution
NDMO	National Disaster Management Office
NDRMP	National Disaster Risk Management Plan
NDRRMC	National Disaster Risk Reduction Management Council

NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NMS	Philippine National Migration Survey
OCD	Office of Civil Defense
OECS	Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
OFWs	Overseas Filipino Workers
OHCHR	The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PAGASA	Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration
PAHO	Pan American Health Organization
PCRAFI	Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative
PDD	Platform on Disaster Displacement
PDNA	Post-Disaster Needs Assessment
PSA	Philippine Statistics Authority
PIDF	Pacific Island Development Forum
PIFS	Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat
POPCOM	Commission on Population and Development
PRP	Pacific Resilience Partnership
SIDS	Small Island Developing States
SPC	(Secretariat of the) Pacific Community
SPREP	Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme
SYR	Synthesis Report
TC	Tropical Cyclone
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UN DESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Program

UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECLAC	United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
US	United States of America
VCAN	The Vanuatu Climate Action Network
VCCDRRP	Vanuatu’ Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction Policy for 2016 to 2030
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

1 Foreword

Climate change-related migration and displacement are already a reality for many people around the world. A growing body of research suggests that the number of people affected will rise over the coming decades, which will create additional risks for the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. This trend and the related issues are an increasing topic of discussion at international policy fora. The Task Force on Displacement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD) are addressing these policy challenges. The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) is calling for the development of “coherent approaches to address the challenges of migration movements in the context of sudden-onset and slow-onset natural disasters”.

This report reflects what is currently known about the impacts of climate change on people living in island nations and highlights the necessity to develop policies that address human mobility dynamics resulting from adaptation to these changes. By looking at island and archipelagic states as diverse as Kiribati, Saint Lucia and the Philippines, the various political frameworks within which they operate and the different response mechanisms they have adopted can be examined. First-hand interviews with experts from across the regions show the multiplicity of challenges governments are facing: from difficulties in distribution of relief goods to land scarcity, aid dependency, insufficient data and personnel capacities. Yet the key interviewees underline ways in which governments can capitalise on the strengths inherent to island and coastal communities to further build resilience using existing and innovative practices.

For policymakers and non-governmental organisations, the authors summarise the different national approaches taken to the topic and provide recommen-

dations on how to support a sustainable management of human mobility. They show that doing so can help to avoid some of the worst climate impacts: extreme human suffering, particularly of the poorest, when people are unable to move out of hazardous areas, but also chaotic displacement situations. Providing skills training to migrants and creating legal pathways for migration can ultimately enable people to move in dignity before climate impacts become life threatening.

For researchers, the findings serve as an entry point into the complex network of different government institutions and their responsibilities. Beyond that, they flag up research gaps and emphasise the need for more home-grown scientific insights that can be used to inform policymaking. Strengthening the science-policy dialogue is key to effectively allocating limited budgets for disaster risk reduction, adaptation and relief.

The German government takes the challenges of climate-related migration seriously, as increasingly do other countries as well. The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) supports its partner countries in protecting the climate but also invests in adaptation to climate change and assists people whose livelihoods and homes are threatened by devastating climate impacts around the world. This study has been conducted as part of the programme “Human mobility in the context of climate change”, implemented by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). It represents a collaborative effort between BMZ, the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK), GIZ, several local researchers, and the policymaking and stakeholder community in each of the nations in focus. The strategic funding provided by BMZ serves to harness the synergies between PIK’s outstanding research capacity and GIZ’s long-standing experience in working with government partners.



Tukuraki – Fiji (© GIZ)

The present study can help operationalise recommendations of international agreements, fostering human rights-based and participatory approaches. The growing attention of Caribbean states towards disaster response and cross-border displacements in the wake of the hurricanes in 2017 or the development of sound procedures on voluntary and planned relocations in Fiji, both portrayed on the following pages, exemplify how countries can take the lead. Not in the future, but

today – before ever more serious climate impacts hinder proactive and sustainable reactions.

Thus, we hope that this study will be a valuable resource for all stakeholders as they continue their work on human rights-based relocations, migration as an adaptation strategy and reducing the hardships associated with disaster displacements – putting the principle of “leave no one behind” into practice.

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2 Executive Summary

Island and coastal regions belong to the most climate change-exposed habitats. Today, people living in island states experience the devastating effects of extreme tropical cyclones, rising sea levels, droughts and ocean acidification. In some cases, entire cultures are at risk of extinction because traditional livelihoods can no longer provide sufficient resources for survival while landmasses are submerged and salinised by high tides. Although there have been notable advances over the last decades, many island countries still struggle with issues like poverty, universal access to basic education, and health-care. Recent development gains are at risk of reversal by the economic and human costs of climate change, which increases dependencies on external actors.

While economically and culturally different, archipelagic and island countries face common problems of scarcity of arable land, remoteness, and the challenges to relief

distribution in times of disaster. Some of their populations are vulnerable and have limited resources to adapt in situ to adversity. These compounding circumstances are push factors for migration and may become so strong that people feel they have no other option but to move out of harm's way in order to have the chance of a decent future. Island agriculturalists – like subsistence farmers, livestock herders, and fishermen – are at particular risk of involuntary displacement to places in which their skills give them no opportunities to earn a living. These nations and particularly vulnerable inhabitants have contributed little to nothing to global greenhouse gas emissions. Faced with this grave injustice, policymakers in archipelagic and island states are trying to understand potential future changes and their implications for their nations. Consequently, many have voiced demands for halting global mean temperature increase at 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. On the achievement of this climate protection goal, they



Barbuda – Antigua and Barbuda (© Kira Vinke / PIK)



East Coast Dominica (© Dr. Horst Vogel / GIZ)

have little to no influence, but rely – some with their territorial existence – on the mitigation plans of the high emitters and the pressure of the international community.

Increasing climatic risks already prompted relocation of villages, and recent changes in the natural environment contributed to migration decisions and forced displacement. Non-governmental organisations are demanding more governmental support for affected communities. This reality has led policymakers in some countries to consider new mechanisms to influence mobility patterns and to guide displacement responses and planned relocation. Others have just started the dialogue on this topic. Their ability to act and come up with policy solutions to address human mobility in the context of climate change, though, is limited by strained financial resources, which are under additional pressures to adapt and reconstruct infrastructure after disasters. Moreover, it can be politically difficult to introduce this topic to the public discourse proactively, as many citizens rightly demand to stay in their home areas. By developing different strategies to address human mobility in the context of climate change (HMCCC), governments can both enable people to stay and

ensure they are able to move in good conditions, in order to minimise human suffering.

This report provides an overview of where human mobility in the context of climate change fits in the policy landscape of nine island and archipelagic countries: Anguilla, Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica, and Saint Lucia in the Eastern Caribbean; Fiji, Kiribati, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu in the Pacific; and the Philippines in the Western Pacific. All of these nations are heavily affected by climate impacts like sea level rise, ocean acidification, tropical cyclones and hydrological extremes. Different forms of human mobility are among the ways people adapt or respond to these changes, in complex ways. Moreover, the policy landscape is heterogeneous. Some of the countries have specifically addressed HMCCC in guidelines, adaptation plans or policies, like Dominica, Fiji, and, Vanuatu. Others have just recently recognised the topic as an emerging policy action field. This report demonstrates that HMCCC is a cross-cutting issue that can potentially be addressed by several ministries and governmental agencies, for example internal affairs, development, immigration, disaster relief, labour, social protection or health. However, without clear responsibilities for

addressing the topic together with a strong coordination between different departments, it may not be adequately considered in planning processes. Moreover, the inclusion of civil society actors and non-governmental organisations in consultations is crucial for ensuring people-centred and rights-based policy development.

This report provides insights gained from 94 expert interviews. Prior to the interviews, regional literature reviews were conducted to understand the challenges and opportunities to address HMCCC in specific local contexts. This report shows the strength of regional approaches for improving migrants' rights and for increasing climate resilience. The findings are relevant to other island nations that face similar challenges and need to build capacity for future climate-related mobility dynamics. Moreover, they highlight the necessity of building a coherent multilateral framework on HMCCC to accommodate and support people who may have to move in the future.

Insights from the Eastern Caribbean: Anguilla, Antigua & Barbuda, Commonwealth of Dominica, and Saint Lucia

The Caribbean has a long history of human mobility dating back from pre-Colombian times to the period of enslavement, indentureship and to the post-colonial period. Today, the impacts of climate change are becoming a push factor for migration and displacement. These changes materialise in different cultural, socio-economic, and demographic settings and therefore can have different outcomes for human mobility. The combined effects of sea level rise and high wind-speed tropical cyclones have led to the (temporary) displacement of people, mainly across the region. The relationship between slow-onset climate impacts and migration in the Caribbean are less observed, researched and understood.

In the Eastern Caribbean, inter-island mobility is facilitated through the framework of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States Commission (OECS), which grants its Member States' citizens freedom of movement and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), which provides freedom of movement for certain types of skilled labour under the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME).



Soufriere & Scotts Head – Dominica (© Dr. Horst Vogel / GIZ)

Dominica has developed a strategy to move people away from hazard-exposed areas. Besides this strategy, no explicit policies or guidelines exist that address HMCCC on a national or regional level.

The extreme cyclone season of 2017 led to unprecedented numbers of displacements in the region. In general, intra-regional collaboration served to accommodate displaced populations and the solidarity between the countries was highlighted as positive by policymakers. However, interviews with regional and national level actors indicated that capacities of involved agencies were hard-pressed, resulting frequently in insufficient care for displaced persons, high stress for agency employees, who themselves were sometimes affected, and missed opportunities for data collection. Displacements after disasters have led to negative psychological health effects and these are insufficiently addressed in response frameworks.

Insights from the Pacific: Fiji, Kiribati, Tuvalu and Vanuatu

The adverse effects of climate change are already having an impact on livelihoods in the Pacific and projections for impacts like sea level rise, droughts and ocean acidification show mounting risks. Rising sea levels might threaten the

very existence of low-lying Pacific islands like Kiribati or Tuvalu. With limited land available for relocation within national boundaries, cross-border migration – within the region or even to far-off destinations – may become a necessity.

Although migration has been part of cultures across the Pacific Ocean throughout centuries, climate change may lead to abrupt and involuntary displacement of communities deeply connected to their land. Climate change is therefore increasingly acknowledged as a driver of human mobility among policymakers in the Pacific. This has prompted civil society movements, like the Pacific Climate Warriors to demand more ambitious climate protection internationally, in order for communities to be able to remain in their homeland. At the same time, policymakers carry the responsibility to take precautionary action and help people move out of hazardous areas.

In 2018, Fiji launched Planned Relocation Guidelines, though the standard operating procedures are yet to be developed. In addition, Vanuatu launched its National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement in 2018. Despite this growing awareness, experts have indicated that HMCCC is not sufficiently addressed in policy documents across the region. Increased awareness among policymakers is a precondition for



Vunidogola – Fiji (© GIZ)

achieving this. Regional actors like the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) or the Pacific Community (SPC) play an important role in giving a voice to Pacific island states in international policy negotiations on climate change. Regional actors like the Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF) are also active in managing or responding to displacement and relocation in the region. The Pacific Island Forum Secretariat (PIFS), another important regional actor, has elevated results from the Technical Working Group on HMCCC to regional policy work in the Pacific. Several respondents referred to good cooperation practices, for instance after tropical cyclones. Referring to national levels, experts expressed doubt in capacities to address HMCCC. Several experts also mentioned the need to improve communication and/or coordination mechanisms between stakeholders in this cross-cutting topic.

Insights from the Philippines

A significant number of Filipino lives are uprooted every year by extreme weather and climate events, a highly visible and well-recorded phenomenon in the Philippines. There is also growing evidence of links between gradual environmental degradation, climate change, and internal human mobility patterns. Growing understanding and policy actor interest in HMCCC is timely, as climate projections portend an increase in risks to Filipino livelihoods, in particular, from heat, rainfall variability and extremes, water scarcity, increased intensity and frequency of storms, sea warming, and rising sea levels.

These changes impact the mobility of both rural and urban populations. In the case of the latter, people in poverty and/or informal housing are particularly at risk of further hazards. Rural populations are apparently migrating to nearby urban areas, nearby farms, and agricultural areas, a trend particularly reported in the larger islands of the archipelago. Internal migration from resource stressed areas towards larger cities is most likely to involve working-age males with middle-to-high socio-economic status. Availability of social networks is particularly important for rural-urban movements, and education is a limiting factor for cities to become springboards for destinations overseas.



Lake Sebu – Philippines (© Jorge S. Ebay)

While no legislation exists specifically referencing HMCCC, two national agencies were created to coordinate, centralise and scale-up work on climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction, two issues typically addressed separately: the Climate Change Commission (CCC) and the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC). Both of these coordinating bodies have the strength of a legal basis, through Republican Act 9729 and Republican Act 10121, respectively. The currently fragmented approaches and multiplicity of actors can be improved by converging the strategies of the two agencies. A good step towards more effective integration of population movements in CCC and NDRRMC activities would be better inclusion of the Philippine Commission on Population (POPCOM), the central body mandated to manage population programmes including internal migration.

Efforts to improve data and research on internal migration will add to the groundwork for efforts to address HMCCC, particularly in the context of environmental degradation and slow-onset hazards. Significantly, the 2018 Philippine National Migration Survey (NMS) builds knowledge on internal migration and provides a baseline for deeper research.

5 Steps Forward: Key Recommendations

Establishing effective policies to manage migration, planned relocation and displacement is essential to minimise potential challenges of human mobility and to deliver on the positive potential of migration for development. To support effective policymaking, several steps can be taken by national and regional actors.

1. Set a Strategic Direction

Setting a clear, strategic, and objective-driven direction for policy development and implementation of climate migration policy is an important component to effective public policy and governance both on the regional and national levels. For example, mapping and integrating existing policies for migration, disaster risk reduction (DRR) and to climate change adaptation (CCA) can strengthen the effectiveness of both policy areas, as these currently often translate to separate institutional structures and operational frameworks. Forming a specific direction of action involves ensuring sustained commitment at key levels of leadership; engaging in regional and/or international dialogues and thereby in cross-country coordination; establishing targeted legal and policy instruments; building institutional structures and capacities for effective implementation of policies and programmes; ensuring the full participation of affected communities, with particular attention to vulnerable or marginalised groups; and executing monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.

2. Execute Abating Actions for Climate Risks

Policies and programmes to undercut the root causes of displacement, and distress migration, and specifically targeting people already affected by climate change impacts, are key. One instrument that increases the capability of addressing climate change is the diversification of income. Especially farmers, fishers, or the tourism industry could thereby decrease their exposure to hazards. Moreover, safety net mechanisms for losses and damage in the context of extreme weather, such as cash for work programmes and insurance schemes, are needed. Community consultation mechanisms will be necessary for many government activities to succeed, for example: to relocate at-risk people, distribute relief equitably, or to establish thresholds at which areas are designated as unsafe or unfit for human habitation.

3. Improve Data and Strengthen Research

The collection of migration and displacement data is important for the implementation, follow-up and review of any migration or displacement management policy, as well as for identifying and assisting groups with specific vulnerabilities. In all regions studied, limitations in data availability, data access, and data management on HMCCC exist. More funding and personnel should be allocated for data collection, knowledge management, and data analysis. Longitudinal or panel data, as well as qualitative case studies, are needed. Gender and human rights should be mainstreamed into these efforts. Disaggregation of data by sex, age, and migration status is necessary and in line with agreed indicators for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In addition, most countries would benefit from systems to better integrate, share, and harmonise existing data on both international and internal migration; targeted analysis on HMCCC; integration of relevant indicators or questions in existing national tools; and trainings on migration and displacement data in general.

Partially due to the lack of data, research on HMCCC is very limited for some regions, like the Caribbean. In other areas, some substantial research exists but is often carried out by external institutions and researchers. Local research capacities and education need strengthening in order to assess HMCCC nationally. Greater consideration is needed for migration and displacement in the context of slow-onset impacts of climate change, in order to maximise the potential for migration to contribute to human development and to minimise possible challenges. Further, more in-depth and qualitative research is needed to understand how climate change affects people's physical and mental health. Several experts approached for this study explicitly mentioned the need to investigate long-term effects of post-disaster trauma and stress.

4. Foster Effective Policy Implementation and Decision Making

Some existing policies, which could be applied to HMCCC, are not effectively implemented. Policy implementation can be strengthened through participatory, community-based approaches as well as by paying special attention to groups with specific needs. In the case of the latter, the dearth of disaggregated data is a challenge to evidence-based policy development. Mechanisms to include the meaningful participation of affected communities should be strengthened. Key barriers to the inclusion of displaced persons in disaster recovery include the dearth of registration and tracking mechanisms post-displacement, for both cross-border and internal displacement; the invisibility of internally displaced persons (IDPs) living in urban areas, in informal settlements, and with temporary hosts; and the reality that many people who migrate following disasters do not self-identify as an IDP. Moreover, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms and increased institutional capacities can help to ensure sustainable implementation. Regional entities like the OECS Commission or CARICOM in the Caribbean and Council of Regional Organisations of the Pacific (CROP) agencies in the Pacific could support coordination of knowledge or capacities. The objective of regional coordination must be the integration of strategies, policies and actions between ministries or departments, across different governance levels, and always integrating local communities, who will themselves be the source of solutions. On a national level inter-ministerial working groups could be established for coordination and to ensure greater mainstreaming of human mobility into overall development planning.

5. Widen and Deepen the Stakeholder Network

Effective policy formulation and implementation need a strong actor network. The first step to this is an improved awareness of climate change and human mobility linkages – and scientific literacy of both issues – among policy actors and practitioners. This requires good science-policy communication, accessible to local governments and their constituents. To achieve this, governments should consider fostering partnerships with universities as independent knowledge brokers.

Moreover, national governments could invite constituted bodies under the UNFCCC regime [e.g. the Executive Committee of Warsaw International Mechanism, the Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG), the Paris Committee on Capacity Building (PCCB), and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN)] to develop guidance related to risk retention and related capacity building and technology needs – for example through a 'toolkit' such as those that exist for planned relocations. Likewise, donor governments should support the development of such guidance/toolkits and the implementation of recommendations therein, with a view to improving consistency and coherence across countries and regions as well as within them, to enhance coordination and complementarity of different actions at various levels of government.



Municipality of Lake Sebu, South Cotabato Province (© Jorge S. Ebay)

Introduction

Recently observed climate impacts and related human mobility responses have called attention to the existing policy frameworks that could guide population movements under future climate change. Especially island and archipelagic nations are at the forefront of bearing the effects of climate change and have already seen migratory movements in response to, or anticipation of those impacts. This report examines how in the Eastern Caribbean, the Pacific, and the Philippines human mobility in the context of climate change (HMCCC) is addressed across different levels of governance. Following the recommendations of recent international agreements such as the Global Compact on Migration, it is clear that knowledge on the existing provisions and instruments is needed in order to identify protection gaps and facilitate an exchange on best practices. Moreover, as climate impacts intensify, the urgency to formulate policies to manage possibly even greater pressures in the future is evident. In the past decade, severe tropical cyclones, like Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, Hurricane Irma in the Caribbean and Cyclone Pam in the Pacific caused massive destruction and displacements across the regions. In the aftermath of these events, disaster management agencies were often overwhelmed with the urgent need for assistance. As projections indicate that storm surges of high-wind tropical cyclones could inundate larger areas, disaster management agencies at national and regional levels need to be better equipped to handle such extreme events. This not only means to improve financial resources and technical capacities. Policies are needed to guide temporary resettlement or response mechanisms to displacement. Already, in all three of these regions there are examples of state-led planned relocations, in which at risk communities were resettled to less exposed areas. Currently, the most common form of human mobility in these regions is labour migration, which can be a successful adaptation strategy to climate change, as migrants can send remittances to their home communities and thereby diversify risk and increase resilience.

In the Eastern Caribbean, the Pacific and the Philippines, HMCCC has been addressed to varying degrees by some regional and national institutions. Whereas in the Pacific policies exist in Fiji and Vanuatu, there are no specific



Soufriere & Scotts Head – Dominica (© Dr. Horst Vogel / GIZ)

policies pertaining to HMCCC in the Caribbean and the Philippines yet, except for a planned relocation strategy in the Commonwealth of Dominica which was developed in response to displacements after Cyclone Erica in 2015. However, other policy frameworks may be applied to HMCCC.¹ Even in the countries where policies have been drafted, their application is yet to be tested and effective implementation may require more capacities on both national and sub-national levels than is currently available.

This report summarises the existing state of knowledge on the regional dynamics of human mobility related to climate change impacts and builds upon 94 qualitative interviews with regional and national experts, outlining


1 As a cross-cutting issue, references to HMCCC may be found in a number of policies or programmes from different ministries or agencies. Furthermore, these documents may or may not be primarily drafted the context of climate change legislation. Documents which may be relevant include: national development plans or frameworks, legislation on migration in general, disaster management or disaster risk reduction policies or strategies, national adaptation plans, and, last but not least, documents prepared for the international governance of climate change such as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).

their perceptions of the existing policies and instruments pertaining to HMCCC. It analyses gaps and shortcomings, but also possible entry points and good practices in the different island and archipelagic states.

While the countries covered in this report differ, among other factors, with regard to their economic situation, geography, demographics, migration dynamics and culture, there are similarities in terms of the climate change-related challenges which these nations are now facing. These include the exposure to tropical cyclones, sea level rise, coral bleaching, and hydrological extremes. Moreover, there are similarities in vulnerability of certain livelihoods and economic sectors that are particularly reliant on functioning ecosystems such as agriculture, fisheries, or tourism. Therefore, bringing together the perspectives and knowledge of very different island and archipelagic nations can prove valuable for future adaptation planning and policymaking. Furthermore, the synthesis of this report will underline the necessity to proactively prepare for future movements in response to climate impacts.

3.2. Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Change – Policy Challenges and Livelihood Opportunities for Island and Archipelagic Nations at Risk

Several international frameworks have highlighted the need for the establishment of new instruments in order to address human mobility in the context of climate change. These frameworks include the Task Force on Displacement within the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, and the Global Compact on Refugees. The latter establishes that climate interacts with other drivers of refugee movements. The necessity to further investigate the relationship between climate change impacts and human migration especially on island states has also been highlighted as an important research field



by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).² Moreover, several organisations, among them the International Organization for Migration (IOM)³, the Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD)⁴ and Oxfam⁵, have pointed to the devastating coincidence of high exposure and high vulnerability to climate change in archipelagos and small islands. In general, it is acknowledged that migration can lead to both negative and positive livelihood outcomes for individuals and households. It can function as a risk diversification strategy, or it can lead to further impoverishment. Without understanding the different vulnerabilities of particular groups, policy responses may not be as effective as they could be or, even worse, increase vulnerability. In this regard, Mearns and Norton speak of the “structural and situational drivers of vulnerability” in a World Bank report on the social dimensions of climate change.⁶ These drivers include geographical location, assets and livelihood sources or social positioning.⁷ To sum this up, risks related to climate change are determined by complex interactions between physical exposures to climate hazards and the socio-economic vulnerability of an individual or a group of people. Therefore, the integration of gender and human rights aspects into policies is important.

In island nations with limited resources halting climate change at 1.5° to 2°C above pre-industrial levels will be decisive for the continuation of traditional livelihoods and



Tukuraki – Fiji (© GIZ)

in some cases for habitation, too.⁸ While currently migration can still function as an adaptation, a regime shift in the climate system⁹ would inevitably lead to a shift in the human mobility patterns as well, leading to more survival migration, displacement and human suffering. The difficult situation and the social tensions that have occurred in the Caribbean during the extreme cyclone season of 2017 provide a glimpse of the multi-layered damages that can be incurred.

Despite the temperature limits that have been outlined in the Paris Agreement, global greenhouse gas emissions continue to rise, in spite of the risk of unmanageable climate impacts. Many policymakers and experts interviewed for this report have pointed out struggles to adapt to the current warming level of 1°C and the changes in the environment that came with it. To confront future climate impacts and to enable migration in dignity, more capacities will be needed.

2 Leonard A. Nurse et al., “Small Islands,” in *Climate Change 2014 – Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: Part B: Regional Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, ed. Vicente R. Barros et al. (Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 1613–54, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415386>.

3 International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Climate Change and Migration in Vulnerable Countries: A Snapshot of Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States” (Geneva, Switzerland, 2019), https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/climate_change_and_migration_in_vulnerable_countries.pdf.

4 PDD, “Platform on Disaster Displacement,” 2019, <https://disasterdisplacement.org>.

5 Oxfam, “Forced from Home: Climate-Fuelled Displacement,” December 2, 2019, <https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/620914/mb-climate-displacement-cop25-021219-en.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

6 Robin Mearns and Andrew Norton, “Equity and Vulnerability in a Warming World: Introduction and Overview,” in *Social Dimensions of Climate Change Equity and Vulnerability in a Warming World*, ed. Robin Mearns and Andrew Norton, New Frontiers of Social Policy (Washington DC, USA: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, 2010), 5.

7 Mearns and Norton, “Equity and Vulnerability in a Warming World: Introduction and Overview.”

8 Curt D. Storlazzi et al., “Most Atolls Will Be Uninhabitable by the Mid-21st Century Because of Sea-Level Rise Exacerbating Wave-Driven Flooding,” *Science Advances* 4, no. 4 (April 1, 2018): eaap974, <https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.aap9741>.


9 Will Steffen et al., “Trajectories of the Earth System in the Anthropocene,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 115, no. 33 (August 14, 2018): 8252–8259, <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1810141115>.

3.3. Concepts and Definitions of Human Mobility

(DISPLACEMENT, PLANNED RELOCATION, MIGRATION, TRAPPED POPULATIONS)

In accordance with decisions taken at the Conference of Parties 16 in Cancun (COP16), this report distinguishes three different types of climate-related human mobility: migration, displacement and planned relocation.¹⁰ “Human mobility” functions as an umbrella term to categorise movements of people. Some experts conceptualise different forms of mobility on a spectrum of varying

degrees of freedom, ranging from entirely voluntary to entirely forced mobility. It is important to note that in practice many movements cannot be clearly categorised, there is significant fluidity between categories, and human mobility ranges considerably across temporal and spatial scales. Whereas other categories could be drawn to differentiate between types of movement, in this report we use the categories suggested in the COP16, to reduce complexity when analysing large amounts of individual movements. An overview of these three broad types of human mobility in the context of climate change is given in the following figure:



10 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), “Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Sixteenth Session, Held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010. Addendum. Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at Its Sixteenth Session,” paragraph 14f, accessed August 15, 2019, <https://unfccc.int/documents/6527>.

11 The Nansen Initiative, “Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change: Volume 1,” 2015, <https://nanseninitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/PROTECTION-AGENDA-VOLUME-1.pdf>.

12 The Nansen Initiative.

13 The Nansen Initiative.

14 The Nansen Initiative.

15 The Brookings Institution, Georgetown University, Institute for the Study of International Migration, and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Guidance on Protecting People from Disasters and Environmental Change through Planned Relocation,” 2015, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/guidance-on-protecting-people-from-disasters-and-environmental-change-through-planned-relocation>.

16 The Nansen Initiative, “Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change.”



East Coast Dominica (© Dr. Horst Vogel / GIZ)

3.4. Objective and Methodology

This report summarises a stocktaking of information on human mobility policies in the context of climate change that was conducted in the three areas of island and coastal environments: the Caribbean (four Member States of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS): Saint Lucia, Dominica, Antigua and Barbuda, Anguilla), the Pacific Islands (four states in the Pacific: Fiji, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Vanuatu), and the Philippines. These states are partner countries of the global programme “Sustainable management of human mobility in the context of climate change”, commissioned by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and implemented by GIZ. The countries were chosen due to their particular exposure to climate impacts and the different mobility patterns that have been observed in relation to climate change, as well as high interest by the governments in HMCCC. Together the countries exhibit large variance in terms of the national and regional institutions which can address HMCCC. Therefore, this report also provides an entry point to develop more joint research and capacity building activities across the regions.

Literature review and analysis of primary data, utilising qualitative approaches, were employed to fulfil the objectives of the research. Thorough reviews were conducted for all three research areas of available scientific publications on climate change and migration as well as of relevant regional and national policy-documents related to these topics. Based on an analytical framework adapted to this study to measure as well as to analyse the efficiency and effectiveness of both policy frameworks and the stakeholder community required for policy implementation,¹⁷ a set of questions was developed together with an interview guide. Prior to the interviews, the questionnaires were reviewed, adapted to the local context, and tested by regional consultants.

Primary data was collected through a series of in-depth interviews with key stakeholders in each target country, as well as a limited number of focus group discussions, between January and June 2019. Interviews were held in person and in some cases via electronic media. They were


¹⁷ See, for example: Adriaan Perrels, “Efficiency and Effectiveness of Policy Instruments: Concepts and Practice” (Workshop on Good Practices in Policies and Measures, Copenhagen, 2001), 14.

primarily conducted in English, although a limited number in the Philippines and in the Pacific were conducted in local languages for the comfort of the interview partner. Interviews comprised regional and national level actors, who may have been involved in the management of migration, displacement or planned relocation, or in the field of climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction. The first list of people was identified by regional GIZ programme staff. This group was broadened to include others recommended by the first set of interviewees through snowball sampling and, later in the research, critical case sampling. In line with European Union data privacy regulations,¹⁸ prior to all interviews, participants were requested to sign forms indicating their informed

consent, understanding of data processing and management employed for this research, and consent to be recorded.

All recordings were transcribed verbatim, and the few recordings in other languages were translated into English. All transcripts were then coded manually by the research team to identify core concepts, themes, and recurring perceptions or opinions of the key informants. Coding, data reduction techniques, and the subsequent text analysis were conducted in an iterative process facilitated by the use of qualitative analysis software called QDA Miner. For the ease of the reader, quotations from the key informant interviews in the text that follows are in italics. Quotations are given verbatim.

18 For more information see: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection_en.





Vunidogola – Fiji (© GIZ)

Limitations

The main limitations of this study are selection bias, the time and resources available, and limited comparability of diverse contexts. The selection of interviewees does not represent the views on HMCCC of the respective governments or the overall populations. However, as experts with knowledge relating either to climate change, disaster management or migration were interviewed, the sensitivity to human mobility in a changing climate can be assumed to be much higher than in other national ministries, NGOs or the general population. This report aims to reflect the local experts’ opinion on the existing national and regional frameworks pertaining to HMCCC and their assessment on how this topic needs addressing in the future. Thereby, we seek to outline both challenges and improvements of current frameworks governing the movement of people under climate change as viewed by experts in the field.

While an exhaustive number of interview partners was not possible in the timeframe of this study, an appropriate balance of viewpoints and experiences was sought to cover numerous subjects. Bias may have been inadvertently introduced by the researchers through wording that can lead the participant and confirmation bias. Interview questions were purposefully kept as simple as possible and in a suitable order, with general questions preceding specific or potentially sensitive ones.

4 The Eastern Caribbean

Human Mobility Policies in the Context of Climate Change in Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, the Commonwealth of Dominica, and Saint Lucia

4.1.

Introduction: Unprecedented Storms and Community Displacement in the Eastern Caribbean

After the extreme cyclone season of 2017 which completely destroyed the infrastructure on the Caribbean island of Barbuda and severely affected other nations, climate-related displacement became an issue of concern among policymakers across the Caribbean. However, the links to climate change and the implications of climate projections have not yet been fully captured and addressed. Likewise, other topics such as poverty reduction or improvements of public infrastructure frequently require more government attention than existing institutional capacities can deliver. The challenges which will arise even under a low emissions scenario in line with the Paris Agreement are substantial and could put Caribbean livelihoods at risk. States need to develop policies for highly affected groups, namely those who work in agriculture, fisheries and the tourism sector. Disaster risk reduction (DRR), adaptation and migration policies have to make special provision for those who are already particularly vulnerable, such as the elderly and people living with disabilities. While the Eastern Caribbean countries under investigation already have improved disaster response mechanisms and regional cooperation on DRR over the past decade, the dimension of the challenges ahead demands urgent action plans to minimise future displacement and facilitate migration in dignity.



Saint Lucia (© Ragna John)

Information Base of the Caribbean Chapter

The Caribbean chapter builds upon the existing literature, interviews with 33 experts in the partner countries, and the study by Clarke and Johnson (2018).¹⁹ The semi-structured qualitative interviews were held with stakeholders from various national ministries, regional organisations, inter-governmental organisations and individual researchers who work on areas related to the topic of this study. Of the 33 participants, 15 were men and 18 were women. The interviews followed the procedures outlined in the methods section.

19 J. Clarke and A. Johnson, "Policy Analysis and Institutional Actor Landscape Relating to Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Change in the Caribbean," GIZ Internal Report (GIZ, 2018).

OVERVIEW OF INTERVIEW PARTNERS IN THE CARIBBEAN			
Type	Nation(s)	Interviewee No.	Sum
Local Politician	Antigua & Barbuda	C03, C11	2
National Politician	Antigua & Barbuda	C16	1
Provincial or Municipal Body		C06	1
Ministry or Other Central National Body	Antigua & Barbuda	C01, C14, C17	3
	Anguilla	C04, C05, C07, C10, C13, C15	6
	Dominica	C21, C22, C30, C31	4
	Saint Lucia	C28, C29, C32, C33	4
Non-Governmental Organisation	Dominica	C18	1 ²⁰
Intergovernmental Organisation	-	C02, C09, C12, C20, C23, C24, C25, C26, C27,	9
Academia	-	C08, C19	2
Total			33

Background: Migration in the Caribbean

The Caribbean is a region with a strong migration tradition. Migration has contributed to social progress and economic wealth through income diversification, educational opportunities and remittances, but also people have been forcibly moved from and to the region.²¹ Countries in the Caribbean are simultaneously areas of origin, destination, transit and return. Human mobility is, thus, not a new phenomenon in the Caribbean.

The earliest inhabitants of the Caribbean, the indigenous Tainos, moved without restrictions between different islands.²² Following European colonisation in the late fifteenth century, the slave trade emerged in the Caribbean. Until the nineteenth century millions of people from Africa were forced to the Caribbean for enslaved labour. Moreover, during the period of indentureship between 1838 and 1917 thousands of people from India were brought to the Caribbean as indentured labourers.²³

Over the last century, labour migration has become the dominant form of human mobility in the region. Already before most of the territories in the Caribbean gained independence, many people emigrated from the region.²⁴ Towards the end of the nineteenth and in the beginning of the twentieth century, thousands of workers from British colonies left their homes in order to work on the construction site of the Panama Canal, often under high-risk conditions and plagued by tropical diseases.²⁵ Similarly, the banana plantations of the United Fruit Company in Central America attracted many English-speaking workers from the Caribbean, particularly in the 1920s and 1930s, and thousands migrated to Costa Rica, Honduras and Panama.²⁶

In the course of the twentieth century, migrants from the Caribbean primarily moved to Europe and North America, with an estimated number of about 6 million in total.²⁷ Whereas in the 1950s and 1960s many left the Caribbean,

20 At the time of the interviews not many NGOs had specific expertise on HMCCC in the Caribbean and some were not available for interviews.

21 Clarke and Johnson, "Policy Analysis and Institutional Actor Landscape Relating to Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Change in the Caribbean."

22 Tony Martin, *Caribbean History: From Pre-Colonial Origins to the Present* (Pearson, 2012).


23 David Dabydeen and Brinsley Samaroo, *India in the Caribbean* (Hansib/University of Warwick, Centre for Caribbean Studies Publication in cooperation with the London Strategic Policy Unit, 2006).

24 James Ferguson, "Migration in the Caribbean: Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Beyond" (London: Minority Rights Group International, 2003), https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/MRG_Rep_Caribbean.pdf; Elizabeth Thomas-Hope, "Trends and Patterns of Migration to and from Caribbean Countries," in *Caribbean Migration*, 2001, <https://www.scribd.com/document/360977487/Elizabeth-Thomas-Hope-Caribbean-Migration-2002>.

25 Ferguson, James, "Migration in the Caribbean: Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Beyond" (Minority Rights Group International), accessed December 2, 2019, <https://minorityrights.org/publications/migration-in-the-caribbean-haiti-the-dominican-republic-and-beyond>.

26 Ferguson, James, "Migration in the Caribbean."

27 Ferguson, James, "Migration in the Caribbean."



Anse La Raye – Saint Lucia (© K. Vinke)

particularly to settle down in the United States of America and the United Kingdom, migration increasingly slowed down as receiving countries started to lower immigration quota, with the result that migration became more and more irregular.²⁸ Nowadays, households engage in different forms of migration, whether it be long-term, short-term or return migration.²⁹ However, in many cases even long-term migrations can not be associated with a total disconnection of the migrants from their roots, but rather create new and diverse forms of transnational connectedness.³⁰ With migration processes becoming increasingly diverse or even irregular and undocumented, a significant number of movements is not recorded in any systematic way. This also is often the case for displacements due to disasters. The different types of human mobility following the 2017 hurricane season, for example, have not been systematically documented.

28 Ferguson, James, “Migration in the Caribbean.”

29 Elizabeth Thomas-Hope, “Trends and Patterns of Migration to and from Caribbean Countries.”

30 Elizabeth Thomas-Hope.

4.2. Climate Change-Related Drivers of Human Mobility in the Eastern Caribbean

In the Caribbean, the impacts of climate change have the potential to influence mobility in multiple ways: by altering existing migration trends, by increasing the likelihood of displacement due to more frequent and intense disasters, and potentially by creating the need for planned relocations of communities, but also by limiting the mobility of certain groups. Knowledge on HMCCC in Latin America in general, and the Caribbean in particular, is very limited. Existing empirical studies have focused mostly on Brazil, Mexico, and the United States.³¹ As compared to

31 Frank Laczko and Etienne Piguet, “Regional Perspectives on Migration, the Environment and Climate Change,” in *People on the Move in a Changing Climate: The Regional Impact of Environmental Change on Migration*, ed. Etienne Piguet and Frank Laczko, vol. 2 (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2014), 13, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6985-4_1; Raoul Kaenzig and Etienne Piguet, “Migration and Climate Change in Latin America and the Caribbean,” in *People on the Move in a Changing Climate: The Regional Impact of Environmental Change on Migration*, ed. Etienne Piguet and Frank Laczko, vol. 2 (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2014), 155–76, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6985-4_7. Ferguson, James, “Migration in the Caribbean”; Faure, Aymeric, “Migratory patterns in the Caribbean: impacts and perspectives for Caribbean countries,” Open Diplomacy, accessed December 2, 2019, <http://www.open-diplomacy.eu/blog/migratory-patterns-in-the-caribbean-impacts-and-perspectives-for-caribbean>.

more populous regions, research on climate change and human mobility in the Caribbean has been limited and mostly confined to the aggregated regional level. Research has focused mainly on the factors contributing to displacement, the humanitarian needs post-disaster, regional integration and the role of social networks in labour migration³². Insufficient research exists on the indirect or longer-term impact of climate change on human mobility patterns in the Caribbean, for example, through the effects of declining water availability and agricultural yields on livelihoods. The need to investigate slow-onset events has also been highlighted in the Paris Agreement (Article 8).

In the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) of the Caribbean, climate change has caused more frequent and devastating weather events such as flooding, tropical storms, and droughts.³³ For example, new methods in attribution science show that climate change can change the likelihood of hurricanes reaching Caribbean islands at their peak force.³⁴ For instance, “the annual probability of encountering Irma’s peak wind of 160 knots within 300 km of Barbuda increased from 0.13 % in the period 1981 – 2000 to 0.43 % by 2017 and will further increase to 1.3 % by 2081 – 2100 assuming RCP8.5. [...] The annual probability of encountering Maria’s peak wind of 150 knots within 150 km of 17 N, 64 W increased from 0.5 % during 1981 – 2000 to 1.7 % in 2017 and will increase to 5 % by 2081 – 2100 assuming RCP8.5.”³⁵

In a Paris Consensus Scenario there could be more severe tropical cyclones and also the average strength of these storms could increase.³⁶ As warmer air holds more water, “average tropical cyclone precipitation rates (for a given

storm) will increase by at least 7 % per degree Celsius sea surface temperature warming”³⁷.

These climate impacts threaten livelihoods in agriculture, fisheries and tourism, as well as public and private infrastructure and the functioning of ecosystems³⁸. One of the most dangerous hazards for the Caribbean is sea level rise. Global projections range between 0.65 m in a Paris-consensus scenario and up to 1.4 m in a business-as-usual scenario by the end of the century.³⁹ Without further infrastructural adaptation low-lying areas would be flooded, affecting human settlements and infrastructure in coastal zones. For example, a 1 m sea-level rise would put 60 % of all tourist resort properties at risk as many of them are located in direct proximity to the beach.⁴⁰ Moreover, rising sea levels can lead to the salinisation of vital fresh-water aquifers and, thus, threaten the supply of water for agriculture, the tourism sector, or human consumption in general. Even if tropical cyclone intensity would remain unchanged, their effects could be more devastating because of higher storm surges.⁴¹

Another substantial threat for Caribbean livelihoods is coral bleaching due to increasing temperatures and acidification which can contribute to fish stock decline. Besides other anthropogenic stressors including overfishing and pollution, fish will also move towards colder waters leading to stock depletion around the Caribbean islands. Projections show severe impacts for this in Saint Lucia.⁴² Already today, climate change has profound negative impacts on Caribbean economies. In a recent statement, Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Secretary-General Irwin LaRocque described the severe economic impacts of superstorms:

32 Elizabeth Thomas-Hope, “Trends and Patterns of Migration to and from Caribbean Countries”; Cédric Audebert, “Régionalisme et migrations dans la Caraïbe,” in *La Caraïbe dans la mondialisation: Quelles dynamiques régionalistes?*, ed. Eric Dubesset and Rafael Lucas (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2011), 23–37, https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00805771/file/AUDEBERT_2011_Regionalisme_et_migrations_dans_la_Caraibe.pdf; ILO, “Labour Migration in Latin America and the Caribbean: Diagnosis, Strategy, and ILO’s Work in the Region,” ILO Americas Technical Reports, 2016/2 (Lima: Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2017), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---americas/---ro-lima/documents/publication/wcms_548185.pdf.

33 World Bank, “Turn Down the Heat: Confronting the New Climate Normal” (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2014), <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/20595>.

34 Kerry Emanuel, “Assessing the Present and Future Probability of Hurricane Harvey’s Rainfall,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 114, no. 48 (November 28, 2017): 12681–84, <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1716222114>.

35 H.-O. Pörtner et al., eds., *IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate* (IPCC, 2019), https://report.ipcc.ch/srocc/pdf/SROCC_FinalDraft_FullReport.pdf.

36 Pörtner et al.

37 Pörtner et al.

38 Vergara, Walter, “Latin America and Caribbean Region, Annual Review,” *Environment Matters* (The World Bank, 2008).

39 Matthias Mengel et al., “Future Sea Level Rise Constrained by Observations and Long-Term Commitment,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 113, no. 10 (March 2016): 2597–602, <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1500515113>.

40 Nurse et al., “Climate Change 2014 – Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.”

41 Pörtner et al., *IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate*.

42 Adams et al., “Turn down the Heat.”



Soufriere & Scotts Head – Dominica (© Dr. Horst Vogel/GIZ)

— “There can be no question that for us in the Caribbean, climate change is an existential threat. It has been recorded that between 2000 and 2017, Member States of our Community suffered at least seven major disasters in which damage ranged from 33 % to 226 % of the affected country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The estimated cost of reconstruction after the 2017 devastation by Hurricanes Irma and Maria has been put at US\$ 5 billion region-wide”.⁴³

Climate change contributes to the degradation of coastal ecosystems such as coral reefs or wetlands and, thus, impacts ecosystem services that are crucial for livelihoods and human well-being. Another problem is the extreme growth of Sargassum seaweed, which affects both fisheries and the tourism industry.⁴⁴ The seaweed which had previously not bloomed in excess in the Caribbean can trap

larger sea animals such as turtles and dolphins, or damage coral reefs. Once it washes up on shore, it produces a strong sulphurous smell, deterring tourism. While climate change may be a contributing factor, it is not yet clear what causes the excessive algae bloom.⁴⁵ Other anthropogenic factors may be the influx of nutrients via the Amazon River into the ocean, or iron fertilisation through dust particles.⁴⁶

The multiple effects of climate change are increasingly putting a burden on governments, Caribbean states that are already highly indebted.⁴⁷ External economic shocks, including the devastating effects of tropical storms and other extreme events, can deepen economic dependencies and counteract efforts to reduce debt.

43 Community (CARICOM), “CARICOM Secretary-General Highlights Region’s Climate Change and EU Blacklisting Concerns at International Conference in Romania,” CARICOM Today, March 12, 2019, <https://today.caricom.org/2019/03/12/caricom-secretary-general-highlights-regions-climate-change-and-eu-blacklisting-concerns-at-international-conference-in-romania>.

44 Clifford Louime, Jodany Fortune, and Gary Gervais, “Sargassum Invasion of Coastal Environments: A Growing Concern,” *American Journal of Environmental Sciences* 13, no. 1 (January 1, 2017): 58–64, <https://doi.org/10.3844/ajessp.2017.58.64>.

45 Louime, Fortune, and Gervais; Katie Langin, “Seaweed Masses Assault Caribbean Islands,” *Science* 360, no. 6394 (June 15, 2018): 1157–58, <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.360.6394.1157>.

46 Langin, “Seaweed Masses Assault Caribbean Islands.”

47 Caribbean Community (CARICOM), “Statistics External Public Debt of CARICOM Member States,” 2018, <http://statistics.caricom.org/ExtDebt.html>.

Health Effects of Extreme Events

Besides some of the direct physical impacts, Caribbean respondents emphasised the effects of climate change on health as a driver of migration. At the same time it was mentioned that the displacement experiences can affect physical and mental health. One respondent explained the multitude of effects of climate change on the health of the population:

— *“We have seen significant disruption to sewage systems resulting in contamination of water supplies and disruptions of the waste management. [...] With respect to mental health, this is really a recent significant area for attention particularly since tropical storm Erica in Dominica and with respect to the 2017 season with Irma and Maria. There is now a growing appreciation of the importance of treating the psychosocial component as an important part of the recovery efforts for the population” (C12).*

The same interviewee also referred to vector borne diseases such as Malaria. These effects on health can in turn also be push factors for outmigration. If people’s health is negatively affected through disease burden and the decay of healthcare provision, it could also hinder them from migrating. Following the 2017 extreme events, public health officials had to address

— *“Injuries, vector borne diseases, mental health, respiratory conditions and impact on food and water security and the destruction of health facilities [...]. So, in Dominica they lost electricity, they lost facilities to give oxygen, lab facilities [...] They had neonatal babies that had to be moved [...]. Having clear protocols around patient’s transfer and mobility is a critical issue in time of disaster” (C25).*

This excerpt highlights the need for providing guidelines for the evacuation and displacement management for ill and injured persons. In the aftermath of tropical cyclones, there was extensive need for mental health care. The effects of climate change impacts and extreme events especially on mental health are not sufficiently addressed overall. In the case of Barbuda, traumas of the devastating Hurricane Irma have gone largely untreated (see chapter 2.4.).

4.3. Regional Policies and Actors Addressing HMCCC

Caribbean policymakers who work on issues of migration, displacement and planned relocation have not yet fully taken into consideration climate change as a potential driver of human mobility. However, after the extreme devastation of Hurricane Irma and Hurricane Maria in 2017, the resulting displacement has emerged as an important issue for policy actors and practitioners.

The significance of building frameworks to manage human mobility in the context of climate change has only been recognised over the past decade. Awareness of this topic is now increasing (C13, C21, C22, C21). Some broader frameworks or strategies exist already on the general phenomenon of human mobility and disasters. For example, the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDEMA) prepared a Comprehensive Disaster Management (CDM) Strategy with strategies for DRR and climate change adaptation at the regional and national level.⁴⁸ Although this framework did not specifically address HMCCC, it established national and regional mechanisms for DRR, which also apply in the case of climate change impacts. CDEMA established international and regional arrangements for cooperation in disaster management.⁴⁹ Furthermore, the organisation undertakes data collection after disasters and works with the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) Commission has a special unit working on climate change and DRR which could become an important actor to develop management strategies for HMCCC. There are national-level actors also. The Commonwealth of Dominica, for example, has developed provisions for the relocation of populations. Many expert interviewees indicated positive policy developments, good cooperation and communication as well as existing standard procedures in cases of disasters. One respondent said: *“There has been a lot of traction from the OECS level on climate change in general, from the public awareness standpoint, mitigation standpoint and more so the adaptation standpoint” (C04).* An intergovernmental expert said: *“Caribbean countries have strong and tested systems to respond to disasters” (C09).*

48 Clarke and Johnson, “Policy Analysis and Institutional Actor Landscape Relating to Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Change in the Caribbean.”

49 Clarke and Johnson.

All those statements indicate that the existing policies address the general risk and impacts of disasters but more specific policies on climate change and human mobility may be necessary.

Regional Actor Landscape

Several regional institutions were identified as important for the policy development of the intersection of human mobility and climate change: the OECS Commission, the CARICOM Secretariat (C08, C17), CDEMA and the Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre (CCCC) (C09, C20). Among the bodies operating at the regional level, states in the Caribbean have two main pre-existing structures that are appropriate to develop and advocate for a strategic direction encompassing the complexity of human mobility outcomes of climate change: CDEMA and OECS Commission.

The OECS Commission is a major regional actor in strengthening regional cooperation on climate resilience, and environmental policy more broadly, as well as on human mobility. These areas of competence have

traditionally been seen by OECS Member States as separate areas of consideration, as alluded above. The OECS Commission provides a promising avenue for governance of HMCCC, to develop evidence-based policy advice as well as a convenor of other actors in the relevant communities. It offers an appropriate space for coordination and exchange of best practices. Such activities can ultimately provide fertile ground for the development and follow-up on proactive domestic policies that specifically address climate-related human mobility.

CDEMA is an inter-governmental disaster management agency that, with additional and targeted support by participating states, would be more apt to deal with the operational and programmatic gaps that persist in addressing all phases of disaster displacement. Through CDEMA, vehicles exist for strategic coordination on disasters that could explore additional needs climate change created in addressing the protection and assistance needs of people displaced by disasters. A comprehensive regional approach to disasters is urgently needed, including effective evacuation plans for each country. The experience of Antigua, Barbuda, and the Commonwealth of Dominica in 2017 demonstrated that current plans are either inad-



Saint Lucia (© Ragna John)



Barbuda (© Kira Vinke)

equate altogether or insufficient to deal with special situations, such as with high-category storms or with scenarios where numerous parts of the region are affected by disaster. CDEMA has put forward a model evacuation policy and plan, which the Council of Ministers endorsed. This policy and plan should be conducted in cooperation with the Council, the CDEMA Commission, and ministries tasked with climate change action in each member state in order to integrate re-active disaster management with proactive resilience building.

Furthermore, international organisations like the intergovernmental IOM, the Platform on Disaster Displacement or the UNHCR were identified as relevant actors for HMCCC in the Caribbean (C09). In terms of scientific background and implementation support, universities and other scientific institutes as well as NGOs can provide significant knowledge. Interviewees pointed out that relevant institutions would be meteorological services (C29), the WAITT foundation, the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and the Caribbean Agricultural and Development Institute (C01). With respect to gender sensitive research, the Institute for Gender and Development Studies of the University of the West Indies has worked with national ministries with responsibility for women's equality and gender affairs. Also the Red Cross is an active organisation in the Caribbean that could provide insights for policy formation.

Relevant Regional Policies for HMCCC

In this section, we outline the current policy frameworks championed by the regional institutions in the Caribbean and explore how they support the mobility of persons in the context of climate change. As noted above, the study did not identify any specific regional laws or policies on climate mobility, except for the Dominican strategy on resettlement.⁵⁰ The two main regimes for movement of people in the Caribbean, CARICOM and OECS, can to some degree provide legal grounds for HMCCC. Overall, regional agreements on freedom of movement can support mobility as a form of adaptation to climate impacts.⁵¹

MOVEMENT OF PERSONS AMONG CARICOM MEMBER STATES

The CARICOM treaty and its protocols regulate the movement of people among Member States. Antigua and Barbuda, the Commonwealth of Dominica, and Saint Lucia are Member States of CARICOM, while Anguilla has the status of an Associate Member.⁵² The CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) allows people with certain skillsets to move freely to other CARICOM states. The approved categories focus on graduates from universities, media personnel, and artists.⁵³ They are entitled to the same benefits and enjoy the same workers' rights as those provided and guaranteed to local workers.⁵⁴ The Protocol on Contingent Rights, adopted in 2018, grants several rights such as access to social services to spouses and immediate dependent family members of a worker moving under the CSME free movement scheme for skilled workers.⁵⁵ In the future the CARICOM arrangements for freedom of movement could also help in the context of

50 Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica, "Dominica Resettlement Strategy" (UNDP), accessed December 2, 2019, <https://info.undp.org/docs/pdc/Documents/BRB/Draft%20-%20Dominica%20resettlement%20strategy%20v.100915.pdf>.

51 Francis, Ama, "Free Movement Agreements & Climate-Induced Migration: A Caribbean Case Study" (Columbia Law School, Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, September 2019), <https://disasterdisplacement.org/portfolio-item/fma-caribbean>.

52 Caribbean Community (CARICOM), "Member States and Associate Members," accessed April 27, 2020, <https://caricom.org/member-states-and-associate-members>.

53 CARICOM Single Market & Economy, "Development and Status of the Right to Free Movement of People – CARICOM Single Market & Economy," accessed April 27, 2020, <http://csme.caricom.org/regimes/movement-of-people>.

54 CARICOM Single Market & Economy.

55 Christopher Lawrence, "CARICOM Integration Advances: All CSME Participating Member States Now Signatories to Contingent Rights Protocol – CARICOM Single Market & Economy," CARICOM Single Market & Economy, March 1, 2019, <http://csme.caricom.org/component/k2/caricom-integration-advances-all-csme-participating-member-states-now-signatories-to-contingent-rights-protocol>.

disaster displacement, as several interviewees contacted for this study indicated. For example, a widening of the justification for immigration to allow for disaster-displaced person to relocate could serve this purpose. The effects of climate change on human mobility were notably raised by heads of government, in the wake of the devastating 2017 hurricane season, at the February 2018 CARICOM intersessional meeting.⁵⁶ Building on this, the 2019 intersessional communiqué⁵⁷ paid notable attention to resilience building and to the need to continue progress already achieved under the CSME, including visa waivers for certain non-nationals.⁵⁸ These official documents and the interviews conducted for this study indicate that the focus remains on economic integration and the free movement of the ten categories of skilled persons already agreed to in Article 45 of the Treaty of Chaguaramas⁵⁹ for all people moving in the context of climate change. Indefinite stay of CARICOM nationals for labour employment does not extend to low- or un-skilled non-wage earners, although migration of unskilled workers in the region was found to exceed skilled migration.⁶⁰ This mismatch can push people into irregular migration within the region.⁶¹ A regional expert noted that currently there are clear limitations for the provision of freedom of movement in the context of climate change:

— *“We already have the capacity to address HMCCC because we have the free movement of persons, but remember it is for skilled labour. So in particular areas, we may need to look at modifications in instance of an event” (C2).*

56 Caribbean Community (CARICOM), “Communiqué Issued at the Conclusion of the Twenty-Ninth Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community” (Port-au-Prince, Haiti: Caribbean Community (CARICOM), 2018), <http://today.caricom.org/wp-content/uploads/COMMUNIQUE.doc>.

57 Caribbean Community (CARICOM), “COMMUNIQUÉ Issued at the Conclusion of the Thirtieth Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community Frigate Bay, St Kitts and Nevis, 26–27 February 2019,” CARICOM Today, February 28, 2019, <https://today.caricom.org/2019/02/27/communique-issued-at-the-conclusion-of-the-thirtieth-intersessional-meeting-of-the-conference-of-heads-of-government-of-the-caribbean-community-frigate-bay-st-kitts-and-nevis-26-27-february-2019>.

58 Specifically, Haitian nationals who are holders of diplomatic and official passports or businesspersons who are holders of US, Canadian or Schengen visas.

59 Caribbean Community (CARICOM), “Skill- Free Movement in the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME).”

60 International Organization for Migration, “Migration in the Caribbean: Current Trends, Opportunities And Challenges” (San José, Costa Rica.: International Organization for Migration – Regional Office for Central America, North America and the Caribbean, 2017), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/migration-caribbean-current-trends-opportunities-and-challenges>.

61 International Organization for Migration.

With increasing risks, deepening regional integration could serve to improve resilience, by allowing people to move in response or anticipation of disasters. Therefore, fostering a regional policy between Caribbean island states guaranteeing to uphold rights of migrants in receiving states would serve the management of HMCCC.

MOVEMENT OF PERSONS AMONG OECS MEMBER STATES

Among other activities, the OECS ensures free movement of people among all protocol Member States.⁶² This freedom of movement requires no special documentation or resources, and the duration of stay in a foreign country is neither restricted nor subject to special interests.⁶³ Free movement is accompanied by a policy of non-discrimination, meaning that citizens of these countries have a right to equal treatment in all member countries.⁶⁴

Primarily for economic reasons, “*people move seeking better living opportunities, better overall livelihood*” (C23) across the region of the OECS. Nevertheless, disasters, also driven by climate change, may increase the use of this channel. A regional official stated that the OECS has started to consider this new policy field (C23). Facing the movement of people without identification cards in case of disasters and the vulnerability of people (C27), a coherent policy needs to include “*hands-on tools and platforms*” (C24) to give insights into “*operational issues, because legally [...] people can move*” (C24). The current framework on the freedom of movement functions well, but additional policies and instrument may be needed to adapt to greater and more irregular influxes and outflow of people related to climate change. OECS Member States agree in section 14.2 of the Revised Treaty of Basseterre to accord the organisation with “legislative competence”⁶⁵ in relation to regional integration policies, environmental policy and immigration policy, although legislative authority remains with the states.

62 Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), “About the OECS,” OECS, accessed April 27, 2020, <https://www.oecs.org/en/who-we-are/about-us>.

63 Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), “Frequently Asked Questions,” OECS, accessed April 27, 2020, <https://www.oecs.org/en/who-we-are/faq>.


64 OECS Member States citizens have equal access to social service systems in every OECS member state when they reside there.

65 Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), “Revised Treaty of Basseterre Establishing the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States Economic Union,” 2010, <https://oecs.org/en/work-with-us/procurements/procurement-procedures/revised-treaty-of-basseterre/download>.

4.4. Country-Specific Insights

Antigua and Barbuda, Anguilla, the Commonwealth of Dominica and Saint Lucia differ in their capacities and in their approach to address HMCCC. This chapter presents country-specific insights from the interviews. It summarises core themes of key informant interviews including communication and cooperation on HMCCC particularly in the aftermath of the extreme tropical cyclones season 2017, and summarises key policies related to HMCCC.

Antigua and Barbuda



The twin island state of Antigua and Barbuda is a transit hub of the Caribbean. The country is located between the Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean Sea. The population of Antigua and Barbuda is 96,000 people, of which approximately 97% live on the island of Antigua.⁶⁶ Hurricane Irma made landfall on Barbuda on the night of 6 September 2017 as a category 5 storm, generating winds of more than 290 km/h. For three hours, the small island of Barbuda was affected by the extreme winds. The storm surge of 1.5 to 3.5 m caused further destruction. In the end, basically all infrastructure in Barbuda was destroyed by the hurricane. Reconstruction is still a major task.

Until today, the colonial history of Antigua and Barbuda affects the nation's development.⁶⁷ In the middle of the seventeenth century the British established control. Antigua mainly produced sugar for the benefit of the British Empire. The sugar industry was established on the basis of enslaved labour forcibly moved from Africa. From 1681 to 1870 the British Empire leased the island of Barbuda to the Codrington family.⁶⁸ People were enslaved on Barbuda for food production to supply the commercial plantations in Antigua.⁶⁹ Antigua and Barbuda gained independence in 1981.

THE ANTIGUA EXPERIENCE

Antigua has been described as the “gateway to the Eastern Caribbean”.⁷⁰ In 2017, as a result of Hurricane Irma, Antigua received not only internally displaced persons from Barbuda but also displaced persons from the Commonwealth of Dominica. It was a transit country for workers from other parts of the region that had been affected by Hurricanes Irma and Maria. The high levels of displacement stressed the capacities to manage immigration and in some cases exceeded the ability to provide adequate services to migrants.

Several respondents highlighted the importance of well-functioning cooperation structures in the region. Particularly, arrangements on freedom of movement within intergovernmental organisations like CARICOM or the OECS (see chapter 2.3) have helped to resolve extremely difficult situations in the aftermath of Irma. This was supported by a DRR specialist who noted that “*I think we saw the spirit of regionalism*” (C17).

Nevertheless, the magnitude of the event brought to light gaps in social protection in times of disaster. It was mentioned that children were sent across the region unaccompanied, a process which is sometimes referred to as “child shifting” and which can expose children to the

67 Cory Look, Erin Friedman, and Geneviève Godbout, “The Resilience of Land Tenure Regimes During Hurricane Irma: How Colonial Legacies Impact Disaster Response and Recovery in Antigua and Barbuda,” *Journal of Extreme Events* 06, no. 01 (March 1, 2019): 1940004, <https://doi.org/10.1142/S2345737619400049>.

68 Allison Bain et al., “Landscape Transformation During Ceramic Age and Colonial Occupations of Barbuda, West Indies,” *Environmental Archaeology* 23, no. 1 (January 2, 2018): 36–46, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14614103.2017.1345115>.

69 Look, Friedman, and Godbout, “The Resilience of Land Tenure Regimes During Hurricane Irma.”

70 Caribbean Community (CARICOM), “Antigua Opens Region’s Most Modern Airport Terminal,” August 23, 2015, <https://caricom.org/antigua-opens-regions-most-modern-airport-terminal>.

66 CIA World Factbook, “Antigua and Barbuda,” accessed October 8, 2019, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ac.html>.

risks of human trafficking (C17). Also because of the high number of displaced persons in Antigua, the situation was at times chaotic: “Some kids couldn’t find their parents” (C01). The capacity to provide relief goods was insufficient: “I would like to mention when the Barbudans arrived [in Antigua] there was not a proper set up for them, there were no blankets, the people came shivering” (C01).

Besides being a receiving country for disaster displaced persons, climate change impacts also affect Antigua directly. A DRR expert described climate-related vulnerabilities in Antigua this way:

- “Antigua too has its own vulnerabilities [...]. We have seen because of climate change beaches that used to go out several metres are now right on the actual coast. [...] There are fishermen that are complaining that there are areas where they used to catch a lot of fish, they no longer [can]. They have to go further out to sea. [...] We have always been dry but we are now seeing the drought periods, the gap between dry spells getting shorter and shorter. There was a time when we used to have a dry spell every five to seven years. Now it is every three to five and we have been in a drought for the last four years” (C17).

Besides the effects of climate change, other anthropogenic factors such as increasing urbanisation and the expansion of cruise-ship tourism are also causing degradation of coastal ecosystems.⁷¹ Moreover, Antigua may also be affected by tropical cyclones in the future.

DATA AND INFORMATION AVAILABILITY IN ANTIGUA

Cross-institutional data collection and management during the displacement period in 2017 was a significant challenge (C14). Tracking migrants was seen as difficult because of the frequency of in- and outmigration. Moreover, the lack of coordination led to duplications of data. Again, this was due to limited capacities in the respective institutions which were overwhelmed by rising numbers of displaced persons. Another official said:

- “Because in 2017 we knew that people were coming, [...] there was a special meeting with immigration and other stakeholders [...] to discuss how to collect information, how to share, etc. But once the numbers starting escalating, that system went out through the window. Going forward we need a formal arrangement to deal with these situations. There is some sharing of information between stakeholders, however that is only at the board of control level and it needs to go beyond that. The information needs to be shared with social services” (C17).

In light of the challenges faced with data management, authorities are seeking to learn from their experiences. Plans for a better information management system are already being considered. One informant explained:

- “The immigration department from this year will be streamlining data collection, it will be capturing, nationality, age, gender (sex) and during the hurricane season a displacement space where people can explain their reasons for moving. All this information will fit into our statistics and we will be able to extract data from it” (C14).

With regard to research, there is a large need for knowledge and capacity building, as a senior government official noted:

- “We need to get to a point where [...] the impact of climate change on the human being is properly researched. People need to be trained in how to capture that information and the knowledge-gained needs to be fed back into the national mechanisms, so the knowledge can be applied” (C17).
- Still today, much of the related research is produced outside of the region and may not be entirely applicable to the case of Antigua and Barbuda. There is also a risk of stranded assets for development projects which do not take into account future climate impacts such as sea level rise (C17).

71 Look, Friedman, and Godbout, “The Resilience of Land Tenure Regimes During Hurricane Irma.”



Destruction and Recovery in Barbuda 2019 (© K. Vinke)

THE BARBUDA EXPERIENCE

Barbuda's history from slavery to emancipation in 1834 and post-colonial independence has shaped land-use practices and land tenure regimes on the island.⁷² The enslaved people on Barbuda developed their own methods of agriculture and livestock farming. They practiced traditions of communal land ownership and land management from Africa to produce food. This communal land ownership is still the governing principle of tenure practices today under the Land Act of 2007.⁷³ The act provides that no land on Barbuda shall be owned, but should be governed and administered communally by the Barbudan people. The Barbuda Council has to approve the use of land for development projects.⁷⁴ This practice supports basic food security post-disaster, as residents are able to hunt and fish

on the land. The communal land ownership practice has been challenged by the Antigua-based national government, which has argued in favour of a privatisation of land-ownership on Barbuda.⁷⁵ There are fears that such an approach, in turn, could lead to a selling-out of the island, as foreign investors are positioned to pay much higher prices than the local population. Most recently, a lease of Hollywood actor Robert De Niro and the Australian billionaire James Packer has been contested in court.⁷⁶ A law called the "Paradise Found Bill" was passed by the Antigua-based national government, giving celebrity investors a 25-year tax break in return for their expanded development on the islands and overriding the right of approval of the Barbudan Council. The prime minister of Antigua and Barbuda, Gaston Browne, has since declared De Niro to be a "special economic envoy" of the country.⁷⁷ The contested project is also relevant with regards to the displacement that occurred after Hurricane Irma in 2017, as many Barbudans expressed the view that in the aftermath of the disaster attempts were being made to keep Barbudans off their land.

The destruction of Hurricane Irma was extensive, destroying critical infrastructure services. Codrington airport, for instance, experienced severe damage and had to be shut down for commercial traffic. Electricity generation, transmission and distribution were heavily affected and not fully operational when this study was prepared. All generators on the island required replacement. The Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) reported that Irma damaged or destroyed 95% of the houses on the island.⁷⁸ Above, the limited public infrastructure was largely destroyed as the island's hospital, schools, bank and government buildings were either destroyed or severely damaged. As of 2019, there is insufficient medical service available on the island and no functioning ATM or bank system. People need to bear transportation costs to Antigua to attain these services.

75 Gould and Lewis, "Green Gentrification and Disaster Capitalism in Barbuda."

76 Martina Johnson and Richard Luscombe, "Robert De Niro's Plan for Caribbean Mega-Resort Opposed by Island Residents," *The Guardian*, November 27, 2015, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/27/robert-de-niro-barbuda-island-resort-controversy>.

77 Associated Press in St John's, "The Mission: Robert De Niro to Be Economic Envoy for Antigua & Barbuda," *The Guardian*, November 29, 2014, sec. Film, <https://www.theguardian.com/film/2014/nov/29/robert-de-niro-economic-envoy-antigua-barbuda>.

78 Government of Antigua and Barbuda, "Hurricane Irma Recovery Needs Assessment: A Report by the Government of Antigua and Barbuda" (St. Johns, Antigua, 2018), https://www.gfdrr.org/sites/default/files/publication/Antigua%20and%20Barbuda%20executive%20summary_print_text%282%29.pdf.

72 Margaret T. Tweedy, "A History of Barbuda under the Codringtons, 1738-1833" (Birmingham, UK, University of Birmingham, 1981), <https://etheses.bham.ac.uk/id/eprint/5356>.

73 Kenneth A. Gould and Tammy L. Lewis, "Green Gentrification and Disaster Capitalism in Barbuda," *NACLA Report on the Americas* 50, no. 2 (April 3, 2018): 148-53, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10714839.2018.1479466>.

74 Look, Friedman, and Godbout, "The Resilience of Land Tenure Regimes During Hurricane Irma."

One expert elaborated on the evacuation experience:

— *“The Barbudan people have been affected psychologically since the passage of Hurricane Irma and even so more traumatised since we were made to evacuate from our homes, from our lands, into what is considered by some people who had never travelled out of Barbuda before. [...] Now that we returned to Barbuda, people are finding it difficult to re-establish themselves. [...] It is unfortunate that the Council does not have the finances to assist in the form of bringing specialist technical people in, technocrats to assist in the education, [...] the reconnection and redevelopment of individuals back into society. Because a lot of our people are still living in tents” (C06).*



Two years after Hurricane Irma, a number of people were still living in tents on Barbuda (© K. Vinke)

Two days after Hurricane Irma made landfall, a mandatory evacuation was ordered on September 8th for the entire island because of another tropical cyclone, Hurricane Jose. Although Hurricane Jose did not make landfall on Barbuda, the evacuated inhabitants were not allowed to return to their homes for several weeks,⁷⁹ and the island was proclaimed “uninhabitable”.⁸⁰ This evacuation was characterised as traumatic by several informants. Some respondents considered the attempt to build an international airport on Barbuda in the immediate aftermath of the hurricane and the later Paradise Found Bill as efforts to challenge communal land ownership. The extended prohibition to return to their homes after the evacuation resulted in heavy criticism.⁸¹

79 Gould and Lewis, “Green Gentrification and Disaster Capitalism in Barbuda.”

80 Joe Sterling and Cassandra Santiago, “For First Time in 300 Years, Barbuda Is Empty,” CNN, accessed September 26, 2019, <https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/15/americas/irma-barbuda-population-trnd/index.html>; MarketWatch, “Tiny Island of Barbuda ‘Practically Uninhabitable’ in Irma’s Devastating Wake,” accessed September 26, 2019, <https://www.marketwatch.com/story/tiny-island-of-barbuda-practically-uninhabitable-in-irmas-devastating-wake-2017-09-06>.

81 Gould and Lewis, “Green Gentrification and Disaster Capitalism in Barbuda.”

Many houses and roofs in particular were still destroyed at the time of this study, which meant that a return to a normal daily routine was not possible. A social protection specialist described the situation:

— *“Their livelihoods have been affected greatly... their liberty was affected. [...] I’ve met some elderly persons that up to this day are disoriented, if they hear heavy wind or a bang, they get stressed. So they have not been able to overcome their trauma” (C01).*

These excerpts portray how both physical climate impacts and displacement can have long lasting effects on the population. One aspect is that in the aftermath of a disaster, social problems such as domestic violence or harassment can be amplified. An interviewee framed the violation of rights as follows: “I’ve seen things, many things, with young girls, people asking for sexual favours in the face of disaster and men passing remarks... to be honest I think that a lot of their rights were infringed upon” (C01). However, a lack of knowledge about rights and the responsible institutions prevented people from making claims.

The interview analysis brought to light that the effects of the hurricane were not limited to the months following the disaster. In fact, even two years afterwards, the physical damage of the hurricane and the psycho-social impact of the displacement are still present in the communities. One interviewee explained the long-term effects on people's livelihoods:

— *“Clearly, the hurricane has changed the island totally, it has wiped out the economy of Barbuda at least for the first year after the storm. The hurricane had a very negative impact in agriculture, all farms were destroyed, animals, small stocks were damaged. In the recovery process things have to be done in a different way and this is where we talk about resilience. So that at least, if this occurs again the impact will not be the same – it would be mitigated by things we put in place” (C16).*

Return migrants may thus be more vulnerable to coming climate impacts, making effective adaptation to future climate change less likely. The issue of finding employment is a central concern, as a senior DRR specialist noted: *“Some of them are still not back to work. They are still not back to where they were before and it will be some time before they get back. The challenge of finding other sources of employment continues” (C17).*

Many people depend on fish for their food security and income base. However, besides the direct effects on the fisheries sector, there were also indirect secondary effects which constituted major challenges: for example, the police occupied the fisheries complex as their operational basis because their station had been destroyed by the hurricane (C16).

Displacement and returning home were particularly challenging for families with young children since they did not have access to childcare and still needed to find employment (C17). The same interviewee mentioned the need to balance the need to look for work to rebuild the homes with the obligation to look after the children. This underlines the necessity for assistance after the return to areas affected by disasters and climate change and how families may be differently affected if no childcare facilities are available. Without additional assistance, recovery to the former status is much slower, or may never be accomplished. In addition, a need for more support for small businesses in the aftermath of the storm was voiced (C17).

The devastation of the storm, the displacement of Barbudans to Antigua and the allocation of aid afterwards led to tensions between Antigua and Barbuda. Interviewees claimed that financial aid had largely stayed in Antigua and even shipments of products for relief were said to have been held up and partially seized at the Antigua port. As a result of the contentions over land and the increasing tensions between the two islands, some Barbudans even voiced secession from Antigua as a possibility. One regional actor explained, *“In Antigua, when the Barbudans moved across it caused an issue. Housing them for free that did cause a political issue, as well as the consideration of new land ownership in Barbuda, that did cause some tensions” (C23).* With two different systems of land ownership in place, the effects of Hurricane Irma reinforced disagreement between the two islands and exacerbated power imbalances.⁸² Overall, with even basic services still lacking, the situation in Barbuda leads to the question which factors enabled the Commonwealth of Dominica to recover faster from the effects of the cyclone and displacement.



Barbuda (© Kira Vinke)

82 Look, Friedman, and Godbout, “The Resilience of Land Tenure Regimes During Hurricane Irma.”

The long-term effects of tropical cyclone-induced displacement



© Kira Vinke

When Hurricane Irma made landfall on Caribbean islands in September of 2017 the effects were devastating. The island Barbuda was completely destroyed and Barbudans were forced to evacuate to Antigua, as another hurricane approached. The infrastructural damages of the hurricane and the recovery efforts continue to determine daily life on the island. The case of Barbuda shows that long after international attention has shifted away from disaster struck regions, people still to struggle with the aftereffects and are left more vulnerable than before to future climate shocks. A group interview of five men from Barbuda sheds light on the effects the hurricane season of 2017 had in this region.

“We have it hard, trust me. My whole house blow down”, one of the younger men in the group says and imitates the sounds of strong winds and cracking glasses. He was not even able to see the house of his neighbours when screaming for help. The storm blew away homes, and with them memories, items of emotional value and financial assets. Moreover, many of the islands’ pigs, sheep and donkeys died. After the storm had passed, no gas, generators or clean water were available. Barbudans have strong ties to their land and the forced evacuation which ensued came as an additional shock to many.


One and a half years after the category 5 hurricane, the island still remains largely without electricity and the damage of both physical infrastructure and the natural

environment is visible everywhere. The men talk about their lives after the storm and the many setbacks and obstacles of their ongoing recovery. Between the hurricanes and the time of the interview many stayed for extended periods in Antigua, which was not directly affected by the hurricane. One of the men slept in Antigua’s national cricket stadium for about a year. The rescue shelters and living conditions were inadequate for longer stays. Access to clothes, water and food was limited. Some were hosted in private homes, but largely the experience of displacement was traumatic. After their return, the men wanted to rebuild their homes together with their families, but construction material and machines were hardly available. Some of them are still living in tents or makeshift houses and the recovery remains slow.

Walking through Barbuda, the enormity of the destruction is as visible as if the storm had passed days ago. There is no sufficient aid to build new homes or even replace all roofs which have been damaged or destroyed. Through fishing and hunting the men provide food for themselves and their families. Critical infrastructure is barely functioning. In the conversation the frustration with the situation of the men cannot be overheard. Just a few days ago the only school on the island had to close until clean water is available again. These pressing issues were hindering the men from returning to a normal life. Yet they are determined to stay on their island, their homeland.

Anguilla

Anguilla is an internally self-governing Overseas Country and Territory of the UK. The country has 23 islands of which only one is inhabited, by approximately 17,000 people.⁸³



Anguilla's economy is based on tourism. The seasonality of the sector, widespread foreign ownership and the annual hurricane season "add considerable risk to economic growth and prosperity", according to the government of Anguilla.⁸⁴

Like many Caribbean islands, Anguilla was severely hit by Hurricane Irma in September 2017. Since 1928, no other category 5 hurricane had made landfall on the island.⁸⁵ According to an official assessment, the hurricane severely damaged 90% of the island's buildings and destroyed or interrupted critical infrastructure, including the island's electricity supply.⁸⁶ Functioning electricity is crucial for the desalination of seawater on which Anguilla depends for freshwater supply.

Hurricane Irma also destroyed Anguilla's passenger ferry port which had been the main gateway to the island and ensured access to neighbouring Saint Martin on which Anguilla's inhabitants find essential goods and services.⁸⁷ All schools on the island were severely affected by the hurricane and, for safety reasons, Anguilla's only secondary school had to be demolished.⁸⁸ The children on the island were still receiving education in temporary facilities at the time of this study. Anguilla's hospital, a 32-bed facility providing public healthcare to the entire population and tourists, was also damaged and remains prone to flooding.⁸⁹

Even before Hurricane Irma hit Anguilla, high levels of unemployment had been a push factor for emigration of Anguillians, who hold British citizenship. Further emigration could lead to a brain drain and hinder the island's development and recovery,⁹⁰ but it could also serve economic growth through remittance-based investments. When asked if there was an awareness of how climate change may be affecting the population, one respondent noted:

— "It is true that we are seeing more catastrophic storms that were unprecedented and that set us back economically for a while. Also the threat of mosquito-borne diseases, which are also climate-related. We are going to see more outbreaks. We are experiencing that with the outbreaks of zika, dengue, chikungunya" (C07).

The same interviewee explained how a single case of a dangerous vector-borne disease may influence tourism from abroad negatively for an extended period of time. There is a lack of research that details the future impact of climate change on the disease burden in the Caribbean. However, both changing climate conditions which can lead to further spread of disease-carrying mosquito species and increased international travel may lead to higher levels of epidemiological risks. It also shows how a tourism-based economy can be devastated by a variety of climate change effects and their coverage in the media. The aspect of healthcare access was also presented as a possible reason for the movement of people. One respondent explained the effects of the damages to the hospital:

83 CIA World Factbook, "Anguilla," accessed October 16, 2019, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/av.html>.

84 The Government of Anguilla London Office, "Anguilla and Hurricane Irma: Recovery, Resilience and Prosperity" (London: The Government of Anguilla, 2017).

85 The Government of Anguilla London Office.


86 The Government of Anguilla London Office.

87 The Government of Anguilla London Office.

88 The Government of Anguilla London Office.

89 The Government of Anguilla London Office.

90 The Government of Anguilla London Office.



Barbuda (© Kira Vinke)

- *“Some people left because they didn’t feel comfortable with the condition of the hospital at that point in time, in case that they had any complications [for example in their pregnancy] they went to have their child, but they came back” (C13).*

Overall, multiple migration push factors and the networks of the Anguillan diaspora in the UK could lead to further outmigration. Considering the difficult situation in the aftermath of Hurricane Irma, with many having lost their jobs and/or their home and critical infrastructure being destroyed, the presence of a well-established Anguillan diaspora makes migration to the UK a rather “realistic option for many”, as stated in the government’s official assessment of the hurricane.⁹¹ There is no comprehensive welfare system in place and many Anguillans lack the funds to rebuild their homes. Even when not faced with a crisis situation, Anguilla’s public infrastructure is inadequate for a population of over 17,000 and the tourists.⁹²

91 The Government of Anguilla London Office.

92 The Government of Anguilla London Office.

Difficult economic situations and missing or lacking public services have always been reasons to leave the island. One respondent provided an overview of the emigration of Anguilla’s population over the years. He described Anguillans as “a population on the move”.

- *“We have always been a people on the move. In recent times with the downturn in our economy [...] people are leaving the island because of the economics. [...] In my opinion, more [for] economic opportunities rather than [because of] climatic conditions” (C15).*

Another respondent elaborated on the link to environmental change of Anguilla’s migration processes, noting that

- *“In the context of the Monserrat eruption, we were a [migrant] receiving country [...]. But I think with Hurricane Irma there were some persons moving out of Anguilla and that is a multiplier. [...] So, I think, hurricane Irma could have been the final nail in the coffin for some persons. They said ‘hey let’s just move’. Persons were already traversing outside of Anguilla and going to the UK for example [...] to make a better life. [...] When we are hit, we are actually unintentionally moving to the UK” (C04).*

It is a common observation that when climate change impacts affect already economically deprived areas, it can be the triggering factor for outmigration. Another source supported this view with a similar observation:

- “After Hurricane Irma a lot of people have left. If you were a hotel worker, you already knew hotels in Anguilla close late August to early September and they reopen in November. Then Irma hits 2017 and that pushes the reopening almost for another year. Then the education aspect because even schools would have been closed, so people sent away their children” (C13).

Unlike in the case of displaced Barbudans in Antigua, people affected by the hurricane in Anguilla did not stay for long in government shelters, but instead lived with relatives or friends (C07 & C13). There was, however, no data collection on the people who stayed in private homes. As in other cases, the competition for labour in the aftermath of the hurricane and recovery period was identified as a source of social tension:

- “We had persons looking at who was getting jobs and looking at work permits that we issued because the thought was, why are you issuing work permits to persons when you have Anguillans out of jobs? But the fact was that most of the work permits were issued to persons that had a skill that we did not possess here, we needed the additional skill.” (C10).

This situation again highlights the need for better access to secondary education and vocational training.

Commonwealth of Dominica

The Commonwealth of Dominica lies between the French Overseas Departments of Guadeloupe and Martinique. It is home to 74,000 people.⁹³



The Commonwealth of Dominica is among the five countries with the highest net migration rate, whereas the size of the diaspora is more than twice as high as the population currently residing in the state.⁹⁴ Pull factors include employment opportunities, the pursuit of higher education elsewhere or the reunification with family members.⁹⁵

The extent of the migration and displacement following Hurricane Maria in 2017 may be some of the largest ever occurring in the Commonwealth of Dominica. Some people went to close-by French-speaking islands, many moved through Antigua to English-speaking territories and some migrated to the UK and the US, both for long and short-term. The full extent of human mobility in the aftermath of the 2017 Hurricane season is an area of research

93 CIA World Factbook, “Central America: Dominica,” 2018, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/do.html>.

94 Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica, “Post-Disaster Needs Assessment Hurricane Maria September 18, 2017: A Report by the Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica” (Roseau, Dominica: Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica, 2017), <https://www.gfdr.org/sites/default/files/publication/dominica-pdna-maria.pdf>.

95 Thomson Fontaine, “Tracing the Diaspora’s Involvement in the Development of a Nation: The Case of Dominica,” 2006, 20.

which has not yet been fully explored and documentation is incomplete.

One interviewee described the partially chaotic movement of people after the cyclone: *“Some of them had documents in order, some had damaged documents and others didn’t have documents at all as they were destroyed during the hurricane. We assisted them to get new documents”* (C22). The situation in the Commonwealth of Dominica after the hurricane was very dire and many did not think they could return: *“Some people thought that Dominica was finished, many people think there is nothing in Dominica for them to come back to, some people were really traumatised, weeks after the hurricane they were still trembling and feeling fear”* (C22).

After the disaster, managing displacement posed serious problems. Immigration officials of other Caribbean states made use of the OECS freedom of movement agreement and tried to support Dominican migrants without documents.⁹⁶ A Dominican official explained:

— *“Some of the challenges we had were families with children coming to you with no travel documents and our system at the time was down. To process the passport we would have needed a computer and we had no electricity”* (C22).

These excerpts show that the nature of migration in the aftermath of an extreme event is often chaotic. One respondent working at an immigration office described a woman who wanted to enter another country: *“Besides immigration trying to process people to go out, people who lived close to the sea and had access to a boat, they just boarded the boats and left”* (C22).

From the point of view of one of the receiving countries, the situation was expressed as follows: *“Persons came here and we had to find the finances to set up a space for them, to feed them, to ensure that everybody was safe. There was nothing in place for that mass migration”* (C28).

One example of planned relocation is the Dominican government’s response to the destruction of Hurricane Erika in 2015 in the community of Petite Savanne, where 217 homes were destroyed. The village is located in one



of the most severely affected areas.⁹⁷ A resident described what he saw as “worse than a war zone” and reported that people dug through mud, often with their bare hands, to rescue those trapped.⁹⁸ Petite Savanne was cut off from the rest of the island for several days following the hurricane.⁹⁹

In September 2016 the government launched a building project called the Bellevue Chopin Housing Development to relocate the community. To meet the housing needs of the of 792 village residents, the construction of 341 units commenced. At the time of writing this report, some residents already lived in Bellevue Chopin.

97 Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica, “Rapid Damage and Impact Assessment Tropical Storm Erika – August 27, 2015,” 2015, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/142861467995411564/pdf/104251-WP-PUBLIC-Rapid-Damage-and-Needs-Assessment-Final-Report-Oct5.pdf>.

98 Patrick Knight, “Dominica Struggles to Recover from Devastating Storm Erika,” UNICEF Connect, September 3, 2015, <https://blogs.unicef.org/blog/dominica-struggles-to-recover-from-devastating-storm-erika>.

99 Barry Alleyne, “Petite Savanne Residents Forced to Bury Dead,” www.nationnews.com, accessed February 12, 2020, <https://www.nationnews.com/nationnews/news/71827/petite-savanne-residents-forced-bury-dead>.

Similar to the Bellevue Chopin, a real estate development project was proposed by the government to provide new housing to citizens affected by Hurricane Maria. The proposed project is financed through the Government's Citizenship by Investment Program and particularly addresses low and middle income groups.

According to the Post Disaster Needs Assessment, Hurricane Maria caused extensive damage in the housing sector: "Of the 31,348 homes comprising the Dominican housing stock, a total of approximately 4,700 houses (15%) were identified as destroyed, (75%) were estimated to have different levels of partial damage and only 3,135 (10%) were considered as not affected by the event".¹⁰⁰

Despite the government's efforts to build new housing in the aftermath of Hurricane Maria, some people were still in shelters at the time this study was conducted. "In the Roseau Area we still have about 300 people in shelters [as a result of the Hurricane]" (C30). Often displacements can last a long time:

- "There are people [here] since tropical storm Erika who have moved from their communities and have not returned. They don't want to go through that experience, so the displacement aspect is seriously impacting persons. They don't want to go back because they feel threatened that if they ever return and stay there for a while these events will continue to occur and impact them" (C31).

The aftermath of the cyclone also brought social tensions to Dominica:


- "People were moved from their farms, from their livelihoods and that creates a lot of tension. Also, there have been a lot of family separations, break up of marriages and things like that. We had some challenges when the government was allocating the housing units because of the breakup of the family structure" (C31).

While there is no quantitative evidence available for these claims, it could serve adaptation planning to investigate the importance of including societal and cultural aspects in the development of new housing, as well as the need for enhanced social services and psychological support in the aftermath of disasters.

¹⁰⁰ Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica, "Post-Disaster Needs Assessment Hurricane Maria September 18, 2017: A Report by the Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica."

Saint Lucia

Politically, Saint Lucia is a regional hub and leader. As the host of the OECS Commission, the country has influence on regional policy as well as the opportunity to contribute to policy integration across governance levels.



Geographically, Saint Lucia is part of the Windward Islands group in the Eastern Caribbean, and has a land area of only 616 km². It has a population of about 177,000 people.¹⁰¹ Saint Lucia became independent in 1979.

Unemployment is high with a fifth of the population out of work. Even higher is the percentage of youth unemployment which is at 36.3%.¹⁰² Castries has a population of 60,390, which accounts for 40% of the country's total population.¹⁰³

In 1995, the Saint Lucia Report on Poverty indicated that 19.7% of the households lived in poverty and a quarter of the population were poor. However, life expectancy in Saint Lucia is 75 years, which is high. Other social indicators like primary school enrolment, which stands at 87%, also show development progress. In 2017, Saint Lucia's

¹⁰¹ The Central Statistical Office of Saint Lucia, "Home – The Central Statistical Office of Saint Lucia," accessed August 15, 2019, <https://www.stats.gov.lc>.

¹⁰² The Central Statistical Office of Saint Lucia, "Home – The Central Statistical Office of Saint Lucia."

¹⁰³ The Central Statistical Office of Saint Lucia.

Human Development Index placed the country in the high human development category.

The Government of Saint Lucia notes that although “Saint Lucia’s per capita income is relatively high among developing countries, it has been disadvantaged by its economic dependence on bananas and by its small size, small population, limited physical and human resources, and the frequency of hurricanes”.¹⁰⁴ Tourism has become an increasingly important industry, which has enabled people to diversify their income. But it is also susceptible to the detrimental effects of climate change.

As in other Caribbean SIDS, Saint Lucians have emigrated in search of economic opportunities in the past. Today, as Saint Lucia is one of the founding members of the OECS, Saint Lucians enjoy the right of free movement of persons in the group of Member States. Based on estimates for 2020, the country has a net migration rate of -1.7 migrants per 1,000 people.¹⁰⁵ In the past, emigrants from Saint Lucia have primarily chosen to migrate to other Caribbean countries such as Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and the neighbouring French Caribbean islands. In recent decades, emigration has also led to a slightly increasing number of Saint Lucians in Canada, the UK, and the United States.¹⁰⁶ In 2017, the highest share of Saint Lucians reported abroad (23,000) resided in the United States.¹⁰⁷ These migrants tend to choose destinations for education, family, or skilled work.¹⁰⁸ Of nearly 55,000 Saint Lucians residing in other countries in 2017, the number in developed regions outnumbered those in less developed regions three to one. By contrast, migration flows from the global south to Saint Lucia exceeded migration flows from the global north two to one. The UN estimates that the total migrants

stock in 2017¹⁰⁹ was 12,900. The countries with the five largest shares of reported foreign-born residents in Saint Lucia were Guyana (1,992), the UK (980), Trinidad and Tobago (787), Barbados (785), and the United States (669).¹¹⁰ Before Hurricane Maria made landfall on 18 September, a reported 231 Dominicans resided in Saint Lucia. This study could not identify data detailing the exact migration and displacement stocks and flows following that event.

The extreme cyclone season of 2017 was a watershed moment for Saint Lucia’s experience with disaster displacement. Saint Lucia is a coordinator in the Caribbean region for regional disaster response. In line with this, the island has received displaced persons from other OECS Member States on a number of occasions, and has more generally become a transit hub for people from the Commonwealth of Dominica bound to the US and for other Caribbean nationals to travel to the Commonwealth of Dominica. In 2017, Saint Lucia was asked to take responsibility for the evacuation of Americans living on the Commonwealth of Dominica (C32). However, the early evacuation of foreigners was criticised by the local population. Also some complaints were made that Dominican migrants arriving in Saint Lucia were given better access to public housing and other services than Saint Lucians, which resulted in low level social tensions. Both claims show that even regional migration management can become politicised and contested.

One prominent official interviewed for this study expressed the perception that the deficiencies in standard operating procedures limit the effectiveness of government response to people on the move following disasters, as well as efforts for longer-term integration (C32). Such procedures would, inter alia, clarify the type and duration of humanitarian assistance provided to non-nationals on the territory of Saint Lucia. This is of particular concern for a hub like Saint Lucia. Ambitious integration efforts may be difficult to justify, for example, when faced with challenges to integrating unskilled migrants into the tourism-oriented Saint Lucian labour market.

However, the number of migrants who remained in Saint Lucia was estimated by government officials to be relatively small, about two hundred people (C32). Migration,

104 Government of Saint Lucia, “Economy of Saint Lucia – Key Facts 2015,” 2015, http://www.commonwealthgovernance.org/countries/americas/st_lucia/economy.

105 CIA World Factbook, “Net Migration Rate. Country Comparison Ranking,” accessed February 14, 2020, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/347.html>.

106 Nations Encyclopedia, “Migration – St. Lucia,” accessed August 15, 2019, <https://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Americas/St-Lucia-MIGRATION.html#ixzz5nIFGFRBI>.

107 Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), “International Migrant Stock: The 2017 Revision,” 2017, <https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates17.asp>.

108 Caribbean Expert Group Meeting on Human Rights and Development in the Caribbean, “Migration in the Caribbean – What Do We Know?,” 2005, https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/38805/1/LCCARL054_en.pdf; Bradley B. Walters, “Migration, Land Use and Forest Change in St. Lucia, West Indies,” *Land Use Policy* 51 (February 2016): 290–300, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2015.11.025>.

109 Estimates from UNDESA are based on data collected as of 1 July 2017.

110 Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), “International Migrant Stock: The 2017 Revision.”



Anse La Raye – fisheries based community, located in between a mountain range (© K. Vinke)

displacement and planned relocation are not mentioned in the country's National Adaptation Plan (NAP) of 2018, although Saint Lucia could be again indirectly or also directly affected by displacement resulting from tropical cyclone risks.¹¹¹

In Saint Lucia, several areas are prone to climate risks. For example, the fishing community of Anse La Raye – which was mentioned by interview partners in Saint Lucia – is located in a valley, making it highly susceptible to flooding during extreme precipitation events. Moreover, fisheries are suffering throughout the region due to widespread coral bleaching and the related diminishment of fish stocks. Despite the fact that the low-lying parts of the village are exposed to mud slides and in the long term also sea level rise, villagers who live in the area do not wish to move uphill because of the proximity to the ocean, which is their workplace. It was mentioned by one government official that in general resilience building measures in the country are preferred to human mobility options (C32). This case exemplifies that planned relocation would have to consider livelihood options and the feasibility of certain types of work in the destinations.

¹¹¹ Government of Saint Lucia, "Saint Lucia's National Adaptation Plan Roadmap and Capacity Development Plan 2018–2028" (Castries: Department of Sustainable Development, Ministry of Education, Innovation, Gender Relations and Sustainable Development, 2018), <https://climatechange.govt.lc/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/NAP-Roadmap-and-Capacity-Building-PLAN-FINAL.pdf>.

4.5. Mapping Obstacles and Building Blocks for HMCCC People-Centred Planning

The 2017 hurricane season appears to have prompted policymakers to consider climate change and human mobility questions more seriously, particularly after the devastation brought to Barbuda and the Commonwealth of Dominica. However, concrete actions and policies pertaining to HMCCC are largely lacking. Currently, only the Commonwealth of Dominica has developed provisions for the relocation of populations, and so far only as a remedial measure for displacement, not as an anticipatory strategy.¹¹² Apart from this first step, mechanisms and resources are missing for managing the complexity of HMCCC.

Policy Gaps

Some experts specifically mentioned the need for migration policies (C07, C10, C14). One officer from Antigua and Barbuda criticised the absence of new policies after disaster and the insufficient documentation of migrants

¹¹² Clarke and Johnson, "Policy Analysis and Institutional Actor Landscape Relating to Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Change in the Caribbean."

(C14), while others described the need for an overarching national policy on climate mobility (C17, C19, C31). An expert from Anguilla criticised migration policies as failing to attract professionals (C07). Policies that would aim at providing training for at-risk communities could help to fill such labour demands. A respondent from an intergovernmental organisation stated that policies addressing the situation of people affected by climate change in terms of compensation, protection, economic and employment initiatives are missing (C09).¹¹³ A general gap concerns the planning dimension: many existing policies are reactive rather than preventative (C07).

Rights-Based and Gender-Sensitive Approaches

The case study countries in the Caribbean are part of various international conventions that could guide the treatment of migrants and displaced persons. The Commonwealth of Dominica has signed and ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, while Saint Lucia and Antigua and Barbuda are not signatories.¹¹⁴ All three countries are signatories of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and Great Britain extended the treaty to Anguilla. All four countries have ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Saint Lucia and the Commonwealth of Dominica voted yes on the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration in 2018, whereas Antigua and Barbuda neither voted nor abstained. In the same year, all countries approved the Global Compact on Refugees.

Although Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, the Commonwealth of Dominica, and Saint Lucia are signatories of these different legal instruments, governments do not always implement the pertaining national regulations on the local level. Moreover, some policies or procedures do not actively take into account needs of women, children people living with disabilities. There is a general lack of awareness about these norms, requiring training alongside the improvement of institutional and human capacities for respecting, protecting and fulfilling all human rights. A senior regional official indicated that

— “Knowledge of human rights has not been prevalent. We need to do the assessment as to whether our laws recognise human rights in an active way. We might be a signatory to international conventions but whether at the local level the laws have been enacted even the awareness of the legal system, we might sign but even the capacity building of our judges and magistrates is not there yet” (C23).

Also for those who are working with displaced persons it may be necessary to provide information on people’s rights to make sure that standards are adhered to. Raising awareness of human rights and redress mechanisms to migrants is also key for their empowerment. General education or pre-departure trainings are needed since many migrants, displaced and relocated persons are not fully aware of their rights. Legal provisions under the CARICOM and the OECS seem to have helped to improve the equal treatment of displaced persons: “The contingent rights protocol [...] demands that once any citizen of the OECS enters another protocol member state they are treated like a citizen of that particular country.” (C27).

The lack of data makes it difficult to thoroughly assess and monitor violations of rights. For example, there is some general evidence that violent crimes can increase in the aftermath of extreme events according to the World Health Organization,¹¹⁵ but so far, no detailed study has investigated this question for the Caribbean. Gender-based violence requires special attention in this context. As one official from a regional intergovernmental association noted,

— “[...] The issue of gender-based violence [...] may increase during or shortly after a big event. We need to take a closer examination of that, maybe through the number of reported cases to hospitals. We may also want to take a look at inter-partner type violence and the whole gender dynamics around it. Also too, the abuse of the aged is something under the radar. The elderly are very vulnerable. How does the disaster compound their living situation so issues of violence need to be explored in this area” (C26).

113 Clarke and Johnson.

114 Anguilla is an overseas territory of Great Britain and not a UN Member state, therefore it is not included herein as a separate entity of analysis.

115 Department of Injuries and Violence Prevention, World Health Organization, “Violence and Disasters” (Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization, 20015), https://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/publications/violence/violence_disasters.pdf.

Deficiencies in the national and regional social safety net systems as well as in climate resilience overall are at the heart of weaknesses in governance of HMCCC. There are, however, limited advances in the portability of rights and in promotion of resilience-building. An academic expert working on disaster risk reduction in the region explains that the topic has not been addressed from a human rights angle:

— *“I have heard no discussion of human rights in the context of human mobility as a result of climate change. [...] The whole issue of gender is more recognised these days, but I don’t think that we have looked at it in the context of environmental movement [of people]” (C19).*

Weaknesses in governance are largely due to deficiencies in strategic engagement on HMCCC, despite interest in the topic. Governance of human mobility is largely seen as a matter of economic exchange and of sovereign national security, and not yet fully as a proactive means to protect citizens while promoting human development in the region. Good practices identified by this study include effective communication and coordination of regional and international institutions, and in some cases between environmental agencies or departments. In some cases, increased awareness has also led to an improvement of institutional capacity to address human mobility: *“I think that in the region we are becoming more qualified. We have a lot more technical people who are training and have the exposure and we have the people who can actually advance this” (C13).* A leading scholar stated that DRR and climate adaptation were well-aligned: *“In the Caribbean, the link between disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation is quite strong at the programmatic level.” (C19).* Other good practices included programmes in the agricultural sector that helped people to cope with climate impacts through access to labour and risk diversification (C02).

Data Gaps

So far, the linkages between human mobility and climate change for the Caribbean have not been thoroughly investigated. One issue are data constraints. Several key informants considered data sources as incomplete or non-existent (C12, C14, C16, and C22) and pointed to insufficient data collecting capacities (C09) and limited cooperation (C03). Some respondents from ministries highlighted specific data needs. For example, documentation on displacement events is still weak.

One interviewee underlined the need for more information by explaining the type of data which was required.

— *“The social services, the institutions and programmes that are available to people in the event of a hurricane or a disaster.” I would also like to have data on all those persons trained to give that kind of support [...] For the children I would like to have information on the family unit. [...] [For example], who are the single parent families” (C27).*

Women, the elderly and children are particularly vulnerable in the case of a disaster and one respondent commented on the need of disaggregated data : *“I think we need general information regarding the population: male, female, elderly, children, living conditions, so that at least you will be able to make assessments and plan how to move forward” (C16).* The interview statements show that the development of new categories for data collection on HMCCC may be required to provide information on particularly vulnerable social groups. Another interviewee also noted the dearth of specific data:

— *“It is challenging to find data specifically dedicated to the different forms of human mobility related to environmental changes. Some sources may exist in terms of censuses, or disaster-related data, but it would be difficult to use them on an ongoing basis for policymaking” (C09).*

Data collection is seen as a fundamental precondition to develop anticipatory mechanisms to manage climate change impacts (C16). There is insufficient data collection on the secondary effects of climate change impacts on livelihoods (C16) and immigration streams (C28), although it could improve risk reduction. The reasons for this are multifold; they include limited financial resources and technical capacities as well as standard procedures to execute data collection.

To bridge these data gaps, key stakeholders suggested several strategies building upon existing data collection tools. One was to streamline immigration data collection across the region (C14). One government official provided some insights into potentially useful sources for data collection, including schools which enrolled migrant students, port of entry documentation and applications for social protection services (C27). Focused on the development of displaced people, one informant proposed to conduct a longitudinal survey over five to ten years to gather information about the reasons for migration and



East Coast Dominica (© Dr. Horst Vogel / GIZ)

people’s current livelihood; however, there are limitations in terms of finances and capacity to conduct such a survey (C15).

Overall, the lack of data on human mobility in the context of climate change is a severe constraint for the improvement of disaster-preparedness because without knowing past migration flows after extreme events it is difficult to prepare for future impacts.

MISSING INSTRUMENTS

The shortage of data and lack of policies on HMCCC in the Caribbean show the need for new procedures and instruments. Mechanisms for tracking movements are missing, as well as the creation or maintenance of capacities, resources and knowledge. Effective displacement management needs to include provisions for the safe transportation and sheltering of people,¹¹⁶ adherence to human rights standards and consistent data collection of migratory movements, including those persons finding shelter in private homes, so that they can also receive adequate access to social services.

In the case of the Caribbean, where free movement is partially granted, good communication and coordination among stakeholders at national and regional levels are essential for successful and efficient capacity-building. A regional stakeholder added: “*We should ensure absolute harmonisation of processes and platforms*” (C21). Regional entities like the OECS could improve coordination, but national ministries could also enhance their communication, coordination and operationalisation of existing policy frameworks (C17, C28). Inadequate cooperation can be a reason for insufficient data collection (C03).

Education, be it specific schooling for the general public or capacity building and advanced training for practitioners, is another field that requires new approaches. Educating about climate change and its relation to human mobility, society, vulnerable groups and human rights is fundamental to raise awareness about the urgency of the topics. Reactive disaster management in Caribbean nations would also profit from improved knowledge about operational procedures¹¹⁷ and existing climate mobility policies (C13). Improving knowledge about impacts of climate change as well as applicable adaptation and mitigation options are needed. Education about climate change without the knowledge and political or economic ability to react will not be sufficient.

116 Clarke and Johnson, “Policy Analysis and Institutional Actor Landscape Relating to Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Change in the Caribbean.”

117 Clarke and Johnson.



Barbuda (© Kira Vinke)

Empowerment and protection of affected people were also raised as topics. Missing support may increase already existing vulnerabilities because those already disadvantaged may not receive support, or do not know how to claim their rights. Two interviewees criticised the out-of-date housing programmes and building codes which do not address urgent housing needs in case of disasters (C11 & C15). The absence of policy guidance on HMCCC has been identified as a weakness.

Research

While the literature on human mobility in the context of climate change has grown, research gaps persist and are especially evident in the Caribbean. Developing and more specific research is also hindered by the absence of available data. One intergovernmental actor specified this research gap as a lack of “actionable research” which “is required to assist countries in developing evidence-based policies on all topics related to environmental migration” (C09). Such applied research should support Caribbean governments to coordinate human mobility in the context of climate change (C16), especially in the areas of implementation of policies, addressing educational deficiencies (C01), and adhering to the Human Rights Convention (C01).

Furthermore, there are research deficits about physical impacts of climate change (C16), including the situations of elderly and children during and after extreme weather events, in particular with regard to their high mortality. Additionally, the situation and needs of families have to be identified. More knowledge is also needed on the specific pathways of environmental migration (C17, C19), the reasons for the reluctance to move out of exposed areas and how in situ adaptation can be facilitated and relocation incentivised (C31).

Entry Points

Considering the foregoing analysis, entry points for a better governance of HMCCC consist in capacity-building, coordination, communication, education, and reforming of housing policies. In general, good entry points for new instruments are the increasing awareness on climate change and human mobility among policymakers, existing communication and coordination systems, and existing standard protocols and procedures. In the Caribbean, regional entities like CARICOM, CCCCC, CDEMA or OECS could be included in the process of, for example, coordinating migration, distributing knowledge to the national level and execute capacity building. Furthermore, deficiencies in monitoring and evaluation again highlight the need for more data collection and organisational instruments. Diversification of incomes constitutes another important entry point to increase adaptation capacities (C11 & C15). More diversified incomes would especially help exposed and vulnerable farmers, fishers, or the tourism industry. For example, successful coordination and political initiative led in the case of Anguilla to a relief-building programme that created partnerships between farmers and families in order to diversify income (C15), called family enhancement. Overall, it has been acknowledged that standard operating procedures such as protocols and guiding papers enable actors to structure themselves and react effectively.

4.6. Recommendations for the Caribbean

Caribbean policymakers and practitioners who are engaged in efforts to deal with the human dimensions of climate change are relatively advanced in some areas – in particular in addressing disaster displacement – as the interviews and communiqués reviewed for this research demonstrate. Challenges persist however in other areas, for example in designing frameworks to deal proactively with movements in the context of gradual changes. This section attempts to summarise priority areas for action – first at the regional level and then separately for the four study countries.

Core Recommendations at the Regional Level

There is currently no specific regional framework to address climate-related human mobility in the Caribbean, neither in the case of disasters nor as a response to gradual environmental changes and the resulting degradation in socio-economic conditions. Nevertheless, Caribbean countries have repeatedly supported each other in the aftermath of disasters by flexibly exercising their sovereign rights within existing frameworks and mechanisms for regular temporary migration and for the relatively unhindered movement of goods. In the future, a more inclusive application of the spirit of free movement of people between Member States by expanding visa categories in later phases of the CSME may further facilitate movement; however, these pathways are currently limited to highly-skilled workers.¹¹⁸ Furthermore, of the countries studied for this report, Anguilla is an associate member of CARICOM and not a part of the CSME.

Regional organisations may also make use of international venues to further work on HMCCC, such as through the International Migration Review Forum (IMRF), the Platform on Disaster Displacement, and the constituted bodies under the UNFCCC. As with other areas studied for this research, actions taken at the regional level will be more effective, due in part to the mobility of the populations and region-wide impacts of natural hazards.

¹¹⁸ At present, only people in ten highly-skilled labour categories can qualify for free movement permissions. Yet, some interviewees approached for this study suggested an expansion of visa categories to include low- and un-skilled people may benefit people on the move more broadly. Expansion is envisaged for later phase of implementation of the CSME, and largely determined at the national level through quotas and visas.

SET A STRATEGIC DIRECTION

Setting a clear, strategic, and objective-driven direction for policy development and implementation is an important component to effective public policy and governance.¹¹⁹ Nations at the regional level can:

- Ensure sustained commitment at key levels of leadership;
- Engage in regional and international dialogues and thereby in cross-country coordination;
- Build institutional structures and capacities for effective implementation of policies and programmes; ensuring the full participation of affected communities, with consideration to vulnerable or marginalised groups; and
- Support, monitor, and evaluate national efforts to manage support services for displaced persons following disasters, for example, by special task force(s) with multi-disciplinary personnel;

For effective governance of human mobility phenomena, these considerations – as well as the human rights and well-being of migrants, women, and vulnerable groups – must be considered for each stage of the migration cycle. While these efforts require bottom-up action by the nations in the region, namely through domestic legislation, coordination and direction-setting should also happen at the regional level. For the Caribbean region, the work and expertise of organisations like the OECS can be leveraged to set evidence-based strategic directions on a few priority areas that have region-wide implications.

FOSTER EFFECTIVE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND DECISION MAKING

Enhanced monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for migration, displacement and planned relocations are needed across the Caribbean, especially in countries typically receiving displaced persons, such as Saint Lucia. Data paucity and limited data sharing are main barriers. The conducted interviews also pointed to limited existence of – or poor implementation of – standard operational protocols, methods, and procedures for dealing with migrants,

¹¹⁹ Adapted from the Auditor General of British Columbia and Deputy Minister's Council, "Enhancing Accountability for Performance: A Framework and an Implementation Plan : Second Joint Report," 1996, <https://www.bcauditor.com/sites/default/files/publications/1996/special/report/enhancing-accountability-performance-frameworkand-implementationplan.pdf>.

displaced people, and relocatees. While existing procedures may become easily overwhelmed in emergency situations, technical experts can assist in calm periods to make protocols adaptable to emergency situations. In addition, a few areas require operable solutions:

- Clear identification of roles and responsibilities for departments and offices involved in disaster response as well as their international partners, including military, police, relief agencies, and immigration, customs, and border officials,
- Registration and tracking of displaced people, with specific attention to vulnerable groups, and especially to children and the elderly;
- Emergency housing, and medium- to long-term housing strategies for displaced people and other vulnerable groups;
- Improved distribution of relief items and/or cash services.

Building capacities will require a number of structural, institutional, and educational efforts. The interviews conducted for this research exposed a number of areas in which general awareness and specific expertise is low among practitioners as well as among affected communities, including in:

- Human rights in general, and rights of displaced people as well as labour rights in particular;
- Regional and international legal frameworks and policies relevant to migration, displacement, and planned relocations; as well as to climate change mitigation and adaptation;
- Gender-responsive programme implementation;
- Psychosocial support, especially for children and people with health needs;
- Support for people with physical and mental health needs, people with disabilities, and elderly persons.

More specialised technical expertise is needed in key governmental departments and ministries, especially in national offices and departments tasked with disaster relief provision and/or migration. Funding and availability

of skilled professionals are the main barriers. Workshops organised externally and in collaboration with the OECS have contributed to recent capacity building of knowledge in this area.¹²⁰

Additionally, governments may consider working together to:

- Replicate expert trainings for key personnel at the national level – immigration officials, social protection specialists, emergency response managers, local government officials and civil society programme managers – on HMCCC;
- Establish an expert group of regional actors involved in providing technical support to governments with regard to HMCCC, to ensure a coordinated response, more efficient use of expertise, and full knowledge of agreed conventions in the future.

FOSTER PARTICIPATORY, COMMUNITY-BASED APPROACHES

Mechanisms to include the meaningful participation of affected communities should be strengthened in the Caribbean. Multiculturalism is a main strength in disaster recovery in the Caribbean when it facilitates the peaceful hosting and integration of non-native peoples. Paradoxically, it can also create challenges, as people absorbed into receiving communities become invisible. Government support to the inclusion of displaced persons in disaster recovery are exacerbated by the dearth of registration and tracking mechanisms post-displacement, for both cross-border and internal displacement; the invisibility of displaced person living in urban areas, in informal settlements, and with temporary hosts; and the reality that many people who move following disasters do not self-identify as an internally displaced person. In short, specific needs and vulnerabilities are difficult for government service providers and their NGO partners to address. A large number of people who were evacuated or who self-evacuated from the Commonwealth of Dominica in

¹²⁰ See, for example, relevant workshop hosted in 2019 by IOM: Caribbean Migration Consultations, “Migration, Environment and Climate Change (MECC): Capacity Building Workshop in the Eastern Caribbean (Not Directly Affiliated with CMC),” 2019, <https://caribbeanmigration.org/events/migration-environment-and-climate-change-mecc-capacity-building-workshop-eastern-caribbean>. And a co-organized one in 2018 by GIZ and OECS: OECS Communications Unit, “Launch of the Caribbean Component of the Global Programme ‘Sustainable Management of Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Change,’” May 9, 2018, <https://pressroom.oecs.org/media-alert-launch-of-the-caribbean-component-of-the-global-programme-sustainable-management-of-human-mobility-in-the-context-of-climate-change>.

response to Hurricane Maria only found accommodation with host families through social media networks or distant acquaintances in Saint Lucia. Over time, such a situation can involve multiple risks of abuses, for example, sexual exploitation and rent discrimination.

Some main areas that could be strengthened include:

- Improve early warning systems and early response mechanisms, which may be supported by projections of future tropical cyclone formation and storm surge simulations
- Ensure due consultation with and participation of displaced people that may face specific vulnerabilities, including women, youth, elderly, people in poverty, people with disabilities, minorities, and other marginalised groups, with consideration to the intersectionality of these groups;
- Implement safety net mechanisms for losses and damages in the context of extreme weather, for example, cash-for-work programmes;
- Develop emergency communications systems, considering also the role of social media networks, working with the information and communications technology sector;
- Work with the private sector to continue to develop insurance schemes, including disaster risk insurance, crop insurance, and livestock insurance; and
- Continue to develop and raise funds for the Caribbean Catastrophic Risk Insurance Facility, and develop mechanisms for funds to reach local affected communities, in consultation with said communities.

As well as working to improve the overall human rights environment, governments can develop specific policy measures and programmes to:

- Facilitate the widening and deepening of diaspora networks;
- Facilitate the transnational circulation of skills and portability of social benefits (e.g. social security);

- Develop programmes to prevent grievous rights abuses migrants are disproportionately subjected to – for example, human trafficking and forced labour – by prosecuting offenders, protecting survivors, and develop partnerships to prevent abuses.

STRENGTHEN ANTICIPATORY EFFORTS TO MANAGE MIGRATION AND DISPLACEMENT

CARICOM states could expand migration levels for low- and un-skilled categories through temporary migrant worker programmes. In addition, targeted skills matching programmes for temporary migration can be increased for all skills categories. Such programmes help fill immediate labour shortages for specific sectors or occupations, and are most effective if accompanied with skills training and/or vocational programmes for both migrants and non-migrants in areas of origin. Enacting migration programmes is the responsibility of the relevant labour ministry in each nation, and in some cases, requires parliamentary approval. Such arrangements may be coordinated at the regional level through the next phase of CSME implementation, as well as through multilateral arrangements with non-CSME CARICOM observers like Anguilla, and are especially coherent with Objectives 5, 7 and 18 of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (2018).¹²¹ In addition, the CDEMA Council of Ministers and CDEMA CDM Strategy for 2014–24 are likely to be among the best available vehicles for enhanced coordination at the regional level, extending plans, guidelines, and best practices to national offices for disaster services.

Concretely, Caribbean governments could seek to further:

- Work with the private sector to identify related skilled and unskilled labour market requirements at the regional level;
- Target programmes and financial support for education and training in identified skill gap areas;
- Work with the private sector, including recruitment and job placement firms, on skills-matching programmes.

¹²¹ E.g. 5(b): “Develop flexible, rights-based and gender-responsive labour mobility schemes for migrants, in accordance with local and national labour market needs and skills supply at all skills levels, including temporary, seasonal, circular and fast-track programmes in areas of labour shortages, by providing flexible, convertible and non-discriminatory visa and permit options, such as for permanent and temporary work, multiple-entry study, business, visit, investment and entrepreneurship” (A/RES/73/195, adopted 19 December 2018, emphasis added).



Sorgossum – Barbuda (© Kira Vinke)

EXECUTE ACTIONS TO ABATE CLIMATE RISKS

Establishing effective policies to manage migration and displacement is essential to minimise potential challenges of human mobility and to deliver on the positive potential of migration for development. In addition, policies and programmes to undercut the root causes of displacement and distress migration, and specifically targeting people already affected by climate change impacts, are also key.

Areas that merit improvement in the Caribbean include:

- Mechanisms to request relocation and resettlement in anticipation of severe hazards and climate risks; and
- Empirical and legal thresholds to designate areas as unsafe or unfit for human habitation.
- Strengthen global mitigation ambition through increased representation at international forums

Planned relocations are currently uncommon in particular in OECS states, where free movement facilitates evacuation and return in the context of disasters, or labour migration in the case of long-term effects. Planned relocations may nonetheless become more frequently requested in the future, as threats of hazards on whole communities – especially near the coast – become more severe. Countries will need to enact a legislative framework to relocate people in coherence with international standards, informed by the

*Guidance on protecting people from disasters and environmental change through planned relocation*¹²² and *operational Toolbox for Planning Relocations to Protect People from Disasters and Environmental Change*.¹²³

A major imperative for reducing climate risks consists in rapid emissions mitigation. While the SIDS have historically produced few emissions, they are strongly affected by the impacts of climate change. Taking an active stance in the relevant climate fora can potentially help to advance mitigation efforts by other, larger emitters. At the same time, adaptation to unavoidable impacts is key. CARICOM states form part of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries (GRULAC) at the United Nations (UN) and have advanced relatively ambitious Nationally-Determined Contributions (NDCs)¹²⁴ and NAPs.¹²⁵ In the interviews conducted, reports of participation in international efforts to combat climate change were mixed. While awareness of the existence of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement was relatively high, awareness of the respective nations' participation in and commitments to these processes was limited. This indicates a need for strengthened two-way communication between siloed departments and ministries tasked with international cooperation and those charged with more local implementation of policies related to development, humanitarian response, migration, and labour. Moreover, preparation for and participation in the COP negotiations could be further strengthened by further trainings and staff support of the respective negotiating teams.

FOSTER A PRACTICE-KNOWLEDGE COMMUNITY AND DEEPEN NETWORK DENSITY

The interviews carried out for this research indicated a relatively strong network of actors in HMCCC, particularly those working for regional organisations and in national disaster offices. This study also identified a significant number of UN agencies, charitable organisations, and

122 The Brookings Institution, Georgetown University, Institute for the Study of International Migration, and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), "Guidance on Protecting People from Disasters and Environmental Change through Planned Relocation."

123 IOM, Georgetown University, and UNHCR, "A Toolbox: Planning Relocations to Protect People from Disasters and Environmental Change | Environmental Migration Portal," 2017, <https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/toolbox-planning-relocations-protect-people-disasters-and-environmental-change>.

124 United Nations Climate Change and UNDP, "Regional Dialogue on Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) for the Caribbean: 8–10 October 2018. Rodney Bay, Saint Lucia. Dialogue Report," 2018, <https://www.undp.org/content/dam/LECB/events/2018/20191008-caribbean-ndc-dialogue/undp-ndcsp-caribbean-dialogue-report.pdf>.

125 International Organization for Migration, "Migration In the Caribbean."

international NGOs working in the Caribbean, particularly in the areas of disaster response. Many of the contributions of these organisations were perceived as positive. However, key informants revealed a number of dependencies to these organisations as well as deficiencies in their operations. One key example is that the operation of NGOs may on occasion complicate or hinder national-level data collection in regards to displaced populations, largely due to the existence of parallel systems or unilateral actions. In addition, some remarked that the provision of assistance de-linked from government programmes, such as the provision of unsolicited goods, can hamper or skew government relief planning and provision. Overall, in order to further strengthen the current practice community, greater coordination with international community would help to reduce redundancies and adverse effects. Related to this, were International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) to place greater emphasis on employing local expertise and labour, it would help to further expand and deepen the local network's knowledge and capacities.

IMPROVE DATA AND KNOWLEDGE

Basic migration and displacement data are important for the implementation, follow-up and review of any migration or displacement management policy, as well as for identifying and assisting groups with special needs or vulnerabilities.¹²⁶ The same can be said for baseline data, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, and is recognised as particularly important in the case of planned relocations. Paucity of data underlies the lack of monitoring and evaluation of programmes and policies in a few critical areas: stocks and flows of migrant and displaced people, welfare of vulnerable groups, gender, and integration of migrants and displaced people. Insufficient registration procedures and lack of registration for spontaneous arrivals (i.e., people not arriving through a recognised air or sea port), which are especially common in the context of emergency situations, can leave migrants and displaced people at greater risk of being subjected to exploitative working conditions, inadequate housing, and human trafficking.

Key challenges include coordination and data sharing with destination countries, inadequate funds to carry out household surveys, and a dearth of qualified data scientists

and other technical specialists in the region. In addition, a primary and remediable reason for the lack of data identified in this study is the absence of standard operating procedures or protocols for data collection, and especially a lack of protocols adaptable to emergencies. Policymakers and practitioners are acutely aware of the need for longitudinal and disaggregated data on displaced people.

A simple and standard, ideally electronic, method of data collection could be considered and standardised across OECS and CARICOM countries. With proper planning, entry forms can be made more useful and adapted to emergency situations. Systems for capturing or estimating spontaneous arrivals can be adapted from other contexts.¹²⁷ Current data collection methods would be strengthened by:

- Collection of data on entries and exits of CARICOM and non-CARICOM nationals;
- Disaggregation of data by sex, age, migration status, and others;
- Improvement of techniques to estimate irregular migration, with specific attention to human trafficking;
- Inclusion of migration questions in census surveys, with a view to capture migration flows as well as spontaneous arrivals;
- Provision of trainings for migration specialists on data collection methods and data analysis;
- Facilitation of trainings for immigration officials and border authorities on migration and displacement, as well as on data collection.

Thematically, research has majorly focused on displacement due to sudden-onset hazards, and rarely on gradual environmental degradation or slower-onset impacts of climate change. Research on these topics can be improved by strengthening general, representative and longitudinal migration and displacement data, and supplemented with tailored household surveys.

¹²⁶ See also footnote 14 in: The Brookings Institution, Georgetown University, Institute for the Study of International Migration, and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), "Guidance on Protecting People from Disasters and Environmental Change through Planned Relocation."

¹²⁷ See, for example, the work on mixed migration flows provided through the UNHCR Operational Data Portal (<https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean>) and IOM's Missing Migrants project (<https://missingmigrants.iom.int>).

Key informants interviewed for this research noted a number of areas that merit further attention:

- The impacts of climate change on the enjoyment of human rights; and on livelihood security;
- Longitudinal studies of people internally displaced by disasters;
- Longitudinal, tracking studies of migrants in receiving countries and return migration;
- The impacts of climate change on climate-prone sectors,¹²⁸ especially tourism, agriculture, and general outside labour and the resulting impacts on migration and residence;
- The impacts of hurricanes and severe storms – in particular, in the context of warming scenarios in which they are more intense and frequent¹²⁹ – on infrastructure, human settlements, as well as the resulting need to develop evacuation and displacement management plans.

Policymaker trainings, expert workshops, and public education campaigns would be particularly useful for topics such as:

- Human rights conventions and related documents;
- The basis of climate science and of climate change scenarios, and the projected impacts of climate change;
- The rights of migrants and displaced people (informed, among other things by the Guiding Principles of Internal Displacement);
- National and regional frameworks for migration, including the Global Compacts on Migration and Refugees.

128 IPCC, “Summary for Policymakers,” in *Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, ed. Christopher B. Field et al. (Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, n.d.), 1–32.

129 Kerry Emanuel, Ragoth Sundararajan, and John Williams, “Hurricanes and Global Warming: Results from Downscaling IPCC AR4 Simulations,” *Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society* 89, no. 3 (March 1, 2008): 347–68, <https://doi.org/10.1175/BAMS-89-3-347>.

National Level

ANGUILLA

Anguilla’s status as an Overseas British Territory is a double-edged sword for addressing human mobility in the context of climate change. Anguilla is both traditionally a migrant-receiving country for migrants and displaced people from within the sub-region as well as a sending country for Anguillians seeking to reside temporarily or permanently abroad, mainly in the UK.

Specific recommendations for Anguilla are:

- Address barriers to in-migration;
- Elaborate solutions for people living in protracted displacement due to disasters;
- Prepare more to receive and absorb migrants and displaced people, especially for undocumented arrivals, including children;
- Scale up resilience-building efforts, especially the reinforcement of infrastructure and telecommunications infrastructure.

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

Antigua and Barbuda have no strategy to deal explicitly with the influence of climate impacts on human movement. The relevant authorities are aware of the need to integrate lessons from the 2017 hurricane season, in particular the mass evacuation of all Barbudans, into strategies to plan for and respond to disasters. Greater technical support and political will be required to also proactively treat the causes of disaster displacement, with due consideration to people with specific needs and vulnerabilities.

Moreover, strategies should be sensitive to the historical disparities in wealth and resilience between the two islands that leave some residents more exposed to climate change risks than others. Many of the same factors contributing to displacement also provide barriers to recovery, integration, and inclusion. For example, the reported discrepancy between education levels of Antiguan and Barbudans contributes to the challenge of integrating displaced children into new schools.



Any successful long-term strategy must address the factors underpinning the well-documented dispute over land rights in Barbuda.¹³⁰ Similar cases in areas governed by customary land tenure in SIDS around the world may provide good practices and lessons learned. Such dynamics are particularly important in consideration of planned relocation and resettlement plans. For example, Fiji and Papua New Guinea provide an interesting comparison of successful and failed policies (see also the Pacific chapter of this report).¹³¹

Priority areas for Antigua and Barbuda are:

- As with all countries in the region, continue efforts to reduce poverty and vulnerability, and to narrow the gaps of inequality;

130 For example of a documentation of this issues, see: Neil Collier, Ora DeKornfeld, and Ben Laffin, “No Man’s Land: Barbuda After Irma,” *Times Documentaries*, November 26, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/video/world/americas/100000005425833/barbuda-after-hurricane-irma.html>.

131 Dalila Gharbaoui and Julia Blocher, “Limits to Adapting to Climate Change Through Relocations in Papua-New Guinea and Fiji,” in *Limits to Climate Change Adaptation*, ed. Walter Leal Filho and Johanna Nalau, Climate Change Management (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018), 359–79, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64599-5_20.

- Facilitate hybrid¹³² and pluralistic¹³³ arrangements for legal land tenure;
- Enhance mechanisms for communities to secure their livelihoods, for example, by strengthening the legal basis for communal land ownership, enabling people return and rebuild, and/or developing mechanisms to request resettlement internally;
- Provide assistance to people living on marginal and exposed land, who are at greater risk of climate impacts;

132 Cosmin Corendea and Tanvi Mani, “Deriving a Legal Framework to address Climate Change Induced Migration in the Pacific,” in *Klima- und umweltbedingte Migration: Weltweit eine zunehmende Herausforderung*, ed. Stefan Burkhardt and Silke Franke, vol. 107, *Argumente und Materialien zum Zeitgeschehen*, 2017, 75–83, http://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:6458/AMZ-107_INTERNET.pdf; Cosmin Corendea, “Development Implications of Climate Change and Migration in the Pacific,” *Climate Law and Governance Working Paper Series* (Centre for International Sustainable Development Law (CISDL), 2016), <https://migration.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/development-implications-of-climate-change-and-migration-in-the-pacific.htm>.

133 Dalila Gharbaoui and Julia Blocher, “The Reason Land Matters: Relocation as Adaptation to Climate Change in Fiji Islands,” in *Migration, Risk Management and Climate Change: Evidence and Policy Responses*, ed. Andrea Milan et al., vol. 6, *Global Migration Issues* (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016), 149–73, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42922-9_8.

- Enable greater participation of civil society in strategic planning and policy implementation (see recommendations section “Foster Participatory, Community-Based Approaches”, above), with equitable participation of Antiguans and Barbudans. For example, targets (or more ambitiously, quotas) for inclusion of Barbudans – also in terms of gender parity – can be set for political representation.

COMMONWEALTH OF DOMINICA

As a small country with a relatively resource-dependent economy, Dominica is a source of migration as well as a destination for return migration. Dominicans are acutely aware of gaps in infrastructure, communications, public education, overall disaster preparedness and rapid response uncovered by the devastating experience of Hurricane Maria in 2017. While the limitations of forecasting played a significant role in the humanitarian impact of the hurricane,¹³⁴ an improvement in overall preparedness will be needed to avoid similar consequences in the future.

¹³⁴ In short, the hurricane was expected to lose force and move, but ultimately gained strength and hit the island head-on with 257,495 km/h winds, causing wide-spread damage that shocked citizens. See: Claire Phipps, “Hurricane Maria: Dominica ‘in Daze’ after Storm Leaves Island Cut off from World,” *The Guardian*, September 21, 2017, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/21/dominica-daze-hurricane-maria-island-caribbean-rescue>.

A key gap identified in the region that was decidedly important in Dominica’s recent experiences was the lack of government leadership in evacuating people and the resulting contributions to spontaneous, unassisted departures. With only commercial transport options available, people unable to pay were trapped and many ultimately suffered from long-term psychological challenges.

Main priority areas for Dominica are:

- Work with partner governments and the private sector to accelerate recovery, ensuring the integration of lessons learned from the 2017 experience and a transition to resilience building;
- Facilitate the return migration of residents, as well as the transfer of social and financial remittances of diaspora members;
- Acknowledge the advantages of free movement in assisting families to rebuild, and further develop the portability of social benefits;
- Prepare for the provision of psychosocial support in the medium- to long-term following disasters, with due attention to gendered effects of displacement, including trauma;



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- Enhance disaster preparedness, especially for mass evacuations;
- Provide psychosocial support, with due consideration to gender, age, and household attributes.

SAINT LUCIA

As a regional hub and thriving economy, Saint Lucia traditionally receives migrants and displaced persons. The government, together with the OECS Commission, has already hosted or endorsed a number of activities intended to strengthen the country’s and its regional partners’ response to human mobility. Activities include capacity building workshops¹³⁵ and trainings, in particular since 2017. While no national framework exists explicitly targeting the impact of climate change on mobility patterns, Saint Lucia is poised to lead the region in developing such a framework.

Saint Lucia has the advantage of a relative abundance of technically skilled residents who can contribute to the development of new policies or adaptation of existing poli-

cies to address human mobility in the context of climate change. This is in part due to the in-migration of people working in areas such as emergency management, DRR, and climate change mitigation. This so-called “brain gain” can be leveraged through the OECS, with positive spill-over effects for national response.

Nevertheless, key recommendations for Saint Lucia include:

- Integrate the HMCCC in government plans and proposals;
- Strengthen data collection on migration trends, especially longitudinal studies on displaced people and migrants living in Saint Lucia;
- Transfer or replicate regional-level training and capacity building at the national level, particularly in the areas of human rights and migration data for all key stakeholders – immigration officials, social protection specialists, disaster response management professionals, local government officials and civil society programme managers – working with partner governments and intergovernmental organisations in the region.

¹³⁵ For past trainings on related topics, see <https://bit.ly/2Z1xfH6>; for a February 2019 training on environment-mobility linkages specifically, see <https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/migration-environment-and-climate-change-regional-capacity-building-workshop-eastern-caribbean>.

5 The Pacific

Human Mobility Policies in the Context of Climate Change in Fiji, Kiribati, Tuvalu and Vanuatu

5.1. Planned Relocation and the Demand to Stay – Pacific Island Nations at Crossroads

In 2017, the 23rd session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) took place under the presidency of Fiji. It was the first time that a Small Island Developing State (SIDS) chaired this important decision-making body. While COP23 was held in Bonn, Germany, for logistical reasons, Fiji’s COP presidency provided Pacific Islands Countries (PICs) a prominent forum to express their concerns about the risks they face in a warming and transforming world. In his closing speech, COP President Frank Bainimarama, Fiji’s prime minister, described why Fiji decided to put emphasis on people and their stories: “We wanted to make a connection between these complex negotiations and the real, everyday concerns and aspirations of people the world over”.¹³⁶

In the Pacific island states of interest in this study – namely Fiji, Kiribati, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu – the adverse effects of climate change are “real, everyday concerns”. People already have to adapt to climate change. Given the often high exposure of PICs to climate hazards, climate change has the potential to significantly alter human mobility patterns in the region. Notwithstanding some national differences in the approach to human mobility in the context of climate change (HMCCC), officials from several PICs have openly discussed the potential of climate change impacts – like sea-level rise, saltwater intrusion, and changes in extreme weather events – to drive out-migration. Nevertheless, climate-induced human mobility has not been a top priority among policymakers in the Pacific.

Other pressures, such as the so-called “urban pull” or poverty, dominate the discourse on migration in the region as interviews conducted for this study indicate. However, it is not possible to make a clear distinction between non-climatic and climatic factors as they interact. The following interview excerpt by a university lecturer illustrates how non-climatic and climatic factors are framed in the current discourse on HMCCC:

— “[Climate change is] considered as one of the drivers of human mobility, but not necessarily one of the main drivers, since there are already many other existing issues that are usually worsened by the impacts of climate change. It’s these issues that tend to be a priority to policymakers rather than climate change where human mobility is concerned. For instance, if infrastructure is damaged, that becomes an economic issue, or if there’s increased salt water inundation, then it becomes an agricultural issue. So issues such as food security or water issues are the frontline drivers, rather than climate change [per se]. However, in the years to come, gradual impacts such as sea level rises will become the frontline drivers of human mobility” (Pac15).

Despite the dominance of socio-economic pressures in the migration discourse, some governments have started to actively address climate-induced migration. In 2018, Fiji launched Planned Relocation Guidelines, with support from the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and expertise from many international experts.¹³⁷ The guidelines have been acknowledged as an advancement in the policymaking on HMCCC. In 2018, Vanuatu also broke new ground by launching its National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced

¹³⁶ Frank Bainimarama, “We Must Put People First’ – President’s Closing Speech at COP23,” Cop23, November 18, 2017, <https://cop23.com.fj/must-put-people-first-presidents-closing-speech-cop23>.

¹³⁷ Ministry of Economy, Republic of Fiji, “Planned Relocation Guidelines: A Framework to Undertake Climate Change Related Relocation” (Suva, Fiji: Government of the Republic of Fiji, 2018), <https://cop23.com.fj/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/CC-PRG-BOOKLET-22-1.pdf>.

Displacement.¹³⁸ Tuvalu and Kiribati have been the target of several research studies and policymaker capacity building programmes.¹³⁹ However, specific legislation has not yet been launched in these two countries.

This chapter will show the different reasons why policymakers in Fiji, Kiribati, Vanuatu and Tuvalu have different ways to approach climate change as a potential driver of human mobility. Either way, since disasters tend to exacerbate pre-existing vulnerabilities,¹⁴⁰ governments in the Pacific need to address legal, institutional and operational gaps in disaster response in order to minimise the burden of disaster-induced displacement for particularly vulnerable sections of affected communities, such as people living with disabilities and chronic illness, women, children (especially when unaccompanied), the elderly, or members of minorities.

Background: Migration in the Pacific

Across communities of the Pacific Ocean, human mobility has played an important role over thousands of years in the formation of societies.¹⁴¹ People have left densely populated places, fled conflicts, or found new livelihoods.¹⁴² In the twentieth century, Australia and New Zealand became major areas of destination for Pacific islanders looking for better education or employment opportunities.¹⁴³ Another important area of destination are the United States of America. In the 2017 American Community Survey about 1,460,000 people identified as “Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander alone or in combination”, whereas about 50,000 identified as Fijian.¹⁴⁴

138 International Organization for Migration, “Vanuatu Launches National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement,” International Organization for Migration, September 28, 2018, <https://www.iom.int/news/vanuatu-launches-national-policy-climate-change-and-disaster-induced-displacement>.

139 Notably, the outcomes of the Pacific Climate Change and Migration (PCCM) project: <https://www.unescap.org/subregional-office/pacific/pacific-climate-change-and-migration-project>.

140 The Nansen Initiative, “Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change.”

141 Corendea, “Development Implications of Climate Change and Migration in the Pacific.”

142 Corendea.

143 Corendea.

144 U.S. Census Bureau, “2017 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates: Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander Alone or in Combination by Selected Groups,” 2017, <https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk>.

While migration has been part of their life throughout centuries, Pacific islanders traditionally have strong ties to their land.¹⁴⁵ Scholars and practitioners alike recommend that this sense of place, intrinsically linked to identity and culture, be explicitly taken into account into the now prevalent discussions on relocating people away from deteriorating environmental conditions.¹⁴⁶ A regional expert on climate change adaptation addressed this point in an interview:

— “There is a need to have the voices [heard] of those people who are threatened by climate change and [who] need to move when developing policies, but it may be difficult to capture their input because they are unwilling to be relocated. They are attached to their land as it is a big part of their identity and gives them a sense of belonging” (Pac15).

The quote indicates why the idea of planned relocations has been politically fraught: many people do not want to leave for any reason. A regional key informant summarised the different positions governments in the Pacific take on migration as adaptation: “Some countries have spoken of migration with dignity, while others are refusing even to discuss the matter, as it could lead to a cost-benefit analysis about saving the islands versus continued emissions” (Pac16).

Governments across the Pacific are facing active civil society movements. The youth-led grassroots network Pacific Climate Warriors, for instance, demands more ambitious climate protection from the international community to protect their islands and cultures. This was demonstrated by their blockade of the large coal port in Newcastle, Australia, in 2014.¹⁴⁷ Pacific Climate Warriors have a clear message: “We are not drowning. We are fighting”.¹⁴⁸ That the government of Fiji signed the Declaration on Children, Youth and Climate Action at

145 Corendea, “Development Implications of Climate Change and Migration in the Pacific.”

146 Karen E. McNamara and Helene Jacot Des Combes, “Planning for Community Relocations Due to Climate Change in Fiji,” *International Journal of Disaster Risk Science* 6, no. 3 (September 1, 2015): 315–19, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s13753-015-0065-2>.

147 Karen E. McNamara and Carol Farbotko, “Resisting a ‘Doomed’ Fate: An Analysis of the Pacific Climate Warriors,” *Australian Geographer* 48, no. 1 (January 2, 2017): 17–26, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00049182.2016.1266631>.

148 McNamara and Farbotko.



Vanuatu (© Kira Vinke)

COP25 in Madrid in December 2019¹⁴⁹ signals the government’s intention to integrate the voices of these and other young climate activists into policies. The declaration was initiated by UNICEF and at its launch UNICEF Global Chief of Communication Paloma Escudero emphasises that long-term investments are needed in order to increase the resilience of communities and, if successful, “children are not uprooted from home and school” when facing extreme weather events.¹⁵⁰

The 2016 Regional Civil Society Organization Forum is another example of civil society engagement in climate action in the Pacific. The forum led to a position paper on climate change and disaster risk reduction in which representatives from diverse civil society organisations urged leaders of PICs “to commence dialogue on migration and planned relocation”.¹⁵¹ While addressing migration as one possible adaptation strategy, the forum explicitly asked Pacific leaders to “develop[...] a Pacific Framework

for Climate Mobility that will enable our people to migrate with justice and dignity”.¹⁵²

In the interviews, respondents emphasised the need to protect cultural identity and heritage when discussing planned relocation and how important it is to involve the affected communities at every step in the relocation process. Loss of cultural identity due to planned relocation is a topic of considerable relevance and the ability to engage in one’s own cultural practices is protected for example under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Evidence from several PICs emphasises the importance of traditional knowledge and customary practices in responding to climate change and making communities more resilient, including customary resource management or the role of leaders and social networks.¹⁵³ Particular attention should be paid to vulnerable and marginalised sections of societies because existing economic and social inequalities are likely to worsen without inclusive and participatory processes to manage mobility.¹⁵⁴

149 Voices of Youth by UNICEF, “Declaration on Children, Youth and Climate Action,” Voices of Youth, 2019, <https://www.voicesofyouth.org/campaign/cop25-join-declaration-children-youth-and-climate-action>.

150 UNICEF, “COP25: UNICEF Global Chief of Communication Paloma Escudero Remarks at High-Level UNICEF-OHCHR Event,” 2019, <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/cop25-unicef-global-chief-communication-paloma-escudero-remarks-high-level-unicef>.

151 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, “2016 Pacific Civil Society Organisations Position Paper on Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management,” 2016, <http://www.forumsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/2016-Pacific-Civil-Society-Organisations-Position-Paper-on-Climate-Change--DRM.pdf>.

152 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat.

153 Ainka A. Granderson, “The Role of Traditional Knowledge in Building Adaptive Capacity for Climate Change: Perspectives from Vanuatu,” *Weather, Climate, and Society* 9, no. 3 (May 18, 2017): 545–61, <https://doi.org/10.1175/WCAS-D-16-0094.1>; Heather McMillen et al., “Small Islands, Valuable Insights: Systems of Customary Resource Use and Resilience to Climate Change in the Pacific,” *Ecology and Society* 19, no. 4 (December 8, 2014), <https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-06937-190444>.

154 Gharbaoui and Blocher, “The Reason Land Matters.”

Experience shows that planned relocation can be a complicated, lengthy and costly process. In this regard, the different capacities of Fiji, Kiribati, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu to address and manage HMCCC are of importance. This may include diverse features such as: financial or technical capacities, past experiences with planned relocation, international networks, or the possibility to relocate within national boundaries or not. This aspect is summarised by an academic:

— *“Fiji, however, may be well ahead in terms of administering relocation of those vulnerable communities, as can be seen in the examples of Vunidogoloa, Tukuraki, and, Narikoso. Also, Fiji has the resources and funding to successfully move communities, as well as to ensure that these communities are relocated within the same land boundary. Hence, avoiding land issues and conflicts. This may be problematic in places such as Kiribati and Tuvalu, because land is scarce, so any relocation that may need to take place will have to occur elsewhere; outside of the land boundary of the community moving or across international borders” (Pac15).*

The different capacities of the focus countries to address matters relating to HMCCC were constantly raised by informants in the interviews. This study presents and discusses these insights about strengths and weaknesses of the current framework to address HMCCC in Fiji, Kiribati, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu in order to understand policy trajectories in the countries. Given current projections of climate change in the Pacific (see next section), key informants

expressed the need to maintain and reinforce efforts to address HMCCC. Disaster risk reduction (DRR) policies may serve as an entry point for this when climate change projections are integrated in planning (Pac15) and when adequate resources are available (Pac16).

Information Base of the Pacific Chapter

This chapter builds on literature from several academic areas as well as on semi-structured interviews with key experts from different fields of work. The sample of interviewees attempts to reflect the interdisciplinary nature of human mobility in the context of climate change (HMCCC). The authors employed snowball and “critical case” sampling techniques common in sociological research. The presentation of findings below intends to improve the database on applied knowledge on managing HMCCC in order to contribute to sustainable solutions of migration management. The expert interviews targeted the institutional actor-landscape relating to HMCCC in the region whereas stakeholders’ opinion on strengths and weaknesses of existing policy frameworks was a major area of interest. In total, 34 interviews were conducted with key experts from regional and international intergovernmental organisations, national ministries or agencies, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (Regional level: 5, Fiji: 10, Kiribati: 4, Tuvalu: 5, Vanuatu: 10). 19 of the interviewees were men (56%), 15 women (44%).

OVERVIEW OF INTERVIEW PARTNERS IN THE PACIFIC

Type	Nation(s)	Interviewee No.	Sum
Ministry or Other Central National Body	Fiji	Pac02, Pac05, Pac08, Pac09, Pac10	5
	Kiribati	Pac11, Pac14	2
	Tuvalu	Pac21, Pac22, Pac23	3
	Vanuatu	Pac27, Pac31, Pac32, Pac34	4
Provincial or Municipal Body	Kiribati	Pac12	1
Private Sector	Fiji & Vanuatu	Pac06, Pac26, Pac28	3
Intergovernmental Organisation	-	Pac01, Pac16, Pac17, Pac18, Pac19	5
Non-governmental Organisation	-	Pac07, Pac13, Pac20, Pac24, Pac25, Pac29, Pac33	7
Academia	Fiji & Vanuatu	Pac03, Pac04, Pac15, Pac30	4
Total			34

5.2. Climate Change-Related Drivers of Human Mobility in the Pacific

The small island states spread across the tropical Pacific are among the countries most vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. This has several implications for human mobility. More intense and frequent extreme weather events can, for instance, increase the number of displacements in the short term while also enhancing the likelihood of migration in the long term. Risks associated with sea level rise, such as loss of land from erosion or the salinisation of soil and fresh water resources, may lead to an increasing number of communities in need of planned relocation. In Fiji, some communities have already requested assistance for relocation to move out of harm’s way. In the case of low-lying coral atolls, interactions between rising sea levels and wave-driven flooding may not only lead to severe and frequent damage to the atolls’ infrastructure but also impact freshwater lenses, rendering some islands uninhabitable within a few decades.¹⁵⁵ With limited available and fertile land for relocation within their national boundaries, cross-border migration within the region or to far-off destinations may become the most feasible options for some Pacific island populations.¹⁵⁶ A recent ruling by the UN Human Rights Committee sheds light on the climate-migration nexus in island and archipelagic nations and the issue of “unhabitability”.¹⁵⁷

In 2015, Ioane Teitiota, a national from Kiribati, sought asylum in New Zealand claiming that rising sea levels and other effects of climate change pose a threat to his life because they make his home country Kiribati uninhabitable. Mr. Teitiota’s wife also gave testimony about the family’s difficult situation in Kiribati, discussing saltwater intrusion and related health concerns.¹⁵⁸ The case was rejected and the family was deported to Kiribati. Following

this, Mr. Teitiota brought the case to the UN Human Rights Committee, arguing that New Zealand had violated his right to life. While the Committee concluded that the deportation of Ioane Teitiota to Kiribati did not constitute a violation of his rights, it did acknowledge the serious situation in Kiribati¹⁵⁹ and, moreover, opened the door for climate-related asylum claims.¹⁶⁰

In what has been called a “historic”¹⁶¹ or a “landmark”¹⁶² ruling, the Committee precisely concluded that “without robust national and international efforts, the effects of climate change in receiving states may expose individuals to a violation of their rights under articles 6 or 7 of the Covenant, thereby triggering the *non-refoulement* obligations of sending states”.¹⁶³ Concerning the situation of countries at risk of being entirely lost as a result of sea level rise, the Committee stated that “the conditions of life in such a country may become incompatible with the right to life with dignity before the risk is realized”.¹⁶⁴

The potential impact of climate change on patterns of human mobility in the Pacific has led to a growing body of research on the matter in the past years, ranging from qualitative case studies to big projects by intergovernmental organisations. A multi-country study from the United Nations research branch, for example, highlighted the potential for climate-affected people either to become “trapped” in worsening conditions or to migrate from outer islands to the capital.¹⁶⁵ Respondents in the present study mentioned the devastating effects of tropical cyclones throughout the interviews. As stated by one

155 Curt D. Storlazzi et al., “Most Atolls Will Be Uninhabitable by the Mid-21st Century Because of Sea-Level Rise Exacerbating Wave-Driven Flooding,” *Science Advances* 4, no. 4 (April 1, 2018): eaap974, <https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.aap9741>.

156 Asian Development Bank, “A Region at Risk: The Human Dimensions of Climate Change in Asia and the Pacific” (Mandaluyong City, Philippines: Asian Development Bank, 2017), 90, <http://dx.doi.org/10.22617/TCS178839-2>.

157 UN Human Rights Committee, “Views Adopted by the Committee under Article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, Concerning Communication No. 2728/2016,” 2020, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2f127%2fd%2f2728%2f2016&Lang=en.

158 UN Human Rights Committee.

159 UN Human Rights Committee.

160 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Historic UN Human Rights Case Opens Door to Climate Change Asylum Claims,” January 21, 2020, <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25482&LangID=E>.

161 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

162 Kate Lyons, “Climate Refugees Can’t Be Returned Home, Says Landmark UN Human Rights Ruling,” *The Guardian*, January 20, 2020, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/20/climate-refugees-cant-be-returned-home-says-landmark-un-human-rights-ruling>.

163 UN Human Rights Committee, “Views Adopted by the Committee under Article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, Concerning Communication No. 2728/2016.”

164 UN Human Rights Committee.

165 Andrea Milan, Robert Oakes, and Jillian Campbell, “Tuvalu: Climate Change and Migration: Relationships Between Household Vulnerability, Human Mobility and Climate Change,” November 1, 2016, <http://collections.unu.edu/view/UNU:5856>; R. Oakes, A. Milan, and J. Campbell, “Kiribati: Climate Change and Migration – Relationships between Household Vulnerability, Human Mobility and Climate Change” (Bonn: United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS), 2016), https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Online_No_20_Kiribati_Report_161207.pdf.



Narikoso – Fiji (© GIZ)

regional official: “[Some climate shocks] are beyond the coping capacity of the communities.” (Pac18).

When discussing the impacts of sea level rise on a specific country or region, it is important to know that rates of sea level rise are not uniform across the globe.¹⁶⁶ In the Western Tropical Pacific, satellite altimetry helped to detect rates of sea level rise between three and four times faster than the global average (between 1993 and 2009).¹⁶⁷ Above-average rates of sea level rise combine with the impacts of El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO), bringing unusually high king tides and exacerbating their erosive effects. For example, the experience of high spring tide floods at Funafuti Atoll, Tuvalu, is well documented by inhabitants.¹⁶⁸ The central area of Fongafale is already below spring tide level,

indicating that the annual damages must be remediated quickly and sustainably. Saline flooding, which threatens the subsistence agriculture economy, is likely to become more frequent and severe.¹⁶⁹ Starting in 2002, communities residing in low-lying areas on the Torres Islands in Vanuatu have been displaced due to rising sea levels in combination with tectonic subsidence.¹⁷⁰

In the interviews conducted for this study, key experts spoke about current climate change impacts that are felt in their countries and/or region, as well as how these impacts undermine people’s livelihoods.¹⁷¹ One interviewee from a regional intergovernmental organisation said that climate change “undermines all livelihoods in some ways”,

166 B. Meyssignac et al., “An Assessment of Two-Dimensional Past Sea Level Reconstructions Over 1950–2009 Based on Tide-Gauge Data and Different Input Sea Level Grids,” *Surveys in Geophysics* 33, no. 5 (September 1, 2012): 945–72, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10712-011-9171-x>.

167 Meyssignac et al.

168 M. Becker et al., “Sea Level Variations at Tropical Pacific Islands since 1950,” *Global and Planetary Change* 80–81 (January 1, 2012): 85–98, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloplacha.2011.09.004>.

169 Hiroya Yamano et al., “Atoll Island Vulnerability to Flooding and Inundation Revealed by Historical Reconstruction: Fongafale Islet, Funafuti Atoll, Tuvalu,” *Global and Planetary Change* 57, no. 3–4 (June 1, 2007): 407–16, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloplacha.2007.02.007>.

170 Valérie Ballu et al., “Comparing the Role of Absolute Sea-Level Rise and Vertical Tectonic Motions in Coastal Flooding, Torres Islands (Vanuatu),” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 108, no. 32 (August 9, 2011): 13019–22, <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1102842108>.

171 This section mainly refers to answers given by regional experts. For country-specific insights, see chapter 5.4.

giving the example of fishermen who are faced with different weather conditions or need to follow their fish to “new” zones further out at sea (Pac16). Another interviewee remarked on how rising sea levels impact agricultural yields when land is inundated (Pac17). Many other respondents referred to impacts on people already living under difficult conditions and primarily relying on natural resources, which leads to concerns about food security (Pac03, Pac19). One expert summarised these climate change impacts:

— *“Those communities that rely heavily on fisheries and/or agriculture feel the impacts of climate change more strongly, such as change in rainfall and temperature patterns, shifts in agricultural seasons, reduced harvest or agricultural yields. Moving fish stock makes it harder to catch fish, and these communities find it harder to adapt, and this has an impact on the household level of income” (Pac18).*

The cumulative, erosive effects of both slow- and sudden-onset hazards and structural vulnerabilities leave some households in the focus countries with very limited capacities to respond or adapt. Informants from regional organisations emphasised the specific vulnerability of coastal communities and people residing on low-lying islands and atolls to climate change throughout the interviews. How this related to human mobility, however, has not yet been fully understood. Regarding this, an informant from an international NGO summarised that *“scenarios of how climate change affects people’s livelihoods, linking the science and the impacts on the communities and how this leads to migration trends would be useful” (Pac18).*

Physical and Mental Health Impacts

HMCCC has many health-related implications. Worsening environmental conditions, including impacts of climate change on water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) or food security, may drive migration. On the other hand, climate-induced human mobility can impact individuals’ physical, social and mental well-being. Informants raised concerns about risk factors or health outcomes potentially related to climate change (for example, impacts on food security or fatalities related to extreme weather events). Many, however, said that more research is required on the health effects of climate change, be it impacts due to slow onset events such as heat or drought or health-related impacts of rapid onset events (for example Pac15). Emerging health

issues due to slow onset events are, for example, changing patterns of waterborne diseases such as dengue fever. Typhoid and cholera also give rise to concern. Generally, climate change acts as a risk multiplier of known health issues. Climate-related impacts to WASH may limit people’s ability to recover from health problems. A government representative from Fiji talked about a pilot project undertaken by the Ministry of Health in 2012 to 2014 which looked at the effects of temperature rise on airborne and waterborne diseases in order to improve climate change adaptation (Pac01).¹⁷²

Concerning mental health effects, one academic addressed the need to investigate the long-term effects of traumatic experiences post-disaster: *“Some assessments are done immediately after a disaster by psychologists, but there needs to be some evaluation of long-term trauma, or how people are coping psychologically a year after a natural disaster has occurred” (Pac15).* The academic gave the example of alcohol abuse by men in Kiribati post-disaster *“as a means of escape” (Pac15).* When asked about mental health effects, another respondent said:

— *“This is not something that comes out very explicitly when talking to affected communities, but through conversations, one does get the sense that these communities are experiencing social stress. Particularly from having to adapt to reduced household incomes because their fisheries or agricultural forms of livelihoods are being affected by impacts of climate change” (Pac18).*

One informant, who has talked to villagers from Vunidogoloa, Fiji’s first community to be relocated because of climate change, emphasised that trauma counsellors are much-needed (Pac08; more on the case can be found in the country-specific insights). The respondent gave insights into the stress villagers experienced prior to relocation *“because they were always frightened of any silent king tide that might come through to the village” (Pac08).* While villagers reported better sleep after the relocation (Pac08), new stressors emerged, since the community that had previously lived close to the sea had to adjust to a completely different environment (Pac01).

172 The project focused on “the increase in water and air borne diseases due to the temperature in place” (Pac01).

Generally, evidence from the interviews indicates that there are negative consequences on the mental well-being of affected communities in the Pacific. One respondent indicated why further research on the health impact of displacement is needed: “*Natural disasters like cyclones are expected to worsen in strength, so we can expect to see more of these types of trauma*” (Pac16). One expert talked about mental health effects in the aftermath of Tropical Cyclone Winston:

— “*I have come across communities where the young children have been affected psychologically and this, I can actually name the particular village I went to in the province of Ra, village is Nabukadra where the village headman explained that, 3-4 months after Winston, whenever they feel there is a heavy rain or strong wind, children would just run and go under their bed, cry and some would be so scared, young people are vulnerable psychologically and mentally to the impacts of climate change*” (Pac05).

RESPONDING TO CLIMATE CHANGE

The climate change-related drivers of migration outlined in this section, including health impacts, indicate the magnitude of the challenges that policymakers need to address in the Pacific, even if global warming would be kept well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels as agreed upon in the Paris Agreement. PICs, however, vary significantly in their ability to respond to the adverse effects of climate change in an effective and integrated manner.¹⁷³ This also applies to the governance of climate change-induced migration even though different approaches to HMCCC also play a role here as the next chapter will show.

173 J. Roy et al., “Sustainable Development, Poverty Eradication and Reducing Inequalities,” in *Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5°C above Pre-Industrial Levels and Related Global Greenhouse Gas Emission Pathways, in the Context of Strengthening the Global Response to the Threat of Climate Change, Sustainable Development, and Efforts to Eradicate Poverty*, ed. V. Masson-Delmotte et al. (In Press, 2018), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/05/SR15_Chapter5_Low_Res.pdf; C. Cvitanovic et al., “Linking Adaptation Science to Action to Build Food Secure Pacific Island Communities,” *Climate Risk Management* 11 (January 1, 2016): 53–62, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crm.2016.01.003>.

5.3. Regional Policies and Actors Addressing Climate Migration

Regional declarations such as the Framework for Pacific Regionalism, approved by Pacific Islands Forum Leaders in July 2014, show the commitment of Pacific leaders to collectively address strategic issues and common challenges such as climate change.¹⁷⁴ Regional cooperation is a crucial component to finding effective and sustainable mechanisms for all forms of climate-induced human mobility in the Pacific. In the aftermath of extreme events, regional actors already play an active role in managing or responding to displacement, as discussed by respondents. Regional actors are also important in discussing HMCCC at the global level. One expert, for instance, talked about a cooperation between the Pacific Islands Forum and the Small Island Developing States group to bring their case to the UN Security Council:

— “[T]hey have started to put a case up to the UN Security Council to make the case that climate change is indeed a threat and it will cause the nation states to lose national jurisdiction or boundaries and it will cause wide scale migration for reasons on the inundation of islands and also the drying of the major water basins and rivers in the world because of the glacier melt” (Pac08).

Regional Actor Landscape

For this study, interviews with experts from the Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF), the Pacific Island Forum Secretariat (PIFS), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) were conducted. Apart from these organisations, experts have mentioned, among others, the Pacific Immigration Development Community and the Pacific Community (SPC) as important stakeholders for HMCCC. PIDF, PIFS, SPC, and SPREP are members of the Council of Regional Organisations in the Pacific (CROP), a network of intergovernmental regional organisations from the Pacific which intends to improve cooperation and coordination “to work

174 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, “The Framework for Pacific Regionalism” (Suva, Fiji: Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2014), <https://www.forumsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Framework-for-Pacific-Regionalism.pdf>.

toward achieving the common goal of sustainable development in the Pacific region”.¹⁷⁵

The Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) is an intergovernmental body and currently has 21 members which are Pacific island states or territories, among them Fiji, Kiribati, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.¹⁷⁶ One of the Secretariat’s tasks is to provide trainings on global policy negotiations and to give technical advice during meetings, for example, at COPs, according to an interviewee familiar with SPREP (Pac16). Furthermore, “SPREP’s work engages communities with climate services to help them predict and plan better” (Pac16). The intergovernmental body also engages in “practical adaptation solutions for some livelihood impacts” (Pac16). One example for such activities is the Pacific Adaptation to Climate Change (PACC) Programme.¹⁷⁷ HMCCC is on the organisation’s agenda: “Through the Nansen Initiative and now the Platform for Disaster Displacement, SPREP has been engaged on this issue for some time” (Pac16).¹⁷⁸

The Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF), the next regional actor to be introduced, is an important stakeholder for issues related to HMCCC. In the 2015 Suva Declaration on Climate Change, PIDF nations highlight that climate change already leads to displacement and declare “the loss of land and territorial integrity [...] results in breaches of social and economic rights”.¹⁷⁹ Ensuring policies that safeguard human rights is an important part of the discussion on HMCCC for PIDF (Pac17). In 2017, PIDF co-hosted an event on climate-induced human mobility.¹⁸⁰ The event led to the launch of a declaration on climate-induced displacement which aimed to influence the Global

Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.¹⁸¹ In addition, PIDF signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) under which a “human rights checklist for use by relocation projects and initiatives” is to be developed and promoted (Pac17). Other activities planned in the project include education on human rights, including environmental rights (Pac17).

The third regional actor, the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS), supports its Member States in global policy discussions and provides them with technical expertise for negotiations, alongside SPREP (Pac19). Founded in 1971, it comprises 18 members, among them the focus countries.¹⁸² According to a regional security expert, PIFS is advocating for climate change to become a topic in the security discourse (Pac19). The interviewee pins his hopes on the Boe Declaration to provide guidance in terms of key climate-related security risks for the Pacific (Pac19). The Boe Declaration on Regional Security was adopted in 2018.¹⁸³ Representatives from Fiji, Kiribati, Tuvalu and Vanuatu were present at the forum which had the meeting theme “Building a Strong Pacific: Our People, Our Islands, Our Will”.¹⁸⁴ In the Boe Declaration, forum leaders “reaffirm that climate change remains the single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security and wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific” and declare their commitment to the Paris Agreement.¹⁸⁵ While the Boe Declaration does not specifically address human mobility,¹⁸⁶ it is important for regional cooperation on climate change in general.

175 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, “Council of Regional Organisations of the Pacific – Forum Sec,” accessed November 27, 2019, <https://www.forumsec.org/council-of-regional-organisations-of-the-pacific>.

176 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, “The Framework for Pacific Regionalism.”

177 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP), “Pacific Adaptation to Climate Change (PACC) | National Adaptation Global Support Programme,” accessed October 22, 2019, <https://www.globalsupportprogramme.org/projects/bf-pacc>.

178 For example this report on joint efforts with the Nansen Initiative: <https://www.sprep.org/news/protection-people>.

179 Pacific Islands Development Forum, “Suva Declaration on Climate Change” (Suva, Fiji: Pacific Islands Development Forum Secretariat, 2015), http://www.piango.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/PACIFIC-ISLAND-DEVELOPMENT-FORUM-SUVA-DECLARATION-ON-CLIMATE-CHANGE_v2.pdf.

180 Pacific Islands Development Forum, “Side Event: Climate-Induced Displacement,” accessed August 7, 2019, <http://pacificidf.org/climate-induced-displacement>.

181 Pacific Islands Development Forum, “Climate-Induced Human Mobility,” accessed August 7, 2019, <http://pacificidf.org/climate-induced-human-mobility>.

182 PIFS comprises the following 18 Member States: Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.

183 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, “Forty-Ninth Pacific Islands Forum Nauru, 3rd – 6th September 2018,” accessed August 9, 2019, <https://www.forumsec.org/forty-ninth-pacific-islands-forum-nauru-3rd-6th-september-2018>.

184 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat.

185 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, “Boe Declaration on Regional Security,” 2018, <https://www.forumsec.org/boe-declaration-on-regional-security>.

186 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat.



Vanuatu (© Kira Vinke)

Relevant Regional Policies for HMCCC

A number of informants approached for this study expressed doubt in the state of governance of HMCCC in the Pacific. For example, a climate change advisor stated that “[v]ery few officials are familiar with the issues, across the region” (Pac16). At the same time, several interviewees from regional institutions referred to good cooperation practices in the region when managing disaster displacement. Several regional frameworks address disaster risk management. Key experts named, for example, the Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative (PCRAFI) (Pac16) and the Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific (FRDP) which “addresses the impact of climate change as well as disaster risk in the Pacific” (Pac01).

The FRDP is authored by different organisations from the international and regional level¹⁸⁷ and therefore combines scientific knowledge and regional practitioners’ insights.¹⁸⁸ Specifically, the framework aims to “provide [...] high level strategic guidance to different stakeholder groups on how

to enhance resilience to climate change and disasters, in ways that contribute to and are embedded in sustainable development”.¹⁸⁹ Priority actions for national as well as subnational governments and administrations in the FRDP call upon them to integrate human mobility issues in their disaster risk management planning, to protect and target those most vulnerable to climate-induced displacement and migration in policies, but also to strengthen institutional capacities.¹⁹⁰ Regional labour migration policies and schemes are listed as priority actions for governments and regional organisations as targeted adaptation measures to protect those most vulnerable to climate change and displacement.¹⁹¹

The Pacific Resilience Partnership (PRP) Taskforce will guide and support the implementation of the FRDP.¹⁹² At the inaugural Pacific Resilience Meeting, which brought together more than 300 stakeholders in Suva, Fiji, in May 2019,¹⁹³ participants reaffirmed the framework’s importance for the region “to guide actions aimed at strengthening Pacific resilience at the regional, national and local levels”.¹⁹⁴ When the FRDP document was launched in 2016, regional and international organisations welcomed the “the world’s first integrated regional framework to build resilience to climate change and disasters”.¹⁹⁵ The integrated approach to address and manage climate change disaster risks with regionally coordinated and coherent responses may help to build more efficient strategies to address the cross-cutting issue of HMCCC.

187 The these organizations are the Pacific Community (SPC), the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP), the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) and the University of the South Pacific (USP).

188 Pacific Community (SPC), Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP), Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) and University of the South Pacific (USP), “Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific: An Integrated Approach to Address Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management (FRDP). 2017 – 2030” (Suva, Fiji: Pacific Community, Geoscience Division, 2016).

189 Pacific Community (SPC), Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP), Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) and University of the South Pacific (USP).

190 Pacific Community (SPC), Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP), Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) and University of the South Pacific (USP).

191 Pacific Community (SPC), Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP), Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) and University of the South Pacific (USP).

192 Pacific Resilience Partnership (PRP), “PRP Taskforce,” accessed August 12, 2019, <http://www.resilientpacific.org/taskforce>.

193 Global Island Partnership, “Inaugural Pacific Resilience Meeting Held from 1 to 3 May 2019 in SUVA, Fiji...” 2019, <http://www.glipa.org/news/community-highlights/408-inaugural-pacific-resilience-meeting-held-from-1-to-3-may-2019-in-suva-fiji>.

194 Pacific Resilience Partnership (PRP), “Pacific Resilience Meeting – Outcomes Statement,” The Pacific Community (SPC), 2019, <https://www.spc.int/updates/news/2019/05/pacific-resilience-meeting-outcomes-statement>.


195 UNDP Pacific Office, “New Framework to Build Resilience to Climate Change and Disasters in the Pacific Islands,” 2016, <http://www.pacific.undp.org/content/pacific/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2016/09/16/new-framework-to-build-resilience-to-climate-change-and-disasters-in-the-pacific-islands.html>.

5.4. Country-Specific Insights

Fiji, Kiribati, Vanuatu and Tuvalu differ in their capacities and in their approaches to address HMCCC as discussed in the introduction. This chapter presents country-specific insights from the interviews. It discusses the actor landscape of each island state, including a short summary of stakeholder’s opinions on communication and cooperation on HMCCC, and summarises key policies and/or instruments related to HMCCC.

Fiji

The Republic of Fiji is by far the most populous state among the PICs chosen for this study. The country consists of 332 islands of mostly volcanic origin covering a land area of 18,274 km².¹⁹⁶ At 1,324 m, Mount Tomanivi on Fiji’s largest island Viti Levu is Fiji’s highest point. Approximately 70 % of the Republic’s total population of around 880,000 people live on Viti Levu¹⁹⁷ and roughly half of all Fijians live in urban settings.¹⁹⁸



Fiji functions as a regional hub in the Pacific. It is both a country of origin, with many Fijians migrating internationally, and a country of destination or transit within the region. Concerning cross-border migration, figures from 2017 estimate a net migration of about -31,000 (2012: -52,000; 2007: -23,700). Among the top areas of destination are Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America. In 2016, the Fijian Diaspora in Australia stood at 98,000 with about 62 % of them being first generation Fijian migrants.¹⁹⁹

Interviewees contacted for this study mentioned major impacts of climate change like rising temperatures, coastal erosion, and land degradation through flooding and tropical cyclones as possible triggers for Fijians to move within the country or abroad. One interviewee discussed how some family members had eventually decided to leave their home in Nadi on Viti Levu and move to higher grounds because they had experienced more severe flooding recently (Pac02). The expert then elaborated on climate-related factors prompting people to migrate in Fiji:

— “In essence, hydro-meteorological disasters – especially flooding – are the major reason why people migrate in Fiji. Most Fijian villages are located along the coast and continuous inundation may force people to relocate to higher grounds. I don’t know to what extent it is really happening, but livelihoods of most of these communities are dependent on agriculture [and] farms are affected by saltwater intrusion. These are simple examples of [why] people in Fiji in particular may relocate due to climate change. But there are a lot of other pressures of migration apart from climate change, but these are some of the reasons with respect on the impacts of climate change” (Pac02).

According to another interviewee, consistent flooding causes problems in parts of Rakiraki (Pac04). With livelihoods depending on agriculture, saltwater intrusion takes away farmland and, thus, the basis of existence (Pac02, Pac10). Apart from continuous inundation as a result of sea level rise, flooding may also be caused by tropical cyclones and “ongoing intense rainfall throughout the year in Fiji affecting people in low-lying areas” (Pac15).

196 CIA World Factbook. “Australia – Oceania: Fiji,” accessed August 14, 2019, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/fj.html>.

197 The Fijian Government, “Fiji Bureau of Statistics Releases 2017 Census Results,” Fiji Government Online Portal, 2018, <https://www.fiji.gov.fj/Media-Centre/News/Fiji-Bureau-of-Statistics-Releases-2017-Census-Res>.

198 Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Fact Book. Australia – Oceania: Fiji.”

199 UN DESA Population Division and UNICEF, “Fiji: Migration Profiles,” 2014, <https://esa.un.org/migmgprofiles/indicators/files/Fiji.pdf>.

One interviewee said that “[t]here are also seasonal changes to tropical cyclones and people are not well-prepared for these intense cyclones such as TC Winston in Fiji in 2016” (Pac15). Another one called these impacts “devastating” (Pac04). One respondent also emphasised that “most people would prefer not to move” (Pac06). Many of the key informants referred to Tropical Cyclone Winston and the destruction it caused on some islands or in the province Ra on Viti Levu (e.g. Pac04). There are still parts of Fiji that have not fully recovered from Winston. While disasters are times of social disruptions and disturbances, in some cases community response mechanisms have been positive, as described by one expert:

— “Three weeks after Winston, all different faiths came together to help the communities. They bring food, clothing and other things to help these communities and to me that actually is an eye opener, where all these religion groups have a common policy to help humanity who are desperate and in a dangerous situation” (Pac04).

An expert described a similarly positive experience in the aftermath of Tropical Cyclone Mona: “Despite of the different religion and backgrounds we have, everybody is just helping each other out when it comes to natural disasters” (Pac05). Nevertheless, in order to avoid tensions, the importance of fair distribution of donations among different groups was mentioned (Pac07).

When asked about the main factors motivating people to migrate, experts often named a combination of “opportunities and constraints” (Pac03). While climate change and environmental degradation may contribute to the decision to migrate, the main factors motivating people to leave Fiji are usually others. One expert summarised that it is “[u]sually a combination of reasons such as economic aspects; moving to greener pastures to upgrade living standards. It’s also a strategy of people to reduce risk by diversifying livelihoods, as opposed to relying on one source of livelihood” (Pac03). Education was named a driver for migration several times, often from outer islands to the mainland (Pac05, Pac07, Pac10). Rural-to-urban migration for work purposes is also one factor for migration in Fiji (Pac07) or, more broadly “[g]etting more economic opportunities and better access to utilities” (Pac09). Land tenure has been named “one major setback in informal settlements” (Pac07).

THE RELOCATION OF VUNIDOGOLOA VILLAGE

Several of the experts interviewed for this report made references to the case of Vunidogoloa or other Fijian villages which have been relocated. One interviewee named the case of Vunidogoloa on Vanua Levu an example of how climate change undermines livelihoods of people because people had to move due to coastal erosion and inundation (Pac01). In 2014, the village of Vunidogoloa relocated to a new site about 1.5 km inland and on higher ground, following several years of consultations.²⁰⁰ The process started in 2006 when the village head requested the government’s support to relocate the village, which gradually became uninhabitable due to the effects of sea level rise.²⁰¹ At the new site, the population of about 150 villagers were equipped with resources to meet their livelihood needs, including fishponds and fruit plantations.²⁰²

Lessons learned from the relocation of Vunidogoloa seem to have fed in the formulation of the Planned Relocation Guidelines, according to one expert working at the government at that time (Pac01). There were several critical remarks on the case. One interviewee said that “the setup of the houses in their relocated area is not that of a typical Fijian village setting” (Pac15). Another criticised this as well, and hoped that lessons will be learned from this for future planned relocating processes:

— “I hope the relocation guideline will take into considerations people’s traditional structures and house placements and the practicality of the current location. You can’t model the traditional setting everywhere, but so long as the people are consulted. I’m also looking at the demographics – the young people, the women, people with disabilities – where they have their own experience and their stories and their needs must be taken into consideration” (Pac08).

One interviewee emphasised that evaluation is critical and that evaluation of relocated communities should take place on a regular basis, maybe every five or ten years (Pac15). Reflecting on the case of Vunidogoloa, researchers have also highlighted the need to integrate customary patterns of land use and land tenure in discussions and policies on

200 Gharbaoui and Blocher, “The Reason Land Matters.”

201 Gharbaoui and Blocher.

202 Gharbaoui and Blocher; Annah E. Piggott-McKellar et al., “Moving People in a Changing Climate: Lessons from Two Case Studies in Fiji,” *Social Sciences* 8, no. 5 (May 2019): 133, <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci8050133>.



Narikoso – Fiji (© GIZ)

planned relocation in Fiji.²⁰³ In the interviews, one expert described how relocation may cause tensions between clans:

— *“In the past, there’s been tension when a clan moves to another clan’s space because when they’ve been given permission, they start developing things without informing the other clan. It also has to do with respect, and there is cultural protocol you have to follow. I think it’s just how you approach that in a kinship manner so that there’s no conflict later on” (Pac04).*

Another case of climate-induced and government-led planned relocation efforts in Fiji is the small village of Narikoso, located on Ono Island, Kadavu, where houses were flooded during high tides.²⁰⁴ The relocation of

Narikoso is supported by SPC and GIZ.²⁰⁵ The pilot project focuses on the building of new houses. Some houses of the small village are powered by solar panels and include coastal protection measures.²⁰⁶

FIJI – ACTOR LANDSCAPE

The Fijian government increasingly acknowledges that communities may require relocation due to their livelihoods being affected by the impacts of climate change. Planned relocation is more and more often framed as an adaptive strategy. This is perhaps best demonstrated by Fiji’s Planned Relocation Guidelines, published in 2018 (see next chapter).

Asked about important institutions and/or actors for responding to the challenges of climate-induced human mobility in Fiji, key experts named, among others: the National Disaster Management Office (NDMO), the Climate Change and International Cooperation Division of the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Rural and Maritime Development, the Ministry of Lands and Mineral

203 Dhrishna Charan, Manpreet Kaur, and Priyatma Singh, “Customary Land and Climate Change Induced Relocation—A Case Study of Vunidogoloa Village, Vanua Levu, Fiji,” in *Climate Change Adaptation in Pacific Countries: Fostering Resilience and Improving the Quality of Life*, ed. Walter Leal Filho, Climate Change Management (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017), 19–33, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50094-2_2; Gharbaoui and Blocher, “The Reason Land Matters.”

204 Fiji Government Online Portal, “Narikoso Village to Be Relocated,” Fiji Government Online Portal, September 4, 2013, <https://www.fiji.gov.fj/Media-Centre/News/NARIKOSO-VILLAGE-TO-BE-RELOCATED>.

205 UNOCHA, “Fiji: Building Resilience in the Face of Climate Change,” OCHA, January 13, 2017, <https://www.unocha.org/story/fiji-building-resilience-face-climate-change>.

206 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), “The Pacific Islands Are Adapting to Climate Change,” accessed November 8, 2019, <https://www.giz.de/en/workingwithgiz/57747.html>.



Resources, the Ministry of iTaukei Affairs, Commissioners Offices, and the Fiji Meteorological Services. Other answers included the iTaukei Land Trust Board (TLTB), or, more generally, NGOs (local and international), the civil society, or faith-based organisations. Two experts explicitly named the Red Cross as an important stakeholder in HMCCC (Pac04, Pac08).

The importance of various institutions of the United Nations (UN) was stressed by several key informants in the interviews (for example, by Pac03 and Pac08), among them: the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), also known as the UN Refugee Agency; the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); the International Organization for Migration (IOM); the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the World Food Programme (WFP); and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Regional organisations such as PIFS were also mentioned (Pac03), and a representative from the NDMO named the European Union (Pac05). Another interviewee included “the communities themselves, so that their views are also taken into account” (Pac06).

As compared to others in the region, Fiji has relatively strong institutional capacities to manage issues related to HMCCC at national and local levels. At the national level, two government agencies are of particular importance in this regard, namely the Climate Change and International Cooperation Division (CCICD) and the National Disaster Management Office (NDMO). These two separate agencies are guided by their own policies and acts.

The Climate Change and International Cooperation Division (CCICD) is a department of the Ministry of Economy²⁰⁷ and the responsible government agency for addressing issues and policies related to climate change.²⁰⁸ The division has also been involved in a village profiling system to map stakeholders such as NGOs and their geographical areas of responsibility (Pac01). Some areas and communities were not covered at all and this finding resulted in the proposal of the Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (IVA) (Pac01).

The second important actor is the National Disaster Management Office (NDMO) which coordinates operations and manages displacement in cases of civil conflict or disaster. Preparedness is an integral part of the NDMO’s work and mandate (Pac05). Generally, measures range from the household level to national level plans. Tasks of the NDMO include, inter alia, issuing flood warnings to communities or planning evacuations. A training unit conducts disaster introduction trainings in rural as well as urban areas. New tsunami sirens were installed and are frequently tested with drills being regularly held for coastal communities, schools and business houses. The NDMO is working to raise public awareness about the sirens and what to do in case of a warning. According to an expert familiar with the NDMO’s work, the NDMO places particular emphasis on work with communities in order to strengthen capacity building at the ground level (Pac05). The NDMO also heads the process of aligning relocation processes at the local level with the newly developed national Planned Relocation Guidelines (Pac01).

Among other stakeholders named by key informants (see above), the iTaukei Affairs seems to be particularly relevant for planned relocations. They ensure that proper consultations, assessments and prioritisation are conducted to identify most vulnerable iTaukei communities. In this regard, one interviewee said that “[t]he iTaukei Affairs were collecting data on Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (IVA) for communities, which will inform government on priority communities for relocation” (Pac09). Referring to the IVA, a government employee said the following:

207 Apparently, the division has been shifted between different departments in the last ten years (Pac01, Pac08). It might be interesting to investigate whether and how this has affected planning.

208 Climate Change and International Cooperation Division (CCICD), “Fiji Climate Change Portal,” accessed August 9, 2019, <http://fijiclimatechangeportal.gov.fj>.

— *“If the IVA project still existed it would have been a very good information for this because actually they have the geographical location in Fiji and they were going into having a database where it identifies the sectors that the communities are vulnerable in” (Pac01).*

Several key experts spoke about strengths and weaknesses in the government’s current strategy to address HMCCC. One expert stated that *“[t]here is a lot of talk on institutional capacity building, but the nuts and bolts of it has not really been very clear” (Pac04)*. One expert said that *“[p]roper, structured protocols for communications between government and the communities [are needed] that [are] actually being abided by on the ground” (Pac03)*. Concerning capacities in the government to manage migration, displacement and planned relocations, some experts thought that technical expertise is quite strong (Pac01, Pac02, Pac05, Pac08, Pac09). One expert was of the opinion that *“[t]here are capacities available, but not really utilised and known so the government has to seek international consultants for support in these areas of expertise” (Pac07)*. Besides, planning should be more inclusive (Pac07), and sensitive: *“People need to know the process of their own moving and government needs to be sensitive to that as well so the dialogue is a pre-requisite” (Pac08)*.

Equipment may be an issue (Pac05, Pac09), the same is true for financial resources since relocation is costly (Pac08, Pac09). In this regard, one respondent said that the government relies on donors (Pac09). One expert named inter-ministerial coordination and communication a weakness in planned relocation processes:

— *“Each Ministry has their own mandate or work plans, so we have to synchronise with each other to get things done because, like I mentioned, networking plays a big part when we try to get a request. You just stick your way into it. But we don’t want it that way and that is one issue that we are trying to work on for relocation itself. If you need a particular assessment or work done, [it’s like:] which Ministry, which department, and who’s the focal person of contact there? Not just Ministry of Labour. And you just find your way in. So if you have a contact list, everything is there available. We are working on that weakness, but I think we made a big improvement from last year” (Pac05).*

Fiji is also strongly involved in regional or international dialogues and cross-country coordination. As discussed in the introduction, the twenty-third session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) took place under the presidency of Fiji. While the event gave a prominent voice to SIDS at the global level, it also helped to create awareness in Fiji on the climate change-related problems that need to be addressed (Pac01). Summing up, a government employee said the following about Fiji’s COP presidency:

— *“Because of our COP23 Presidency and Fiji being the first Small Island Developing State to be a COP President – in fact, [also] the first Pacific Island, if you have to count Australia and New Zealand – we are very much seen as leaders in the Climate Justice fight, despite the fact that people might hold their own opinion about whether we were worthy enough. But the fact is we assumed that role because of the confidence and the trust placed in us, apart from the 193 parties to the convention. It is quite a proud legacy and the opportunity may never come again, and so it’s something that Fiji can be proud of” (Pac08).*

According to the expert, the Ministry of Economy works collaboratively with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when formulating national positions for global climate change negotiations and negotiating them at COPs (Pac08). Both actors are therefore important in Fiji’s regional and international engagements.

FIJI – KEY POLICIES AND INSTRUMENTS IN CLIMATE MIGRATION MANAGEMENT

There is no law that specifically addresses migration, displacement or planned relocation in the context of climate change in Fiji. However, relocation guidelines – the first for the Pacific – were launched by the Climate Change and International Cooperation Division during COP24 in Katowice in December 2018. At the event, Fiji’s Minister for Defence and National Security, Hon. Inia Seruiratu, emphasised that planned relocation is “viewed as an option of last resort”.²⁰⁹ The guidelines also emphasise that planned relocation should only be considered “when all adaptation options have been exhausted”.²¹⁰

209 Fijian Government, “Fiji High-Level Climate Champion Officiates at the Launch of Fiji’s Relocation Guidelines,” 2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9aBuI30mh3A>.

210 Ministry of Economy, Republic of Fiji, “Planned Relocation Guidelines: A Framework to Undertake Climate Change Related Relocation,” 2.

Timeline of Key Policies and Instruments for HMCCC in Fiji



Figure 4

The scope and purpose section of the Planned Relocation Guidelines states that they are “[t]o ensure an inclusive and gender responsive consultative and participatory process to strengthen communities’ riposte to climate change impacts, and ensure community engagement and ownership in the relocation process”.²¹¹ The guidelines, thus, aim to function as a coordination mechanism to facilitate “clear, inclusive and comprehensive procedures” of all stakeholders.²¹² The section also underlines the “richness of the indigenous knowledge, the multi-cultural and inter-faith composition of the Fijian population”.²¹³

How the guidelines will be implemented and translate into concrete actions on the ground remains to be seen. The fact that the language is rather inclusive in the scope and purpose section, as well as throughout the 22-page-long document, gives some cause for optimism that the needs and voices of the affected communities are heard and, moreover, their knowledge is recognised and integrated.²¹⁴ Much will depend on the yet to be developed Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), as a project manager of a European-funded planned relocation project emphasised: “When you have a SOP in place, there’s a method on how

you plan [the relocation]; if you don’t have a method, it’s just a piece of paper. So SOPs are lessons learnt” (Pac05). The same respondent also mentioned that, for relocation planning, “the whole of government is involved [...] right to the Prime Ministers’ office” and that the expertise of international partners is needed, for example to conduct trainings (Pac05).

References to HMCCC can be found in several earlier plans and documents from the Government of the Republic of Fiji, paving the way for the Planned Relocation Guideline. Fiji’s Second National Communication to the UNFCCC, published in 2014, for instance, names soil erosion and saltwater intrusion as key reasons to relocate and identifies “[r]elocation of population and economic activities” as one adaptation measure for the coastal zone.²¹⁵ Table 7.3 lists vulnerable communities in Fiji, many of them with the label “[p]otential relocation” or “[p]ossible relocation”.²¹⁶ Fiji’s Climate Vulnerability Assessment, launched in 2017 just before COP 23, does not specifically address HMCCC as a separate topic but discusses several aspects of human rights, such as psychological health concerns or gendered vulnerabilities in human mobility issues.²¹⁷ References

211 Ministry of Economy, Republic of Fiji, “Planned Relocation Guidelines: A Framework to Undertake Climate Change Related Relocation.”

212 Ministry of Economy, Republic of Fiji.

213 Ministry of Economy, Republic of Fiji.

214 For details on the drafting process and who was consulted, please refer to the “Background” section in the guidelines. A speech of Ambassador Nazhat Shameem Khan at a UNHCR Meeting in October 2017 also contains a few details on the drafting process: <https://www.unhcr.org/59d531fa7.pdf>.

215 Government of the Republic of Fiji, “Republic of Fiji: Second National Communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change” (Suva, Fiji: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Government of the Republic of Fiji, 2014), <https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/fjinc2.pdf>.

216 Government of the Republic of Fiji.

217 Government of the Republic of Fiji, “Climate Vulnerability Assessment: Making Fiji Climate Resilient” (Suva, Fiji: Government of the Republic of Fiji, 2017).

to HMCC can also be found in the 5-Year and 20-Year National Development Plan, published in November 2017.²¹⁸ The government has identified 830 communities for relocation which are particular at risk from climate-related events, out of which 48 are said to be “in urgent need of relocation”.²¹⁹ The annual targets at the end of the plan name two villages as the expected outcome for the years 2017 to 2022.²²⁰

Fiji’s first-ever National Adaptation Plan (NAP), launched in 2018, critically discusses several issues related to HMCCC.²²¹ A section on “Human settlement”, for instance, makes references to past planning and management deficiencies that have led to failures in providing safe and affordable land for the construction of houses.²²² In combination with urban migration, this has led to a growing number of informal settlements which are described as particularly vulnerable to climate hazards.²²³ The section also briefly refers to gendered vulnerabilities in such settlements.²²⁴ The NAP declares the government’s intention that “any relocation be voluntary and as a result of meaningful and informed consultation that fully respects the rights of affected persons”.²²⁵ However, while the NAP “emphasises the need for human mobility issues to be incorporated into sub-national development planning processes and for a comprehensive approach to community relocation to be developed”,²²⁶ steps forward and details for such developments are not explicitly laid out. Notably, Fiji’s NAP also has a section on values. In this section it is stated that “[a] daptation planning can never be apolitical. Climate change impacts and influences social and economic groups differently. For instance, climate change is not gender neutral”.²²⁷

A few months after the launch of the Planned Relocation Guidelines, Fiji released its new National Climate Change Policy.²²⁸ The new policy replaces the National Climate Change Policy of 2012, in which issues relating to HMCCC are hardly addressed and relocation as adaptation is not mentioned at all.²²⁹ This very fact, however, seems to have triggered the development of the Relocation Guidelines, according to a government representative. At Fiji’s first National Climate Change Summit at the end of 2012, the Climate Change Division “took that on board and tried to find a solution and address that particular gap” (Pac01). The policy gap has not only been addressed with the launch of the Planned Relocation Guidelines, the new National Climate Change Policy also has several links to HMCCC. One strategy of the policy covers migration, displacement and planned relocation:

— “Human mobility is established as a priority human security and national security issue. Legal frameworks, policies and strategies to manage climate and disaster-induced displacement are used to protect human rights and reduce long term risks. Planned relocation is supported through relevant resourcing and national policies and strategies as a form of adaptation. Cross-border migration issues and policy development is supported through the United Nations and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. The role of climate change in human displacement is articulated and international responsibilities defined”.²³⁰

Fiji’s new National Climate Change Policy also makes references to the Planned Relocation Guidelines and their operationalisation.²³¹ The policy was drafted in consultation with several stakeholders – government and non-government ones – over a period of two years.²³²

218 Ministry of Economy, “5-Year & 20-Year National Development Plan: Transforming Fiji” (Suva, Fiji: Ministry of Economy, Republic of Fiji, 2017), <https://www.fiji.gov.fj/getattachment/15b0ba03-825e-47f7-bf69-094ad33004dd/5-Year---20-Year-NATIONAL-DEVELOPMENT-PLAN.aspx>.

219 Ministry of Economy.

220 Ministry of Economy.

221 Government of the Republic of Fiji, “Republic of Fiji National Adaptation Plan: A Pathway towards Climate Resilience” (Suva, Fiji, 2018), <http://fijiclimatechangeportal.gov.fj/document/republic-fiji-national-adaptation-plan-pathway-towards-climate-resilience>.

222 Government of the Republic of Fiji.

223 Government of the Republic of Fiji.

224 Government of the Republic of Fiji.

225 Government of the Republic of Fiji.

226 Government of the Republic of Fiji.

227 Government of the Republic of Fiji.

228 Ministry of Economy, “National Climate Change Policy 2018 – 2030” (Suva, Fiji: Ministry of Economy, Government of Fiji, 2019), <http://fijiclimatechangeportal.gov.fj/sites/default/files/documents/National%20Climate%20Change%20Policy%202018%20-%202030.pdf>.

229 Government of the Republic of Fiji, “Republic of Fiji: National Climate Change Policy” (Suva, Fiji: Secretariat of the Pacific Community, 2012), <http://fijiclimatechangeportal.gov.fj/document/republic-fiji-national-climate-change-policy>.

230 Ministry of Economy, “National Climate Change Policy 2018 – 2030.” Ministry of Economy, “National Climate Change Policy 2018 – 2030.”

231 Precisely, the policy states the following: “Fiji’s *National Planned Relocation Guidelines* are operationalized through the development of *Standard Operating Procedures* which establish pro-active processes for addressing the risk of climate and disaster-driven displacement. At-risk communities are successfully relocated and supported. National procedures for assessing and implementing planned relocations are enabled by relevant financial mechanism.”

232 Ministry of Economy, “National Climate Change Policy 2018 – 2030.”



Fiji (© Kira Vinke)

The year 2019 saw more policy developments which are or could be of relevance for HMCCC, indicating the concerted efforts of the Fijian Government to address the topic. In June 2019, the Parliament of the Republic of Fiji enacted “Act 21 Climate Relocation of Communities Trust Fund” in June 2019.²³³ The act has the aim to “establish a trust fund for the planned relocation of communities in Fiji that are adversely affected by climate change” and lays out purposes, operational procedures and regulations of the fund.²³⁴ Money from the fund may be invested, inter alia, in identifying or assessing communities at risk and finding relocation sites. More general investments may be in research on planned relocation processes, including activities that aim at ensuring adequate livelihoods situations of relocated communities.²³⁵ In December 2019, the Fijian Government launched Displacement Guidelines at COP25 in Madrid.²³⁶ Taking into consideration existing policy frameworks at national and global levels, Fiji’s Displacement Guidelines in the Context of Climate Change and Disasters aims to further increase protection mechanisms in place, reduce vulnerability and address an increasing demand.²³⁷

233 Parliament of the Republic of Fiji, “Act 21 Climate Relocation of Communities Trust Fund,” Pub. L. No. 21 of 2019 (2019), <http://www.parliament.gov.fj/acts/act-21-climate-relocation-of-communities-trust-fund>.

234 Parliament of the Republic of Fiji.

235 Parliament of the Republic of Fiji.

236 The Fijian Government, “The Official Launch of Fiji’s-Displacement Guideline,” 2019, <https://www.fiji.gov.fj/getattachment/37b65740-c9fe-43ef-bada-474b3254bca1/The-Official-Launch-of-Fiji%E2%80%99s-Displacement-Guideli.aspx>.

237 The Fijian Government.

Apart from the Trust Fund and the Fiji’s Displacement Guidelines, other recent developments may become relevant in the near future. The Fijian Government has published a draft of the Climate Change Bill 2019 which makes several reference to displacement and planned relocation.²³⁸ The minister responsible for climate change, for instance, should “convene other ministries to support national efforts to mainstream climate change mitigation, adaptation and climate displacement into development planning, decision making and policy”.²³⁹ The draft suggests that the minister “may convene a Cabinet Committee on Climate and Disaster Risk” which should, inter alia, “support and provide oversight, where required, to the relocation of at-risk communities and other matters relating to climate displacement”. The draft also addresses the operationalisation of the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for the relocation guidelines. Recognising the specific vulnerability of people living on SIDS in the Pacific to sudden and slow-onset events, a section of the draft bill discusses regional displacement.²⁴⁰ The draft explicitly asks to “to facilitate [their] acceptance” in Fiji.²⁴¹

Despite these positive developments for HMCCC in general, key informants spoke about weaknesses of current policies and instruments directed at disaster response. One of the interviewees named outdated policies as a weakness of current response mechanisms, specifically naming the Natural Disaster Management Act of 1998 and the National Disaster Management Plan of 1995 (Pac01). According to another interviewee, these two policies are currently being reviewed (Pac05).²⁴² The aim of this review process is to improve response and make disaster management more robust (Pac15).

238 Government of the Republic of Fiji, “Draft Climate Change Bill 2019” (2019), <http://www.economy.gov.fj/images/CCIC/uploads/BILL/Draft-Climate-Change-Bill.pdf>.

239 Government of the Republic of Fiji.

240 Government of the Republic of Fiji.

241 Government of the Republic of Fiji.

242 Precisely, the expert said the following: “Fiji has a good, robust system, but we are looking at improving them and at the moment we are looking at the Natural Disaster Act and Plan where the Act is 21 years old, and the plan is 22 years old, and we are doing consultations to review the act within government and outside of government so we can do it more robust and better. The reason being: we have declared and non-declared disasters, it’s a non-declared disaster where NDMO have little powers to assist where there is a landslide and it blocks some roads and when they come to ask for assistance we don’t have the power and laws to assist, but if it declared, then we can actually assist.” (Pac15).

A Talanoa Dialogue on Planned Relocation

Qelekuro village is a small coastal village in Tailevu Province on Fiji’s main island Viti Levu. Away from the hustle of the capital Suva, in the village the culture and traditions of Fiji are deeply intertwined with daily routines and livelihoods. Members of four tribes reside in Qelekuro. The farm lands of three tribes, however, are located far away from the village. Despite the natural beauty of the surroundings, the destruction of the last cyclone is still visible, almost three years after it has changed the lives of the villagers. In 2016, the village was severely affected by Tropical Cyclone Winston. Water swept over the small seawalls and several houses were destroyed by water intrusion and strong winds. A mother of nine lost her life²⁴³ and some people suffered from typhoid fever in the aftermath of the storm.²⁴⁴

The combined effects of different climate change impacts have led to a discussion about inland relocation of at least parts of the village. Because of their exposure to sea level rise-induced coastal erosion and cyclone damages, the houses near the coastline are planned to be relocated. In a Talanoa dialogue members of the community share their experience about the situation in Qelekuro, among them representatives of a women’s group, youth representatives, and the village headman. Talanoa is an inclusive and participatory dialogue format used to solve differences in the Pacific.²⁴⁵ The idea is to share views and exchange experiences through storytelling in order to deepen understanding and, in the end, decide collectively for the greater good.²⁴⁶ In 2018, the concept has been used by UNFCCC to bring together stakeholders in informal dialogues in order to assess countries’ climate action after the Paris Agreement,



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step up national and global efforts, and discuss the way forward.²⁴⁷

After the formal opening procedures of the Talanoa, villagers of Qelekuro share how coastal erosion increasingly impacts their livelihoods: “Coconut trees and coastal plants used to stand in front of the village and big trees were covering the coastal areas but they are all lying in the sand now,” one member of the community explains. Around the coastline the village is almost entirely deforested. Another person talks about the destructive effects of flooding: “Today, when its high tide or king tide, the waves are higher than the sea wall and smash the sides of the houses near the coast. Houses will be flooded. When the river that runs through the village is flooded at the same time, villagers residing in low lands away from the coast are also affected. They are afraid during bad weather.” When asked whether anyone has left the village because of the additional pressures, the village headman responds that so far no one has gone elsewhere in response to these problems.

243 Mere Naleba, “Salacieli, 10, Tells of Her Fiji Night of Terror as Her Mum Dies,” *Asia Pacific Report*, February 22, 2016, <https://asiapacificreport.nz/2016/02/22/salacieli-10-tells-of-her-fiji-night-of-terror-as-her-mum-dies>.

244 Health & Nutrition Cluster, “Fiji. Tropical Cyclone Winston. Reporting Period (09.03.2016–18.03.2016),” no. Bulletin # 2 (March 18, 2016), http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/HNC-Bulletin_Issue2_20160318.pdf.

245 Talanoa Dialogue Platform, “What Is Talanoa?,” Talanoa Dialogue Platform, accessed November 26, 2019, <https://talanoadialogue.com/background>.

246 Talanoa Dialogue Platform.

247 COP24 Presidency Bureau, “Fiji and Poland Issued the Talanoa Call for Action,” COP 24 Katowice 2018, accessed November 26, 2019, <http://cop24.gov.pl/news/news-details/news/fiji-and-poland-issued-the-talanoa-call-for-action>.

The village headman recalls how a key representative from the National Disaster Management Office visited Qelekuro village after Cyclone Winston and, considering the visible impacts, told him that the village has to be relocated. Since this conversation, the village headman has been torn whether to ask for government assistance to build a stronger seawall, or whether to encourage people to move to higher grounds, he explains to the group. Villagers had already discussed the impacts of coastal erosion on the houses and decided that at minimum new houses should be constructed on higher grounds.

However, relocating the old brick houses is difficult for them without any financial assistance. Moreover, the land to the coast is culturally significant to the villagers and especially the elder population does not want to abandon their land. Currently, there are no NGOs working in the village who could assist in this transition, the community representatives say.

“The changes in the weather patterns have strongly affected our agriculture here” adds one villager. Agriculture is the main source of food and income in Qelekuro village and farmers usually sell their produce in the Suva market on Saturdays. However, the effects of the changes in the environment make it harder for longstanding agricultural practices to continue, as some of the farmers elaborate. A traditional farming calendar which the elders used for deciding what to plant when, seems to be no longer applicable due to the changes in seasons. In some areas even fruits no longer grow.


Qelekuro is surrounded by freehold lands. The villagers share the land that is left. They used to work together on the small piece of land around the village until the youth moved further inland to plant valuable “yaqona” (kava) and other root crops. But, *“planting kava has led to deforestation near the river and this has created problems for the newly established farming areas”*, the village headman explains. Switching to more profitable cash crops is therefore not without risks.

The women’s group voices worries about the changes they witnessed. They discuss the many ways people in the village suffer from illness because of the changes in weather patterns. Moreover, of special importance to them are the dif-

ferent pressures on the ocean and on coastal areas. They describe how mangroves act as a sea wall and minimise the impact of waves on the coasts. In the past, women of Qelekuro used to catch large fish. However, fishing does no longer provide a solid alternative source of income as the nearby stocks are already overfished. Furthermore, the women’s group raised concerns about the Chinese-owned cement factory on the freehold land near their village. The company has been extracting gravel from the rivers which has increased risks to reefs in their fishing ground. The women mention that the waste from the cement factory is flushed into the sea and the resulting changes in sedimentation have negatively affected the marine ecosystem.

Despite the limited resources and the various environmental pressures, the villagers of Qelekuro try to adapt to climate change. They discuss initiatives to improve livelihoods and the measures already taken to live and work under changing conditions. For example, the official village boundary was extended after two clans had willingly given pieces of their land. Most of the new houses in the village were built within the newly demarcated boundary. However, the discussion shows that relocation is not an easy task. The youth representatives suggest seeking assistance from the government to construct new roads which will make the farms that are located far away from the village more accessible. This would also allow to build houses inland, if needed. They see relocation as the best adaptation option because of the increasing impact of changes. Already, plans are in place for all youth to build their houses on the new parts of the village. The women emphasise that relocation should take place within the village and relocation should enable members of different tribes to stay together. In the end the village committee will decide about the placement of new houses. Faced with multiple challenges, finding common ground between protecting ancient lands and adapting to future changes, has to be carefully discussed. The Talanoa offered a way to find a joint understanding and a collective way forward.

After the closing ceremony, the village headman walks around Qelekuro and explains the unprecedented destruction that occurred. Looking over the still visible damage in his village, he says: *“We have to prepare.”*



Kiribati

The Republic of Kiribati is situated in the Central Pacific Ocean and consists of 33 coral atolls with a total land area of about 800 km². Kiribati is highly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change, particularly sea level rise. Apart from the highest point of 81 m on the raised coral atoll Banaba, the atolls mostly rise only 3 to 4 m above sea level. Kiribati is home to more than 110,000 people, the majority of whom are concentrated on Tarawa.²⁴⁸ Movements to the capital are more common than international migration.

Kiribati's islands are spread over a large area. This has several implications for HMCCC. One concern, for instance, is communication to remote islands before a disaster hits: *“When it comes to informing people on impending natural disasters it's pretty hard to reach the islands in a timely manner”* (Pac14). Reaching remote islands after disasters and providing relief may also prove to be difficult as discussed by one expert:

— *“One of the weaknesses is the response time in providing aid for communities affected in the outer islands. Due to the limited shipping services in the island, priority communities in South Tarawa are usually assisted first before they cover the outer islands. In most cases, response usually takes more than 2 weeks to reach affected communities”* (Pac12).

There is currently no mechanism in place to request relocation or assistance for affected communities in Kiribati (Pac11, Pac12, Pac13). One respondent noted that *“in some cases we do assist them when they seek assistance from the Ministry of Infrastructure and Sustainable Energy and they come up with a report”* (Pac12). One interviewee working in the government explained why an institutional structure to request for relocation may not be needed from his point of view:

— *“There are no mechanisms in place yet because most communities move to their family lands and usually do not request government for assistance. The family system is quite strong in Kiribati where families can usually accommodate the affected ones”* (Pac11).

Asked about the main factors motivating people to migrate in Kiribati, one expert said that *“I guess they are looking for the bright lights here in South Tarawa but mainly for education and health facilities”* (Pac12). Rural-to-urban migration to Kiribati's already densely populated capital South Tarawa would put further pressure on the capital. A government employee *“[has] not come across any case that they say they have migrated because of climate change events”*, linking migration to better livelihood opportunities or education (Pac14). It is something people do out of *“their own personal choice”* (Pac14).

Some experts made references to regions or communities that may be particularly vulnerable to climate change and therefore for which HMCCC may be a pressing issue. This includes the northern and most southern islands. One interviewee identified coastal communities, especially in the southern islands of Tamana, Arorae and Nikunau, as

248 National Statistics Office, Ministry of Finance, “2015 Population and Housing Census. Volume 1: Management Report and Basic Tables” (Bairiki, Tarawa, Kiribati: Republic of Kiribati, 2016), http://www.mfed.gov.ki/statistics/documents/2015_Population_Census_Report_Volume_1final_2111016.pdf.

prone to disasters (Pac12). The focus on southern islands is also supported by another interviewee who is referring to more frequently occurring king tides and greater sea level rise in the south (Pac13). Droughts on the southern islands and extensive rainfalls on the northern islands are additional pressing influences (Pac13, Pac14). One expert referred to research gaps and said that there was a need to understand internal relocation trends (Pac11).

Several interviewees made references to social tensions in the aftermath of disasters in Kiribati. These may be due to the distribution of aid between different communities or as a result of shrinking freshwater resources (Pac08, Pac11, Pac12). One expert gave the example of water tanks which had been installed near churches and which were only used by communities belonging to their respective church (Pac11). Another expert talked about land issues. When people are forced to leave their land due to erosion and move further inland or just to another part of their land, “they are causing a lot of land issues”, according to the expert (Pac14). This may also create tensions within families, because the system of landownership in Kiribati is: “all land is owned by families” (Pac14).

KIRIBATI – ACTOR LANDSCAPE

The government of Kiribati has been at the forefront of raising awareness on the severe effects of climate change on low-lying island states and the possible necessity for relocation. This became most evident in 2014, when Kiribati’s then President Anote Tong announced that his government had finalised the purchase of 20 km² of land on the Fijian island of Vanua Levu.²⁴⁹ While President Tong spoke of efforts to address climate-related impacts on the economy and on food security,²⁵⁰ local and international responses associated the acquisition with the possibility of seeking refuge outside of Kiribati in times of rising sea levels.²⁵¹ In any case, the pronouncement marked increasing international awareness about the exposure of small island states to climate change.

249 Office of the President, “Kiribati Buys a Piece of Fiji,” *Press Release by the Office of the President, Republic of Kiribati*, April 30, 2014, <http://www.climate.gov.ki/2014/05/30/kiribati-buys-a-piece-of-fiji>.

250 Office of the President.

251 Laurence Caramel, “Besieged by the Rising Tides of Climate Change, Kiribati Buys Land in Fiji,” *The Guardian*, July 1, 2014, sec. Environment, <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jul/01/kiribati-climate-change-fiji-vanua-levu>; Elfriede Hermann and Wolfgang Kempf, “Climate Change and the Imagining of Migration: Emerging Discourses on Kiribati’s Land Purchase in Fiji,” *The Contemporary Pacific* 29, no. 2 (2017): 231–63.

As noted above, climate-related migration is a politically divisive issue, as many people do not want to leave their ancestral home. The current government does not focus on HMCCC. When asked about capacities needed to address the issue, a government official from Kiribati stated: “*Since migration in the context of climate change is not a priority of the current government, there is no urgent need by the government to build capacity on it*” (Pac11). A key expert from Fiji talked about this change in addressing HMCCC in Kiribati: “*They are exploring other options and some colleagues from Kiribati have highlighted that this new President’s focus has changed so [that] Kiribati is able to help itself, and that’s where they will go on from there*” (Pac01). One interviewee from Kiribati summarised: “*There is no institutional structure to look into climate migration [...] more efforts are channelled on mitigation and adaptation*” (Pac11).

Key respondents from Kiribati noted that the Ministry of Health and Medical Services, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Infrastructure and Sustainable Energy, the Ministry of Environment, Lands and Agricultural Development, and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade are important government actors in issues related to migration, displacement, and planned relocation (Pac11, Pac12). According to interviewees, the right to enact laws for HMCCC is shared as follows: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for external migration, and the Island Council takes care of internal migration (Pac11, Pac12, Pac13).²⁵²

In the case of a disaster, the National Disaster Management Office takes care of people (Pac11) while the National Statistics Office (Pac12, Pac13) and the Kiribati Meteorological Office (Pac14) have auxiliary roles. The National Disaster Risk Management Plan (NDRMP) identifies roles and responsibilities of national agencies.²⁵³ International actors like the Red Cross or Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade provide “*huge support*” in responding to disasters and assessing impacts, according to a government employee working in a central national agency (Pac11).

252 One respondent said that the Office of the President would be responsible for planned relocation laws (Pac11).

253 Ministry of Finance & Economic Development, Government of Kiribati, “Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management,” 2016, <http://www.mfed.gov.ki/publications/climate-change-and-disaster-risk-management>.

Concerning climate change administration in general, one expert mentioned that the human resource base is too weak at the national level and more technical capacity is needed (Pac11). Coordination at local levels is better, according to the expert (Pac11). One respondent working in an Urban Council, made a longer comment on weaknesses in the institutional structure:

— *“One weakness that I’ve noticed is the conflict between the agencies, like the climate change unit within the Office of the President and the Ministry of Environment. When it comes to climate change, there is confusion to which agency that takes the lead role. There is an implementing body and there is a focal point, but we target all our proposals to the office of the president”* (Pac12).

Generally, the National Expert Group on Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management (KNEG) functions as the advisory body for climate change and disaster risk management in Kiribati and should also coordinate measures.²⁵⁴ According to a government employee, the group comprises senior government representatives from several ministries as well as representatives from NGOs and key partners such as faith-based organisations and *“meets on an ad-hoc basis”* (Pac11). The KNEG is involved in agenda setting, policy design and the implementation of interventions and provides technical advice (Pac11). One expert describes the KNEG as a *“vital group”* (Pac13).

Several experts made references to weaknesses in cooperation, coordination and communication of stakeholders working on issues related to HMCCC in Kiribati. One interviewee, for instance, said that capacities are available in the administration to address HMCCC, but *“there needs to be coordination to better utilise the existing capacity”* (Pac13). One interviewee discussed the good coordination practices of the NDMO (Pac14). Similarly, another respondent mentioned good coordination practices amongst the clusters involved when people are displaced by disasters (Pac11). One respondent also addressed the implementation of projects or interventions related to HMCCC by the government of Kiribati or NGOs and summarised that *“[i]t requires coordination to ensure that everyone is doing the right thing for the right reasons and also aligning to*

the national priorities and efficiently using the resources” (Pac11).

KIRIBATI – KEY POLICIES AND INSTRUMENTS IN CLIMATE MIGRATION MANAGEMENT

Currently, Kiribati does not have a specific policy or programme on HMCCC. Nevertheless, several policy documents from Kiribati make references to issues relevant for HMCCC. However, these must be interpreted in light of the policy priority shifts in addressing climate-induced mobility in Kiribati in 2016 when the current government came into power. A government official explained this shift, referring to the national consultation on climate change held in Tarawa during which *“[m]ost of participants expressed their views on remaining on the islands of Kiribati and building their resilience”* (Pac11). This, according to the official, provided the new government with a clear policy mandate to put resilience on top of the agenda in order to *“ensure that [communities] land and livelihoods will be able to withstand the stressors of climate change”* (Pac11). Forced movements should be avoided (Pac11, Pac12, Pac14).

In 2015, Kiribati issued the National Labour Migration Policy. The policy does not only recognise international migration as a mechanism to address limited opportunities in Kiribati and to promote socio-economic development, but also as a response to climate change.²⁵⁵ In the Preface, then President of the Republic of Kiribati Anote Tong emphasised: *“[international labour migration] is also a critical component in the concept of Migration with Dignity, which articulates the importance of training I-Kiribati to take upskilled labour migration opportunities in response to climate change threats to livelihoods at home”*.²⁵⁶ Or in the words of an interviewee: *“Kiribati has a migration policy in place that focuses on equipping their citizens with livelihood skills that can be put to use in their destination countries should they choose to migrate”* (Pac15). In the National Labour Migration Policy the government states that *“[it] is committed to proactively expand labour mobility opportunities to disadvantaged population groups including women, youth, and outer island residents”*²⁵⁷ and discusses how the human rights of migrant workers can be protected in general.²⁵⁸

254 Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP), Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), “Whole of Island Approach – Abaiang Atoll, Kiribati. Integrated Vulnerability and Adaptation Assessment – Synthesis Report.” (SPREP, SPC and GIZ, 2014).

255 Government of Kiribati, “Kiribati National Labour Migration Policy” (Government of Kiribati, 2015), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-/asia/---ro-bangkok/---ilo-suva/documents/publication/wcms_431833.pdf.

256 Government of Kiribati.

257 Government of Kiribati.

258 Government of Kiribati.



Village marked for relocation – Fiji (© Kira Vinke)

Given current climate change projections, HMCCC may resurface in the future as a topic requiring urgent action by the government of Kiribati. Land scarcity is increasingly becoming a problem, and the still ambitious upper temperature limit of the Paris Agreement of 2°C would require relocations. One interviewee noted that internal relocation programmes are problematic because there is not enough suitable land (Pac15). Besides, further rural-to-urban migration to South Tarawa would put the capital's infrastructure under further pressures. Roughly 50% of the total population reside in South Tarawa.²⁵⁹ The government is actively trying to provide housing as well as relocation options within Kiribati for the growing population. A government official working in a central national agency talked about a major housing project near the airport in Temaiku, which is in the planning stage and should be conducted with the help of New Zealand (Pac11). He also talked about a proposal to relocate communities to Christmas Island (Pac11). Another government employee stated that “Temaiku has been identified as a sight for development to cater for those communities relocated from South Tarawa” (Pac12).


The National Disaster Risk Management Plan (NDRMP), launched in 2012, regulates operational arrangements in case of a disaster.²⁶⁰ In the interviews a key government official discussed strengths and weaknesses of current disaster response mechanism. The interviewee emphasised “ongoing coordination” within the administration and how humanitarian organisations start to help within a short timeframe, also with funding. The respondent also highlighted that government funds were available for affected people and that “[t]he government has increased funding assistance to these displaced farmers and people through the years”. As weaknesses in the government's current disaster response mechanism one expert mentioned response time to reach remote islands, which he attributed to “poor shipping and infrastructure”, as well as limited resources to assist affected communities and provide them with “water and other basic humanitarian needs” (all Pac11). Assistance in the aftermath of a disaster is on “request basis” whereas “[t]he initial assessments are conducted by the Disaster Office engineers to determine the scope of damage before any intervention is done” (Pac11). A large share of government's funds for relief or resilience is allocated to the construction of seawalls (Pac11, Pac12, Pac14).

259 National Statistics Office, Ministry of Finance, “2015 Population and Housing Census. Volume 1: Management Report and Basic Tables.”

260 Ministry of Finance & Economic Development, Government of Kiribati, “Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management.”

Tuvalu

The Tuvalu archipelago covers a land area of 26 km² and consists of nine small islands, six of them atolls and three of them limestone reef islands. It is situated approximately 1,100 km north of Fiji in the Pacific Ocean. As a small and low-lying island nation, Tuvalu’s maximum elevation is approximately 4 m which implies a special exposure to some adverse effects of climate change. Census figures from 2011 show a population of approximately 11,000 people in Tuvalu.²⁶¹



Tuvalu’s territory is spread over a large area. This fact makes all islands, especially coastal areas, prone to sea level rise, as noted by all informants from Tuvalu (Pac20 – Pac24). However, one interviewee emphasised that it was important to differentiate between the different islands: “For drought, we have our Northern islands. We know through our climate data that they are more vulnerable than the Southern islands. So there are some islands that we know have certain vulnerabilities as compared to other islands” (Pac21).

TUVALU – ACTOR LANDSCAPE

Several state actors were identified in the interviews which are relevant for responding to the challenges of HMCCC in Tuvalu. These include the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Environment, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Home Affairs and Rural Development. In the institutional arrangement on climate change in Tuvalu the National Advisory Council on Climate Change (NACCC) is of particular relevance. One expert described the operational procedures of the NACCC within the government, how stakeholders feed into legal processes and how policies are enacted:

— “The NACCC reports directly and provides technical guidance/advice to the cabinet on matters related to climate change, including migration or human mobility. Any issues that will come up, we’ll bring up to the NACCC and they will deliberate on that before they make a recommendation or guidance to Cabinet. Cabinet will have the final say. If it is a legislation, it will go to Parliament” (Pac21).

The NACCC includes members from government departments as well as NGOs and CSOs. The same interviewee thinks that the NACCC “is well established” (Pac21). Other than government institutions, the Red Cross, which is also a NACCC member, has been named an important stakeholder. At the regional level, the council works closely with UNOCHA as well as other agencies from the United Nations (Pac20). One expert named IOM and the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) as partners the office has worked with on issues related to climate-induced migration while saying that “there is very minimal work that has been done in this area. I can sense from discussions with Vanuatu that it is a very complex issue to relocate people” (Pac21).

Concerning communication and coordination between actors, one expert noted that the “NACCC was a way forward in harmonising and working in collaboration with relevant stakeholders, building partnerships” (Pac23). At the same time, staff turnovers and a shortage of human resources hinder communication (Pac23). A NGO representative wished for more acceptance and respect of the youth in contributing or assisting in climate change matters (Pac20).

261 Tuvalu Central Statistics Division, “Tuvalu Statistics at a Glance,” 2011, <https://tuvalu.prism.spc.int>.

TUVALU – KEY POLICIES AND INSTRUMENTS IN CLIMATE MIGRATION MANAGEMENT

While climate change as a driver of human mobility is a sensitive, but recognised topic among policy actors in Tuvalu, the state does not have a policy on climate-induced human mobility yet. Several stakeholders noted that no mechanism exists to request planned relocations (Pac21, Pac23, Pac24). An employee from a key government body shared insights from interviews which indicate that climate-related impacts have driven international labour migration because “[people] say they cannot do agriculture or fishing because of the increasing impacts of climate change, so they rather do fruit picking and do other seasonal work outside Tuvalu that will allow them to earn an income” (Pac21). The same expert explains why policies on HMCCC are not on the top of the government’s agenda:

— “Basically because migration is not something the Government is paying attention to. We develop a strong belief that people don’t want to move. They want to stay here. However, we have made efforts to recognise the right of people who are being displaced, they are being forced to move. And one of the initiatives that Tuvalu took forward to the UN General Assembly is a draft UN resolution on people displaced by climate change and that discussion is being led by our mission in New York” (Pac21).

Several policy documents mention HMCCC. Tuvalu’s National Strategy for Sustainable Development for the years 2016 to 2020 names international migration a limited strategy for households in Tuvalu to diversify risks of climate stressors.²⁶² The strategy also makes references to questions of identity and discusses the deep connection of the people of Tuvalu to the sea and ancestral land.²⁶³ According to the strategy, Tuvalu intends to strengthen legislation efforts on climate change and migration.²⁶⁴ In the National Climate Change Policy of 2012 migration/resettlement plans for each islands are listed as one strategy to be prepared.²⁶⁵ Furthermore, a “[s]pecial Pacific

Access Category (PAC) for Tuvaluans” is mentioned.²⁶⁶ The policy stresses that preparedness is not only crucial in order to guarantee the security of Tuvaluans, but also to protect their cultural identity and maintain their national sovereignty against the impacts of climate change.²⁶⁷ Aspects of national sovereignty are also highlighted in Tuvalu’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC): “While longer term impacts such as sea level rise could result in the unavoidable out-migration of some of her people, they have a right to pursue any and all means to ensure their nation survives and the legacy remains, with future generations living productive lives on these islands”.²⁶⁸

Respondents pointed out that there are mechanisms in place to help people in the aftermath of a disaster. The government provides shelter, food, and funds if houses have been destroyed (Pac21, Pac22, Pac24). People can submit a request to the Tuvalu Survivor Fund and seek for assistance if their house has been destroyed (Pac21, Pac24). But government provision of food and water after a disaster may only last for a short period of time (Pac24). The disaster risk management team has a rapid assessment team and since recently the CCD as support (Pac21). According to a government employee, Tuvalu’s central disaster management act, the National Disaster Risk Management Act of 2008,²⁶⁹ is currently being reviewed:

— “We have a legislation, the National Disaster Risk Management Act that is currently under review as we learned a lot from TC’s Pam and Ula because they came very close. Within one year. Pam was in March 2015 and Ula was in 30 December 2015, so while we were still recovering, we were hit again. We have learned a lot from the two cyclones. In 2012 we declared a state of emergency for drought. So we have some experience that have helped us to strengthen and better reflect climate scenarios and early warning systems. We are now reviewing the Act to reflect the reality of the work that is being carried out” (Pac21).

262 Government of Tuvalu, “TE KAKEEGA III: National Strategy for Sustainable Development 2016 to 2020” (Funafuti, Tuvalu: Government of Tuvalu, 2016), <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/cobp-tuv-2017-2019-ld-02.pdf>.

263 Government of Tuvalu.

264 Government of Tuvalu.

265 Government of Tuvalu coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade, Tourism, Environment and Labor, “TE KANIVA: Tuvalu Climate Change Policy 2012,” 2012, 26, <https://www.pacificclimatechange.net/sites/default/files/documents/TCCP%20Te%20Kaniva%20English%20final%20web%20new.pdf>.

266 Government of Tuvalu coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade, Tourism, Environment and Labor, “TE KANIVA: Tuvalu Climate Change Policy 2012.”


267 Government of Tuvalu coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade, Tourism, Environment and Labor.

268 Government of Tuvalu, “Intended Nationally Determined Contributions: Communicated to the UNFCCC on 27 November 2015,” 2015, <https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Tuvalu%20First/TUVALU%20INDC.pdf>.

269 Government of Tuvalu, “National Disaster Management Act. 2008 Revised. CAP. 20:38,” 2008.

Vanuatu

Vanuatu, a 12,190 km² archipelago in Melanesia, is comprised of 83 volcanic islands and divided into six provinces – Malampa, Penama, Sanma, Shefa, Tafea, Torba. Its highest point is the 1879 m high Mount Tabwemasana. Over 272,000 people are living on Vanuatu's islands.²⁷⁰



Vanuatu ranks first on the WorldRiskIndex 2018 as the country with the highest disaster risk worldwide.²⁷¹ It is not only vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change but also prone to geological hazards like earthquakes or volcanic eruptions. Climate-related and geological hazards that undermine the livelihoods of the Ni-Vanuatu exacerbate pre-existing issues.

Given Vanuatu's high exposure to climate risks, interviewees discussed several climate change impacts on the state. They mentioned sea level rise, salinisation, coastal erosion, tropical cyclones and their increased frequency and intensity, extreme weather events, or changes in seasonal patterns such as prolonged periods of droughts.

One expert expressed regret about how “coastal erosion [...] destroys items of cultural significance” in Vanuatu (Pac33).

The effects of climate change on food security were frequently discussed in the interviews. A technical advisor for development, for instance, gave an account of how the salinisation of agricultural land, changes in the occurrence of El Niño and La Niña, or, more generally, changes in seasonal patterns impact food production (Pac28). Another respondent summarised that “changes in seasonal patterns is affecting how and when people harvest and the amount being harvested and this also affects what's available for sale in the local markets” (Pac33). A representative from a women's organisation talked about a project with FAO on food security (Pac29). One expert from a state authority explained that many people had to rely on food provisions for a long period of time and farmers needed seeds and planting materials (Pac31).

Many interviewees talked about Tropical Cyclone Pam which hit Vanuatu in March 2015 and caused widespread damage. The severe category five cyclone killed dozens and damaged or destroyed 90 % of the buildings in the capital.²⁷² Then President Baldwin Lonsdale blamed climate change for this devastation.²⁷³ Vanuatu is still recovering from Pam, one of the worst disasters in Vanuatu's history. One expert talked about social tensions that may arise in the aftermath of a disaster, giving the example of lootings (Pac31).

Some experts spoke about regions of Vanuatu that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. Populations that live in coastal areas, at river banks or near volcanoes are especially prone to certain environmental impacts (Pac31, Pac33). An informant noted that “the Malampa province has the least amount of support, and assistance should be strengthened for this province” (Pac25). One interviewee pointed out that being aware of the hard crop growing conditions of smaller islands is important to recognise the existing pressing influence (Pac32). One expert characterised “communities living on small, low-lying islands” as particularly vulnerable to sea level rise and gave the example of “Emao [where people] have been displaced due to sea-level rise” (Pac33).

270 Vanuatu National Statistics Office (VNSO), “2016 Post-TC Pam Mini-Census Report. Vol.1. Republic of Vanuatu” (Port Vila, Vanuatu: Republic of Vanuatu, Ministry of Finance and Economic Management, Vanuatu National Statistics Office), 1, accessed August 14, 2019, <https://vnso.gov.vu/index.php/component/advlisting/?view=download&fileId=4542>.

271 Hans-Joachim Heintze et al., “WorldRiskReport 2018. Focus: Child Protection and Children's Rights” (Berlin and Bochum: Bündnis Entwicklung Hilft and Ruhr University Bochum – Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict (IFHV), 2018), 31, https://weltrisikobericht.de/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/190318_WRR_2018_EN_RZonline_1.pdf.

272 Claudine Wery, “Vanuatu President Beggars World to Help Rebuild, Blames Climate Change, after Cyclone Pam,” *The Sydney Morning Herald*, March 17, 2015, <https://www.smh.com.au/environment/climate-change/vanuatu-president-beggs-world-to-help-rebuild-blames-climate-change-after-cyclone-pam-20150317-1m00eo.html>.

273 The Government of Vanuatu published the “Cyclone Pam Post Disaster Needs Assessment” and the “TC Pam Lessons Learned Report.”

Displacement of whole communities and state-led relocation have already taken place in Vanuatu. The case of the state-led relocation of Lataw, located on Tegua Island of the Torres Islands, got international attention because of a press release by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) which named the villagers the first climate change refugees.²⁷⁴ According to one interviewee, that was the only official relocation in Vanuatu (Pac26).

VANUATU – ACTOR LANDSCAPE

In 2018, Vanuatu launched its “National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement”. A result of this policy is high awareness among policymakers on HMCCC. When asked whether climate change is a driver of migration, one respondent, for instance, just answered: “Definitely” (Pac25).

A law expert described the process to enact policies related to migration, displacement, and planned relocation: “Within the Ministry of Climate Change, the Minister and Director General are working closely with the Prime Minister’s office and there is a department within the Prime Minister’s office for policy” (Pac27). The Council of Minister, the countries’ supreme decision-making authority, has to give its final approval (Pac27, 32). The Ministry of Climate Change Adaptation, Meteorology, Geo-Hazards, Energy, Environment and Disaster Management was generally perceived to be an important stakeholder in HMCCC, not only for the policy process (Pac26, Pac27, Pac33, Pac34). Several other government organisations were identified as important stakeholders to provide input in the policy process, among them the National Disaster Committee (Pac32) and Vanuatu’s NDMO (Pac32).

One expert also mentioned the importance of civil society organisation (CSOs) “and those partners that work at the community level such as VCAN” as important for designing policies on HMCCC (Pac33). According to an expert from an NGO, The Vanuatu Climate Action Network (VCAN) “also contributed to the climate change policy and maintains a good working relationship with the National Advisory Board and, hence, the government recognises VCAN as a reliable source of information” (Pac25). VCAN has been established under the Vanuatu NGO Climate Change Adaptation Program²⁷⁵ and “facilitates the sharing of lessons and good

practice approaches among over 20 civil society organisations and with the Government of Vanuatu”.²⁷⁶ VCAN “provides a space for training and dialogues on many issues related to climate change”, among them displacement (Pac33). The secretariat aims to keep members updated on climate change discourses on the regional level (Pac33).

When asked about relevant stakeholders to respond to challenges of HMCCC in Vanuatu in general, one expert summarised: “Ministry of Climate Change, Ministry of Lands, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education and the established cluster groups which include NGOs as well (education, WASH, health, food and agriculture, shelter)” (Pac32). Apart from governmental entities, respondents also identified non- or inter-governmental organisations like IOM and OXFAM as significant (Pac27).

In the case of a disaster, the NDMO is the responsible government agency to coordinate and manage the government’s response to displacement: “Everyone has to come under the umbrella of NDMO” (Pac26). When a disaster strikes, assessment teams go out, report to the NDMO and implement and carry out disaster responses (Pac34). One interviewee said that the NDMO creates a lot of awareness on HMCCC (Pac29). After Tropical Cyclone Pam, the government of Vanuatu made the decision to establish a standing cluster system to improve disaster coordination and preparedness.²⁷⁷ The cluster is organised in eight technical clusters headed by ministries or the NDMO and often co-lead by NGOs. The Logistics Cluster, for instance, is led by the NDMO and co-led by OXFAM.²⁷⁸

Financial resources are scarce and hinder stakeholders’ work on HMCCC in Vanuatu. An expert from a key government agency referred to missing human and financial capacities:


276 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Sustainable Development, “Vanuatu NGO Climate Change Adaptation Program,” 2014, <http://www.sids2014.org/index.php?page=view&type=1006&nr=2750&menu=1507>.

277 National Disaster Management Office, “Cluster System,” accessed August 8, 2019, <http://www.ndmo.gov.vu/resources/clusters>.

278 Vanuatu National Disaster Management Office, “Logistics Cluster (VLC),” accessed November 7, 2019, <http://www.ndmo.gov.vu/resources/clusters/95-vlc>.

274 Ballu et al., “Comparing the Role of Absolute Sea-Level Rise and Vertical Tectonic Motions in Coastal Flooding, Torres Islands (Vanuatu).”

275 More information can be found here: <http://www.sids2014.org/index.php?page=view&type=1006&nr=2750&menu=1507>.



— “Since 2015 we really hit the ceiling in terms of human resources and everything because we experienced Cyclone Pam and a major relocation from one of the islands due to volcanic activities, and this year the volcanic eruption in Ambrym Island, and so right now we are kind of strained, but at the same time it also reflects the other department, and, like I mentioned, the what’s written in the policy is really good, but the issues lies with the implementation part of it” (Pac34).

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AN NGO expert describes a memorandum of understanding (MOU) through which OXFAM and other civil society organisations (CSOs) may be able to improve disaster planning and map in advance areas where people can be accommodated when disasters strike (Pac25). The same respondent also said that the NDMO is often perceived to be solely responsible for handling disaster displacement and disagrees on this matter: “there needs to be a more multi-sectoral approach to addressing this issue” (Pac25). The expert also refers to the importance of state authorities at the local level: “Provincial authorities should take the lead in disaster preparedness and awareness at the grassroots level” (Pac25). Coordination improvement measures are required for the intersection of government and aid organisations which might enable a quicker disaster response (Pac24, Pac32, Pac33). The National Disaster Committee is also an important stakeholder (Pac32).

One expert who has been part of the COP delegations in 2017 and 2018 summarised that “Vanuatu is participating well and is helping the Alliance of Small Islands in all its submissions and on adaptation and mitigation” (Pac34). The same expert discussed limited funding for the participation in COPs by the government²⁷⁹ and how this makes it difficult for the delegation from Vanuatu to be actively

involved in all relevant thematic areas during negotiation processes:

— “For a small Pacific island like us and other Pacific Islands it’s very important that we involve in any COP discussion, it’s always a nightmare to make sure that we have the number to go to COP, but Vanuatu has been sending quite a good number of delegations attending COP since prior to 2015” (Pac34).

Several experts discussed communication and coordination between actors. One expert from a government department said “the impacts of climate change are affecting us more than the efforts we are putting in. Coordination amongst stakeholders and financial resource need to be improved.” (Pac32). One respondent also made general comments about the government’s capacity to manage disaster displacement:

— “Negotiations with customary landowners or the host communities tend to drag out and government is not fully equipped in terms of moving large masses and people are left to live in tents, accessing services such as health dispensaries are limited because the clinics are not fully stocked or have the resources to accommodate the increase in people within that community” (Pac25).

279 According to the expert, the number is limited to four.

One interviewee from a NGO addressed the difficulties people face when seeking assistance from the government: “They have to have their communication links strengthened, people are not aware of the structure and to whom you have to seek assistance right from community level, like community reps, because there might be misleading information” (Pac26). The same interviewee also criticised the structure of direct reporting from the community to the Ministry of Climate Change and said a technical officer should be involved in order to “give a fair assessment on the issue in the communities” and prevent false information (Pac26). One expert named the establishment of the clusters a strength in the institutional structure to address HMCCC in Vanuatu (Pac32).

VANUATU – KEY POLICIES AND INSTRUMENTS IN CLIMATE MIGRATION MANAGEMENT

Vanuatu launched its National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement in 2018.²⁸⁰ The introductory part of the policy, titled “Statement of key issues and context” defines what is meant by displacement in such a way that people not familiar with the issue can understand the concept.²⁸¹ The policy also introduces to frameworks of disaster-induced displacement from national, regional, and global levels and draws on principles included in several of these frameworks.²⁸² At the same time, Vanuatu recognises its pioneering role in developing a policy on climate-induced disaster displacement.²⁸³ For the national level, several policy documents are discussed as relevant for the new policy, including Vanuatu’s National Sustainable Development Plan 2030, which is known as “The People’s Plan 2030”, and Vanuatu’s Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction Policy for 2016 to

2030 (VCCDRRP).²⁸⁴ While the policy’s name suggests that it focuses primarily on displacement in the context of climate change, migration and planned relocation are integral aspects of Vanuatu’s National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement. The policy, for instance, “acknowledges the risks of relocation if carried out without appropriate safeguards” and lays out principles for relocation processes.²⁸⁵

The policy identifies twelve strategic priority areas, which are grounded on a comprehensive analysis of existing policy and institutional gaps.²⁸⁶ Weaknesses in planning, responsibilities, inter-ministerial communication and coordination in general are discussed. These may affect long-term recovery needs or “clear policy gaps in terms of addressing the needs of people who are living in and moving into informal settlements, as well as displacement stemming from evictions, rezoning, development and infrastructure projects”.²⁸⁷ Women’s leadership, gender responsiveness, social inclusion as well as community participation are listed among the core cross-cutting priorities.²⁸⁸ The annex includes, among other things, a stakeholder map and relevant national policies.²⁸⁹

Since the policy was launched only a few months before the interviews took place, key experts could not say much about the implementation of the policy. One expert shared his thoughts about the policy and combined this with the decentralisation act: “The policy helps communities to understand the different scenarios that may require relocation and the act empowers people at the community level” (Pac33). Some experts talked about how the policy came into being. One expert, for instance, said that Tropical Cyclone Pam and the volcanic eruption on the island of Ambrym demonstrated the need for the formulation of a displacement policy and accelerated the process (Pac31). Another referred to the policy’s “rights-based approach to displacement in the context of climate change and disasters” (Pac30). An expert from an internationally operating NGO shared thoughts on the policy’s strengths and weaknesses:

280 Vanuatu National Disaster Management Office NDMO, “Vanuatu National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement” (Port Vila, Vanuatu: NDMO, Ministry of Climate Change Adaptation, Meteorology, Geo-Hazards, Energy, Environment and Disaster Management, Government of Tuvalu, 2018), <https://ndmo.gov.vu/images/download/Vanuatu-National-Policy-on-Climate-Change-and-Disaster-Induced-Displacement-2018-published.pdf>.

281 Vanuatu National Disaster Management Office NDMO.

282 Explicitly mentioned are the following global ones: the Sendai Framework, the UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement, the Task Force on Displacement, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change, the Guiding Principles for Early Recovery and, the IASC Framework on Durable Solutions. On a regional level, the Framework for Pacific Regionalism, the SAMOA Pathway, and the FRDP are emphasized.

283 Vanuatu National Disaster Management Office NDMO, “Vanuatu National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement.”

284 Vanuatu National Disaster Management Office NDMO. In the policy a comprehensive list of relevant national policy documents is provided in annex D (p. 53).

285 Vanuatu National Disaster Management Office NDMO.

286 Vanuatu National Disaster Management Office NDMO.

287 Vanuatu National Disaster Management Office NDMO.

288 Vanuatu National Disaster Management Office NDMO.

289 Vanuatu National Disaster Management Office NDMO.

- *“The strength probably lies in the area where the newly enacted displacement policy offers some form of protection to communities that are being displaced or relocated. The weakness is the policy is not specific to the many different cultures of the various islands in Vanuatu” (Pac33).*

The National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement is not the only document from the government which makes references to HMCCC while addressing human rights. The People’s Plan 2030 touches on the topic of human mobility from a societal aspect, addressing efforts to build resilience and adaptive capacities.²⁹⁰ Both documents explicitly include or promote human rights, including gender equality.

As briefly discussed above in the case of the NDMO, inadequate human resources affect the management of HMCCC in Vanuatu. An academic described Vanuatu’s legal and policy framework to address HMCCC as “very strong” while emphasising at the same time that “*there is limited capacity to implement laws and policies*” in terms of financial, technical, and human resources (Pac30). Several interviewees from government agencies and non-governmental organisations alike discussed how insufficient resources affect the implementation of the new policy. A government employee, for instance, stated: “*What is written on the policy is very good, but we lack the resources to implement it*” (Pac34).

There are some mechanisms in place for people to obtain assistance in the aftermath of a disaster. These include planting materials or shelter kits (Pac32). One expert talked about food provision:

- *“The Food security cluster is led by the department of agriculture and they encourage people to replant and it is also providing the planting materials, tips on how to earn some money after disaster, they even go as far as providing chicks and also seedlings” (Pac34).*

5.5. Mapping Obstacles and Building Blocks for HMCCC People-Centred Planning

The analysis of relevant national policy documents from Fiji, Kiribati, Tuvalu and Vanuatu shows that promising policy developments to address climate-induced human mobility are underway. Awareness of the need to address HMCCC exists in all countries. Referring to several extreme events, an interviewee summarised that “*people around the Pacific have stood up and taken notice that when faced with these issues, they need to act, the strength is the communication and the awareness made by some member countries is good*” (Pac19). The same respondent also gave the example of how disaster response teams of the Pacific Community (SPC) provided assistance in Vanuatu in the aftermath of Tropical Cyclone Pam (Pac19).

At the same time, disasters may also create tensions in the region. A government employee from Fiji discussed how institutional capacity building to address and manage HMCCC within the country is rather challenging and Fiji’s capacities might be overstrained if having to handle cases from abroad:

- *“All capacities and even our laws need to be worked in. It’s almost like an overhaul in how you do things, you are really challenging the way the state handles migration like an ordinary situation. In extraordinary situations where climate change is involved, where people will be asking to enter your borders, to protect the interest of the state and looking after your welfare and responsibility to care for the others, it’s going to be a bit sensitive for Fiji to adhere to” (Pac08).*

Policy Gaps

Despite the comparative advancement of policy development on HMCCC in the region, several regional informants outlined weaknesses in responding to disasters. This may be due to lack of financial resources (Pac15), problems to disseminate information or warnings to remote places (Pac15), missing technical capacities or expertise (Pac19), inefficient coordination structures (Pac15), or poorly managed transportation when providing aid (Pac15).

290 Government of the Republic of Vanuatu, “Vanuatu 2030 The People’s Plan: National Sustainable Development Plan 2016 to 2030” (Port Vila, Vanuatu: Department of Strategic Policy, Planning and Aid Coordination, Republic of Vanuatu), accessed August 8, 2019, <https://www.gov.vu/attachments/article/26/Vanuatu2030-EN-FINAL-sf.pdf>.

One interviewee talked about his experience in disaster coordination with external partners, saying that some of them “want to run the show or they think they should be the lead agency”, and he emphasises that the NDMO of the respective country should lead (Pac19). According to an expert in climate change adaptation,

- *“Fiji is making an effort to improve infrastructure and be better at disseminating information and warnings but because of the geographical isolation of some islands there is still more work to be done to disseminate information to these remote places in a more timely and efficient manner, and to improve transport and efficiency in providing relief and aid” (Pac15).*

One expert also addressed the “[l]ack of resources to build back better as opposed to a quick fix to get people back into shelter” as a weakness in current disaster response (Pac16). As discussed in the country-specific insights, insufficient resources are major barriers to policy implementation of climate change and disaster displacement policies in all focus countries.

Gender-Sensitive Approaches

Girls and women are particularly vulnerable in times of crisis. Gendered vulnerabilities, thus, need to be addressed in policies as well as in practice on HMCCC. Why gender matters in climate change is summarised by Margaret Alston:

- *“It matters because the experiences of women and men during and after times of climate crisis are different – a difference based on cultural norms and practices, on work roles and access to resources, on safety and security and on different levels of vulnerability resulting from a combination of these factors.”²⁹¹*

Awareness about gender differences during and in the aftermaths of disasters seems to exist at NDMOs across the Pacific according to a security advisor: “every NDMO across the region, at the operation level they are very aware of the different needs between men, women and children in times of disaster” (Pac19). Generally, though, respondents were

rather hesitant to discuss gender, even if asked explicitly about the situation of women and girls, or answered in more general terms (“there needs to be more dialogue about these rights”) (Pac03). Gender and human rights both are topics that are rather sensitive which may partly explain why informants were hesitant to respond or give detailed accounts. Some informants referred to global agreements such as the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which all focus are parties to,²⁹² or Beijing+25 (Pac08).

An issue of concern seems to be women’s sexual and reproductive health in the aftermath of a disaster: “Due to the reduced household income they did not have enough money to buy items such as sanitary pads” (Pac18). An NGO expert also discussed a case in Maéwo, Vanuatu, where “the health facility was not equipped to cater for the pregnant women who had relocated there” (Pac25). The same expert also summarised that post-disaster assessments have shown that the needs of women and children differ and that their needs were not always addressed sufficiently (Pac25). An expert from Vanuatu discussed operational procedures in the aftermath of a disaster:

- *“Whenever there is a disaster, including displacement of people, the gender and protection cluster always brings up the right of women, women and everyone that is being displaced, their security, making sure that wherever they are there should be some means for protection for example; in rural communities just going to the bathroom is risky for some women, hence there should be some lightings or whatever for the security of women. So therefore security of women is always brought up whenever there is disaster or displacement” (Pac34).²⁹³*

292 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Status of Ratification. Interactive Dashboard,” 2019, <https://indicators.ohchr.org>.

293 Asked why it is dangerous, the expert replied: “It could be going to the bathroom or just fetching water, it could be risky for women because, for instance, for displaced people it’s not your village so a human being living in a new environment you will obviously develop that fear so we want to protect them and the gender and protection cluster always make sure that there should be lightings and always make sure that whoever is going to fetch water can be accompanied by someone older just for protection. I’m saying fetching of water because, I don’t know much in other parts of the world, but here in the Pacific fetching of water is mostly done by girls/women so this is why we want somebody to accompany them to fetch water because anything can happen and the rape rate in Vanuatu is quite high as well so we try to protect them as much as we can” (Pac34).

291 Margaret Alston, “Introducing Gender and Climate Change: Research, Policy and Action.” In, “Research, Action and Policy: Addressing the Gendered Impacts of Climate Change, ed. Margaret Alston and Kerri Whittenbury (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer, 2013), 3–14.

As discussed above, both Fiji’s Planned Relocation Guideline and Vanuatu’s National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement make explicit and detailed references to gender. In Kiribati, experts noted a limited awareness of human rights, including the rights of women. There is a gap on research which explicitly addresses gendered vulnerabilities in the context of climate-induced human mobility in the Pacific.

Data Gaps

Deficiencies and challenges in data management have been mentioned throughout the interviews by experts from all focus countries. Even if available, informants said that data is dispersed or difficult to access (Pac19).

In Fiji, there seems to be an agreement from those interviewed that data relevant to displacement, planned relocation, and migration is lacking. An academic said that data on HMCCC is “almost non-existent” (Pac03), while another academic emphasised the difficulty to get data from the government (Pac15). One interviewee said there is no database in place for locally displaced people in Fiji (Pac01). A government official shared that data collection

on HMCCC is a real challenge given how understaffed they are.²⁹⁴ An officer from a ministry stated that “[t]here should be a database where all the data and research that has been conducted to be available. It also minimises the problem of replicating projects which has been done in the past” (Pac09). Another government employee indicated his support for a database while at the same time stressing data protection concerns: “Some data that is not for public viewing” (Pac05). The Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (IVA) seems to have been helpful in detecting and closing some data gaps, but data may not be openly available (Pac01).

In Kiribati, the National Statistics Office has data on human mobility (Pac11, Pac13). Informants from Kiribati were not aware of data linking human mobility and climate change (Pac11, Pac13, Pac14). One informant working in a key government agency stated that there is a need to understand internal migration trends and that this information could also be useful for development plans (Pac11). Existing data is fragmented (Pac11, Pac13, Pac14), or data collectors

294 This insight was shared in a GIZ project workshop on HMCCC in Much, Germany, on June 25, 2019, in which representatives from several PICs gave their opinion on preliminary results from the interviews conducted for this study.

Overview of Starting Points to Improve Data on HMCCC




Figure 5



Vunidogola – Fiji (© GIZ)

are not willing to share data (Pac11, Pac13). A meteorology expert pointed to the fact that the country only has five operational weather stations even though it covers a vast area in the Pacific Ocean (Pac14).

Tuvalu tracks migration data of the Pacific Access Categories (Pac21) and conducts a census every 10 years (Pac24). According to one informant the “immigration [department] does not capture people who have moved for good” (Pac21). The same informant also emphasised that there is a need to clarify within the government what HMCCC really means and how to distinguish people falling in that category from others (Pac21).

In Vanuatu, informants said that migration data is both lacking and difficult to assess (Pac26, Pac27, Pac28, Pac32, Pac33), or may be outdated (Pac26). There seems to be no central database for inter-island mobility and internal return migration (Pac28). One informant shared that census data and data from other sources (statistics office, population count on the ground) do not match (Pac26). Census figures from 2009 are the most recent reliable statistics on migration in the country (Pac26, Pac32). This might have severe consequences when disasters strike as indicated by one informant: “In the aftermath of [Tropical Cyclone] Pam, which hit Vanuatu in 2015, the government had to rely on 2009 census data to estimate the number of people living in the islands that were severely affected by

[Tropical Cyclone] Pam” (Pac27). After Tropical Cyclone Pam the Vanuatu National Statistics Office released a “Mini-Census Report”.²⁹⁵ In the foreword, minister Gaetan Piklouné explains that some changes in data collection were introduced which intend to “improve the information available to assist with disaster preparedness and response”.²⁹⁶

In sum, data collection, data availability and data management are all issues that need to be addressed in Fiji, Kiribati, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. As opposed to many others, one regional expert was of the opinion that most of the data is available and that it is rather a problem of data management and missing research (Pac17). The expert gave the example of a missing nexus between existing projections on sea level rise and census data, concluding that a linkage could provide important information on vulnerable communities under different climate change scenarios (Pac17). International actors like GIZ or IOM seem to contribute to closing the knowledge gap, for instance through IOM’s displacement tracking metrics in the aftermath of disasters (Pac18).²⁹⁷

295 Vanuatu National Statistics Office (VNSO), “2016 Post-TC Pam Mini-Census Report. Vol.1. Republic of Vanuatu.”

296 Vanuatu National Statistics Office (VNSO).

297 Data has been collected after Tropical Cyclones Pam, Winston, and Gita at the request of governments (Pac18).

Research

HMCCC, as a new scientific and political field, gives space for plenty of research gaps. Some scientific insights exist, especially from a more general perspective, but specific and applicable knowledge is rather rare which hinders successful practices (Pac11, Pac14). Several interviewees from different regions in the Pacific identified the lack of data as a reason for this gap. The lack of data is often influenced by missing monitoring and evaluation practices. Research gaps that have been identified differ from country to country.

Respondents from Kiribati stressed research gaps in the field of internal migration trends (Pac11, Pac12), health impacts and food security (Pac13). Kiribati and Vanuatu are both interested in the “*effectiveness of the different interventions by the different development partners*” (Pac13, Pac25).

Interviewees from Tuvalu identified research gaps in the field of psychology and long-term planning. Psychological and “*scientific, social and economic studies*” are required (Pac22). Questions were raised that address the long-term future of Tuvalu: “*How do we create another Tuvalu within New Zealand or Australia, for example*” (Pac21) and “*Also our EEZ, if we are to move somewhere else who is to own our EEZ.*” (Pac21).

A focus on relocation and land issues was noted by interviewees from Vanuatu. Mapping land for relocation (Pac26, Pac31, Pac34) and rights, security and employment issues (Pac25, Pac32, Pac34) were identified as research gaps. Furthermore, interviewees noted that the research should include local people (Pac29) and particular vulnerable areas (Pac32). Many research gaps in Vanuatu underline the importance of inclusiveness through a good resource allocation to provincial people (Pac25), mediation between sending and receiving parties (Pac26), integration of particular exposed regions (Pac32), and disaster management (Pac26, Pac34).

In the Pacific, health impacts of HMCC generally seem to be important areas in which more research is needed (Pac15). In the case of Fiji, conditions for conducting research on changing indicators of health, however, are rather challenging. A representative from a Fijian national agency talked about a research gap that was detected in projects on the effects of climate change within and on the health sector. It seems that there is a “*lack of historical data*

in terms of indicators of diseases” (Pac01). Referring to the Pacific in general, an academic voiced the need to conduct more qualitative studies “*where the Pacific voices, particularly that of affected communities, are heard, recorded and documented*” (Pac15). This may also provide insights about the overall situation of communities at relocation sites, for instance whether they were able to continue with their traditional livelihoods or practices (Pac15).

Communication and Coordination between Stakeholders on HMCCC

Given the interdisciplinary nature of HMCCC, functioning channels of communication as well as effective institutional mechanisms of coordination are critical. Several regional key informants addressed the need to improve communication and/or coordination mechanism between relevant stakeholders in the field (Pac16, Pac18). While recognising the work of the NDMOs as “*proactive and effective in their roles despite the limited resources*”, one interviewee emphasised that better coordination in projects is needed among the relevant stakeholders, also because government manpower is limited (Pac18). Referring to the cross-cutting aspects of HMCCC, another interviewee said that this issue should not be limited to NDMOs or climate change departments (Pac16). An academic referring to Fiji noted that the “*various sectors within government that are vital to the process of moving people [...] may not be aware of the need to be involved to ensure the continuity of the relocated communities*” (Pac15). The same respondent also referred to the very nature of a project-based working environment and how this translates into double efforts:

— “*There is no proper coordination/communication/collaboration between relevant stakeholders which results in overlap in projects rather than a combined effort. Most projects are also driven by funding and may result in studies or projects that may have already been conducted or may result in work being done independently of other relevant stakeholder*” (Pac15).

This view was shared by another expert (Pac18).

5.6. Recommendations for the Pacific

While Pacific policymakers and practitioners are relatively new to dealing with climate change and human mobility questions, one could say they have faced baptism by fire: the displacement and relocation of Pacific islanders is one of the most visible and publicly recognised law and policy issue related to climate change and human mobility in the world today. Based on the results of this study, Pacific governments and their partners recognise that their efforts to deal with the human dimensions of climate change are relatively advanced in some areas, such as the successful inclusion of language about loss and damage, planned relocations, and cultural identity into relevant regional and international forums and agreements. Pacific officials have advocated passionately for the voice of the Pacific islands with the result that they have a disproportionate weight in climate change negotiations relative to their countries' small population sizes. However, national and regional actors also recognise their deficiencies in other areas, especially in the implementation of frameworks to deal with movements in the context of gradual environmental and climatic changes, as well as monitoring and evaluation.

Compared to the other study areas considered for this report, regional discussions specifically focusing on HMCCC are relatively advanced and have had recent leaps forward. This is largely due to attention to Pacific SIDS in the on-going processes in the framework of the UNFCCC – including, for example, specific policy recommendations discussed at the Suva expert dialogue²⁹⁸ – as well as through other notable capacity building projects and workshops led by the United Nations,²⁹⁹ the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS),³⁰⁰ and GIZ.³⁰¹

This section will not repeat policy advice from the forums noted above. Instead, the main goal of this section is to offer suggestions for the target countries in operationalising the two main relevant policy roadmaps applicable at the national and multilateral levels, namely: the work and recent recommendations from the Report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage, especially the recommendations in paragraphs 51(q), (s), and (t),³⁰² and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, in particular, objectives 2 and 5.³⁰³ Priority areas are expressed at the regional level and then for the four countries studied.

Core Recommendations at the Regional Level

Given the current path, solutions for climate change and human mobility are highly likely to be pursued at the regional level. This is of particular importance in the Pacific, where the practical and legal understanding of boundaries and community are less linked to national citizenship-based identity, as compared to other areas considered for this study. The main challenge is therefore to ensure integrative and coherent approaches across the countries in the region in the implementation of relevant frameworks, in particular, in the post-2015 Agenda (especially the goals agreed in the Paris Agreement, The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030,³⁰⁴ and the Sustainable Development Goals).

The interviews carried out in the Pacific for this study indicate that the barriers to executing plans for improving or accelerating financing of technical capacities, and knowledge transfers appear to have captured the attention of the actor network on human mobility and climate change. This reality has created a non-negligible phenomena which could be called “consultation fatigue”. In other words, more flexible financing and concrete project with multi-lateral and bilateral donors would be needed to move from discussion to action and to further energise the actor-stakeholder community. This means funding for projects which enable different actions at different levels of govern-

298 UNFCCC Secretariat, “Report of the Suva Expert Dialogue,” 2018, <https://unfccc.int/documents/182364>.

299 Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), “Pacific Climate Change and Migration Project,” accessed August 14, 2019, <https://www.unescap.org/subregional-office/pacific/pacific-climate-change-and-migration-project>.

300 International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Climate Change and Migration Project Launched to Protect, Empower Pacific Communities,” International Organization for Migration, March 26, 2019, <https://www.iom.int/news/climate-change-and-migration-project-launched-protect-empower-pacific-communities>.

301 GIZ has been working to develop scenarios for HMCCC with key actors in the region. See: <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/regional-scenario-workshop-human-mobility-and-climate-change-pacific>.

302 UNFCCC Secretariat, “Report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts,” 2018, <https://unfccc.int/documents/183233>.

303 United Nations General Assembly, “Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration” (New York, USA, 2019), paragraphs 18 and 21.

304 UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, “Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030” (Geneva, Switzerland: UNISDR, 2015), <https://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications/43291>.

ment, as well as working to promote coordination and complementarity between them. In the discussions held at COP24 (2018), significant attention was paid to deficiencies in developing capacity building, technology transfers, and response measures, inter alia. Notably, several countries remarked concerns over the lack of clarity on the interaction and effectiveness of the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and of the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), and called for more attention to sustainable funding to its functions as well as to the technical requests submitted to the CTCN.³⁰⁵

A successful approach entails addressing the issue from all angles while simultaneously reducing donor fatigue, enhancing long-term local buy-in, avoiding duplicated or contradicting efforts, and facilitating continued coordination across stakeholders. In order to foster effective governance of HMCCC in the Pacific, the objective of regional coordination must be the integration of strategies, policies and actions between ministries or departments, across different governance levels. Local communities, who will themselves be the source of solutions, should be integrated in the processes. In particular, these coordinated, integrative efforts and plan implementation can be facilitated through regular exchange on National Adaptation Plans (NAPS) as well as through the forums provided by the constituted bodies under the UNFCCC regime [i.e. the Executive Committee of Warsaw International Mechanism, the Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG), the Paris Committee on Capacity Building (PCCB), the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN)].

While this section has focused on two key roadmaps, countries in the Pacific should sustain their engagement in forums at the regional and international levels, such as those mentioned earlier in this chapter, as well as the International Migration Review Forum (IMRF), the Platform on Disaster Displacement, and the Asia-Pacific Migration and Environment Network (APMEN).

National Level

The reports of the Suva expert dialogue indicate that while a fruitful discussion was held, it focused heavily on the regional and international processes. More insights, best

practices, and concrete ideas for the national level are needed. National authorities have the primary or exclusive role in a few essential areas:

- Developing NAPs
- Establishing public-private-partnerships (PPPs) to develop insurance products, promote migration skill partnerships, and facilitate technology transfers, among other support systems to manage climate-related risk;
- Establish migration policy, promote bilateral and multilateral migration agreements, and develop skills partnerships (such as the Global Skills Partnership envisaged by the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration).
- Share good practices with partners through the forums noted above.

FIJI

Fiji is a regional leader in addressing HMCCC, at least in part due to the policy and capacity development around the Planned Relocation Guidelines (2018). With that auspicious position comes the responsibility to provide technical and policy support to its regional partners, share good practices, and continue to develop and implement frameworks and guidelines related to HMCC.

Some priority areas for Fiji include to:

- Share good practices and models at regional and international levels, such as through the voluntary reviews of the implementation of the Global Compact on Migration, participation in the International Migration Review Forum (IMRF), and regular communications with the UN Migration Network (as envisaged in para. 51(v) of the 2018 report of the Task Force on Displacement). For example, Fijian practitioners and civil society members can share experiences in expert briefings to the UN Migration Network, at the IMRF, and at meetings of UNFCCC bodies.
- Lead by example. The implementation of Fiji’s guidelines on planned relocation after developing standard operation procedures can provide valuable lessons for the country and region. As a next step, Fiji can further mainstream migration, displacement, and relocation into its National Adaptation Plan (NAP). Building on the acknowledgement of these forms of mobility in the

³⁰⁵ Jennifer Allan et al., “Summary of the Katowice Climate Change Conference: 2–15 December 2018,” *Earth Negotiations Bulletin* 12, no. 747, COP24 Final (December 18, 2018): 1–34.

current NAP,³⁰⁶ Fiji can further include concrete plans to: increase safe pathways for migration, as a positive option to adapt to climate change; monitor and evaluate the migratory dimensions of its NAP; identify and communicate specific technical and capacity gaps through requests to the CTCN.

- Develop adequate monitoring and evaluation systems. This will help ensure policies and programmes attain their intended effects, and will provide valuable learnings to other countries in the region. In order for policies addressing HMCCC to be successful, participation of affected communities from all stages of the policy cycle is critical, including in the monitoring and evaluating stage. Sharing and reviewing migration experiences across the region and communicating them to international partners is an important component of this, and can also be highlighted through the platforms provided by voluntary review mechanisms, UNFCCC bodies and expert groups, and the IMRF.
- Improve communications and coordination. Several experts interviewed for this study noted a need for better inter-ministerial coordination and communication in Fiji.

A newly-established UN-led climate change and migration project could also be a helpful vehicle for policy implementation, as well as for exchange of good practices with Kiribati, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and others.³⁰⁷

KIRIBATI

This study demonstrated that climate-mobility linkages have been recognised by many policy actors in Kiribati. However, attachment to land and the limitations to international migration are key challenges. Migration internally – especially to Tarawa and Kiritimati – is increasingly risky as population pressures grow.

The government and its partners, and particularly with international donors, can work on a few top priority areas:

- Develop policies, plans and strategies specifically on climate change and human mobility;
- Clarify and communicate plans for land purchased in Vanua Levu in due course, with particular attention to the implications on current knowledge and international standards related to planned relocations, cultural identity, nationality, and livelihoods;
- Expand DRR and resilience building efforts in Tarawa;
- Develop and expand – to the extent possible, given available labour gaps – planned migration to regional neighbours;
- Simultaneously, develop and expand programmes that help make I-Kiribati migrants more attractive on the international labour market, such as targeted skills and vocational training (via, for example, analogues to the ‘Pacific Qualification Framework and Regional Education Framework’ as well as via the ‘Global Skills Partnership’ envisaged in the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration);
- Ensure specific allocations for development projects targeting women, children, people with disabilities, and other marginalised or particularly vulnerable groups.

TUVALU

Tuvaluan policy actors demonstrate an increasing awareness of attention to HMCCC. While international mobility has been the focus of much of the interviewees quoted in this report, this study also exposes the risk that attention to climate-related migration should not come at the expense of regular national development and resilience-building efforts. Empirical research suggests that the majority of current environment-related migration in Tuvalu is rural-urban labour migration to Funafuti, not to international destinations.³⁰⁸ In part as a result of this increased population density and organic urban growth, resources available in the capital cannot keep pace with the need for water, safe housing, and services. The city has also become an area at risk, as noted above, in particular because of the potential impacts of extreme weather and spring tides.

Disaster risk reduction efforts are a main weakness currently in Tuvalu. Such efforts will, by their nature, also help to protect people on the move as well as to preserve the right to stay. Building on insights from a previous

306 Government of the Republic of Fiji, “Republic of Fiji National Adaptation Plan: A Pathway towards Climate Resilience.”

307 International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Climate Change and Migration Project Launched to Protect, Empower Pacific Communities.”

308 Milan, Oakes, and Campbell, “Tuvalu,” 66.

project,³⁰⁹ the newly-established UN-led climate change and migration project mentioned above may be a helpful vehicle to further explore this question and implement ideas related to HMCCC.³¹⁰

The government and its partners, and particularly with international donors, can work on a few top priority areas:

- Develop policies, plans and strategies on climate change and human mobility;
- Develop livelihood options as well as service provision, accessibility, and communications on the outer islands;
- Develop employment in alternative urban and peri-urban areas (called “secondary cities” in other contexts), to absorb some of the pressures of migration on Funafuti;
- Develop and expand – to the extent possible, given available labour gaps – seasonal work programmes to regional neighbours, such as those already in place for Australia and New Zealand;
- Simultaneously, develop and expand programmes that help make Tuvaluans more attractive on the international labour market, such as targeted skills and vocational training (via, for example, analogues to the ‘Pacific Qualification Framework and Regional Education Framework’ as well as via the ‘Global Skills Partnership’ envisaged in the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration);
- Ensure specific allocations for development projects targeted for women, children, people with disabilities, and other marginalised or particularly vulnerable groups.

Drawbacks to inter-ministerial communication and coordination were noted as a key deficiency in Tuvalu in this study. Moreover, in its work to address the key priority areas noted here, Tuvalu and its partners should work to:

- Expand CSO participation where possible, as it is critical to the effective functioning of government;

- Work together to ensure regular communications between governmental departments, including through projects to stock-take and expand information and technology (ICT) infrastructure;

While Tuvalu is well integrated in international discussions, at the UNFCCC in particular, regional integration should also be expanded, in part because solutions to climate-related human mobility may come from regional cooperation. Tuvalu should therefore continue to be engaged in the activities noted in the previous section. In particular, Tuvalu should continue to work through the NAP process.

VANUATU

Vanuatu is relatively advanced in the region in terms of HMCCC governance, due to the recent launch of the National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement (2018). A new UN-led project should also add to efforts to address the issue.³¹¹ In implementing the policy and project, the government should continue attention to:

- Develop livelihood options as well as service provision, housing, infrastructure, and communications infrastructure across the country and especially in outer islands;
- Develop resilience and DRR in Port Villa, Port Havannah, and Mele;
- Develop and expand – to the extent possible, given available labour gaps – seasonal work programmes and other forms of planned migration;
- Simultaneously, develop and expand targeted skills programmes and vocational training
- Ensure specific allocations for development projects targeted for women, children, people with disabilities, and other marginalised or particularly vulnerable groups.

309 Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), “Pacific Climate Change and Migration Project.”

310 International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Climate Change and Migration Project Launched to Protect, Empower Pacific Communities.”

311 International Organization for Migration (IOM).

The Philippines

Human Mobility Policies in the Context of Climate Change in the Philippines

6.1. Introduction: Human Mobility in the Philippines

When mapping patterns of human mobility in the Philippines, both international and internal movements are important phenomena to look at. Out of a total population of approximately 104.9 million, nearly 5.4% of Filipinos live abroad.³¹² Of those, 2.3 million people in 2017 were classified in the category of migrant workers known as Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs), representing over 2.1% of the total population of the Philippines.³¹³ Of nations with the highest proportion of its citizenry abroad, the country ranks in the top ten.³¹⁴

Internal – and especially inter-provincial – human mobility also constitutes a significant phenomenon in the Philippines.

Based on the Census of Population and Household (CPH) data from 2010, approximately 2.9 million Filipinos changed residence between 2005 and 2010.³¹⁵ In that period, 50.4% were long distance movers (measured by change of province) and 45.4% were short distance movers (measured by change of city), while just 4.2% had moved

internationally.³¹⁶ Rural and agricultural poverty,³¹⁷ the draw of urban areas,³¹⁸ violent conflict,³¹⁹ social and kinship networks,³²⁰ and natural disasters are among the main factors contributing to the decision to migrate in the Philippines.

Consistent with observed trends in other developing countries, the rate of women migrants has increased substantially in recent decades, particularly for rural-urban movements and for international labour migration.³²¹ Women represent approximately 64.7% of all Filipinos abroad³²² and over 53.6% of OFWs.³²³ The ratio of international migrants that are women is significantly higher than the global average of 47.9%.³²⁴ For both internal and international migrants, women are more often in domestic housework or childcare sectors and less often in manual labour

312 Calculated as 5.7 million out of 104.9 million. Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), "International Migrant Stock: The 2017 Revision."

313 Approximately 2.3 million out of 104.918 million, or 2.1%. Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA), "Total Number of OFWs Estimated at 2.3 Million (Results from the 2018 Survey on Overseas Filipinos)," 2019, <https://psa.gov.ph/statistics/survey/labor-and-employment/survey-overseas-filipinos>.

314 OECD et al., "2019 International Migration and Displacement Trends and Policies Report to the G20" (Paris: OECD, 2019), <https://www.oecd.org/migration/mig/G20-migration-and-displacement-trends-and-policies-report-2019.pdf>.

315 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), "Overview of Internal Migration in Philippines," 2017, <https://bangkok.unesco.org/sites/default/files/assets/article/Social%20and%20Human%20Sciences/publications/philippines.pdf>.

316 Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA), "2017 Survey on Overseas Filipinos (Results from the 2017 Survey on Overseas Filipinos) | Philippine Statistics Authority," 2018, <https://psa.gov.ph/content/2017-survey-overseas-filipinos-results-2017-survey-overseas-filipinos>.

317 International Organization for Migration (IOM), "Country Migration Report: The Philippines 2013," 2013, <https://publications.iom.int/books/country-migration-report-philippines-2013>.

318 Philippines Statistics Authority (PSA), "Domestic and International Migrants in the Philippines (Results from the 2010 Census) | Philippine Statistics Authority," 2012, <https://psa.gov.ph/content/domestic-and-international-migrants-philippines-results-2010-census>; Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA), "Urban Barangays in the Philippines (Based on 2010 CPH)," 2013, <https://psa.gov.ph/content/urban-barangays-philippines-based-2010-cph>.

319 IDMC, "Disaster-Induced Internal Displacement in the Philippines. The Case of Tropical Storm Washi/Sendong" (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre – Norwegian Refugee Council, 2013); IDMC, "The Evolving Picture of Displacement in the Wake of Typhoon Haiyan: An Evidence-Based Overview," 2014.


320 Agnes R Quisumbing and Scott Mcniven, "Migration and the Rural-Urban Continuum: Evidence from Bukidnon, Philippines," *Philippine Journal of Development PJD* 33 (2006): 43.

321 Quisumbing and Mcniven.

322 Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), "International Migrant Stock: The 2017 Revision."

323 Philippines Statistics Authority (PSA), "Domestic and International Migrants in the Philippines (Results from the 2010 Census) | Philippine Statistics Authority."

324 Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), "International Migrant Stock: The 2019 Revision," 2019, <https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates17.asp>.



Lake Sebu – Philippines (© Jorge S. Ebay)

or transportation. While women previously represented a lower share of rural-urban migrant workers – perhaps due to their relative lack of formal education and skills as compared to men, as well as to social and cultural norms and obligations – women have more recently become above half of rural-urban migrants.³²⁵ The macro view of women and migration was reinforced by the expert interviews conducted for this study.

— *“...[M]igration has already been feminised. Because the land is being subdivided [In farming communities], that is reducing the land for farming. So if you have five children with two or three males, [they] would usually remain in the communities while the females would leave and find work outside the community. So they will migrate, either within or outside the country... [Women are] better educated as well. Since the 1970, the number of women who finished schooling has increased. We can observe the same trend up to now” (Ph04).*

The latest information from the 2018 National Migration Survey (NMS) considers migration in the past five years, providing an update on the longer-term trends represented in the census data. According to the initial findings from the NMS, 15 % of Filipinos have migrated between 2013 – 2018.³²⁶ Most moved between and across regions, especially to the capital and nearby Calabarzon region; the Eastern Visayas; and Davao.

Reflecting the important linkages between education and migration highlighted by the key informant cited above, education levels appear to be a limiting factor in migrant destinations – or, put differently, education enhances the opportunities available to prospective migrants. Of recent internal migrants in the Philippines, 28 % have some college education. In comparison, 50 % of people with recent international migration experience and 65 % of people with both internal and international mobility experience have some college education.³²⁷

325 Quisumbing and Mcniven, “Migration and the Rural-Urban Continuum: Evidence from Bukidnon, Philippines.”

326 Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) and University of the Philippines Population Institute (UPPI), “2018 National Migration Survey: Key Findings” (Quezon City, Philippines: PSA and UPPI, 2019).

327 Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) and University of the Philippines Population Institute (UPPI).

BACKGROUND FOR THIS CHAPTER

In the Philippines, climatological, meteorological and hydrological disasters already create significant economic damage and lead to the suffering of millions of affected people.³²⁸ It has also been observed that the cumulative, erosive effects of multiple disasters over time can aggravate structural inequalities and contribute to migration propensities.³²⁹ This changing character of drivers of mobility in the Philippines creates new challenges for protection, assistance, and resilience of Filipino families. As a result of climate change, previous ways of addressing human mobility have to change to meet these new challenges. Yet, the evidence base required for effective government action is currently limited, in particular, with regard to slow-onset hazards and climate events.

Presently, there are no laws or policies that directly address human mobility in the context of climate change. However, frameworks and bodies exist for climate change and disaster risk, especially those relying on R.A. 9729 and R.A. 10121, described in detail below. The country also has an extensive and advanced institutional infrastructure in place to address the needs of people before, during, and after displacement. As the evidence gathered for this baseline study demonstrates, important stakeholders from governmental and non-governmental organisations acknowledge the importance of addressing climate-induced human mobility and are positioned to advance the issue. However, important actors called for more research and evidence to be generated to guide leaders, policy actors, and decision makers.

Information Base of the Philippines Chapter

The present chapter of this baseline study is based on the existing literature and the expert interviews conducted for this study. A total of 27 participants were involved through ten individual interviews and two focus groups discussions. The individual interviews (six females, four males) included: an expert in agricultural policy and programming, two specialists in human mobility in humanitarian contexts, a demographer, an expert on human rights and internal displacement, a demographic policy and programming specialist, an expert on coastal resilience, a climate change policy and programming specialist, and two climate policy researchers.

OVERVIEW OF INTERVIEW PARTNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES		
Type	Interviewee No.	Sum
Residents/Focus Group Discussion Participants	Phil18 – 27	10
Personnel of Ministries and Other Central National Bodies	Phil01, Phil06, Phil08, Phil11 – 14, Phil16, Phil17	9
Researcher/Academic	Phil04, Phil09, Phil10	3
Intergovernmental Organisation	Phil02, Phil03, Phil05	3
Non-Governmental-Organisation	Phil07	1
Personnel of Provincial or Municipal Bodies	Phil15	1
Total		27

A focus group with seven participants (five females, two males) from the Regional Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (RDRRMC) of Region VI was conducted specifically to understand shared responsibilities and goals for disaster response. Finally, ten residents (five females, five males) of Sitio Lamsabuy, Barangay Tasima, Lake Sebu, South Cotabato were invited for a focus group discussion to delve into community-wide changes and issues.

328 IDMC, “The Evolving Picture of Displacement in the Wake of Typhoon Haiyan: An Evidence-Based Overview”; IDMC, “Disaster-Induced Internal Displacement in the Philippines. The Case of Tropical Storm Washi/Sendong.”

329 IDMC, “Disaster-Induced Internal Displacement in the Philippines. The Case of Tropical Storm Washi/Sendong.”



Lake Sebu – Philippines (© Jorge S. Ebay)

Background: Migration in the Philippines

Historically, migration propensities in the Philippines can be attributed to the geographic and the archipelagic characteristics of the country. The riverine set up of pre-colonial Philippine communities facilitated movement to search for food, to conduct trade, to intermarry, or to even wage war to conquer other lands. Forced or conscripted labour,³³⁰ settlement of new frontiers,³³¹ overseas work,³³² modernisation³³³ and urbanisation³³⁴ have been important triggers of movement in the Philippines.³³⁵ These elements form part of a more complex tapestry of migration history, which has been especially influenced by the country's long-standing relationships with colonial powers, but also by flows to Mexico, China, and countries in the Middle East.³³⁶

330 Renato Constantino and Letizia R. Constantino, *A History of the Philippines* (NYU Press, 1975).

331 Teodoro A. Agoncillo, *History of the Filipino People*, 8th ed. (Quezon City: Garotech Publishing, 1990), https://www.goodreads.com/work/best_book/2223636-history-of-the-filipino-people.

332 Allen J. Scott, "The Shoe Industry of Marikina City, Philippines: A Developing Country Cluster in Crisis," *Urban/Regional* (University Library of Munich, Germany, November 7, 2005), <https://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwpur/0511003.html>.

333 Alfred W. McCoy, *An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines* (Univ of Wisconsin Press, 2009).

334 Quisumbing and Mcniven, "Migration and the Rural-Urban Continuum: Evidence from Bukidnon, Philippines."

335 Luis H. Francia, "History of the Philippines: From Indios Bravos to Filipinos," 2010, <https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/7869640-history-of-the-philippines>; Juan Antonio Perez III, "On the Move: Current Patterns and Factors of Internal Migration in the Philippines Filipinos," 2016, <https://slideplayer.com/slide/10247958>.

336 OECD, "The Philippines' Migration Landscape," in *Interrelations between Public Policies, Migration and Development in the Philippines*, by OECD and Scalabrini Migration Center (OECD, 2017), 41–65, <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264272286-6-en>.

The 2018 NMS referred to above builds knowledge on recent internal migration in the country, a topic for which there is relatively less evidence as compared to information on international migration. Findings from the NMS suggest that, of those surveyed, only 2% of people who had moved in the past five years migrated internationally. In addition, permanent, intra- and inter-regional migration – especially rural-to-rural flows (46% of the total surveyed) – are significant and outweigh movements to foreign destinations.³³⁷ Interestingly, while both internal and international migrants report seeking employment as the primary motivation for their first move – 46% and 89%, respectively – other motivations gain in importance over time for internal migrants, who cite housing, marriage and education among their motivations.³³⁸ Only 23% of internal migrants cited employment as the main reason for their most recent move, as compared to 84% of international migrants.³³⁹

Despite available information, studies that explicitly explore the relationship between climatic or environmental variabilities and human mobility in the Philippines are scarce.³⁴⁰ The primary gap is the lack of research on indirect ways in which climate change affects movements, namely, by affecting livelihoods and household strategies. In contrast, there are numerous studies related to displacement and humanitarian crisis resulting from a climate-related extreme event.³⁴¹ Developing a greater understanding of both types of movements, as well as the linkages between them, is an important step in designing appropriate policy measures and actions.

337 Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) and University of the Philippines Population Institute (UPPI), "NMS Key Findings."

338 Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) and University of the Philippines Population Institute (UPPI).

339 Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) and University of the Philippines Population Institute (UPPI).

340 Pratikshya Bohra-Mishra et al., "Climate Variability and Migration in the Philippines," *Population and Environment* 38, no. 3 (March 1, 2017): 286–308, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11111-016-0263-x>; F. H. Bordey et al., "Linking Climate Change, Rice Yield and Migration: The Philippine Experience," *Economy and Environment Program for Southeast Asia (EEPSEA) Research Report*, 2013, http://www.eepsea.net/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=450:linking-climate-change-rice-yield-and-migration-the-philippine-experience&Itemid=265.

341 For instance, in a jointly conducted study, more than two hundred assessments and reports came out of Typhoon Yolanda in 2014: IDMC, "The Evolving Picture of Displacement in the Wake of Typhoon Haiyan: An Evidence-Based Overview."

6.2. Climate Change-Related Drivers of Human Mobility in the Philippines

This section briefly summarises potential impacts of climate change on the Philippines, followed by a discussion of the existing empirical evidence on the links with displacement and migration. Climate models suggest a robust warming trend for the Philippines. Mean temperatures are expected to rise by between 0.9°C to 1.1°C by 2020 and 1.8°C to 2.2°C by mid-century. Evidence suggests the months of March, April and May, in particular, are getting hotter.³⁴² Temperature and rainfall patterns are generally expected to be more erratic, more frequent and intense extreme weather events are more likely. Importantly, heat stress will have critical impacts on rice production.³⁴³ The human and economic cost of heat, disasters, health risks, and other climate impacts will be great. If the world continues on a higher-end global emissions path (A2 scenario), the Philippines stands to lose 2.2 % of its GDP every year by 2100.³⁴⁴

The Philippines is expected to face many of the threats climate change represents to developing, coastal, and populous nations of Southeast Asia. In particular, the economic and human costs of extreme weather are already severe and likely to be exacerbated by climate change. Changes to rainfall patterns and distributions, a high degree of water scarcity, more intense droughts and El Niño episodes, and reductions in grasslands due to dryness are among the most severe projected effects. An overall decrease in rainfall accompanied by an increase in days of crop-damaging heavy downpours is expected by between 2020 and 2050 in most parts of the country.³⁴⁵ In addition to the expected reduction in nearly 1 million hectares of grassland due to extended periods of dryness

and heat, the rice grain yield in the Philippines is expected to decline by 10 % for each degree (Celsius) of warming in the minimum growing season temperature.³⁴⁶ Coastal subsidence and erosion, aquifer and agricultural soil contamination, and flooding are also expected to be particularly acute in the Philippines, as the observed sea level is three times higher than the global average due to regional differences in sea-level rise described in the previous chapter. About 60 % of Local Government Units (LGUs) across 64 coastal provinces will face the effects of sea-level rise, leading to an estimated number of 13.6 million Filipinos that may require relocation.³⁴⁷

In a highly mobile society such as in the Philippines, the negative impacts of climate change have the potential to alter existing voluntary and forced migration trends. In addition, scholars hypothesise that yet-to-be-witnessed severe effects of climatic variability, extreme weather, and sea level rise may lead to previously unobserved migration patterns.³⁴⁸ While there is a dearth of empirical research linking migration, displacement, and climate change in the Philippines, there are significant bodies of research investigating these topics separately.³⁴⁹ International migration of Filipinos has been tracked by central bodies and well-studied by academics for decades. Internal displacement is more often tracked by external actors like the UN (Phil05), and there is more limited empirical data available on internal migration (Phil04).³⁵⁰ These words of one interview was echoed by many contacts for this study: “[The government] is looking more at relocation and the displaced people, but not at migration” (Phil04).

342 Government of the Philippines, “Climate Change in the Philippines” Department of Science and Technology Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (n. d.), <http://bagong.pagasa.dost.gov.ph/information/climate-change-in-the-philippines>

343 R. Wassmann et al., “Climate Change Affecting Rice Production: The Physiological and Agronomic Basis for Possible Adaptation Strategies,” in *Advances in Agronomy*, ed. Donald L. Sparks, vol. 101 (Academic Press, 2009), 59–122, [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2113\(08\)00802-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2113(08)00802-X).

344 IPCC, “Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part B: Regional Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change” (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014), <https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2>.

345 Climate Change Commission, “Executive Brief: The Philippine National Climate Change Action Plan Monitoring and Evaluation Report, 2011–2016” (Manila: Climate Change Commission, 2019), <https://climate.gov.ph/our-programs/national-climate-change-action-plan-nccap>.

346 Climate Change Commission; Climate Change Commission, “Climate Change and the Philippines: Executive Brief” (Manila: Climate Change Commission, 2018), https://climate.gov.ph/files/CC_Executive-Brief_V32.compressed.pdf.

347 Climate Change Commission, “Climate Change and the Philippines: Executive Brief.”

348 Kate Burrows and Patrick L. Kinney, “Exploring the Climate Change, Migration and Conflict Nexus,” *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health* 13, no. 4 (April 2016), <https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph13040443>.

349 See for example: R. V. O. Cruz et al., “2017 Philippine Climate Change Assessment: Impacts, Vulnerabilities and Adaptation.” (Pasig City, Philippines: The Oscar M. Lopez Center for Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Management Foundation, Inc. and Climate Change Commission, 2017), <https://climate.gov.ph/files/PhilCCA-WG2.pdf>; Rosa T. Perez, Leoncio A. Amadore, and Renato B. Feir, “Climate Change Impacts and Responses in the Philippines Coastal Sector,” *Climate Research* 12, no. 2–3 (August 27, 1999): 97–107, <https://doi.org/10.3354/cr012097>; Quisumbing and Mcniven, “Migration and the Rural-Urban Continuum: Evidence from Bukidnon, Philippines.”

350 See also: Maruja M. B. Asis, “The Philippines: Beyond Labor Migration, Toward Development and (Possibly) Return,” migrationpolicy.org, July 11, 2017, <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/philippines-beyond-labor-migration-toward-development-and-possibly-return>.

In many of the interviews undertaken for this study, experts referred to Typhoon Haiyan (locally known as Yolanda) when giving examples for lessons learned on HMCCC. Typhoon Haiyan, which made landfall on the Philippines in November 2013, was one of the most powerful tropical cyclones ever recorded. With wind speeds reaching more than 300 km/h, as well as storm surges of more than four metres, Haiyan caused severe damage.³⁵¹ According to the report on Reconstruction Assistance on Haiyan by the Government of the Philippines, nearly 6,000 people were killed, approximately 27,000 were injured, and more than four million Filipinos were displaced.³⁵² Discussing the effects of Haiyan, an interviewee from a prominent intergovernmental agency reported that thousands of families are still in need of support for housing and livelihoods. There is a want for long-term solutions for displaced people in general (Phil03). In addition, a high-ranking staff from a key climate change office mentioned that “[i]n Tacloban again, in areas affected by Yolanda, people continue to stay in areas classified as no-build zones. They are aware of the risk, but because of livelihoods or economic activities, they have difficulty leaving the place” (Phil01).

Consistent with similar findings in other tropical developing countries, episodes of extreme events and temperature increases have had stimulating effects on outmigration, including rural-rural internal migration, while rainfall has had a mixed or limited demonstrated effect.³⁵³ For example, one predominant study demonstrates that a standard deviation increase in temperature in the Philippines corresponds to a 1.16% increase in out-migration, particularly for provinces with the largest rural and agriculture-dependent populations.³⁵⁴ Studies of other regions with already high baseline temperatures suggest that rising temperatures can increasingly have negative effects on crop yields³⁵⁵ and agricultural

exports.³⁵⁶ Agricultural incomes is one of the primary channels through which climate change affects migration of resource-dependent households. As explained by one interviewee, “There are indications [that slow-onset climate events lead to rural-urban migration]... They would prefer to work in urban areas since they can hardly make both ends meet if they rely only in agriculture. They said that agricultural inputs are becoming more expensive, so it is better to work [in urban areas] so that you can get your salaries, even [if you have to work] on a daily basis” (Phil06). For all the climate-related variables it is not known whether there are threshold values from which migration patterns would change nonlinearly. Current literature on environment and migration phenomena from other parts of the world indicates that working-age men with capital necessary to migrate are often those who migrate in the face of resource stress.³⁵⁷ This trend is explained by prevailing migration literature suggesting that in the face of risks, households take economic decisions jointly.³⁵⁸ To supplement agricultural income, some decide to invest in the migration of those members with the highest earning potential and relatively lower household obligations.

Many experts approached for this baseline study made explicit references to the link between the sensitivity of agricultural outputs to climate change and mobility. A key informant from the Climate Change Commission, for instance, discussed the research about the correlation between crop shortfalls and observed increases in human mobility presented in the Philippine Climate Change Assessment as “direct impacts of climate change” (Phil08). Another expert interviewed for this study stressed this point further:

351 The National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), “Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda.” (Pasig City, the Philippines, 2013), <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2013/12dec/20131216-RAY.pdf>.

352 About 1,800 people were still missing (as of December 12 2013), according to The National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA).

353 Bohra-Mishra et al., “Climate Variability and Migration in the Philippines”; Bordey et al., “Linking Climate Change, Rice Yield and Migration: The Philippine Experience.”

354 Bohra-Mishra et al., “Climate Variability and Migration in the Philippines.”

355 Wolfram Schlenker and David B. Lobell, “Robust Negative Impacts of Climate Change on African Agriculture,” *Environmental Research Letters* 5, no. 1 (2010), <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/5/1/014010>.

356 Benjamin F. Jones and Benjamin A. Olken, “Climate Shocks and Exports,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, January 1, 2010), <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1544761>.

357 Richard Black et al., “Demographics and Climate Change: Future Trends and Their Policy Implications for Migration,” working Paper, 2008, <https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2680629>; Paul A. Lewin, Monica Fisher, and Bruce Weber, “Do Rainfall Conditions Push or Pull Rural Migrants: Evidence from Malawi,” *Agricultural Economics* 43, no. 2 (2012): 191–204, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1574-0862.2011.00576.x>; Koko Warner et al., *Where the Rain Falls: Climate Change, Food and Livelihood Security, and Migration* (United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security, 2012), <http://collections.unu.edu/view/UNU:2901>.

358 Ian Scoones, “Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: A Framework for Analysis,” 1998, <https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/123456789/3390>; Oded Stark and David E. Bloom, “The New Economics of Labor Migration,” *The American Economic Review* 75, no. 2 (1985): 173–78.

— “Once the agriculture – the farms – are damaged, the means of livelihood are damaged, temporarily these families would have nothing and would have to look for alternatives. And what happens, as per our observation, is: some of them would migrate to the cities and live with their families and look for jobs in the factories, stay in slum areas, and then we would find out that after a year that they would come back” (Phil03).

This account was not uncommon. One key informant noted “if there is drought and the economy is not moving in a particular rural area, migration may come out later on, let’s say 6 months, or a year, or 2 years after realisation about the effect of climate change” (Phil04).³⁵⁹ Both slow-onset events and sudden-onset hazards can cause crop damage, and the effect of repeated crop failure can lead to migration when coping strategies are exhausted. Another interviewee stated unequivocally: “Typhoons have pushed people out of their communities into the urban areas to look for jobs” (Phil06). As the increased intensity and frequency of storms is likely to influence internal migration to urban areas in particular,³⁶⁰ further evidence in this area could be beneficial to enhance concurrent efforts.

The effect of storms on communities is particularly significant in coastal and riverine areas, where around 60% of the Filipino population lives.³⁶¹ While evidence suggests that natural hazard-induced disasters often result in short-distance internal migration,³⁶² duration of stay varies significantly. Depending on other factors present – such as conflict and structural inequalities – displacement may be short or become protracted. In the Philippines, the impact of social networks appears to be strong. Interviewees noted that temporarily displaced people tend to return quickly to their home communities to assist with the reconstruction,



Lake Sebu – Philippines (© Jorge S. Ebay)

or help financially.³⁶³ One key informant said that “[f]or Filipinos, a social network is important because it could help guarantee your security” (Phil04). According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), the Philippines was the country with the highest number of people displaced by disasters in 2018.³⁶⁴ A whopping 3.8 million new disaster displacements were recorded, roughly the same number as in China. IDMC’s global disaster displacement risk model estimates that, on average, 718,000 people are likely to be displaced by sudden-onset disasters in the Philippines each year, with tropical cyclones accounting for the large majority of these displacements.³⁶⁵ The effects of disasters are having ripples across the society, including in diaspora communities, as evidenced by the increased remittance flows to the Philippines from international migrants in the aftermath of major disaster events.³⁶⁶

359 As demonstrated by Bordey et al., “Linking Climate Change, Rice Yield and Migration: The Philippine Experience.”, changes in rice field and gross revenue per hectare due to extreme weather changes significantly affected overseas migration. The number of total OFWs is observed to increase by 5 persons per thousand population for every 1 metric ton decrease in average yield.

360 Michael Beine and Christopher R Parsons, “Climatic Factors as Determinants of International Migration: Redux,” *CESifo Economic Studies* 63, no. 4 (2017): 368–402, <https://doi.org/10.1093/cesifo/ifx017>.

361 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), “Climate Risk Profile: Philippines,” *Climatelinks*, 2017, <https://www.climatelinks.org/resources/climate-change-risk-profile-philippines>.

362 Clark L. Gray and Valerie Mueller, “Natural Disasters and Population Mobility in Bangladesh,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 109, no. 16 (April 17, 2012): 6000–6005, <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1115944109>; Xin Lu, Linus Bengtsson, and Petter Holme, “Predictability of Population Displacement after the 2010 Haiti Earthquake,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 109, no. 29 (2012): 11576–11581.

363 D. Yang and H.J. Choi, “Are Remittances Insurance? Evidence from Rainfall Shocks in the Philippines,” *THE WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REVIEW* 21, no. 2 (2007): 219–248.

364 IDMC, “Global Report on Internal Displacement 2019,” 2019, <http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2019>.

365 It is stated that the figures for average annual displacement in the model “should be considered as an indicator of the potential magnitude of displacement, not as an exact value.” See: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, “Global Report on Internal Displacement 2018,” 2018, <http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2018>.

366 Yang and Choi, “Are Remittances Insurance? Evidence from Rainfall Shocks in the Philippines.”

Drought, degradation and untracked migration in the Province of South Cotabato



Lake Sebu – Philippines (© Jorge S. Ebay)

The natural gifts of the municipality of Lake Sebu are impressive: rolling hills, dark soil, and lush greenery. The area is as rich in history and culture as it is in natural resources, and the municipality has made strides in ensuring that the indigenous way of life and cultural practices are recognised, protected and preserved. In 1993, Lake Sebu was declared as the ancestral domain of four major indigenous groups: T’Bolis, Ubos, Tirurays and Manobos. Lake Sebu is home of the famous handwoven tinalak textile, from which the biggest festival in the province got its name. Located inside a watershed forest reserve on Mindanao, the second-largest island of the Philippines, Lake Sebu serves as one of the premier tourism destinations in the Province of South Cotabato. In 2015 – 2016, the province experienced one of its worst droughts in memory. Overall, the El Niño-triggered drought reportedly cost PhP 15.2 billion (approximately USD 300,891,300) in agricultural losses.³⁶⁷ Several villagers of Sitio Lamsabuy, a small community of Ubos in Lake Sebu with 32 households, share their stories about the drought, among them Mariel, a farmer, James, who works for the church, and Perlah, a single mother. All of them have seven children.

Despite the natural and cultural richness of the area surrounding Sitio Lamsabuy, the villagers have always had to face difficult livelihood conditions in this rather remote community. Changing climatic conditions have put further pressures on their livelihoods which primarily rely on rainfed agriculture. Corn is people’s staple diet, supplemented by bananas and root crops. Farmers have no access to capital and, thus, no means to expand production. Furthermore, the absence of agricultural facilities, including irrigation, make corn production vulnerable to extreme weather events. According to respondents, almost 50% of household heads in Lamsabuy temporarily left the community during the El Niño-triggered drought in 2015 – 2016 to look for survival means elsewhere. Many went to work on sugarcane or cassava plantations for low-wage labour, while others went to cities to find work or stay with family members.

James recalls: *“It was really difficult and many of us left our community to find work in other areas, like in the town of Polomolok. Some remained and endured difficult conditions here. We tried planting crops during El Niño, but it was useless.[...] Only bananas could withstand the heat. Corn, our staple crop, could easily wither away. So we have no choice but to consume whatever is available. We ate root crops like Palawan (taro)”. Mariel shares how difficult it was to feed her seven children: “We would be happy if we could find coconuts to eat. We would get the fruits and feed them to our children. They would sleep at night with only coconuts in their stomach. In fact sometimes, they would just drink water and go to sleep. And it was a challenge to look for a water source too. Our usual sources dried up, so we have to walk longer distances to find spring water just so we can have something to drink”. Perlah talks about the effects of the drought on education: “[Our children] stopped schooling. We can’t send them to school when we have nothing to feed them in the first place. They will get hungry in school and could collapse on an empty stomach”.*

Both Mariel and James eventually left the community to support their family. Mariel worked on a cassava plantation about 25 km away. She describes the hard physical labour on the farm and how some labourers suffered severe health problems from the work. She got paid in goods. James joined a group of farmers from the village to work in a farm

³⁶⁷ Agence France Presse, “Oxfam: Expect 2016 Drought in Philippines amid ‘super’ El Niño,” ABS-CBN News, December 14, 2015, <https://news.abs-cbn.com/focus/12/14/15/oxfam-expect-2016-drought-in-philippines-amid-super-el-nio>.

in the town of Digos. They were recruited in the village and brought to the site in a truck. An advance payment allowed him to leave money to his wife before he left. Despite the extra income, James’s wife still struggled: *“It was sad. It was difficult [especially] for my children. I would feel terrible when they ask for food or for bread and I have nothing to give them. The money that my husband would send would sometimes fall short. I had to take out credit from the store or from our neighbours. I looked for a means to find food myself. I would leave my smaller children to their older siblings while I look for menial jobs myself.”*

This drought episode highlighted the need to improve early warning and response mechanisms from the government, as well as local uptake of information. The Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA) announced the onset of El Niño in the Philippines in March 2015 and issued regular advisories three months later. Yet, villagers perceived that no formal advisory was provided – although some heard information about the drought on the radio – and preparedness was consequently low. Despite considerable lead time for preparations, a declaration of a state of emergency and humanitarian relief from the provincial and national authorities were delayed.³⁶⁸ Under future climate change scenarios extreme El Niño events may become more common. In terms of remediation efforts and proactive adaptation solutions, residents of Lamsabuy collectively expressed an interest in diversifying their income sources and in seeking government assistance for climate-smart projects. However, they acknowledged, available resources are low.

368 The Provincial capital, Kidapawan City, declared a ‘State of Calamity’ eight months after the initial advisory. In December 2015 the government announced the PhP19 billion allocation to combat El Niño a couple of months after it assembled an El Niño Task Force that crafted the Roadmap to Address the Impact of El Niño (RAIN). Food, health, energy and safety were the major thrusts, but the massive funding and the special body fell short in delivering the intended outcome. See: “Roadmap to Address the Impact of El Niño Archives,” *The National Economic and Development Authority* (blog), accessed August 14, 2019, <http://www.neda.gov.ph/tag/roadmap-to-address-the-impact-of-el-nino>.

6.3. Policies and Actors Addressing Climate Migration

While there appears to be a growing recognition by policy actors in the Philippines that climate change can trigger internal migration – particularly through its effects on the frequency and intensity of extreme weather and environmental degradation – this phenomenon has yet to be recognised in legal and policy frameworks, from the national to the local level. Climate change and human rights experts in the Philippines approached for this study expressed optimism that there is significant room for action. This section maps the existing institutional infrastructure on issues related to HMCCC. The first part discusses stakeholders from the field and their constellation, the second focuses on key policies and instruments relevant for managing HMCCC in the Philippines.

Actor Landscape

A number of major actors in Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (DRRM) and Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) should be highlighted: the CCAM-DRR Cabinet Cluster; relevant agencies of the National government; the LGUs; civil society; and the affected communities.

THE CCAM-DRR CABINET CLUSTER

In 2011, then President Benigno Aquino III signed Executive Order No. 43, creating a cabinet cluster on Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation (CCAM), to facilitate the implementation of climate change-related policies, plans and programmes. It was eventually reorganised as the CCAM-DRR cluster in 2016. The cabinet cluster intends to effectively pursue the government’s “social contract” with citizens and serve as “venue[s] and mechanism[s] for coordination, harmonisation, complementation, and synergy among the Departments and other Government instrumentalities”.³⁶⁹ The reorganized cluster, thus, primarily intends to function as a mechanism to discuss the interrelated challenges of climate change and disaster risk management, whereas the cluster’s actions shall focus around measures to protect the environ-

369 Office of the President of the Philippines, “Executive Order 43: Pursuing Our Social Contract with the Filipino People Through the Reorganization of the Cabinet Clusters,” 2011, <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2011/05may/20110513-EO-0043-BSA.pdf>.

ment and natural resources. The cluster aims, inter alia, to increase the climate resilience of rural communities “through increased agricultural productivity, water sufficiency, food security, and climate and disaster-risk resilient development.”³⁷⁰

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Two national agencies have been created to address climate change and disaster risk reduction in the Philippines: the Climate Change Commission (CCC) and the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC). Both have inter-agency orientation that strives to coordinate, centralise and scale up climate and disaster work across levels of government.³⁷¹ Government agencies can also work together through a convergence strategy or through joint circulars to implement complementary programmes.

The Philippine Commission on Population and Development (POPCOM) possesses the mandate to manage population programmes including internal migration. Along with fertility and mortality, it looks at internal migration as an essential demographic process, although migration is not as well inscribed in population projections as the first two. Internal migration is predominantly interpreted as a demographic process aligned with urbanisation. There are limitations in generating data on internal migration; thus, POPCOM usually collects data at the local level to track movements. POPCOM works with the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) for statistical concerns and with the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) to strengthen its anchor with the LGUs. It may need to work with CCC or secure a seat in the NDRRMC so that population processes and movements are considered in CCA-DRR discourses and vice-versa (*see Figure 6*).

THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS (LGU)

The LGU, based on RA 7160 (Local Government Code of the Philippines), aims to provide for wider-scale participation by fostering the government’s responsiveness and flexibility. LGUs in the Philippines are semi-autonomous governance units from the sub-national (provincial) down to the village (barangay) level. To date, there are 82 provincial, 145 city, and 1,489,489 municipal, and 42,029 village governments in the country. LGUs serve to execute state administrative policies and to assist in rural development.

LGUs are mandated to formulate local policies for safety and resilience – as defined in RA 9729 (Climate Change Act, 2009) and RA 10121 (National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act, 2010) – and to anchor their programmes in international agreements and national guidelines. Each LGU in the country is mandated to organise their own local DRRM bodies and craft DRR-CCA plans and programmes, including planning counterparts to the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan (NDRRMP) and the National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP).


CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES

There are clear provisions for civil society participation in the DRRM and CCA laws of the country. Representatives from non-government organisations help compose the advisory board of the CCC while four non-government organisations are invited as members of the NDRRMC. Local communities serve as the first level of defence in times of disaster (Phil13). Key informants in a focus group conducted for this study, agreed that local communities are crucial players in the implementation of climate action and risk reduction (Phil13–17). Focusing on local communities not only saves resources, but also ensures participation and empowerment (*ibid*). Community capacities for adaptation and risk reduction thrive in an environment where it is being encouraged and promoted. Among others, UN departments³⁷² suggest that safety and resilience initiatives will only gain traction if these are locally relevant and invite people’s participation.

370 Office of the President of the Philippines. For more information about the cluster’s stated objectives and its organisational structure refer to the official website: Government of the Philippines (GoP), “Cabinet Clusters: Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation,” accessed October 2, 2019, <http://www.pms.gov.ph/index.php/67-linkccam/57-cabinet-clusters>.

371 CCC receives technical advice from an interagency body composed of 14 government departments; two national bodies, National Security Council (NSC) and National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW); presidents of local government leagues; and representatives from academia, the business sector, non-government organizations and the DRRM sector.

372 United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR), “Living with Risk: A Global Review of Disaster Reduction Initiatives – UNDRR,” 2004, <https://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications/657>.



ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS

Higher education institutions actively partner with the government and non-government organisations to strengthen research and technical capacity on CCA-DRR including HMCCC. Many academic institutions also have research and public service mandates that allow them to play an active role in safety and resiliency advocacy and programme implementation. Furthermore, topical experts occasionally move between public and academic fields. Interviewees noted that partners in state universities and colleges were important to “carry out assessment and capacity building with LGUs” and “they help in finding innovative technologies that could help address farming issues and concerns in local communities” (Phil01). One key informant from academia underlined the utility of partnering for technical knowledge and local capacities:

— “What we advocate is the community of practice, where the LGU will have an academic and CSO partner that will help them in terms of gathering the data, [especially] if it’s climate change adaptation, climate related. They can build the baseline data which they can use to back up their local sectoral plans, such as the LCCAP and the DRRM Plan, which will eventually be included in their CDP. That’s the strategy” (Phil10).

PRIVATE ORGANISATIONS

A number of privately-owned organisations have formally launched their involvement in CCA-DRR in the Philippines. One example is the Philippine Disaster Resilience Foundation (PRDF), which established itself as a leading private sector vehicle for coordinated responses to disasters in the country. Last year, the organisation drew up a national framework on the role of the private sector in DRR, together with the NDRRMC and UNDP.

Timeline for Key Moments in Building CCA and DRR/DM Policies in the Philippines



Figure 7

Relevant Policies for HMCCC

In the Philippines, new ground can be broken by finding entry points for HMCCC in two national policies on CCA (RA 9729) and DRRM (RA 10121). These policies frame the country's engagement in international coordination and negotiation mechanisms, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Hyogo Framework of Action (HFA), and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (see Figure 7).

THE CLIMATE CHANGE ACT OF 2009

RA 9729 aims to mainstream climate change into government policy formulation and to establish national and local strategies and programmes for climate change mitigation and adaptation. The law asserts the responsibility of the state to resolve climate change issues, protect vulnerable groups, and engage the above-mentioned stakeholders through improved policy formulation, development planning, poverty reduction programmes and research. The law also provided for the creation of the CCC as an oversight body to coordinate, monitor and evaluate the programmes and action plans of the government relating to its UNFCCC obligations.^{373 374} The responsibility to lead climate change-related initiatives at the local level has been lodged with the LGUs, with the close involvement of the barangays.

CCC was initially set up with a funding of PhP50 million (approximately USD 989,890). Its subsequent allocations were included in the General Appropriations Act. In 2010, the CCC published a Framework Strategy and Program on Climate Change and the National Climate Change Action Plan for 2010–2022.

THE NATIONAL DRRM ACT OF 2010

RA 10121 intends to strengthen institutional capacities for disaster risk reduction and management system, in line with current international humanitarian standards, as well as to advance the resilience of the population to disasters. The Act contains an explicit recognition of gender, indigenous knowledge, and intersectionality with conflict-affected groups without explicitly acknowledging the need to protect the human rights of these people.

³⁷³ See note 345.

³⁷⁴ For a detailed list of powers and responsibilities, see Fourteenth Congress of the Philippines, "R.A. 9729," Pub. L. No. 9729 (2009), https://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2009/ra_9729_2009.html.

RA 10121 establishes the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC), with interagency composition, chaired by the Department of National Defense.³⁷⁵ In 2011, the NDRRMC produced the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan (NDRRMP), 2011 – 2028. The law has explicit provisions for decentralisation down to the village level and for funding.³⁷⁶

RA 9729 and RA 10121 were perceived as landmark policies by officials approached for this study, because of their endorsement of interagency cooperation. This enables the development and recognition of specific agency guidelines to reinforce institutional capacities at multiple levels, even if local uptake can be improved. For example, DILG developed the guidelines for the Rationalized Local Planning System to integrate DRR and CCA concerns into local development plans and programmes. Both NEDA’s Mainstreaming DRR in Subnational Development Land Use/Physical Framework Planning in the Philippines as well as the Harmonized Gender and Development Guidelines for Project Development, Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation reinforce the call for local actions considering gender variables.

Both policies likewise encourage the participation of civil society, academia, private sector and community-based organisations, an indication of facilitating their empowerment as key partners (Phil11–17). Mandatory funding provisions assure financial resources needed to pursue risk reduction and climate action to accomplish safety and resilience objectives.

6.4. Mapping Obstacles and Building Blocks for HMCCC People-Centred Planning

None of the laws and policies noted above makes explicit mention of population movements relating to climate change. Experts interviewed for this study confirm there are no frameworks that “*tackle mobility, migration, or displacement in relation to climate change directly*” (Phil08, emphasis added). Climate is a relatively new policy field. Laws and policies related to human mobility more generally are nascent and have been the target of fluctuating political interest at multiple levels of government. While RA 9729 and RA 10121 have some areas for improvement, they are commonly perceived by interviewees as good steps forward. RA 10121, in particular, was described by interviewees as “*robust*” (Phil03), “*a big feather on the cap*” (Phil05), and “*the closest policy measure we can probably consider as addressing the issue of climate-related migration*” (Phil08).

Policy Gaps

Key informants expressed the perception that a lack of interest in internal migration and of slow-onset drivers of vulnerability represent a key gap in current policies, plans, and knowledge (Phil02, Phil03, Phil04, Phil06). A number of policy and administrative reforms may be necessary to formally and fully integrate HMCCC concerns into the prevailing policy and governance structure.

A review of RA 10121 was initiated but was stalled during the transition into the new administration.³⁷⁷ Calls to review emphasised the need to consider the “*new normal*” (Phil02-03) as well as to integrate lessons learned from the large-scale disasters like Typhoon Washi/Sendong in 2011, Typhoon Bopha/Pablo in 2012 and Typhoon Haiyan/

375 Fourteenth Congress of the Philippines, “Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010 – Republican Act 10121,” Pub. L. No. Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010 (RA 10121) (2010), <http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-content/uploads/laws/1549.pdf>.

376 “Not less than five percent (5%) of the estimated revenue from regular sources shall be set aside as the LDRRMF to support disaster preparedness programmes including training, purchasing life-saving rescue equipment, supplies and medicines, for post-disaster activities, and for the payment of premiums on calamity insurance.” See Section 21, Fourteenth Congress of the Philippines.

377 Sofia Tomacruz, “Mandatory Review of Disaster Law Did Not Take Place in Congress,” August 24, 2018, <https://www.rappler.com/nation/210255-mandatory-review-republic-act-10121-did-not-take-place>.

Yolanda in 2013.³⁷⁸ An expert shared views on why the review is necessary:

— “[the policy] lacks substantive provisions [on protection]. The tendency usually is to declare an emergency or advisory to evacuate but [there are] no guidelines on how to evacuate, so people get left behind. People are getting abused, even during the transit or even during evacuation. [...] and I think that’s a big gap” (Phil05).

RA 9729 has no clear provisions on the management of climate-induced mobility but considers migration as a “system of interest” within the CCC. It may not be a major thematic priority in the NCCAP (Phil08), but “population displacement and migration as a result of sea level rise or other large-scale biophysical, ecological or social disruptions [are] linked with security concerns associated with climate change” (Phil08). At the time of writing, the NCCAP was in the process of being updated³⁷⁹ and the National Security Strategy alludes to climate change as a national security threat.³⁸⁰

Policy reforms could be assisted by developing a robust evidence base. One issue expert noted the challenge of championing climate-mobility linkages: “We recognise the two are related but moving forward can be hindered by [a dearth of] information” (Phil06). Interviewees noted, nevertheless, anecdotal evidence on the migratory impacts of drought and El Niño (Phil01), degraded fisheries and other coastal resources (Phil06, Phil08, Phil09–10), rising sea levels (Phil01, Phil009–010), ocean acidification (Phil09–010), and degradation of agricultural land and natural inputs (Phil06, Phil08). A number of interviewees referred to experiences of drought in 2016 and in 2019, thought to have triggered labour migration of people from rural to urban areas.³⁸¹

378 Various proposals for the replacement of RA10121 came out both in the House of Representatives and in the Senate. At the time of writing, a proposal to combine DRR and CCA – embodied in HB 8165 – into a joint cabinet-level level, the Department of Disaster Resilience, awaits approval. Voltaire Tupaz, “Gov’t Eyes ‘stronger’ Disaster Management Agency to Replace NDRRMC,” Rappler, January 12, 2017, <http://www.rappler.com/move-ph/issues/disasters/158170-government-eyes-stronger-disaster-management-agency-replace-ndrrmc>.

379 “National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP) 2011–2028 | ESCAP Policy Documents Management,” accessed August 14, 2019, <https://policy.asiapacificenergy.org/node/928>.

380 Office of the President, “National Security Strategy: Security and Development For Transformational Change and Well-Being of the Filipino People” (Manila, April 2018), <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2018/08aug/20180802-national-security-strategy.pdf>.

381 Ariah Cadiogan, “Drought-Affected Philippine Farmers Share Hopes for New Government,” news.trust.org, May 31, 2016, <http://news.trust.org/item/20160531034226-4ze2y>.

Weak leadership, inter-agency communication, siloed outputs and procurement difficulties can detract from the positive coordination efforts noted above. Interviewees noted a lack of adequate leadership on the part of the Office of Civil Defense (OCD), leaving the four vice chairs of the RDRRMC to perform tasks as required, creating subsequent confusion across multiples clusters (Phil11–17). One focus group participant complained: “This is ironic since when we talk about [environmental action], RA 10121 is highly praised, but in reality, there’s a lot of confusion and overlap.” (Phil16).

Weak communication mechanisms and coordination within inter-agency platforms noted by interviewees have contributed to hardening of institution-specific mandates and the de-prioritisation of inter-agency goals. Moreover, the NDRRMP shaped several institutional initiatives on DRRM but many of these initiatives were carried out by some institutions with relative independence from the national plan.³⁸² Procurement guidelines can be constrictive for local governments, especially for agencies like the Disaster Risk Management Bureau (DRMB) that does considerable work for 5th or 6th class municipalities – lower- and lowest-income provinces and cities – encumbered by demands to protect their constituencies and assets on shoestring budgets. Demand to produce outputs consistent with national goals and international norms needs to go with governance reforms that could support and facilitate local level capacities.

Gender-Sensitive Approaches

Overall, experts interviewed for this baseline study noted that gender is relatively prevalent in efforts to address disaster displacement and migration, in part because women were already visibly present in migration – as well as empirically – in some communities for many decades (Phil04). Furthermore, there is a prevalence of women in the public sector, in particular in sustainable development and humanitarian aid (Phil02–03). Many experts underlined that women’s sexual and reproductive health should be of particular concern in times of crisis. However, in the context of this research, most government officials did not address women’s safety in great depth. This may be due to

382 Sonny N Domingo and Divina C Olaguera, “SERP-P Publication: Have We Institutionalized DRRM in the Philippines? Domingo, Sonny N., Olaguera, Ma. Divina C. 2017” (Philippine Institute for Development Studies, 2017), <https://serp-p.pids.gov.ph/serp-p/details.php?pid=5813>.



Lake Sebu – Philippines (© Jorge S. Ebay)

cultural norms, the sensitivity of the issue, or personal reticence to speak about the issue in an anecdotal way.

One notable exception discussed the following incident: “During Yolanda, in relocations sites, there were notable increases in cases of teenage pregnancy. We tried to determine the reasons, identified appropriate intervention. That’s our observation. If you are displaced and mobile, you are more exposed to risk” (Phil06). Concerning migration for proactive adaptation and displacement risk reduction, one expert noted: “[women] usually do not have a decision-making power to migrate prior to a disaster” (Phil08).³⁸³ Another explained that the subdivision of land disadvantages women farming communities, adding to the need to seek livelihoods elsewhere (Phil04). These expert opinions confirm findings from the literature review conducted for this study, which indicated urban, educated, and well-connected women are more likely to benefit from migration than women from rural areas, although rural-urban internal migration of women is increasing (see section 6.2).

While most experts expressed their perception that good policies are in place to protect the rights of women, some areas for improvement were noted. The importance of

empowering women at the local level was highlighted by at least one interviewee:

— “And the problem really persists in terms of, I think: we have to bring more women champions to be more visible in leading the communities towards sustainable solutions to climate change. So the women in the communities have to understand that they can contribute as well in terms of long-term solutions to climate change... So, it has to be more about providing the women sector with the expertise, providing them opportunities to lead in their communities, in their sectors of expertise wherever they are working – in the schools, in the business sector, providing them the tools to also take part in transforming their sector towards resilience” (Phil08).

Several interviewees identified gaps in research and data on the gendered impacts of climate change. One interviewee mentioned missing research on gendered-based accounts of international migration when agricultural productions decline, because women can apparently find work abroad more easily (Phil08). Sex and age disaggregation of data was a priority concern for some (Phil06 and Phil10), which are also commitments elaborated in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. However, as long as the availability of regular, reliable data on migration in general is poor in the Philippines (described in the next section), experts believe it is unlikely that disaggregation of data will be prioritised (Phil06).

³⁸³ The expert also said that the link between mobility and gender was “also one of the more heated discussions on the adaptation forum that we last held in the ADB” (Phil08).

Data Gaps

There is a strong perception in the Philippines that poor or absent data is a major weakness for understanding human mobility and for formulating evidence-based policies on mobility in the context of climate change. Poor or absent data was the weakness most discussed by key informants, covered at least 37 times. By comparison, lack of disaster preparedness and lack of targeted policies were the two next most frequently discussed issues, appearing 17 and 13 times in the interviews, respectively.³⁸⁴

Official reports are not available but experts interviewed shared their observations, for example: *“I don’t have information about communities that move out because of the impact of climate change. But I think it’s happening, and I’m sure there are many factors involved”* (Phil01). One interviewee simply stated that *“there’s no conscious effort to put a priority on data management”* (Phil05). Another, from a prominent intergovernmental organisation, noted that they went to donors outside of the country to apply for funding in order to conduct research on mobility, for which national interest could not be mustered. Specifically, the research would fill gaps in knowledge on communities in Mindanao that had been adversely affected by climate change and *“are moving from one place to another, mostly internally, but also abroad and [ultimately] become OFWs”* (Phil02).

The need to improve databases on migration was expressed throughout the interviews, along with many examples of why tracking past or current movements is such a major challenge in the Philippines. One interviewee mentioned that population projections are sometimes stalled after each census, for political reasons, or due to a lack of data (Phil04). A key informant described how restructuring processes around the establishment of the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) created institutional confusion and impediments to data collection, like the NMS in 2015. PSA replaced the National Statistics Office (NSO) in 2013, *“So all interagency committees, technical working groups, were sort of in limbo, and nothing happened. It took some time to process all the necessary papers under the new agency”* (Phil04). More technical personnel in areas from census enumeration to statistical analysis would be needed to support PSA in its work (Phil04).

384 It is worth noting that some issues explored more extensively in the literature were not broached by most interviewees – for example, social tensions or conflicts.

Establishing the PSA as a single, centralised authority which “shall primarily be responsible for all national censuses and surveys, sectoral statistics, consolidation of selected administrative recording systems and compilation of national accounts”³⁸⁵ is a key effort by the Government of the Philippines (GOP) in order to produce better official statistics along with: (1) the standardisation of concepts and definitions on internal and international migration for statistical purposes;³⁸⁶ (2) development of a framework to be able to measure internal migrants and to distinguish international migrants from overseas Filipinos; and, (3) conduct of the National Migration Survey.³⁸⁷

Government officials approached for this study place a lot of weight in the ability of the National Migration Survey (NMS) to close existing data gaps. The NMS is expected to provide a boost of confidence in knowledge of both international and internal migration.³⁸⁸ The aim for NMS is to refine data on different migration streams that would allow comparison of development initiatives across urban and rural conditions. It could also generate information of the migration experience, for example, whether one’s livelihood or well-being has improved due to transfer of residence. Initial results are already telling in terms of the magnitude of intra- and inter-regional migration, migration motivations and intentions, and shifts in migrant destinations, both internally and internationally.³⁸⁹ The survey includes indicators related to displacement but does not specifically intend to include slow-onset climate drivers. However, it will shed light on labour mobility more broadly, which will capture migrants affected by gradual climate changes. Overall, experts felt the NMS is a very

385 Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA), “About PSA,” n.d., <http://www.psa.gov.ph/about>.

386 RA 10625 (the Philippine Statistical Act of 2013) mandates the PSA to coordinate with government departments and local government units to promote and adopt “statistical standards involving techniques, methodologies, concepts and definitions and classifications,” and to ensure the “avoidance of duplication in the collection of statistical information.” In response to this call, the Interagency Committee on Migration Statistics (IACMS) recommended for the approval of official concepts and definitions related to migration for statistical purposes.

387 Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA), “Total Number of OFWs Estimated at 2.3 Million (Results from the 2018 Survey on Overseas Filipinos).”

388 Data for NMS has been collected and is currently being processed. While a report and the underlying data were not available at the time of writing, initial results launched in October 2019 were reviewed: Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) and University of the Philippines Population Institute (UPPI), “NMS Key Findings.”

389 Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) and University of the Philippines Population Institute (UPPI).

positive development that will improve migration data and provide entry points for HMCCC. One interviewee noted that *“It was a long process advocating for [the NMS],”* and *“we’ve been advocating for [inclusion of migration questions in the census] for more than 10 years now”* (Phil04).

To complement the NMS, efforts are being funnelled into supporting local capacities for migration tracking. POPCOM initiated the Registry of Barangay Inhabitants and Migrants (RBIM) programme with DILG, replacing the now-defunct Registry of Barangay Inhabitants (RBI) of DILG. The RBIM is essentially a migration tracking instrument that a barangay can use to monitor entries and exits. Through this, the community can develop its own migration database to inform local plans and programmes. The programme was piloted in Tanay, Rizal and in Malay, Aklan.

Many key informants provided anecdotal evidence about human mobility in the context of climate change. Nine of ten individual interviewees spoke about the topic. Some key informants made note of the limited reliability of such evidence (Phil06, Phil09, Phil10). They recommended more research to close existing data gaps and to provide a solid base on which decision makers can act: *“we need empirical data for more efficient planning”* (Phil06). One difficulty raised by a key informant was in regards to future population projections that include migration as a key demographic: *“we have almost nil for migration because data are always lacking”* (Phil04).

Interestingly, several interviewees drew a connection between HMCCC and settlements in unsafe areas. While there is currently limited empirical evidence that climate change is an important factor driving under-resourced migrants and displaced people to unsafe settlements, particularly in larger cities, more research on the issue is needed. For example:

— *“When we talked about natural disasters, we see that most victims are migrants because they are forced to settle in hazardous areas. Migrants usually look for available lands to settle in regardless of risk... The driver of unsafe settlements is internal migration. One of our limitations right now is the data. So far that’s what we see. We can establish the connection between unsafe settlement locations with internal migration because there’s literature and a logical connection, but we need the database to serve as evidence for this relationship and the linkage between human mobility and climate change”* (Phil06).

The same interviewee also expressed optimism about future knowledge management and research opportunities: *“...when we were approached [to contribute to the HMCCC project in the Philippines], we responded affirmatively while thinking about the potential inputs and data that it can bring. It can help us in crafting a more realistic policy”* (Phil06).

POPCOM is a key actor in data collection and management. Part of its mandate is to develop local capacities to track internal migration and it, thus, serves as the “lead organization in population management for well-planned and empowered Filipino families and communities”.³⁹⁰

The need to shed further light on the implications of internal migration – rural-urban movements, in particular – led POPCOM to conduct a rapid appraisal in 2014 to explore existing patterns and to identify prevailing factors influencing decisions to migrate or stay under more or less similar circumstances.³⁹¹ Using data from the 2010 census (CPH) as well as qualitative information from key informant interviews and focus group discussions, the appraisal points to a very dynamic character of internal migration in the country.³⁹²

These assessments are crucial inputs for policymakers in identifying action points that can create an enabling context for local development to improve service and quality of life of the rural population. However, interviewees also noted that a more systematic, longitudinal database on internal migration and internal displacement would be helpful, especially in any attempt to link slow-onset hazards and migration.

390 Commission on Population (POPCOM), “Mission Vision Goal,” accessed August 14, 2019, <http://www.popcom.gov.ph/transparency-seal/agency-profile/mission-vision>.

391 Perez III, “On the Move: Current Patterns and Factors of Internal Migration in the Philippines Filipinos.”

392 Migration experts acknowledged that the decadal CPH does not completely capture internal migration. The default question on migration is not currently adequate to bridge the gap, as de facto migration can only be discerned if a given participant’s residency changed up to five years before the enumeration year. This, however, can produce misleading information on migration because it fails to capture return movements, short-term movements, and circular or seasonal migration. As in other areas, experts indicated that key priority areas – in this case, basic migration data through the NMS – would take precedent over putting resources into deeper, complex empirical work needed to better capture and understand HMCCC phenomena.



Philippines (© Kira Vinke)

Research

In part thanks to familiarity with human mobility, many tools exist in the Philippines to understand migration broadly. For internal migration, mechanisms for monitoring movement at the community level, such as through the Migration Information Centre (MIC), are growing. Pilot data collection activities in places like Tanay, Rizal, Malay and Aklan – where a spate of recent increases in internal migration has been detected – have been evaluated by the government as promising. Additionally, there are efforts to revive the Registry of Barangay Inhabitants (RBI) of the Department of Interior and DILG. The RBI module may be improved to become the RBIM and lodged across all villages in the country. A standard population data basing tool is crucial given the failure of other similar tools in the past to fully take off (e.g., the Community Based Monitoring System or CBMS). It is vital for the tool to be friendly, technically accessible, and comprehensible to users to ensure compliance. Dialogues with other agencies with complementary functions could redound to mutual benefits vital in fulfilling respective mandates.

Current effort to address information gaps on internal migration are likely to continue to have positive knock-on effects in terms of greater understanding of slow-onset climatic and environmental determinants of migration. Initiatives like the reorganisation of NSO into PSA are fundamental in consolidating national accounts and

information databases.³⁹³ Specifically for migration, they could refine methodological and analytical parameters in migration research, policy, planning and programming and boost calls to fill data gaps on migration, both internal and international.

In terms of the link between climate change and displacement, current knowledge and monitoring mechanisms are a notable strength in the Philippines. Good practices exist and can be replicated. For instance, a week after Typhoon Yolanda in 2013, the Migration Outflow Desks (MODs) was established by IOM in partnership with DSWD and the Philippine National Police (PNP) in key coordination hubs along the typhoon corridor (Tacloban, Cebu, Guiuan, Roxas, Ormoc and Manila) to monitor the inflow and outflow of people. Outflows triggered mainly by government-supported evacuation³⁹⁴ were observed to return to pre-typhoon levels in one month.³⁹⁵ MODs built profiles of the people moving out, the intention being to track survivors who sought temporary shelter with relatives, especially in Cebu and Metro Manila, in order to better provide them with necessary provisions and support.

Experts approached for this study noted that a greater conceptual clarity between “voluntary” migration and displacement as they relate to climate impacts is needed.

393 Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA), “Total Number of OFWs Estimated at 2.3 Million (Results from the 2018 Survey on Overseas Filipinos).”

394 Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA).

395 IDMC, “The Evolving Picture of Displacement in the Wake of Typhoon Haiyan: An Evidence-Based Overview.”

Movement due to slow-onset events or environmental degradation represents a gap in empirical evidence. In the case of the Philippines, anecdotal evidence of this has been presented (see the “[Storytelling](#)” box, page 112).

Current tools for migration data and research in the Philippines are not entirely appropriate to unpack the complex relationship between human mobility and climate change, especially to investigate the internal movements that are the most likely to be observed. Previous research³⁹⁶ tracing migration movements relied on primary data collection rather than on official government records or reports. Existing tracking mechanisms are reserved for international labour migrants and are generally not applicable to internal migrants.³⁹⁷ The Migration Information Center (MIC) developed by POPCOM in consonance with RA 7279 may fill some gaps but requires buy-in from LGUs. The dataset generated by the MIC is intended as input to policies that would regulate movement and improve population management programmes.³⁹⁸

The state of empirical research specifically on HMCCC in the Philippines is limited as compared to other regions of the world. Interviews conducted for this study uncovered a number of areas of focus for future research identified by experts in the field, notably: the influence of weather variability and extreme weather on rural out-migration, including internal, international, and circular movements (Phil02-03, Phil08); gendered impacts of climate change on human mobility (Phil04, Phil08); impacts of climate change on rural-urban migration to informal settlements, and related displacement risks (Phil02-03); the role of migration as a household strategy to adapt to environmental and climatic change (Phil04); the impacts of natural hazard-induced displacement on subsequent migration (Phil04, Phil08); greater tracking of people post-displacement in general (Phil04), and; in general, more ethnographic (qualitative) studies to elucidate observations made from quantitative research (Phil08).

6.5. Recommendations for the Philippines

There is currently no law or policy specifically on human mobility and climate change in the Philippines. Legal and policy frameworks to address human mobility tend to fall under two categories: disaster displacement or international labour migration. International engagements on the part of the government on the climate-mobility nexus also reflect the prioritisation of the protection of overseas workers as well as of the facilitation of the development of benefits of international migration.³⁹⁹ Inside the Philippines, the government has more experience tackling disaster displacement than addressing the root causes and impacts of voluntary migration in the face of longer-term climate impacts, particularly in regards to internal migration, which are likely to be the main type of movement resulting from climate change impacts. However, there are opportunities to bring a climate lens into existing policy frameworks. Based on key insights from expert interviews, this section summarises some of these priority areas and offers some recommendations.

SET A STRATEGIC DIRECTION

In recent years, the Philippines has demonstrated many of the key strengths needed to set strategic direction for human mobility in the context of climate change: sustained commitment at national levels of leadership; engagement in relevant international dialogues, and in cross-country coordination, such as through the Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD) and former Nansen Initiative, the MCIC initiative, the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (2018), and the separate Global Compact on Refugees (2018); building institutional structures and capacities for effective implementation of policies and programmes, for example, through the work of POPCOM and DRMB; and executing monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, such as the pilot initiative to track internal migration through the Registry of Barangay Inhabitants (RBI) prescribed by the DILG.

396 Quisumbing and Mcniven, “Migration and the Rural-Urban Continuum: Evidence from Bukidnon, Philippines.”

397 An expert interviewed for this purpose shared that there is a need to harmonize data on international migration. There are specific units under the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Department of Foreign Affairs that work on international migration and they do not have a unified data set. The Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) under DOLE uses contracts issued in determining the number of migrants. So if a worker got two separate contracts in a year, i.e., six months or less per contract, then that worker is counted twice.

398 Perez III, “On the Move: Current Patterns and Factors of Internal Migration in the Philippines Filipinos.”

399 For example, by advocating in international fora for: improved remittance environments and lowering the costs and barriers to financial remittances; fair recruitment practices; strengthening migration pathways and overall economic relations with key receiving countries; and facilitating foreign investment.

An area for continued improvement is ensuring the full participation of the affected communities in policy development and implementation planning, with due consideration to disaggregation of data, and with special attention to the specific circumstances and needs of vulnerable or marginalised groups. Overall, a main priority for the Philippines remains the need to translate international- and national- level policies and interests to their implementation in local communities. In addition, the Philippines is well placed to:

- Share best practices and lessons learned in addressing displacement due to disasters in international fora, and advocate for greater integration of a climate-mobility lens in relevant international plans and programmes;
- Contribute to a better understanding of the local, community-level impacts of climate projections, and their subsequent influence on migration trends, which may be supported by the development of multi-dimensional models and indices to predict the impacts of climate change on migration outcomes.

FOSTER EFFECTIVE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND DECISION MAKING

Effective policy implementation on human mobility in the context of climate change means mainstreaming of human mobility – including migration, displacement, and planned relocations at different geographic and temporal scales – into overall development planning. The government’s strategy should include: capacity building and training of key officials at the local and provincial level; further efforts to raise awareness about climate-related migration trends; and integrating this lens into development planning. A development worth noting is the first intra-regional migration census conducted by PSA in 2018.⁴⁰⁰

In addition, it would be important to:

- Invite POPCOM into the NDRRMC and CCC, to broaden understanding and approaches to internal migration while considering its value as a strategy for risk reduction and adaptation;

- Improve and standardise vulnerability assessment tools at the local and regional levels, for instance, participatory mapping at the community level can be a vital material for LGU planning and policy implementation;
- Establish needs assessments and develop policy remedies intended specifically for people moving in the context of slow-onset hazards;
- Integrate climate and migration lenses to research and data instruments including via the NMS, RBIM, and the Community-Based Monitoring System (CBMS) for LGUs, among others;
- Fit the Climate and Disaster Risk Assessment (CDRA) (the tool currently endorsed by the DILG to build climate information database) with questions/parameters that would allow LGUs to track/monitor slow onset climate events;
- Include a climate and human mobility lens in the review of existing policies and plans particularly associated with RA 9729 and RA 10121;
- Support the DILG in advancing a legal and policy framework to identify, endorse, fund, and carry out planned relocations of whole communities and of families in exposed areas, informed by international standards.⁴⁰¹

FOSTER PARTICIPATORY, COMMUNITY-BASED APPROACHES

Community-based programme implementation and integration of vulnerable groups can be improved. Both are needed for inclusive and sustainable policy implementation. The dearth of disaggregated data is a challenge to evidence-based policy development as well as to monitoring and evaluation of policy effectiveness. In addition, measures for community participation in the conception and implementation of planned relocations should be strengthened. While research indicates that Filipinos prefer local measures to adapt in situ to the prospect of whole community relocations,⁴⁰² higher-level coordination and government support in these strategies will be critical

401 IOM, Georgetown University, and UNHCR, “A Toolbox: Planning Relocations to Protect People from Disasters and Environmental Change | Environmental Migration Portal.”

402 Ma. Laurice Jamero et al., “Small-Island Communities in the Philippines Prefer Local Measures to Relocation in Response to Sea-Level Rise,” *Nature Climate Change* 7 (July 24, 2017): 581. Laurice Jamero et al.

400 Karen Bermejo, “Malay Migration Grows in 5 Years: POPCOM,” October 10, 2018, <https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1050634>. Bermejo.

to their success. Moreover, the need for adequate, timely responses to relocation requests by families and individuals in exposed areas⁴⁰³ is likely to continue.

- Strengthen monitoring of local implementation of policies and programmes with full participation of affected communities and community leaders, considering inclusivity principles;
- Develop and communicate clear, open mechanisms for requesting planned relocation, supporting the DILG’s initiatives on local implementation of planned relocation frameworks;⁴⁰⁴
- Develop mechanisms for formalisation and transfer of tenure in informal settlement areas, including grievance mechanisms.

ANTICIPATORY EFFORTS TO MANAGE MIGRATION AND DISPLACEMENT

There should be an overarching system to manage migration and displacement that includes the establishment and maintenance of safe, regular, dignified and prosperous migration pathways at all skill levels. Greater sensitivity should be exercised to low- and un-skilled sectors, because climate change impacts disproportionately affect the poor and marginalised. The previous experience of the Philippines and the ‘Global Skills Partnership’ envisaged in the Global Compact on Migration can be scaled up through private sector partnership to develop targeted skills matching programmes for temporary migration for all skills categories.⁴⁰⁵ In addition, to continue the country’s sophisticated disaster displacement management outlined above, the Philippines and its partners should:

- Ensure the DRMB is adequately funded and staffed;
- Support DILG and DRMB in their work for Geographically Isolated and Disadvantaged Areas (GIDAS), to undercut contributing factors to so-called “distress” migration;
- Regularly consult with the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of IDPs on the improvement of disaster displacement response as well as the intersection between conflict and disaster displacement.
- Actively pursue and support the development of the population registrars (through CBMS or RBIM) to anticipate movement vital in proactive management of internal migration.

EXECUTE ABATING ACTIONS FOR CLIMATE RISKS

Policies and programmes to undercut the root causes of displacement and distress migration, and specifically targeting people already affected by climate change impacts, are also key actions the Philippines could include:

- Further developing safety net mechanisms for poor families experiencing severe losses and damage in the context of extreme weather and disasters, such as cash for work programmes, which are currently limited;
- Continuing to support and expand the Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation and the Cooperative Insurance System of the Philippines (CISP), working with the private sector;
- Evaluate mechanisms to request relocation and resettlement in anticipation of severe hazards and climate risks;
- Establish empirical and legal thresholds to designate areas as unsafe or unfit for human habitation.

403 Annabel Consuelo Petinglay, “39 Families along Malandog River up for Relocation,” 2019, <https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1066078>. Petinglay.

404 See above.

405 For example, article 5(b) of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, adopted in 2018: “Develop flexible, rights-based and gender-responsive labour mobility schemes for migrants, in accordance with local and national labour market needs and skills supply at all skills levels, including temporary, seasonal, circular and fast-track programmes in areas of labour shortages, by providing flexible, convertible and non-discriminatory visa and permit options, such as for permanent and temporary work, multiple-entry study, business, visit, investment and entrepreneurship.”



Manila, Philippines (© Kira Vinke)

FOSTER AND SUSTAIN A STRONG ACTOR/ STAKEHOLDER NETWORK

There is a need for enhanced communication and cooperation between national-level actors, local level actors, the multi-national private sector, and the donor community. One of the primary challenges in policy implementation and in ensuring the sustainability of capacity building efforts has been the reliability of LGUs. While this report does not seek to question the autonomy of LGUs, given the importance of local buy-in to ensure the sustainability of policies and programmes, a number of possible actions are proposed for DILG in particular:

- Prioritise the establishment of partnerships between LGUs and reliable local implementing partners for evidence-based policy development and implementation, in particular, through universities (as independent knowledge brokers);
- Train LGUs and local implementing partners in migration data and analysis, as well as in – most critically – how to interpret and downscale the findings of climate science to local impacts;
- Raise awareness about climate change and human mobility in the context of climate change among the general population;
- Enhance coordination and collaboration between and among government agencies, donors, and civil society organisations to work towards common solutions to climate and mobility challenges at the level of the communities.

STRENGTHEN CRITICAL COORDINATION AND EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATIONS

Communications challenges emanating from a complex actor landscape along with related fields like resilience building and overall development can be mitigated by closing the gap between national- and local-level decision makers and practitioners:

- Enhance cooperation and communication across relevant agencies through regular, effective, and results-oriented meetings of the NDRMC and Climate Change Commission, and day-to-day communications of the participating agencies;
- Charge a data task force and commission of technical experts with improving web hosting systems and sharing mechanisms (both ICT infrastructure and protocols) for data and information;
- Invest in communications between DILG and LGUs in general, and establish coordination calls on this topic specifically;
- Enhance transparency of activities and advance proposals to ensure data and information accessibility by the public and academia, for example, through journalist trainings, hackathons, improving open source data, inter alia;
- Improve public advocacy and communications about the rights of migrants and the rights of IDPs in general, with particular attention to humanising mobility and recognising the positive potential of migration (both internal and international) for development and adaptation to climate change impacts.

IMPROVE KNOWLEDGE AND DATA

Collection of basic migration and displacement data is important for the implementation, follow-up and review of migration or displacement management policy, as well as for identifying and assisting groups with special needs or vulnerabilities. A more consistent, standard, and good quality database that integrates existing data collection initiatives and empirical studies will help stakeholders to develop a better view of the mobility generally, and environment-motivated human mobility specifically. At the national level, within existing tools and initiatives, the government and its partners could consider:

- Better integration, sharing, and harmonisation of existing data on *international* migration, and targeted analysis for potential environment-migration nexus trends, including: administrative data on border crossings, work permits and visa processing; the survey of overseas Filipinos; the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency; the Commission on Filipinos Overseas, the Bureau of Immigration;
- Mapping of existing data on *internal* migration, and targeted analysis for potential environment-migration nexus issues, in order to identify trends and data needs or gaps, including: population registrars; census data; periodic surveys (such as the NMS); Census of Population and Housing; National Health and Demographic Survey(s); and the Community-Based Monitoring System; and RBIM,
- Establish a data task force/working group of relevant agencies to meet regularly to coordinate ways that improve data harmonisation, sharing, and overall knowledge management, which could be coordinated through the NDRMC;
- Charge a data task force with improving web hosting systems and sharing mechanisms (both ICT infrastructure and protocols) for data – including by commissioning experts to improve systems for encoding, cleaning, protecting, and managing data – and advance proposals to enhance information sharing with the public;
- Advance proposals for inclusion of migration questions into existing surveys;
- Invite technical experts – for example, from IOM or the migration data task force/working group – to brief the NDRMC, Climate Change Commission, and Congress on the state of the art on climate-mobility linkages in the Philippines and ways to improve data and analysis on migration in the context of slow-onset hazards.

STRENGTHEN LINKS BETWEEN RESEARCH AND POLICY

Research institutions and academic institutions have been known to work in silos, providing limited opportunities for dialogue and knowledge sharing. Research outputs should be funnelled back into the channels described above, to help ensure evidence-based policymaking. In addition, efforts can be made to:

- Standardise and consult on terminology, methods, and typologies for internal migration, especially operational definitions used by LGUs in small-scale surveys;
- Scaling-up of the potential of the Community-Based Monitoring System for migration tracking;
- Encourage universities to strengthen student exchanges and host international scholars to present research on the environment-migration nexus, to host trainings, and mentor students.

The literature on the environment-migration nexus in the Philippines is fairly limited but is growing. Existing empirical studies conducted in Southeast Asia have tended to focus on disaster effects rather than migration related to slow-onset hazards.⁴⁰⁶ Key informants interviewed for this research noted a number of areas that merit further attention, and which may be commissioned or undertaken by technical experts:

- The impacts of climate change on human rights;
- The impacts of climate change on livelihood security, especially in relation to droughts and saltwater intrusion;
- Longitudinal studies of people internally displaced by disasters;
- Longitudinal, tracking studies of internal migration;
- The impacts of climate change on red tides, coral bleaching, changing patterns of migratory fish, irrigation supply, and [perceived] extreme heat, and subsequent effects on migration patterns.

406 F. Laczo and C. Aghazarm, “Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Assessing the Evidence,” *Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Assessing the Evidence*, 2009, <https://www.cabdirect.org/cabdirect/abstract/20103136708>.

7

Moving Ahead

Overarching Recommendations

The research across the Pacific, Eastern Caribbean and the Philippines brought to light that while regional experts are concerned about the growing pressures on livelihoods and their influence on human mobility dynamics, there is no sufficient capacity to systematically address HMCCC. One challenge is – and this is true also outside of the countries under investigation – that HMCCC often cannot be directly attributed to one ministry, but is a cross-cutting issue, involving immigration, environment, health, education, labour and disaster response ministries. Moreover, in some cases, such as in the 2017 displacements during the Caribbean cyclone season, movements occur across international borders. Therefore, the topic requires strong inter-ministerial, and intra-regional cooperation. Also both financial and personnel capacity is needed at different levels of governance. While some interview partners established that there are more pressing push factors for outmigration, such as poverty, there is general agreement that climate impacts are increasingly undermining livelihoods and therefore will become a more important factor in future migration decision making. In order for human mobility to become an effective adaptation to climate change, policies and instruments to support migrants, receiving and sending communities need to be designed. To fulfil this objective, both the Warsaw Mechanism’s Task Force on Displacement and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration provide guidance. In the following sections we outline how the recommendations from these two instances can be operationalised for the three regions.

7.1. Operationalising the Recommendations of the Task Force on Displacement

The Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts submitted draft conclusions of the Chairs to the Forty-ninth session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice in Katowice, 2 – 8 December 2018, drawing from the report of the Executive Committee of the WIM mechanisms (FCCC/SB/2018/1).⁴⁰⁷ Countries should work to operationalise the recommendations from the Task Force on disaster displacement, especially 51(s) and 51(t).⁴⁰⁸ This means addressing disaster risk reduction while striving for climate-resilient development.

First and foremost, all countries should “consider developing policies, plans and strategies, as appropriate, and to facilitate coordinated action and the monitoring of progress, where applicable, in efforts to avert, minimise and address loss and damage”.⁴⁰⁹ Some countries noted below have done so via their NAPs, while most have the opportunity to take part in relevant regional discussions.

Specific objectives related to climate change and human mobility are further elaborated by the WIM Executive Committee through its five-year rolling work plan. In particular, strategic work stream (e) which calls for “[e]nhanced cooperation and facilitation in relation to action and support, including finance, technology and

407 UNFCCC Secretariat, “Report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts.”

408 UNFCCC Secretariat.

409 COP Decision of 8 December 2018: FCCC/SB/2018/L.6



East Coast Dominica (© Dr. Horst Vogel / GIZ)

capacity-building, to address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change”.⁴¹⁰

The WIM executive committee underlines the need “[t]o support and enhance regional, subregional and trans-boundary cooperation, in relation to averting, minimizing and addressing displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change, including for risk and vulnerability assessments, mapping, data analysis, preparedness and early warning systems”.⁴¹¹

For example within the regions under investigation countries can work together to:

- Consider equity and non-economic considerations – such as wealth disparities, cultural identity, and place-based identity – in disaster risk reduction activities, plans, and strategies. These considerations vary by

410 UNFCCC, “Report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts. Addendum,” FCCC/SB/2017/1/Add.1, 2017, <https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/2017/sb/eng/01a01e.pdf>.

411 UNFCCC Secretariat, “Report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts.”

country, household, group, and gender, creating specific needs that should be considered.

- Raise awareness of climate change impacts at the local level through science-policy communication, made accessible to local governments and their constituents.
- Invite constituted bodies under the UNFCCC regime [e.g. the Executive Committee of Warsaw International Mechanism, the Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG), the Paris Committee on Capacity Building (PCCB), the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN)] to develop guidance – for example, a ‘toolkit’ such as those that exist for planned relocations – related to risk reduction, related capacity building, and technology needs that can be adapted and applied at the national level.
- Encourage donor governments to support the development of such guidance/toolkits and the implementation of recommendations therein, with a view to improving consistency and coherence across the regions as well as within countries, to enhance coordination and complementarity of different actions at various levels of government.

7.2. Operationalising the Objectives of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration

The Global Compact provides a roadmap for addressing migration, with a focus on actions within the authority of sovereign states, and on the ways in which bilateral and multilateral cooperation can enhance national goals. With respect to current challenges in the Pacific, Eastern Caribbean and the Philippines, two objectives of the compact should be of particular interest: Objective 2, minimise the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel people to leave their country of origin, and; Objective 5, enhance availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration.

Inter alia, in Objective 2 subsections (b) and (g), states commit to drawing from the following actions:

- “(b) [...] eliminating the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel people to leave their country of origin, [...] climate change mitigation and adaptation”;
- “(g) Account for migrants in national emergency preparedness and response”.

In addition, states commit in Objective 5, inter alia, to draw on actions to develop labour mobility schemes [21.(d)], to promote effective skills-matching [21.(e)], to

- (g) Develop or build on existing national and regional practices for admission and stay of appropriate duration based on compassionate, humanitarian or other considerations for migrants compelled to leave their countries of origin, due to sudden-onset natural disasters and other precarious situations [...],
- “(h) Cooperate to identify, develop and strengthen solutions for migrants compelled to leave their countries of origin owing to slow-onset natural disasters, the adverse effects of climate change [...] including by devising planned relocation and visa options, in cases where adaptation in or return to their country of origin is not possible.”



Tukuraki – Fiji (© GIZ)

Sovereign nations determine how to domesticate and follow-up to the compact, which provides a roadmap for states as well as a vehicle for regional and international cooperation. Implementing its objectives may inspire an enhancement of policies and plans at the national level, taking a whole-of-government approach. Successfully achieving the goals of the compact is much more likely with sustained support of the compact itself, as well as the objectives therein. Opportunities for the Philippines and Pacific and Caribbean countries, in line with the compact, can be found through: bilateral cooperation and engagement, as well as multi-stakeholder partnerships; regular exchange with the UN Migration Network; and overall support to and engagement in the multilateral system.



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9

Annex

9.1.

List of Interview Partners

CARIBBEAN			
Code	Organisation/Position	Area of Expertise	Country
C01	Ministry or Other Central National Body	Social Services	Antigua and Barbuda
C02	Intergovernmental Organisation	Sustainable Development	
C03	Local Politician	Tourism	Antigua and Barbuda
C04	Ministry or Other Central National Body	Environment	Anguilla
C05	Ministry or Other Central National Body	Environment	Anguilla
C06	Provincial or Municipal Body	Governance	Antigua and Barbuda
C07	Ministry or Other Central National Body	Health, Disaster Coordination	Anguilla
C08	Academia	Gender	
C09	Intergovernmental Organisation	Climate Change and Migration	
C10	Ministry or Other Central National Body	Labour	Anguilla
C11	Local Politician	Agriculture and Fisheries	Antigua and Barbuda
C12	Intergovernmental Organisation	Disaster Management	
C13	Ministry or Other Central National Body	Disaster Management	Anguilla
C14	Ministry or Other Central National Body	Immigration	Antigua and Barbuda
C15	Ministry or Other Central National Body	Social Development	Anguilla
C16	National Politician	Education	Antigua and Barbuda
C17	Ministry or Other Central National Body	Disaster Management	Antigua and Barbuda
C18	Non-Governmental Organisation	Health, Humanitarian Action	Dominica
C19	Academia	Disaster Risk Reduction	
C20	Intergovernmental Organisation	Disaster Risk Resilience	
C21	Ministry or Other Central National Body	Immigration	Dominica
C22	Ministry or Other Central National Body	Immigration	Dominica
C23	Intergovernmental Organisation	Sustainability	
C24	Intergovernmental Organisation	Disaster Risk Management	
C25	Intergovernmental Organisation	Health	
C26	Intergovernmental Organisation	Social Development	
C27	Intergovernmental Organisation	Social Development	
C28	Ministry or Other Central National Body	Disaster Management	Saint Lucia
C29	Ministry or Other Central National Body	Disaster Management	Saint Lucia
C30	Ministry or Other Central National Body	Disaster Management	Dominica
C31	Ministry or Other Central National Body	Local Government Affairs, Disaster Management	Dominica
C32	Ministry or Other Central National Body	Disaster Management	Saint Lucia
C33	Ministry or Other Central National Body	Immigration	Saint Lucia

PACIFIC			
Code	Organisation/Position	Area of Expertise	Country
Pac01	Intergovernmental Organisation	Disaster Displacement	
Pac02	Ministry or Other Central National Body	Meteorology	Fiji
Pac03	Academia	Geography, Development	Fiji
Pac04	Academia	Environment	Fiji
Pac05	Ministry or Other Central National Body	Disaster Management	Fiji
Pac06	Private Sector	Environmental Law	Fiji
Pac07	Non-Governmental Organisation	Urban Resilience	Fiji
Pac08	Ministry or Other Central National Body	Multilateralism, Climate Change	Fiji
Pac09	National Ministry	Agriculture	Fiji
Pac10	National Ministry	Forestry	Fiji
Pac11	Ministry or Other Central National Body	Climate Change Policy	Kiribati
Pac12	Provincial or Municipal Body	Community Development	Kiribati
Pac13	Non-Governmental Organisation	Climate Action	Kiribati
Pac14	Ministry or Other Central National Body	Meteorology	Kiribati
Pac15	Academia	Climate Change Adaptation	Fiji
Pac16	Intergovernmental Organisation	Climate Change	
Pac17	Intergovernmental Organisation	Regional Cooperation	
Pac18	Intergovernmental Organisation	Climate Change and Migration	
Pac19	Intergovernmental Organisation	Security	
Pac20	Non-Governmental Organisation	Health	Tuvalu
Pac21	Ministry or Other Central National Body	Climate Change Policy	Tuvalu
Pac22	Ministry or Other Central National Body	Project Management	Tuvalu
Pac23	National Ministry	Biodiversity	Tuvalu
Pac24	Non-Governmental Organisation	Climate Change and Disaster Management	Tuvalu
Pac25	Non-Governmental Organisation	Development	Vanuatu
Pac26	Private Sector	Maritime Ecosystems	Vanuatu
Pac27	National Ministry	Environmental Law	Vanuatu
Pac28	Private Sector	Development	Vanuatu
Pac29	Non-Governmental Organisation	Gender	Vanuatu
Pac30	Academia	Environmental Law	Vanuatu
Pac31	Ministry or Other Central National Body	Local Government Affairs, Development Planning	Vanuatu
Pac32	Ministry or Other Central National Body	Finance	Vanuatu
Pac33	Non-Governmental Organisation	Climate Action	Vanuatu
Pac34	Ministry or Other Central National Body	Disaster Management	Vanuatu

PHILIPPINES			
Code	Organisation/Position	Area of Expertise	Country
Phil01	Ministry or Other Central National Body	Climate Change, Agriculture, Fisheries	Philippines
Phil02	Intergovernmental Organisation	Migration	Philippines
Phil03	Intergovernmental Organisation	Disaster Preparedness and Response	Philippines
Phil04	Academia	Demography	Philippines
Phil05	Intergovernmental Organisation	Human Rights	Philippines
Phil06	Ministry or Other Central National Body	Migration	Philippines
Phil07	Non-Governmental Organisation	Coastal Protection	Philippines
Phil08	Ministry or Other Central National Body	Climate Change	Philippines
Phil09	Academia	Climate Change Policy	Philippines
Phil10	Academia	Sustainable Cities	Philippines
Phil11	Ministry or Other Central National Body	Local Government Affairs	Philippines
Phil12	Ministry or Other Central National Body	Civil Defence	Philippines
Phil13	Ministry or Other Central National Body	Social Welfare	Philippines
Phil14	Ministry or Other Central National Body	Science and Technology	Philippines
Phil15	Provincial or Municipal Body	Disaster Risk Reduction	Philippines
Phil16	Ministry or Other Central National Body	Security	Philippines
Phil17	Ministry or Other Central National Body	Development	Philippines
Phil18-Phil27	Residents/Focus Group Discussion Participants	Various	Philippines

9.2. Interview Guide

- Introduction of interviewers and project (Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Change), state name, affiliation and position.
- Explanation of project scope: “To improve applied knowledge relating to the sustainable management of human mobility in the context of climate change in (the Philippines/the Pacific region/Caribbean region) as well as in international cooperation. “
- Goals of the interview: Learning about existing policies related to human mobility in the context of climate change.
- Technical Aspects: Interviews will be audiotaped and later on transcribed.
- Informed Consent: Interviewers are required to read the informed consent form out loud in the language of the interviewee. They ask whether everything was understood by the potential respondent and whether they wish to participate in the study. If yes, the respondent is asked to sign the form and answer the questions regarding audiotaping, use of transcriptions and anonymity. If no, the interviewers say that this is fine and thank the respondent for their time.
- Questions should be asked in sequence, however, if some questions are already answered as part of a reply to a previous question, the questions are not repeated. Probing and additional questions for understanding and elaboration of new insights are possible.
- At the end of each interview the interviewer thanks the respondents for their time and participation.

9.3. Set of Questions

Goal	Policy Action	Expert interview question	
Introduction		1. What is your name?	
		2. What is your organisation?	
		3. Note to interviewer: please note gender.	
		4. Please describe your position/role.	
Topical Information		5. How does climate change undermine livelihoods of people? Could you give some examples and how this relates to you work?	
		6. Have you witnessed effects on people’s health, also mental health such as trauma or depression?	
		7. What are the main factors that motivate people to migrate?	
		8. Do you think that climate change is acknowledged as a potential driver of human mobility among policymakers?	
		9. Have you experienced the worsening of religious, ethnic or any form of social tensions in the aftermath of a climate-related natural disaster?	
Dimension 1: Strategic Policy Regime/ Framework 1	Policy Strategies	Governmental Policies 10. Are there laws or policies on climate mobility on the national/ regional/local level? 11. Who holds the final authority to enact policies related to migration, internal displacement, and planned relocation? (in general, not necessarily related to climate) 12. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the government’s current strategies to address migration, displacement and planned relocation in the context of climate change?	
		Regional or international dialogues & cross-country coordination 13. What is your/your ministry’s/your entity’s involvement in global policy discussions, such as the annual Conferences of the Parties (COPs) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)?	
		Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms 14. What are the evaluation procedures in place for initiatives relating to migration, displacement and planned relocation?	
		Institutional capacities 15. What capacities are there in the government to address or manage migration, displacement and planned relocation? 16. What capacities are needed?	



1	Information on participatory, community-based approaches	Communication mechanisms	17. What are the mechanisms for people to obtain assistance in the case of climate shocks (e.g. crop failure, flooding, destruction of shelter or productive assets)? (e.g. how do citizens contact relevant authorities to obtain assistance?)
		Citizen consultations	18. Are there mechanisms for communities to request relocation from climate change-affected areas?
			19. Do current disaster risk reduction policies and initiatives consider climate change projections?
		Livelihoods and Economic Development	20. Are there any employment or economic development initiatives that target climate change-affected communities? (e.g. skill training, financial assistance, ...)
			21. In what geographical areas should assistance be strengthened for populations vulnerable to sudden-onset or slow-onset events?
			22. Which ministries/departments or partners have the final authority for the protection of and assistance to people displaced by disasters?
			23. What are the strengths and weaknesses of current responses to people displaced by natural hazard-induced disasters?
			24. Are there any compensation or social protection schemes in place for those affected by (slow-onset/rapid-onset) climate impacts? For example, government- or internationally-supported food safety net programs, crop or livestock insurance.
			25. If so, what impact do those schemes have on migration? (more/less/different destinations ...)
			Human rights of migrants and displaced people
		27. Please describe any domestic human rights and civil liberties instruments (e.g. constitutional amendments, domestic application of international human rights law) to migrants, displaced people, relocating/relocated people (for example: right to migration/free movement, citizenship, mobility of voting rights, mobility of social security, etc.)	
		28. Are you aware of your government's involvement in the discussions on the Global Compact on Safe, Regular and Orderly Migration or the Global Compact on Refugees? Please describe any of the government's priorities therein.	
		Application of women's rights of migrants and displaced people	29. Are you aware of women's rights instruments that are applicable to women and girls who are migrating, displaced or being relocated?
		Rights & Capacities to move	30. What capacities are there in the government to manage migration, displacement and planned relocation? What capacities are needed?
31. Are there any planned relocation programmes related to environmental change? If so, how do these feed into other existing settlement schemes?			
32. Should people severely affected by climate change in your country be entitled to live and work in another country?			
33. Do national asylum regulations and refugee policies consider environmental/climate change? If so, in which way? Please detail on past experience and/or existing legislation.			



Dimension 2: Actor/stakeholder network 2	Institutional Setting	Stakeholders	34. Which role do regional and international actors play in managing or responding to environmentally/climate related migration, displacement, and planned relocation on the national level? (for example development aid, NGO)
			35. Which institutions and/or individual actors do you regard crucial to respond to the challenges of climate migration?
			36. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the current institutional structure to address environment- or climate-related displacement, migration and planned relocation?
		Coordination	37. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the communication between actors working on environment, climate change, and displacement, migration, and relocation?
			38. On what basis do government actors working in climate change adaptation, disaster response, internal displacement, migration, and planned relocation coordinate? For example, are there inter-ministerial task forces or trainings?
Dimension 3: Supportive Actions 3	Knowledge	Research	39. Are there any research programmes or projects specific to environment- or climate-related migration, displacement and planned relocation?
			40. How is current knowledge and new research on environment, climate change and migration, displacement and planned relocation shared within your ministry/organisation?
			41. What type of research on this topic is needed?
		Data	42. Describe any data that exists on migration, displacement and planned relocation?
			43. What are the strengths and weaknesses of current data collection and data/knowledge management on migration, displacement and planned relocation?
44. Whom else should we interview regarding the topic of climate migration?			

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