Cosmological Aesthetics Through
The Kantian Sublime And Nietzschean Dionysian

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University Press of America

Contents

Acknowledgements

First and foremost I would like to convey my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Howard Caygill. It has been a privilege to work with such a distinguished scholar and an inspiring and open-minded person. He has given me invaluable guidance and motivation throughout the process. I appreciate all his contributions to make my Ph.D. experience productive and stimulating. I am also grateful for the excellent example he has provided as an enthusiastic teacher and independent thinker.

I am very grateful to Simon O'Sullivan and Gary Banham for serving as readers for my dissertation, for the challenging and rewarding viva and insightful comments on the later drafts of the book. I am really thankful for the time and patience they invested for such a careful and critical examination. Furthermore, I wish to thank Nicholas Walker for his thorough reading and detailed corrections on the early drafts. I am also indebted to Steven Connor who, in line with the essential principle of London Consortium, encouraged my transdisciplinary approach. He also made rewarding comments about my research in the early stages. I also feel lucky to have shared these memorable years with fellow Consortium students.

Finally, I must thank Sara Volkmar who read and reviewed my work from the early stages to the very end. She has been a great partner and motivator with her lively presence. I would also like to thank my devoted mother Neriman Çultu who always supported and encouraged me throughout my student life.

Introduction

Both Heraclitus' *peri phuseōs*[1] (*On Nature*) and Kant's *Übergang* (*Opus Postumum*) enjoy the reputation of being intractable, difficult but also important works in the history of philosophy. We do not have complete versions of either and the style and content of these texts resist interpretation. In this book, we attempt to place these texts beside one another and to read them within a framework provided by Kant's metaphysics of nature and third *Critique* on one side, and Nietzsche's writings on the Pre-Socratics and aesthetics on the other. By supplementing the texts in this way it is hoped that they will gain internal consistency as well as a shared thematic orientation with respect to questions of aesthetics and of cosmology as the overcoming of ontology. To begin, we must first prove that *Opus Postumum*, Kant's most Pre-Socratic work, is informed by cosmological rather than logical-ontological concerns and driven by the ambition to draw together material from diverse fields of philosophy under the aegis of a new thinking of *logos*.

In *Opus Postumum* Kant mentions a new discipline of thought that aims to explain the transition between the metaphysical principles of natural science and the concepts of physical moving forces.[2] In this process of transition, the concept of motion is the active cause on which all elements of experience rely.[3] The motion in nature and the movement occurring in the aesthetic faculties are essentially linked not only by means of their effects but also of their source. Prior to Kant, Wolff and Leibniz define cosmology as a division of metaphysics alongside natural theology, psychology and ontology. Kant develops his cosmology as a thought analyzing and defining the direction, time, quality, relation and modality of the moving forces of matter. He thereby attempts to systematically categorize and define these moving forces of matter throughout major works and other writings from his first published work, *Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces*, to *Metaphysical Foundations of the Natural Science* and finally *Opus Postumum*.

Yet, with particular reference to Kant's early works such as *Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces*, one may rightly question the validity of the term "moving forces" in Kantian philosophy, considering also his rejection of Wolff's notion of moving forces. Kant argues that motion and force are essentially unrelated, as force has to do with "being" and thereby deserves to be called *vis activa* or active force (as a better representation of the dynamic source).[4] Active forces are the constructive elements of nature creating space, its structure and the universe and everything within by spreading and effecting out, in turn ruling everything from materially produced ideas to mentally intended actions.[5] On the other hand, before Kant, Descartes states that "motion" rather than force is the constitutive principle of nature showing that force is essentially reducible to the quantity of motion. However, Leibniz defends the force-argument viewing force as the basic quality of nature.[6] Modern science, through the empirical discoveries of momentum and kinetic energy, confirms the validity of both Cartesian reduction of force to motion and thus physics to kinematics, and Leibniz's discovery of a new quantity of velocity (which he calls "living force" or *vis viva*) to expand physics into dynamics. It is Kant's correct anticipation of the validity of both of these arguments that makes him reconcile motion and force through the term "moving forces" in his later philosophy of nature. This is one of the reasons why he freely uses "moving forces," as the dynamic elements of nature, in *Metaphysical Foundations* and *Opus Postumum* while, unlike Wolff, providing this concept with a deeper and critical focus. Another reason for Kant's choice of "moving forces" is his systematic aim to disentangle the particular forms or modes of forces like attraction and repulsion. But since it is inappropriate to tell apart the particular or localized force from the dynamism of the whole, the term "moving forces" is used to represent the totality, accurately underlining both the dynamism of being as a whole and the presence of the multitude of forces (once they are localized within and between certain forms of matter). While motion is a generic term designating the dynamic unity of all matter, force is or at least seems to be the motion applied by/to a body of matter, or, motion that occurs between two bodies of matter (attracting, repelling each other). This is why it is possible to call attraction and repulsion "moving forces" instead of just forces. For when a body of matter applies force to another, it reveals its essential dynamism as well as its belongingness to the unity of forces and bodies of matter in one all-encompassing motion. The transition from these physical moving forces to the principle or idea encompassing them all is what Kant calls *Übergang*. Therefore, alongside a final clarification with regards to "moving forces," *Opus Postumum* provides several clues about Kant's ultimate views on the essential characteristics of the idea of nature.

While *Opus Postumum* informs the main principles (transition and motion) that constitute our arguments, the first *Critique* serves as a dictionary for defining and discussing the Kantian terms used throughout the book such as cosmological concepts, sense-intuitions, power of judgment (*Urteilskraft*) and "inner sense." *Opus Postumum*, as Kant's original voice, supersedes the first *Critique*, which is designed as a critical clarification of the philosophical tradition he in-

herited, and as a systematic prolegomenon for future metaphysics. However, this does not alter the fact that these works are essentially related not only in terms of their descriptive qualities but also of their theoretical content. While both works conceive cosmology in a positive sense, in *Opus Postumum*, cosmology overtakes the entire realm of metaphysics in an attempt to reconcile it with the realm of physics.[7] Similarly, Kant's discussions on self-affection and inner sense in the first *Critique* seem to correlate his arguments in *Opus Postumum*. For instance, associating the doctrine of self-positing (*Selbstsetzungslehre*) with the doctrine of a priori self-affection, initially articulated in the first *Critique*, Friedman describes the transcendental synthesis as "an act of a priori self-affection" in which the active faculty of understanding affects the passive faculty of sensibility (*Empfindung*).[8]

On the general spectrum of the first *Critique*, Förster notes, "the fundamental a priori determinations of a 'nature in general' were the proper subject of this book, not the systematic unity of an empirical science."[9] This is also valid for *Opus Postumum*. But what is new in the latter? Why did Kant feel the need to write a post-critical *Opus* when everyone was convinced that his philosophical system was complete after the third *Critique* in which he attempts to reconcile natural necessity and rational spontaneity? Kant had actually found a new principle which would bridge his system of nature and the systems of pure understanding and reason. This new principle, I argue, is not a logical but a "cosmological" principle. It is not just transcendental (at least in the sense of its use in the first *Critique*) because its existence also relies on empirical intuitions. Tuschling rightly says that Kant is not content with his transcendental deductions in the first *Critique*; according to the new principle however, the concept of an object of possible experience begins to point at the universality of the experience. Förster too agrees that transition is the principle according to which basic forms and concepts can be thought within an all-encompassing system.[10] Therefore, the reading of Kant must not begin with oppositions stemming from the dialectical reasoning but from the new principle introduced in *Opus Postumum*. For only in *Opus Postumum*, does Kant begin to question the validity of the dichotomies between object and subject, matter and form, phenomenon and noumenon, *phusis* and *ethos*, nature and reason, world and God. For only there does he mention the necessity of an all-encompassing a priori principle (of transition) from which all these oppositions derive and through which they exist in unity and balance. This system is itself the demonstration of the unity of our pure intuitions of motion, space and time and the conceptual structure of our thought processes, of the primitive laws of nature and our aesthetic understanding and judgment.

It would also be appropriate to characterize the incomplete (yet rich and innovative) *Opus Postumum* as the continuation of both Kant's theory of the sublime and reflective judgment in the third *Critique*, and his underlying motivation to integrate his physics, aesthetics, ethics and metaphysics into a single philosophical viewpoint as in the philosophical-cosmological systems of the Pre-Socratics. For this work contains not only Kant's dynamical theory of matter

defining motion within the natures of space and time and the advanced version of his philosophy of natural science, but also his arguments for the phenomenal validity of the metaphysical foundations (or the essential unity of the theoretical and practical reason), his teachings on the aesthetic human faculties of judgment and *Anschauung* (sense-intuition), and the discernment of the transcendental philosophy from Platonic idealism carrying it to a rather cosmological level.[11]

Nevertheless, here, one might rightly question the legitimacy of associating Kant's cosmology with Pre-Socratic and especially Heraclitean cosmology[12] based on Kant's extensive use of *subiectum* and *obiectum*.[13] Kant knows Heraclitus only through secondary sources such as Plato's *Cratylus* and Aristotle's *Metaphysics*[14], though he admits (after Aristotle) in the first *Critique* that he always felt threatened by the major Heraclitean doctrine of *panta rhei*. Indeed, this doctrine makes it impossible to conduct a philosophical inquiry by assuming a self-conscious subject or "I," as it rules out the possibility of a completely detached or disinterested reasoning which necessarily requires an unchanging state of mind.[15] However, the *shift* in Kant's later works (from the third *Critique* onwards) must not be overlooked. Above all, Kant's attempt to generate a new cosmology based on the new principle of transition, which applies to the entire realm of philosophy from theoretical physics to metaphysics and aesthetics, demonstrates his endeavour to break free from the Cartesian dualisms. He focuses instead on the inquiry into nature as an aesthetically and cosmologically represented idea (as in the case of the Pre-Socratic *historia peri phuseôs*). What shall we make of Kant's cosmological-aesthetic approach in his two late major works, *Critique of the Power of Judgment* and *Opus Postumum*?

To answer this, we need to understand why cosmology better relates and applies to aesthetics than to other divisions of metaphysics like psychology, theology and ontology. Any cosmological argument must also refer to the physically sensible moving forces and/or their apprehensible metaphysical foundations. Human sense-intuition and judgment are the primary tools for the transition from the phenomenal appearance of forces into intelligible concepts, which is necessarily an aesthetic process.[16] To explicate *Übergang*, we need to reconcile cosmology, the oldest branch of philosophy that deals with the ways the forces of motion (*phusis*) structure *kosmos* and affect human life (*ethos*), with aesthetics, one of the youngest branches of philosophy concerned with the ways we perceive, sense and judge the form and motion of matter. Moreover, aesthetics does not solely investigate the appearance of physical objects but must extend its focus to active as well as passive human understanding, sense-intuitions (*Anschauung*) as well as sense-perceptions (*Empfindung*). The source of any aesthetic idea or judgment regarding nature lies in the way the cosmic forces communicate human inner- and outer-senses.

The English word "transition" perfectly preserves *Übergang*'s sense of "movement, passage, or change from one position, state, stage or concept to another." The primary importance of "movement" in the definition of the word "transition" also supports the intrinsic relation between the cosmological principle of motion and the aesthetic principle of transition. In fact two different no-

tions of transition are developed in *Opus Postumum*: first, the transition from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics, and second, the transition from the metaphysical foundations to the transcendental philosophy. But it is possible to reconcile these two notions by adopting a *cosmologic-aesthetic* explanation. The necessity of the intermediary concepts as the components of the bridge between physics and metaphysics entails the demonstration of the essential relation between cosmology and aesthetics.

One of the structural arguments in the book concerns the theory of moving forces in *Opus Postumum,* revealing essentially a similar motivation that underpins both Kant's theory of the sublime in nature and his theory of reflective judgment. For they proceed from the construal of nature as an aesthetic notion and systematic or non-systematic whole. While *ta panta* (everything or the whole) becomes the ordered whole or *kosmos* only as an aesthetic idea, any aesthetic notion about nature must handle and explain it cosmologically as an elementary system. The fruitful comparison between the Kantian sublime and Nietzschean Dionysian constitutes the primary source of inspiration in our quest for a philosophy of aesthetics beyond the merely logical or rationalist accounts. Indeed, an elaborate understanding of the comparison between the Kantian sublime and Nietzschean Dionysian requires higher criteria and principles by which we can observe the affinities and transitions between nature and art, forces and concepts, physics and metaphysics.

To attain the goals set above, I employ the method of amplification or ampliative reconstruction in my examination and presentation of the arguments of these three major philosophers. In this manner, their respective cosmological and aesthetic notions and theories such as *Übergang*, *sublime*, *logos*, *phusis*, *Dionysian* and *will-to-power* are extended by systematically positing them vis-à-vis each other under two main principles. This method helps generate new approaches to these notions and creates scope for further contemplation regarding their ontological or cosmological foundations. A Pre-Socratic reconstruction of the Kantian philosophy, for instance, renders it multi-dimensional and flexible (and thereby amplified). Similarly, a Kantian reconstruction of the Heraclitean philosophy would pave the way to its fuller understanding by bridging the gap between ancient and modern philosophical concepts. Indeed this is the method adopted by Nietzsche in his Schopenhauerian reconstruction of the tragic thought in *Birth of Tragedy* and his Heraclitean critique of modern philosophy in the later works.[17] However, when using this method, one has to be careful not to remove an argument from its original context and thereby misinterpret and misuse the conceptions and ideas developed by the thinker. To avoid this kind of misrepresentation, we will resort to the Heraclitean philosophy to frame the main principles and ideas that prelude both chapters. Kantian terminology is used as a *dictionary* to substantiate the descriptive and critical qualities of the arguments. Nietzsche's aesthetics (and specifically the Dionysian) constitutes the force that drives and guides cosmological aesthetics as an alternative philosophical approach. Furthermore, Heidegger's early and late period works assist the critical assessment of the Pre-Socratic, Kantian, and Nietzschean thought

while enriching the content of the book.

So, the first chapter delves into the principle of transition, associating it with the Heraclitean *logos* in the Prelude through the late nineteenth– early twentieth–century construal of *logos* as *Weltanschauung,* especially in Dilthey, Jaspers and Heidegger, the latter of whom contributes extensively to frame this work around the Heraclitean philosophy. After a preliminary philological and philosophical appropriation of the Heraclitean *logos*, we examine the principle of transition with reference to the cosmological and aesthetic arguments in Kant's *Opus Postumum*. In applying the principle to Kantian philosophy in general, the faculty of sense-intuition (*Anschauung*) is regarded as the faculty through which the transition takes place. *Anschauung* transforms sensible appearances into unifying intuitions regarding nature by bridging the gap between the aesthetic perception of phenomena and the theoretical or cosmological ideas. Moreover, the power of judgment is posited as the faculty that regulates and determines the transition between the moving forces in nature and human freedom (as well as between the faculties of understanding and reason.) This chapter further explores the way Kant attempts to transform his transcendentalism in the later fascicles of *Opus Postumum* through the principle of transition into a cosmological worldview while preserving the moral being of man at the forefront of philosophical speculation. In an attempt to establish it as a primary philosophical and aesthetic principle, we expand on the principle of transition through the Kantian sublime, Nietzschean Dionysian (both construed as aesthetic theories representing the transition) and the ensuing idea of genius, revised in keeping with Kant's new notion of *cosmotheoros*.

The second chapter explores the principle of motion with regard to the Heraclitean, Kantian, Nietzschean and Heideggerian cosmology, physiology and aesthetics. Following the pattern developed in the first chapter, the principle of motion is preliminarily grounded on the Heraclitean worldview this time revolving around his conceptualization of *phusis*. Here, the analysis of the principle of motion in Nietzsche's lectures on the *Pre-Platonics* and late Heideggerian metaphysics supplements the philological and philosophical discussion regarding the term's constitutive affinities with such notions as *kosmos*, *kinesis*, *arkhē* and *logos*. After this thorough grounding of the key components of the principle, the chapter examines Kant's metaphysics of nature framing his theory of motion with regards to its unifying character as the primary cosmic principle, its consideration of nature as dynamic continuum, and its essentiality for the determination of the categories of time and space. The demonstration of the link between Kant's *Übergang* and the principle of motion through a discussion of the role and necessity of transition in the communication of motion finalizes the section. Further, the Kantian sublime is construed as a cosmologic-aesthetic idea representing *phusis* or the motion in/of nature. Unlike the sublime, the Dionysian is not posited as a representative aesthetic concept but rather as a fully developed cosmological theory given that the later Dionysian comes to dominate Nietzsche's entire philosophical standpoint. Therefore, an exploration of Nietzsche's principle of motion, cosmology and physiology also entails an analysis

of the enhanced theory of the Dionysian alongside the originally Heraclitean elements. We then examine his theories of eternal recurrence and will-to-power respectively as the Heraclitean and Dionysian formulations of the principle of motion to strengthen the main argument. Finally, to demonstrate how these principles can be employed in the critique of actual artworks, we provide an extensive analysis of Van Gogh's *The Starry Night* in an excursus. By referring to the painting as well as other artworks of genius, this section finalizes the comparison between the Kantian sublime and Nietzschean Dionysian as it outlines, exemplifies and reaffirms the philosophical grounding of cosmological aesthetics.

NOTES

1. Diogenes Laertius. *The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers*, trans. Yonge, London: J. Haddon & Son, 1853, Book IX, pp.376-82.

2. Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.44.

3. Ibid., p.13.

4. Also see Friedman, Michael. *Kant and the Exact Sciences*, Harvard University Press, 1992, pp.5-6.

5. Schönfeld, Martin. "Kant's Philosophical Development" in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-development/) Retrieved on June 2, 2009.

6. Ibid.

7. In his *Kant and the Exact Sciences*, Friedman describes this function of *Opus Postumum* as follows: "The problem of the *Transition* project is to build a bridge between the a priori doctrine of the universal properties of matter in general . . . and the empirical or experimental physics of the specific properties and interactions of particular types of matter. . . . Such a bridge is absolutely necessary if experimental physics is ever to amount to more than a mere empirical aggregate." (Friedman, Michael. *Kant and the Exact Sciences*, Harvard University Press, 1992, p.242). Furthermore, Friedman states that this problem bears a striking resemblance to the way Kant posits the problem of reflective judgment. (Ibid., p.243.) He adds, "The analogy is striking indeed: as the universal principles of the *Metaphysical Foundations* stand to the particular phenomena of empirical physics in the *Transition* project, so the universal transcendental laws of the understanding stand to the empirical laws of 'particular experience' for the faculty of reflective judgement." (Ibid., pp.243-4). This point is examined in the section on the regulative role of the faculty of judgment.

8. Friedman, Michael. *Kant and the Exact Sciences*, Harvard University Press, 1992, p.332. Furthermore, Friedman rightly argues that in his formulation of the principle of transition, Kant illustrates the a priori self-affection (self-determination) with the representation of motion: "The representation of motion in pure intuition—conceived as the realization of figurative synthesis—first grounds the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge." (Ibid., pp.333-4.)

9. Förster, Eckart. *Kant's Final Synthesis*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000, p.4.

10. Ibid., p.115.

11. This finding is endorsed yet purposefully not furthered by Friedman in his *Kant and the Exact Sciences* (Friedman, Michael. *Kant and the Exact Sciences*, Harvard University Press, 1992, p.213, fn.1).

12. Admittedly, in many places, Kant's interpretation of Heraclitean cosmology is undeveloped. In his lectures on metaphysics and logic, he identifies him (agreeing with Socrates) as an exceedingly obscure thinker due to the newness of philosophy and philosophical language in the Greek culture. (Kant Immanuel, *Lectures on Metaphysics* trans. Ameriks & Naragon, Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp.120, 303; Kant Immanuel, *Lectures on Logic* trans. Young, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.261.)

13. In his third and last seminar in Le Thor in 1969 Heidegger exposes the shift operated by Kantian philosophy from the Greek philosophical tradition including Aristotle: " . . . in what way are *ta onta* and *ta phainomena* synonymous for the Greeks? Just how are what presences and what shows itself from itself (what appears) united? For Kant, such a unity is simply impossible. For the Greeks, things appear. For Kant, things appear to me. In the time between them, it has come about that the being has become an ob-ject (*obiectum*, or better yet: *res obstans*). The expression "object" simply has no correlate in Greek." (Heidegger, Martin. *Four Seminars*, trans. Mitchell & Raffoul, Indiana University Press, 2003, pp.36-7.)

14. Guyer, Paul. "Notes" in Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*, ed. Guyer and Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.739 fn.29.

15. In the *Criticism of the third paralogism of transcendental psychology* of the first *Critique* Kant accepts the irrefutability of the Heraclitean notion of universal becoming or the transitory nature of all things, admitting the impossibility of positing a totally persistent and self-conscious subject. (Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*, ed. Guyer and Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.424 (A364).)

16. For a further discussion on the aesthetic character of the principle of transition from the sensible stratum to intelligible substratum, see section XI of Kant's First Introduction to *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, where he explicitly shows the systematic foundations of his philosophy.

17. This point is extensively discussed and established in the second chapter.

Chapter One

On *Transition* as one of the Founding Principles of Cosmological Aesthetics and its Applications in the Kantian Sublime and Nietzschean Dionysian

PRELUDE: THE HERACLITEAN *LOGOS* AND THE PRINCIPLE OF TRANSITION

Logos is often seen as a controversial and obscure expression employed by various philosophers and schools from Sextus Empiricus and the Stoics to Nietzsche and Heidegger. This prelude not only helps framing Kant's notion of *transition between metaphysics and physics* but also constitutes the grounding argument of the book. After a short philological background of the Heraclitean *logos*, the philosophical parallels between *Übergang* and *logos* paves the way for the introduction of a cosmological-aesthetic approach to philosophy. A comparison between the Kantian sublime and Nietzschean Dionysian as the aesthetic theories representing the principle of transition then substantiates these arguments.

The Principal Fragments on "Logos"

Fragment 1: "Of the Logos which is as I describe it men always prove to be uncomprehending, both before they have heard it and when once they have heard it. For although all things happen according to this Logos men are like people of no experience, even when they experience such words and deeds as I explain, when I distinguish each thing according to its constitution and declare *how* it is; but the rest of men fail to notice what they do after they wake up just as they forget what they do when asleep."[1]

Fragment 2: "Therefore it is necessary to follow the common; but although the Logos is common the many live as though they had a private understanding."[2]

Fragment 50: "Listening not to me but to the Logos it is wise to agree that all things are one."[3]

Argument**:** *Logos is the common archaic principle that mediates between the metaphysical and phenomenal by way of regulating and determining both the understanding (intuitive as well as perceptive) of the forces of nature and the grounding of the aesthetic and ethical ideas in this process of mediation.*

Heraclitus did not use the categories of logic but "tended to describe the same thing (or roughly the same thing) now as a god[4], now as a form of matter, now as a rule of behaviour or *principle* which was nevertheless a physical constituent of things."[5] These multiple natures and definitions of *logos* suggest its intermediary role between different realms of thought (such as cosmology and aesthetics) and strata (macrocosm and microcosm).[6] In his *Heraclitus*: *The Cosmic Fragments*, Kirk argues, "Heraclitus made it far clearer than his immediate predecessors that man himself is a part of his surroundings; in him, too, the Logos is operative, and his effective functioning depends upon action in accordance with it—and so upon his understanding of it."[7] Minar claims that *logos* is the *common* (not only cosmological) law through which all things, motions and concepts are defined and altered.[8] But he also rejects any interpretation in terms of pure (scientific) cosmology. *Logos* is common, communicative, primary, self-sufficient and comprehensive.[9] It is the principle that sustains the relation between divine and human law and secures the orientation of *nomos* and *ethos* in the cosmic law by regulating the apprehensibility and application of the moving forces of matter through the generation and alteration of intelligible concepts[10]. In that *logos* constitutes the primary unifying and regulating law of *kosmos*.[11] It is both metaphysical and phenomenal since "the content of the vision which Heraclitus desiderates is in a sense 'metaphysical' in that it involves perception of essentially abstract relationships. The Logos is present to all the phenomena of nature." But it also implies a world of everyday experience (or *ethos*), life and concepts.[12]

Patrick argues that the second section of Heraclitus' work demonstrates how human arts (arts, ethics, society and politics) are *imitations of Nature*.[13] The third section of Heraclitus' book concerning theology poses the theory that "the names of things are designations of their essence. . . . Etymologies of the names of the gods was the proof first brought forward . . . to show this connection of names and things was to prove the intimate connection of man with Nature."[14] This intimate connection between the names or concepts and nature parallels our construal of *logos* as the principle of transition between the natural moving forces of matter and the concepts of human arts. As Förster shows, Kant's *Übergang* serves the same purpose: "The transition, Kant says, is 'a schematism of the concepts of metaphysics.' Its absence, he adds, would 'commit the propositions

of philosophy to the play of opinions and hypothesis'—to a mere random groping among concepts."[15] *Logos* too is a schematism of the philosophical concepts by which they continue to exist in balance in relation to each other, and maintain their substance in relation to the forces in nature.[16]

Logos serves not only as an *idea* that unifies all concepts of understanding but also as a bridging *principle* that transmits the forces and laws of nature to human *ethos.* Thereby it maintains the dependence of the ideas of human reason to its solely apprehensible primordial origin. This origin is nothing other than the *phusis* of human being and thinking. The very act of mediation actually renders human reason and its ideas and thus human culture, *alive*. On the unifying and regulating function of *logos*, Heidegger suggests: "To gathering belongs a collecting which brings under shelter. . . . That 'something extra' which makes gathering more than a jumbling together that snatches things up is not something only added afterward. . . . The safekeeping that brings something in has already determined the first steps of the gathering and arranged everything that follows."[17] Similarly, Heidegger associates *logos* with the act of collecting and bringing together: "To collect, to gather, means: to bring various dispersed things together into a unity, and at the same time to bring this unity *forth* and hand it over. . . ."[18] If we are to construe the safekeeping as judging, this definition also corresponds to the determining and arranging character of the power of judgment. The transition requires gathering and safekeeping, the former for its presence and the latter for its continuity. Heidegger later construes shelter as *ethos.* In that sense *logos* brings the forces of *phusis* under the shelter of *ethos*.[19] *Logos* regulates and thereby determines *ta panta* (everything) transforming it into *kosmos* or cosmic unity. But *logos* is not the a priori cosmic law. Instead it operates between humanity and *kosmos*. The process of transition makes *ta panta* apprehensible by human sense-intuition and *ta panta* is *kosmos* only as long as humanity *looks at* it. Nihilism takes place when humanity turns its gaze away from *kosmos* and *phusis*. In contrast, the experience of the sublime and the Dionysian are the moments when humanity looks straight into them. Heidegger seems to defend a similar interpretation of *logos* (as *transition*) arguing that *logos* helps or guides *ta panta* in uniting, unifying, assembling, gathering, laying.[20] Although Heidegger's choice of vocabulary to describe *logos* remains elusive, his description provides a powerful insight into *logos'* functions or the purposes of bridge-making. *Logos* is the bridge built across the two edges of a deep canyon. However, whilst standing on the bridge one cannot fully see the bridge itself; likewise the philosophical riddle of *logos* remained and will remain challenging for any philosopher. Furthermore, it is hard to give a complete and appropriate account of the bridge when approached from either side. This explains the multiple meanings of *logos*. All the merit of Heraclitus lies in the fact that he approaches the bridge from both sides of the canyon, the following fragment suggests: "The One, the only wisdom, does and yet does not consent to be called Zeus." The views from the two sides of the canyon are in fact as disparate as the sunset and sunrise. When approaching from the side of *ethos* where human ideas dwell, we look straight at *phusis* or at the constant sunrise.

The abundance of light blurs our sight and the bridge remains shadowy. But as we approach from the side of *phusis* (which is harder and requires wisdom), the tender light of sunset casts a clarifying light on the bridge as well as humanity dwelling on it, which we can now see plainly. Thus the Pre-Socratic cosmologists (of *peri phuseôs*) chose to approach humanity from the perspective of *phusis*. However, *logos* must not be confused with this whole picture, it is only the *bridge* where the transition occurs. Else, as Heidegger suggests, *logos* would be nothing other than the highest god or Zeus and cosmic destiny of *ta panta*. *Logos* is as human as it is *cosmic* or *godly* due to its transitory essence in-between these realms. Heidegger formulates this as follows:

> Does the *Logos* imply the elevation and transfer of the mortal's way-to-be to that of the unique One? Does mortal *legein* remain only an image corresponding to the *Logos*, which is itself the Fate in which presencing as such and for all present beings rests? Or does such questioning, which attaches itself to the guidelines of an Either-Or, not at all apply, because its approach is from the start inadequate to the inquiry here undertaken? If this is so, then neither can *Logos* be the overcoming of mortal *legein*, nor can *legein* be simply a copying of the definitive *Logos* (but rather) *logos* has a more primordial origin—and this in the simple middle region between both. Is there a path for mortal thinking to that place?[21]

In turn, Heidegger continues, the modern *Dasein* based on the notion of the overcoming of mortal *legein* becomes confined in the microcosmic level of *ethos,* unable to attain the account of the most elementary productive forces or *phusis*. In addition, *logos* is logos only insofar as it relates microcosmic human existence to macrocosmic movement of the whole.[22] That is why we handled transition as transition *between* the presencing and the conceptual outcome of the jointure. This construal of the principle as a *between* principle perfectly functions both for the transition as *logos* and the transition as *phusis*. The latter is the movement or passage between two states or realms of being, and the former is the bridge or jointure between two realms of thinking, namely between *phusis* and *ethos*. But is it possible to reconcile these two definitions? This question is discussed alongside the philosophical essence of the principle of motion.

Logos, Apprehension and Weltanschauung

Another similar character of *logos* to the principle of transition is that it is only apprehensible and thus only communicates directly to the inner sense (*Anschauung*). Heidegger acknowledges that *logos* can only be apprehended and thus does not depend on comprehensible words.[23] As Kirk states, "Change from one to another brings about a total change of name, which is misleading, because only a superficial component has altered and the most important constituent remains."[24] Waterfield, referring to the fragments 9 and 11, also confirms the ar-

gument that *logos* is an essentially apprehensible principle: "Although the logos, the truth of things, is common (i.e. universal and universally apprehensible), it is different from anything else (fragment 11) although it is common, it is unfamiliar and unexpected (fragment 9)."[25] But then why does *logos*, if common and universal, appear unfamiliar and unexpected? This is because the eyes and ears of those who see and hear it are not prepared or somehow hindered by expected and familiar or *traditional* truths. In his Introduction to *Being and Time*, Heidegger, inspired by Heraclitus' fragments 2 and 50, underlines the difficulty of discovering the idea unifying the original moving forces or *phusis* due to the domination of tradition or the temporal and spatial concepts of *ethos* on the ways to apprehend the transition.[26] Nietzsche, in *The Gay Science*, discusses the standardization of knowledge due to the adapting of one's ideas into the general spatial and temporal concepts useful for human kind, in other words, the corrupting effect of *ethos* on *logos*.[27]

Furthermore, it is possible to find echoes of *logos* as transition attained via human intuition (*Anschauung*) in the concept of worldview or *Weltanschauung*, which became popular in the early twentieth century especially in the philosophies of Dilthey, Jaspers and the early Heidegger. The word conceptualizes a broad *apprehension* of the world by which the individual understands and interprets it, accomplishes the reconciliation of his phenomenal and noumenal consciousness and interacts in the world with reference to this ideal framework. Heidegger associates apprehension with the Greek *noein* and gives it a double meaning akin to *Anschauung*.[28] In other words, the apprehension of *logos* requires one to anticipate the relation between the appearing thing and the way that thing stands for the mind, or, the reciprocal dependence of *what* and *how* questions, the latter being the determinant of the former. Like *Anschauung*, apprehension embodies both the sensible phenomenon and the intuitive process of understanding it within a whole. When perceiving the appearing thing, one also takes in the process of its relation to the unity that determines its nature and regulates the way it is judged accordingly.[29] Kahn defines *logos* as apprehension in his paraphrase of the fragment 124:

> *Graspings, that is to say groups holding together, apprehensions bringing things together: these are* wholes and not wholes; *they characterize a system which is* convergent, divergent, s*tructured by cooperation and by conflict; this system is* consonant, dissonant, *held together by harmony and discord alike*; from all *its components* a unity *emerges*, and from *this* unity all things *emerge.*[30]

Likewise, *Weltanschauung* is crucial in understanding *how* the empirical-phenomenal world (*Welt* or *kosmos*) is linked to the metaphysical foundations through *Anschauung*, as an intuitive and perceptive faculty referring both to outer senses (image, appearance) and to the inner sense (idea, notion), both to *what* appears and to *how* it is conceptualized. This line of argument establishes *Weltanschauung* as the mediating phase between *kosmos* or *Welt* and humanity.

Therefore, *Weltanschauung* in its purest form[31] corresponds to our definition of *logos*.

Epistemologically, the ideas generated through *Weltanschauung* must be *a priori*, universal and cosmological rather than *a posteriori*, particular and logical. This is also the case with *logos* since it is a priori as it has always been there to be apprehended even though it is incomprehensible to and hidden from the many. A coherent definition of *logos* must then consist in cosmological rather than logical principles that are dependent on intuitions of time and space. In contrast, cosmological principles are rooted in the primal moving forces that are prior to the logically assembled temporal and spatial conditions. In *Opus Postumum,* Kant defines *Übergang* as the originator of itself rather than the logical employment of reason which merely concerns the formal (temporal-spatial) element of knowledge.[32] Indeed it would be inaccurate to translate *Übergang* as the product of a purposeful rational process formed by the logical understanding. This leads one to side with pure idealism and, as in the case of the Enlightenment thought, to categorize human *ethos* as the supervisor and determinant of *phusis*. On the other hand, if one interprets *logos* as a mere outcome of *phusis*, this would lead one to mere physicalism, the view that everything can be reduced to sensible phenomena and that the very being of human *ethos* can be reduced to their material-practical existence.

One of the common grounds that bring Heraclitus, Kant and Nietzsche together lies in their critique of both idealism and physicalism despite borrowing important arguments from each of these theories. Heraclitus first identifies *logos* as the common principle that makes *phusis* meaningful and human *ethos* moving and changing. Kant's attempt to bridge empiricism and idealism, physics and metaphysics, resulted in uncovering the "bridge" between the physical and the ideal for the possibility of their standing as the two sides of the meta-physical thinking. Lastly Nietzsche, having been inspired by both alongside the Greek mythology and tragedy, proposed his Dionysian—the symbol of constant destruction and creation—as the artistic mediation between the senseless cosmic forces and the fragile human *ethos*.

In *Opus Postumum*, Kant brings together the necessity of regarding the sensible phenomena as appearances with the reflecting (aesthetic) judgment, which links the physical and ideal through the principle of synthesis.[33] Hence, *Weltanschauung* is a cosmological as well as an aesthetic principle since *Anschauung* or sense-intuition is an active and aesthetic faculty, and understanding *how* the forces become concepts entails the employment of an aesthetic worldview or principle. Heidegger explicitly supports this argument in his *Comments on Karl Jaspers' Psychology of Worldviews* in his analysis of Jaspers' cosmological foreconception arising from the fundamental experience of life as a whole:

> It is possible here that without allowing himself to be placed before an antinomy, Jaspers does indeed gain access to the essential thing for him, i.e., the Absolute, within a fundamental aesthetic attitude and sets about classifying it in the same manner. It is likewise possible that his view of life focusing on the full

> "vehemence" and "force" of the "vital process" is an aesthetic one, even if the content of this "process" is understood to be of an ethical nature. Life "is there" as something we have by means of looking at it, and it is by means of this kind of having that we gain possession of it in the sense of a whole encompassing everything.[34]

Ultimately, this leads to the construal of *logos* as a vital process determining the worldview that considers life as a whole (*Welt* or *kosmos*). *Logos* is not a static comprehensible principle but an ec-static (beyond or outside of the static) and *ap*prehensible aesthetic principle. *Logos* is the *active mediating principle* that transmits between human inner and outer sense and finds expression in pure and manifold concepts of understanding. It is both the cosmic force of balance that *moves* life and the aesthetic principle that regulates the *judgment* we make regarding that movement. This is why it is appropriate to consider *logos* both in the sense of the principle of motion regulating the dynamic whole (which through this regulation transforms *ta panta* into *phusis*), and in the sense of the transition from the idea of the regulated whole into the concepts of *ethos* grounding the being and understanding of humanity as a whole. However, this understanding also necessitates the revision of the entire system of modern logic based on metaphysical antagonisms and speculative dialectics, detached from the *phusis* of humanity.

Logos versus Logic

If modern logic has functioned in total isolation from other fields of study, it is because it dissociates *logos* from its roots in *phusis,* causing logical (*logos*-based) thought to lose its cosmological and aesthetic grounding. Heidegger criticizes this handling of *logos* as a theory inquiring into the categories and their order (such as Kant's starting point in the first *Critique*):

> Today it is taken to be self-evident, as it has been for a long time, that the essential characteristics of Being are categories. But at bottom, this is strange. It becomes intelligible only when we grasp that, and how, *logos* not only separates itself from *phusis*, but at the same time comes forth *over against phusis* as *the* standard-setting domain that becomes the place of origin for the determinations of Being.[35]

Nevertheless, the Heraclitean *logos* stands as the grounding principle through which the philosopher examines the characteristics of *phusis*. Contrasting with its modern meaning, his *logos* is by no means in an antagonistic relation with his *phusis*. Unlike the modern metaphysical worldview, Heidegger claims, *logos* cannot be "the overcoming of the mortal *legein*" for otherwise it would resemble Kant's *Überlegenheit*,. As we attempt to show later on, the Kantian theory of the sublime is partly based on *Überlegenheit* (superiority of man over nature), or the

overcoming of *mortal legein*, in other words, being over mortality.[36] Conversely, the Nietzschean theory of the Dionysian, as the tragic sublime, remains relatively loyal to the aesthetic-tragic Heraclitean *logos*[37]

Until *Opus Postumum*, Kant seems to posit his categories over and against the unifying principle of the sensible forces and phenomena of nature. But it is Kant's Heraclitean turn in *Opus Postumum* that drives his inquiry into the nature of things through the principle of transition as opposed to the merely supersensible categories of the speculative reason that isolate *logos* to the mechanical standards of the post-Socratic logic.[38] Unlike the Socratic *logos* (and like the Heraclitean *logos*), Kant's new principle of transition aims to connect his transcendental philosophy to the sense-intuitions and sense-perceptions regarding the appearances of the phenomena and forces of nature.

The association we attempt to establish between the Kantian *Übergang* and Heraclitean *logos* uncovers territories of philosophy overshadowed by modern concepts and dichotomies. One of these, Heidegger suggests, consists in the alleged dichotomy between Being and appearing:

> Being essentially unfolds *as* appearing. . . . With this, there collapses as an empty construction the widespread notion of Greek philosophy according to which it was supposedly a "realistic" doctrine of an objective Being, in contrast to modern subjectivism. This common notion is based on a superficial understanding. We must set aside terms such as "subjective" and "objective," "realistic" and "idealistic."[39]

Nietzsche too mentions the necessity of setting these terms aside to avoid the arbitrary epistemological distinctions and antagonisms of what he calls "folk metaphysics":

> It is not the opposition between subject and object which concerns me here; I leave that distinction to those epistemologists who have got tangled up in the snares of grammar (of folk metaphysics). Even less am I concerned with the opposition between 'thing in itself' and appearance: for we 'know' far too little to even be entitled to *make* that distinction.[40]

According to Heidegger, the reason for the inappropriateness of the concepts of modern logic is the distance that has grown between being and thinking: "Being, as the element of thinking, is abandoned by the technical interpretation of thinking. 'Logic,' beginning with the Sophists and Plato, sanctions this explanation. Thinking is judged by a standard that does not measure up to it."[41] This is precisely why the *not-yet-metaphysical*[42] cosmological philosophies of the Pre-Socratics are closer to the original thought regarding *phusis*, which becomes instrumental in observing the weaknesses and shortcomings of the modern metaphysical worldview based on the logical standards of judgment.[43]

This stance against modern philosophy naturally includes a criticism of Kantian philosophy, as after all, it was Kant who attempted to integrate logical standards and dialectical concepts into one complete system of thought in his

first *Critique,* defining them and their relations to each other in detail. Yet some Kantian scholars like Tuschling have argued that even in the first *Critique* these concepts were *not* set in an antagonistic relation but rather "the subjective conditions of empirical knowledge are also the objective conditions of possible objects of that knowledge; that, in turn, is why the rules for combining representations in the understanding are the basic laws of nature and of the empirical world."[44] The understanding of nature and its moving forces depends on "the synthesizing activity of understanding."[45] However, as both Tuschling and Förster would agree, by appealing to the idea of *Übergang*, Kant attempted to reconcile all these seemingly antagonistic conceptions within a single a priori principle, setting the framework of a single system. This system itself demonstrates the unity and relation of our pure intuitions of motion, space and time and the conceptual structure of our thought processes, of the primitive laws of nature and our aesthetic, ethical and political ideas. Kant's *Opus Postumum* attempts to give an account of both the intuitions of moving forces (the cosmological argument) and the philosophical-aesthetic consequences of their representation (the aesthetic argument).

ON THE PRINCIPLE OF TRANSITION AS THE FOUNDATION OF COSMOLOGICAL AESTHETICS WITH REFERENCE TO *OPUS POSTUMUM*

The Cosmological Argument in *Opus Postumum*

The cosmological argument is not new in Kantian philosophy. From his doctoral thesis, *Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicae nova dilucidatio (A New Explanation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Knowledge)* and early writings such as the *Universal Natural History and the Theory of Heavens* to his latest writings on dynamics and moving forces such as the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Kant reflected on the principles and forces governing nature and the universe. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, for instance, Kant defines the cosmological ideas and cosmical concepts (or world-concepts) as follows:

> I have called the ideas with which we are now concerned "cosmological ideas," partly because by "world" is understood the sum total of all appearances, and our ideas are also directed only toward the unconditioned among appearances, but partly too because in the transcendental sense the word "world" signifies the absolute totality of the sum total of existing things, and we are directing our attention only to the completeness of the synthesis (though properly only in the regress toward its conditions). Considering, moreover, that taken collectively these ideas are all transcendent and, even though they do not overstep the ob-

> ject, namely appearances, in kind, but have to do only with the sensible world (not with *noumena*), they nevertheless carry the synthesis to a degree where transcends all possible experience; thus in my opinion one can quite appropriately call them collectively world-concepts (*Weltbegriffe*)[46] (A420/B447.)

In Kantian philosophy, the cosmical concepts encompass the *synthesis* of noumena and phenomena because while they represent and schematize the appearances or things in nature, at the same time, as universally valid concepts, they carry these schemas and representations to a level that goes beyond possible experience (thus beyond any dualism such as object—subject and real—ideal). However, this level cannot simply be identified as *noumenal* as this would disregard the phenomenal roots of these concepts. That is why Kant understood cosmological ideas as the syntheses of the "world" as the totality of appearances and the transcendental world, the sum total of existing things.[47] But what, if any, is the difference between these two definitions of "world"? Why should we distinguish the totality of appearances from the sum total of existing things? The latter are recurring questions throughout Nietzsche's philosophy, which he addresses to undermine both the Kantian and the Platonic endeavours to keep these worlds separated for the sake of logical philosophising. Nevertheless, in this specific passage, Kant defines the cosmological ideas and world-concepts accentuating their synthesizing character, a character that brings the world of appearances and the transcendent world together. In other words, cosmic concepts or world-concepts are active and valid only insofar as they maintain the transition between these seemingly separate worlds. Kant later elaborates on this crucial point in the 1790s especially in the third *Critique* and *Opus Postumum* arguing that the transition between these two worlds (the world as the sum of all appearances and the transcendental world) takes place through human senses and intuitions, and thus through the *aesthetic* understanding and sense-based intuition of the whole.[48]

He expands on this all-encompassing cosmological principle that bridges the transcendental and natural world and that determines both the cosmic forces and ideas in several places in *Opus Postumum*. For example, he uses the concept of *cosmotheoros* as a principle to designate what he calls "a basis in idea for all the unified forces which set the matter of the whole of cosmic space in motion."[49] This definition demonstrates his belief in the necessity of an archaic principle that precedes any other idea or principle and that can underlie the movement and regulation[50] of cosmic forces from which the cosmical concepts are derived.[51] In *Opus Postumum*, Kant also uses the term *cosmotheoros* to define the universal theorist or the philosopher. As a person, this philosopher is the one "who creates the elements of knowledge of the world himself, *a priori*, from which he, as, at the same time, an inhabitant of the world, constructs a world-vision [*Weltbeschauung*] in the idea."[52] Kant also discusses this *cosmotheoros* and its personified version in the first *Critique* while discussing the logical and cosmological handling of the concept of philosophy as follows:

> Until now . . . the concept of philosophy has been only a scholastic concept, namely that of a system of cognition that is sought only as a science without having as its end anything more than the systematic unity of this knowledge, thus the logical perfection of cognition. But there is also a cosmopolitan concept[53] (*conceptus cosmicus*) that has always grounded this term, especially when it is, as it were, personified and represented as an archetype in the ideal of the philosopher. From this point of view philosophy is the science of the relation of all cognition to the essential ends of human reason (*teleologia rationis humanae*), and the philosopher is not an artist of reason but the legislator of human reason. It would be very boastful to call oneself a philosopher in this sense and to pretend to have equalled the archetype, which lies only in the idea.[54] (A838-9/B866-7.)

The shift in tone in these two passages, although discussing exactly the same concept, is a proof of the shift in Kantian philosophy. I argue that this shift results from the very disparity between the underlying *telos* of these books. While in the first *Critique* Kant aims at preparing a framework of thinking to clear up the confused metaphysical vision he inherited from previous traditions, in *Opus Postumum* he takes on the responsibility and risk to work on new cosmological ideas. While the former is methodologically written to clarify this vision as a "prolegomenon" for all future metaphysics,[55] the latter is designed to present Kant's very own ideas. The first *Critique* provides the framework of Kant's philosophical understanding, while *Opus Postumum* is the final product of his philosophical endeavour. Nonetheless, it must be noted that his purpose of defining an all-encompassing, *cosmo*logical concept or principle, which grounds the logical perfection or the systematic unity of philosophical knowledge both as an archaic principle and as an archetypical philosopher, remained consistently important throughout Kant's thought process. In addition to its archaic cosmological essence, *Übergang* must also be treated as an aesthetic principle, as suggested in the following section regarding the aesthetic argument in Kant's late magnum opus.

The Aesthetic Argument in *Opus Postumum*

Can *Opus Postumum* be considered the continuation of Kantian aesthetics as presented in the third *Critique*? Many scholars tackled this question not only because both are among Kant's late period works but also due to the apparent continuity of their argumentative content. *Opus Postumum* launches a new theory of aesthetics based on a new a priori principle introducing the mediating character of the power of reflective judgment and the crucial role of motion and moving forces in the determining concepts of understanding and the regulative ideas of reason. This new theory begins with picturing the concepts of understanding from a cosmological level, and this new aesthetics goes beyond Kant's theory of taste and the analytic of beauty. Mathieu, for instance, argues for the

continuity in Kant's argumentation in his last three books: *Metaphysical Foundations*, *Critique of Judgment* and *Opus Postumum*, despite their different contents, the first constituting the ground for a science of nature, the second for an aesthetics of nature (especially from the analytic of the sublime onwards), and the last working on a possible transition between these grounds.[56] What interests us in this chapter is the relation between the second and the last book in this alleged trilogy. Mathieu, whilst defending this relation, stresses the unifying role of the subjective principle of reflective judgment and thus its necessity for any aesthetic theory of transition. Even though Förster tries to rule out Mathieu's argument, he cannot help but conclude his book on Kant's final synthesis by referring to Hölderlin[57] using his aphorism "I regard reason as the beginning of the understanding," hinting at his recognition of the intermediary role of aesthetics and reflective judgment (bridging understanding and reason). This suggests the necessary inclusion of Kant's transcendental aesthetics to achieve any satisfactory account of the main argument of *Opus Postumum*.

In *Opus Postumum,* Kant uses the term *Übergang* for *transition* meaning "to go over, to move over from one realm to another." *Übergang* is certainly a deliberate choice of concept emphatically distinguished by Kant from *Überlegenheit* (the state of being superior or transcendence), which refers to *one's* ascending or going beyond his subjectivity (achieving purity and superiority). Thus *Überlegenheit* presupposes two separate realms, the actual (contingent) and ideal (pure) realms of self and the understanding. It assumes that the transcendence commences from the level of the late metaphysical construction of "the subject." Due to the superiority (*Überlegenheit*) assigned to it, the notion of subject as well as human reason replace the God and the godly in classical and medieval metaphysics. Kant attempts at this association until the end of his critical period (and before *Opus Postumum*) using *Überlegenheit* as the notion that exalts human being to a distinct rational superiority and transforms it into a totally independent intelligence observing the phenomena surrounding him. Consider, for instance, the following passage from the third *Critique*:

> The feeling of the sublime in nature is respect for our own vocation, which we show to an object in nature through a certain subreption (substitution of a respect for the object instead of for the idea of humanity in our subject), which as it were makes intuitable the superiority (*Überlegenheit*) of the rational vocation of our cognitive faculty over the greatest faculty of sensibility.[58]

In *Opus Postumum*, by contrast, Kant distinguishes *Übergang* from *Überlegenheit*, thus revising his aesthetics in accordance with the principle of motion. As a result, his theory becomes immune to ontological or psychological interpretation and reconstruction. At this stage, it is crucial to bear in mind that Kant argues in *Opus Postumum* for the priority of positing the moving forces affecting human mind over the apprehension and conception of spatial and temporal relations.[59] In that sense, the person's relation to motion initially determines his relation to

space and time, and serves as a *prime mover* in the transition that takes place in human mind.

Three important similar passages in *Opus Postumum* discuss the intermediary concepts that construct the transitory bridge between the metaphysical and the physical.[60] These passages demonstrate Kant's endeavour to reconcile metaphysics and physics through the mediating concepts. These concepts must relate themselves both to the metaphysical foundations of nature and to the sensible or phenomenal content of the concepts of understanding in order to serve as a law-like transition. He envisages this bridge assuming the existence of a broad gulf between these separate realms. But why do we need to presume this gulf at all? Why isn't it possible to situate physics within metaphysics, or regard metaphysics (as the outcome of the human *ethos*) as a construct of *phusis*? Philosophy took over the reign of cosmology and strengthened the human consciousness within *ethos*. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the total separation was an aesthetic necessity. On the contrary, aesthetics has been the only thought that kept the link(s) alive between these two realms. This is why Kant says that the bridge cannot be constructed on merely empirical concepts although it must consist in the interpretation of sense-data (sense-perception), sense-intuition and aesthetic judgment. For that reason according to Kant, it is philosophy's responsibility to build the bridge and reinstate the transition.

But what kind of philosophy is Kant referring to? Why should we assume that existing philosophical concepts are insufficient? The very existence of this gulf verifies indeed their insufficiency to mediate the now-separated gulfs of human thinking and understanding. Especially after Descartes, the modern philosophical argumentation is based on an either-or reasoning. In a strict and limited modern philosophical context, a way of thinking is either objective or subjective, either naturalist or rationalist, either empirical or speculative, either realist or idealist, either physical or metaphysical. Such arbitrary oppositions have contributed to the deepening of the large gap inherited from the traditional monotheistic religions based on the opposition between the physical world or nature and God and metaphysics. What then is needed to divert the philosophical reasoning from these ready-made opposing conceptions? Kant does not think that these conceptions are faulty or unnecessary, but he never gives up his *telos* to unify them in a balanced and critical way. The most radical move he makes to this effect is his idea of transition in *Opus Postumum*. So, before expanding on the system of intermediary concepts, which requires a cosmological-aesthetic undertaking, we first need to focus on what Kant meant by the principle of transition.

As Förster argues in his introduction to Kant's *Opus Postumum*, this necessary science of transition "requires an 'idea' or 'plan' according to which it is to be executed. . . . This idea cannot be derived from physics itself, any more than the 'idea of a transcendental philosophy' could be derived from metaphysics. Nor can it be derived from the *Metaphysical Foundations* from which the 'Transition' commences."[61] For the derivation of this idea or plan, I propose, we need to demonstrate the transition between the intuitive knowledge of the cosmic

forces, and the thought studying the concepts of human life. In so doing, we need primarily to *understand* this transition (*Übergang)* between these realms of thinking, in other words, see *how* the cosmic forces affecting human inner and outer senses are represented in the concepts of human understanding and in the ideas of human reason. This pure understanding of nature, I propose, is necessarily an *aesthetic* one. In that sense, the transition to physics can develop itself in a new set of concepts according to the law of the connection of human intuitions and judgments, while investigating the relation between cosmical and aesthetic concepts through an elementary system presented in *Opus Postumum*.

In short, this core chapter of the theory of Cosmological Aesthetics aims to explain the contents of the transition through a detailed discussion regarding the human sense-intuitions (*Anschauung*) by which the transition takes place in the faculty of understanding, and examination of the power of Judgment (*Urteilskraft*) by which the transition is regulated and applied to the concepts of understanding. A thorough analysis of these faculties shall expose how the transition (*Übergang*) functions and paves the way for further exploration of the intermediary concepts on which the bridge is built.

ON THE HUMAN FACULTY OF SENSE-INTUITION (*ANSCHAUUNG*) THROUGH WHICH THE TRANSITION TAKES PLACE

The German word *Anschauung* refers to notion, idea and intuition, and to outlook and appearance; it is the human faculty that reconciles the metaphysical and phenomenal levels of human existence by way of initiating an immediate and spontaneous transition between the phenomenal and metaphysical concepts of understanding. Kant expressly defines intuition as an aesthetic faculty that points towards vision.[62] *Anschauung* is a developed primary faculty that precedes *Empfindung* (which refers to passive immediate sensation or literally "finding yourself affected"),[63] as Kant suggests in the following passage: "Axioms of Intuition precede the Anticipation which forms the *basis* of perception."[64] Indeed, *Anschauung* deals with the inner sense to which all human senses are linked and through which the apperception[65] (or the perception via apprehension) of the moving forces is completed and prepared for the next phase, *conceptualization*.[66] This renders *Anschauung* the most important element within the human faculty of understanding without which the *transition* (*Übergang)* would never take place and unity of senses in inner sense would remain underdeveloped as in the case of the animal senses. Therefore, the faculty of sense-intuition, as the faculty transmitting the experiences of cosmic moving forces to the human faculty of conceptualization, is what makes human beings unique.[67] While animals are directly, unconsciously affected and driven by the dynamics of nature, human beings possess the power to become conscious of

these forces (as in the case of tragic wisdom) and actively conceptualize them through intuition even though they may not alter the ways they are being affected. The closeness of the faculty of intuition to reality also supports the argument made above on the appearances that, as the formal elements of intuition, they are the intuitively driven forms of reality. Thus, the Platonic and Cartesian attempts to establish an unmediated separation between reality and appearances are, according to late Kantian philosophy, unsatisfactory.

On the other hand, "since no concept of the object is the ground of the judgment, it can consist only in the subsumption of the imagination itself . . . under the condition that the understanding in general advance from intuitions to concepts."[68] Therefore, the concepts of motion (which are conceptualized by the human faculty of understanding) essentially derive from the effects of moving forces of matter on the human faculty of *Anschauung* by means of which the transition is accomplished. This takes place only insofar as these empirical intuitions are concluded with concepts. Kant does not easily achieve this balanced argument between idealism and empiricism, even though he was never blindly driven by intuitionism.[69] In contrast, Kant generally maintains that for the achievement of pure concepts of understanding, and not just concepts void of content governed by mere logical forms, the rules or conditions under which the objects are in harmony with the concepts must be determined a priori through empirical intuition and power of judgment.[70] The metaphysical foundations of the natural science provide sense and meaning to the empty concepts of understanding. However, Kant slightly alters this line of argument in *Opus Postumum* where he recognizes that the apprehension and formation of the empirical intuition are themselves subject to an a priori rule or principle that all life "belongs to a single cosmic, dynamic system."[71] This aligns with our previous argument regarding the cosmological essence of *Opus Postumum* where the sense-intuition itself is subject to a single moving cosmic system of phenomena even though it itself initiates the transition between this universal principle and the empirical intuition of particular aesthetic phenomena.[72] Yet, Tuschling rightly asks if it is possible to assume a single a priori existent or being as an object of empirical intuition.[73]

To answer this question, we have to turn to the late fascicles of *Opus Postumum* in which Kant explicitly argues for a direct relationship between the formal perception and intuitive apprehension of the a priori moving forces, given that the completeness of understanding requires a unity of the form and content of the perceived matter or motion. There, *Anschauung* functions as the transmitter between the mere sense-data (*Empfindung*) and the unifying a priori principle through which it initiates the whole process for the fullness of understanding. It is the inner sense to which the outer senses are connected, and through which the forces and concepts are represented. Kant puts this as follows: "All existence of consciousness in space and time is mere appearance of inner and outer sense, and, as such, a synthetic principle of intuition takes place a priori, and affects itself as a thing existing in space and time."[74] The inner sense represents the a priori moving forces of matter through which every perception and experience

must be defined. The act of understanding makes the *Anschauung* of a phenomenon into an empirically perceptible object: "The intelligible object is not an *objectum noumenon*, but the *act* of the understanding which *makes* the object of sensible intuition into a mere phenomenon."[75] Kant pins down here the argument that the act of understanding is itself nothing but the transition between the sense-intuition and mere phenomenon, and continues: "Empirical intuitions (*Anschauung*) with consciousness depend on forces which *move* the senses and form an elementary system of matter."[76] This view underlines the necessity of reconciling cosmology and aesthetics, the former as the form of thought dealing with the intuitions dependent on the cosmic forces, and the latter as the one examining the movements affecting human inner and outer senses. For instance, the sublime can be regarded as the aesthetic idea that moves and disturbs human sensuous understanding, forcing it to reconsider the governing intuitions of time and space.[77]

In Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason, Anschauung* as the inner sense plays a very important role in the deduction (*Deduktion*) of the pure concepts of understanding, being the first phase in the spontaneous understanding. Kant defines the threefold synthesis underlying all knowledge as follows: "the apprehension of the representations, as modifications of the mind in intuition; of reproduction of them in the imagination; and of their recognition in the concept."[78] Moreover, in the first *Critique*, he explicitly describes *Anschauung* as the inner sense to which all human senses are related and thanks to which the understanding and thus transition takes place: "Wherever our representations may arise, whether through the influence of external things or as the effect of inner causes, whether they have originated *a priori* or empirically as appearances—as modifications of the mind they nevertheless belong to inner sense."[79] This very belongingness of all sensible and supersensible representations to inner sense confirms the function of human intuition as the main component of the aesthetic process of transition by which both appearances and concepts are understood in relation to each other. In other words, all our representations and concepts regardless of their being metaphysical concepts or physical phenomena and forces are initiated and transmitted through the human inner sense or *Anschauung*, and indeed, this very intuitive act of transition renders them meaningful representations.

Similarly, in his early notebooks, Nietzsche defines the philosopher and the artist as the ones that can establish a transition between their personal psychological impulses and the impersonal supersensible world: "Unconscious thinking must take place apart from concepts: it must therefore occur in *perceptions* (*Anschauungen*). But this is the way in which contemplative philosophers and artists infer. They do the same thing that everyone does regarding their personal psychological impulses, but transferred (*Übertragen*) into an impersonal world."[80] Crawford stresses the importance of *Anschauung* in Nietzsche's early philosophy drawing on Nietzsche's following sentence: "The artistic transference of a nerve stimulus into images is the mother, if not grandmother of every single concept."[81] However, Nietzsche borrows this term from Schopenhauer who uses it essentially in the Kantian sense to designate "both our direct awareness of

individual entities (a process which, for us, is always by means of passive sensibility) and the percepts of which we are thereby aware." But adds Crawford, Nietzsche mostly relies on the more obvious definition of *Anschauung* as a viewing, or mode of viewing or observing. In sum, according to Nietzsche, "*Anschauung* is not only intuitive-perception . . . in a passive sense, rather it assumes that the act of perception is . . . an active process of synthesization. . . ." Therefore, *Anschauung* is both intuitive-perception and sense of the act of imaging or the synthesizing and transmitting faculty of *sense-intuition*.[82]

In another instance, Kant confirms that sense-intuitions fundamentally alter the quality of appearance which is therefore to be defined with reference to the inner sense itself: "Appearances are not things in themselves but rather the mere play of our representations, which in the end come down to determinations of the inner sense."[83] This is due to the fact that inner sense functions as a mediating faculty between the seemingly a posteriori sensible realm of appearances and seemingly a priori supersensible realm of ideas. Appearances do not "appear" in themselves, they are produced by human sense-intuitions and perceptions before (*Anschauung*) and after (*Empfindung*) the experience of external phenomena. But what distinguishes a phenomenon from its appearance is that while a phenomenon possesses a particular, individual and neutral existence in itself but no sense or meaning, its appearance is generated by human mind and through the inner sense rendering it consistent with the universal principle of transition which relates humanity to *kosmos*. Arguably, the very reason why Kant felt obliged to write *Opus Postumum* lies in the alleged impossibility of distinguishing a phenomenon from its appearance. Kant's trust in appearances is never more evident than in the late fascicles of *Opus Postumum*, where he explicitly relates them to the formulae of the transcendental philosophy.[84]

Keeping this in mind, Kant reconstructs his cosmology through the new aesthetic principle of transition generated by the faculty of *Anschauung*:

> World is the *whole* of sense-objects—thus also including the forces acting on the senses—insofar as it amounts to a unity (that is, combined synthetically according to a principle). '*Totality* of sense-objects,' [since it represents merely] logical unity, does not express the concept of 'world.' Thus [the concept of 'world'] does not just belong to metaphysics but to transcendental philosophy—in which latter, knowledge is given *a priori* in intuition, through concepts . . . and forms the transition from the metaphysical foundations of natural science.[85]

In the second half of this important passage, which plainly demonstrates his intention to renew his philosophy through new principles and concepts, Kant defines "world" not only as the metaphysical foundation of natural phenomena and forces or the whole of sense-objects but also as the intuitively generated transcendental concept which functions as the transition from the metaphysical foundations of nature. In other words, the concept of "world" brings together the totality of the sense-perception (*Empfindung*) of the earthly phenomena and the knowledge acquired through human sense-intuition (*Anschauung*). The first part

of the passage points to the necessity of the faculty of sense-intuition in the understanding and conceptualization of the "world" as a unity under an *a priori* principle. In other words, *Anschauung* gathers together all the knowledge regarding natural phenomena and forces into a synthetic unity which is simply called "world." The definitive relation between the first and second parts of this passage once more demonstrates the role the faculty of *Anschauung* plays in the very initiation of the process of transition (*Übergang*). The belongingness of the concept of world both to transcendental philosophy (which forms the transition) and to the metaphysical foundations of nature renders *Anschauung* the primary human faculty in the cosmological and aesthetic conception of the "world." Nietzsche explicitly endorses this point in his *Early Notebooks* arguing that becoming and being are simultaneous. This simultaneity is represented in appearance because everything external corresponds to something internal. This is why *Anschauung* as artistic projection is the essence of the perception of nature as a whole. The aesthetic faculty of *Anschauung* reconciles the individual *subject* with the ever-changing dynamic whole. This worldview is thoroughly represented by the Dionysian dithyramb and the communication of Zarathustra in late Nietzschean philosophy.[86] In the end, Crawford rightly argues that according to Nietzsche's *Anschauung Notes*, the purpose of knowledge is necessarily aesthetic and even *transcendental aesthetic*.[87] However, considering his skeptical approach against the very idea of transcendentalism, it is more appropriate to call it *cosmological aesthetic*.[88]

Particularly in the last sections of *Opus Postumum*, as a result of his earlier philosophical and theological beliefs (as he steps out of the boundaries of the critical philosophy), Kant attempts to use the unity of sensible forces in an inner sense as a proof for his hypothesis of the a priori synthetic unity and oneness of experience which leads him to argue for the possibility of the idea of an omnipresent intelligent being or God. Here, God appears to be the absolutely necessary cosmic principle of all possibility, or the ontological ground of the unity of all experiences. According to Förster, this leaves undetermined *how* the realities (material for all possible notions) are supposed to appear to the human mind[89] because the idea of God as a cosmic principle or ontological ground fails to sustain the necessary transition between the natural phenomena and forces and the ideas of human reason. Rather it isolates itself in the static and false concept of Being which must allegedly be defined in and for itself, and which thereby does not require a transition. This project aims in turn at purifying Kant's cosmology from the notions brought by the Christian tradition so as to explain and analyze the principle of transition in its aesthetic or not-yet-metaphysical form. A form which presupposes an archaic moving source (from which the transition reciprocates with the human mind) that does not isolate and stabilize but rather exposes, moves and discovers itself not in and for itself but through the concepts of human understanding. The important link between this primordial force and the role of intuition in its grasp by human understanding is examined in the section on the Kantian sublime, but elaborated in the second chapter. Next, I would like

to discuss *how* the transition is regulated and determined by the faculty of Judgment (*Urteilskraft)* for the human understanding of the cosmic motion.

Before concluding this section, it is crucial to note that the faculty of judgment is very much dependent on whether or not the manifold understanding of ruleless aggregate is previously transformed by intuition into a synthetic unity which qualifies for human judgment:

> Without laws no experience can take place and, without a principle of the combination of the manifold in *a priori* intuition, no law. For knowledge [*Wissen*] exceeds judgment and only makes the latter capable of thoroughgoing determination; the receptivity of certainty in synthetic *a priori* judgments only takes place if the objects of intuition first qualify for this, merely as appearance in my consciousness of myself.[90]

In that sense, even though the power of judgment regulates and determines the transition, it is capable of these functions only insofar as it reciprocates with the faculty of *Anschauung* which paves the way for the transition by rendering the transition an *a priori* synthetic principle.

ON THE POWER OF JUDGMENT AS THE FACULTY THAT REGULATES AND DETERMINES THE TRANSITION

After a short introduction on the relation between the faculties of sense-intuition and aesthetic judgment, this section introduces and discusses three interrelated arguments regarding the faculty of judgment and principle of transition. According to the first, as the faculty of judgment intermediates between the faculties of understanding and reason, the aesthetic judgments function as the regulatory transitions between the cognition of the sensible natural phenomena and the supersensible realm of ideas. The second argument shall maintain that nature in general can only be understood if it fits into the cognitive human faculties and that human reasoning maintains its effectiveness only when it takes place within the framework of the idea of nature in general. And since the fitness and/or taking place of one within the other is an aesthetic process (as in the case of the sublime), it necessitates the representation of nature as art through the reflecting judgment, and the understanding of art as the extension of nature again through the aesthetic picture presented by the reflecting judgment. Lastly, as a result of these, while the aesthetic reflecting judgment is construed as the all-regulating intermediate faculty, aesthetics is defined as the foundation of philosophical speculation as well as the phenomenal understanding of nature instead of a mere critique of the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. This argument is later employed to tell apart the judgment on the sublime from that on the beautiful.

Sense-intuition (*Anschauung*), as the founding faculty of all our sensible knowledge, reciprocates with judgment (*Urteilskraft)*, as the faculty that aesthetically regulates all these sense-data according to a system through syllogism.[91] This is due to the inevitable interaction between the aesthetic faculty and aesthetic principle for the functioning of the first according to the regulation of the second, and to the fact that the appearances of phenomena are not apprehended as simple insubstantial and individual shapes but rather as complex substantial parts of an aesthetic whole. In *Opus Postumum*, Kant puts this as follows:

> The principle of the ideality of intuition lies at the foundation of all our knowledge of things outside us: That is, we do not apprehend objects as given in themselves (*apprehensio simplex*), but, rather, the subject produces (*fingit*) for itself the manifold of the sense-object according to its form, and does so, indeed, according to a principle (*iudicium*), prior to all empirical representation with consciousness (perception)—that is, [it does so] *a priori*, by means of the faculty of judgment (*iudicium*), through a syllogism, into a complex (*complexus*), not of a ruleless aggregate but of a system.[92]

This description emphasizes the necessity of a careful examination of the faculty of judgment for the success of any exploration on the principle of transition which transforms the ruleless aggregate of phenomenal understanding into an aesthetic system or *kosmos*. But how does this transformation take place? And what is the function of the faculty of judgment in this transformation? As argued above, the transition is regulated and determined by the aesthetic faculty of judgment. This is because the human senses have the mediating power with respect to the appearances of phenomena and forces of matter, and the human Judgment is the intermediary faculty linking the concepts of human understanding to the ideas of human reason:

> In the family of the higher faculties of cognition there is still an intermediary between the understanding and reason. This is the power of judgment, about which one has cause to presume, by analogy, that it too should contain in itself *a priori*, if not exactly its own legislation, then still a proper principle of its own for seeking laws, although a merely subjective one; which, even though it can claim no field of objects as its domain, can nevertheless have some territory and a certain constitution of it, for which precisely this principle only might be valid.[93]

However, according to Kant, since the faculty of judgment functions as intermediary, unlike the understanding and reason, is not self-sufficient but dependent on the latter two.[94] Yet what if we argue that it adds its own special principle *a priori* through its very function of intermediation? What if we posit the transition between nature and freedom, understanding and reason itself as a principle (as in the case of the Heraclitean *logos*)?[95] This would not only undermine the dialectic[96] Kant developed in the first and third *Critiques* by way of reversing

the reasoning established from Plato onwards in Western philosophy, but also require the primacy of aesthetics not just as a critique of artworks or sense-experiences but also as the necessary grounding for philosophy as a whole. This entails the priority of the sense-intuition and reflecting judgment regarding the nature of things over theoretical logic (developed in the first *Critique*) and practical ethics (developed in the second *Critique*) as the mediating and thereby initiating and regulating faculty of cognition. Nonetheless, this is exactly what Kant does or attempts to do in *Opus Postumum* with his novel approach to the way the faculties of human mind function and relate to each other and to the way philosophy as a whole must be understood.[97] This crucial point is discussed in the following sections. Now, to gain a better understanding of the passage quoted above, we need to read further:

> Thus if there is to be a concept or a rule which arises originally from the power of judgment, it would have to be a concept of things in nature insofar as nature conforms to our power of judgment, and thus a concept of a property of nature such that one cannot form any concept of it except that its arrangement conforms to our faculty for subsuming the particular given laws under more general ones even though these are not given.[98]

We find a similar argument in a later passage regarding the link between the mediating role of the faculty of judgment and necessity of the agreement of the natural laws to it, which reconciles the first and second arguments presented in this section:

> Our understanding thus has this peculiarity for the power of judgment, that in cognition by means of it the particular is not determined by the universal, and the former therefore cannot be derived from the latter alone; but nevertheless this particular in the manifold of nature should agree with the universal (through concepts and laws), which agreement under such circumstances must be quite contingent and without a determinate principle for the power of judgment. Nevertheless, in order for us to be able at least to conceive of the possibility of such an agreement of the things of nature with the power of judgment . . . we must at the same time conceive of another understanding, in relation to which, and indeed prior to any end attributed to it, we can represent that agreement of natural laws with our power of judgment.[99]

This leads us to our second argument: Nature can only be understood through its construction by human reason and human reason maintains its effectiveness only when it is placed within nature. Therefore, mediation between them must be primary for both to remain meaningful and effective, and for the faculties of reason and understanding to function properly. In that sense, the faculty of judgment is the primary faculty that governs and regulates the transition by subsuming the particular natural laws into general supersensible ideas (such as the idea of nature) and principles that unify them even though this does not mean it is completely self-sufficient. This is due to the necessity of the unity of particular experiences of natural phenomena under a principle (like the principle of

motion or the principle of purposiveness), which does not belong to the faculty of judgment itself, but necessarily regulated by the latter:

> What the category is with regard to each particular experience, that is what the *purposiveness* or *fitness* of nature to our power of judgment is (even with regard to its particular laws), in accordance with which it is represented not merely as mechanical but also as technical; a concept which certainly does not determine the synthetic unity objectively, as does the category, but which still yields subjective principles that serve as a guideline for the investigation of nature.[100]

However, the fitness of nature to our faculty of judgment does not necessarily entail its purposiveness. This is because while the purposiveness (or *telos*) is given *a posteriori* via practical human concepts, the fitness of nature to human faculty of judgment is necessarily *a priori* for any judgment on nature to be possible. Human judgment makes this fitness possible and regulates the aesthetic principle of transition thereby leading to the reconstruction of nature as art:

> The concept which originally arises from the power of judgment and is proper to it is thus that of nature as *art*, in other words, that of the *technique* of nature with regard to its *particular* laws, which concept does not ground any theory and does not, any more than logic, contain cognition of objects and their constitution, but only gives a principle for progress in accordance with laws of experience, whereby the investigation of nature becomes possible.[101]

What does the principle of progress refer to? Could it be considered as the principle of transition combined with the *a posteriori* given principle of purposiveness? This would make sense when the former is understood to be the principle that grounds the phenomena of nature and latter to be the one that grounds artistic creation. By this way, the natural sensible phenomena can be posited as having been constituted in accordance with an aesthetic regulation. The same would apply to the reconciliation of the cosmological principle of motion and the aesthetic principle of transition. But is it really legitimate to do so? Does the idea of nature as art constitute a new philosophical approach through which the faculty of judgment would acquire its own principle independent of the cognition of nature and ideas of freedom? Kant's response is unfortunately ambiguous and continues to veil the principle of transition presented in *Opus Postumum*. However, Kant partially addresses this point further as follows:

> Philosophy, as a doctrinal system of the cognition of nature as well as freedom, does not hereby acquire a new part; for the representation of nature as art is a mere idea, which serves as a principle, merely for the subject, for our investigation of nature, so that we can where possible bring interconnection, as in a system, into the aggregate of empirical laws as such, by attributing to nature a relation to this need of ours.[102]

The necessity of the derivation of aesthetics from the empirical laws of nature leads the power of judgment always to arise from the empirical sense-perception and sense-intuition of nature and to ground a principle on the basis of sensible phenomena and laws derived from them.

Kant's arguments for the necessity of the transition between art and nature, which is argued to be analogous to the faculties of understanding and reason in our first argument, are presented mostly in the transitory passages between his aesthetics and natural teleology in the third *Critique* just after the sections on the sublime and genius. It is crucial to see here that section 58 functions to explain the transition between the *Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment* and the *Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment*.[103] While the former is the response to *how* we take the phenomena and forces *in*, the latter inquires *what* we take *in* as nature.[104] Nevertheless, according to Kant, these two functions of the faculty of judgment must not be considered separate. He tries to categorize these functions under the *reflecting judgment*. Kant uses "*reflectiren*" and "*Überlegen"* interchangeably for "reflecting" in the third *Critique*. This is crucial because (as discussed above under the aesthetic argument in *Opus Postumum*) *Überlegen* carries a meaning of ascending or going beyond one's subjectivity to have a purer cognition of nature, and thus in the case of the reflecting judgment, to make a purer judgment on natural and artistic phenomena:

> *Reflecting* (which goes on even in animals, although only instinctively, namely not in relation to a concept which is thereby to be attained but rather in relation to some inclination which is thereby to be determined) in our case requires a principle . . . in which the underlying concept of the object prescribes the rule to the power of judgment and thus plays the role of the principle.[105]

Kant defines three separate domains in which the reflecting judgment functions: systematic-scientific, teleological, and aesthetic judgment. While the first one has not been introduced by him in the third *Critique*, the latter two have constituted the two main sections of the same book in which they are thoroughly examined and discussed. Kant chooses them mainly for their power to mediate between the realms of nature and art in complementing the primary character of the faculty of judgment as the faculty that links human reason to human understanding. For instance, the aesthetic judgment comprises both the sublime and the beautiful in both nature and art.[106] Guyer too describes the main function of the reflecting judgment as its function of "intermediation between the categories and our actual observations or empirical intuitions and of organizing them into a coherent system."[107] But how does the reflecting judgment manage to regulate and determine the transition? According to Kant:

> The reflecting power of judgment . . . proceeds with given appearances, in order to bring them under empirical concepts of determinate natural things, not schematically, but *technically*, not as it were merely mechanically, like an instrument, but *artistically*. . . . Thus the power of judgment itself makes the *technique of nature* into the principle of its reflection *a priori*, . . . only in order

> to be able to reflect in accordance with its own subjective law, in accordance with its need, but at the same time in accord with laws of nature in general.[108]

In that sense, the reflecting judgment, reconciling its artistic rendering of the technique of nature with the general-universal laws of nature, functions according to a cosmological and aesthetic principle which deserves to be called *cosmologic-aesthetic* principle of transition. It accomplishes this thanks to the apparent and apprehensible character of natural phenomena that allows human judgment to systematize them. Judgment carries with it *a priori* the natural laws and also applies artistic principles on the reflection regarding nature through which it mediates between nature and art. Thereby, nature, as the idea embodying the metaphysical foundations of natural science, comes to be intuited and represented artistically through the faculty of judgment.[109]

Nonetheless, for Kant, there is a delicate relationship between "the expression 'technique' where objects of nature are sometimes merely *judged as if* their possibility were grounded in art, in which cases the judgments are neither theoretical nor practical . . . since they do not *determine* anything about the constitution of the object nor the way in which to produce it; rather through them nature itself is judged, but merely in accordance with the analogy with an art, and indeed in subjective relation to our cognitive faculty, not in objective relation to the objects."[110] In that, transition, considered as the judgment made through an artistic analogy, *theoretically* precedes nature since nature is generated as an analogy through creative-artistic human faculty but *practically* preceded and determined by nature as the original force-principle underlying every natural phenomenon including human faculties of judgment and imagination.

Aesthetic reflecting judgment, a faculty that precedes all concepts of phenomena and that is "unmixed with any other faculty of cognition," constitutes the determining ground for concepts. It is a pure faculty, which requires its own *a priori* principle to justify its universal validity and thereby ground a critique of judgment.[111] This finding endorses the distinction between the determining and reflecting judgment. While the former receives its governing principles from the faculty of understanding, the latter has its own principles *a priori*.[112] In that reflecting judgment not only operates for the aesthetic transition between the theoretical and the practical but also *is* one of the main components of the process of transition alongside the faculties of sense-intuition, imagination and artistic representation. According to Kant the aesthetic power of judgment, as a special faculty, refers to nothing else than the *reflecting power of judgment* and the feeling of pleasure which is dependent on it "by means of which it strives to rise from intuitions to concepts in general, and as connected with it in accordance with a principle *a priori.*"[113] This entails the question as to how *being aesthetic* relates to the intermediary essence of the faculty of reflecting judgment.[114]

Kant responds as follows: "the form of a given object in empirical intuition is so constituted that the *apprehension* of its manifold in the imagination agrees with the *presentation* of a concept of the understanding . . . then, in the mere reflection understanding and imagination mutually agree for the advancement of

their business"[115] towards the power of judgment. An aesthetic judgment of reflection (and thus not a cognitive judgment) is constituted through the transition from the empirical intuition (*Anschauung*) to the power of judgment. Thus, the purposiveness here defined by Kant culminates in the aesthetic judgment and is just for the sake of the transition itself (not for a predetermined *telos*). This kind of judgment, not teleological but merely aesthetic, constitutes and regulates the first phase of the artistic transition from the intuition of the sensible phenomena to the supersensible (metaphysical) concepts.

In the end, Kant explains that reflecting judgment is aesthetic if the power of judgment "holds the imagination (merely in the apprehension of the object) together with the understanding (in the presentation of a concept in general) and perceives a relation of the two faculties of cognition which constitutes the subjective."[116] Since nature must necessarily be construed as a universal idea encompassing all perception of phenomena and forces, the reflecting judgment, by aesthetically unifying (and thus regulating) these perceptions, holds up a "cosmological" grounding of nature through which it can mediate between this cognitive ground and the artistic ideas, between the unity of all possible perceptions of natural phenomena and the common ideas underlying the "works of art."

There is an underlying relation between the principle of motion, which considers nature dynamic and technical rather than mechanical, and the principle of transition, which aesthetically applies these characteristics of the former principle to the works of art thereby rendering them "the extensions of nature." Kant explains:

> I would call *causality* of nature with regard to the form of its products as ends the *technique* of nature. It is opposed to the mechanics of nature . . . which have their effect in an end without a concept having to be their ground, machines but not works of art . . . the *power of judgment* is properly technical; nature is represented technically only insofar as it conforms to that procedure of the power of judgment and makes it necessary.[117]

According to this argument, the faculty of judgment cannot be both mechanical and technical and Kant chooses to call it technical mainly because it is more consistent with the function of the faculty of judgment when the set of principles applied to it revolves around the dynamic understanding of nature. This understanding allows the technical procedure of the power of judgment to represent itself artistically or technically within nature in accordance with aesthetic ideas. We here try to replace the natural teleology with cosmology by substituting the principle of purposiveness regulating the teleological power of judgment with the principle of motion grounding the idea of nature as a whole.

Indeed, while the aesthetic principle of transition sees subjective purposiveness as a real end of nature or of art, it also establishes it via its very correspondence to our power of judgment.[118] *Opus Postumum*, as Kant's major work composed during and after the writing of the third *Critique*, embodies the continuation both of his theory of sublime and of the second part of the third

Critique. Here, he theorizes the relation between the empirical and rational, *a posteriori* and *a priori* principles of the power of aesthetic judgment. Even though Kant's last major work must be seen as complementary to the third *Critique* and Kantian aesthetics in general, what is new in *Opus Postumum* is Kant's argument that "the objective element in appearance presupposes the subjective in the moving forces; or conversely, the empirical element in perception presupposes the form of composition of the moving forces with respect to what is mechanical."[119] This implies a deconstruction of the general Kantian subject—object dichotomy and demonstrates the necessity of a comprehensive analysis of the physical essence of the metaphysical principles or the transition from the natural moving forces to the concepts of understanding through the human faculty of Judgment, and the metaphysical essence of the physical forces or the transition from the aesthetic intuitions of natural phenomena to a priori principles of motion hidden in appearance again through human Judgment.[120] In the end, understanding this transition comes to be a prerequisite for the redefinition of systematic empirical doctrines as *a priori* apprehensible within the regulated format generated by the faculty of the power of judgment.

Both Guyer and Zammito regard Kant's *Critique of the Power of Judgment* as an attempt to demonstrate the relation and prove the necessity of transition between nature and freedom. Kant compares these two domains as follows:

> All facts belong either to the *concept of nature*, which proves its reality in the objects of the senses that are given (or can possibly be given) prior to all concepts of nature, or to the *concept of freedom*, which sufficiently proves its reality through the causality of reason with regard to certain effects in the sensible world possible by means of it, and which are irrefutably postulated in the moral law. The concept of nature (belonging merely to theoretical cognition) is either metaphysical and completely *a priori* or physical, i.e. *a posteriori*, and necessarily conceivable only by means of determinate experience. The metaphysical concept of nature (which presupposes no determinate experience) is therefore ontological.[121]

Here Kant maintains the existence of an incalculable gulf fixed between the domain of the concept of nature, as the sensible, and the domain of human nature, as the supersensible, so that from the former to the latter no transition is possible, just as if they were two different worlds:

> But that these two different domains, which are inevitably limited not to be sure in their legislation but still in their effects in the sensible world, do not constitute *one* domain, stems from this: that the concept of nature certainly makes its objects representable in intuition, but not as things in themselves, rather as mere appearances.[122]

However, he later argues for the necessity of a mediating common ground for these domains:

> There must still be a ground of the *unity* of the supersensible that grounds nature with that which the concept of freedom contains practically, the concept of which, even if it does not suffice for cognition of it either theoretically or practically, and thus has no proper domain of its own, nevertheless makes possible the *transition* from the manner of thinking in accordance with the principles of the one to that in accordance with the principles of the other.[123]

Moreover, he explicitly declares that the power of judgment provides this transition from the concepts of nature, cognized by the faculty of understanding, to the concept of freedom, determined by the faculty of reason, from the purely theoretical to the purely practical philosophy.[124] The theoretical and practical realms of philosophy are connected through the transition processed by the power of judgment according to its own special aesthetic principle. Kant believes that the faculty of judgment only serves as a connection which is why it cannot provide any cognition of its own. But the judgments it produces "under the name of *aesthetic*" (as distinguished from the logical cognition) "are of such a special sort that they relate sensible intuitions to the idea of nature."[125] Therefore, the aesthetic principle of transition becomes the main *a priori* principle relating the idea of nature as a whole to the sensible intuitions of the particular natural phenomena. Therefore, the faculty of judgment functions as a regulatory power both for the two other faculties, namely understanding and reason, and for their fields of application, namely, sensible substratum of nature and the intelligible substratum of freedom.

The argument for the necessity of free reflective judgment (considered by Kant to be the *telos* of nature) for the possibility of aesthetic understanding leads us to consider why Kant brought aesthetics and natural teleology together in the third *Critique*. According to Guyer, he did so because aesthetic judgments regarding the beautiful and the sublime and teleological judgments regarding nature as a whole "are both instances of . . . reflecting judgment, a use of judgment that seeks to discover a concept for a particular object that is given to it rather than to find a particular object to which to apply a concept that it already has."[126] As Guyer asserts, "Kant's deepest reason for connecting aesthetics and teleology in a single book . . . is that both aesthetic and teleological judgment lead us to look at products of *nature* and indeed all of nature itself—and in his theory of genius Kant will imply that even works of fine art must be considered to be gifts of nature."[127] Allison too stresses the significance of Kant's argument in the introduction of the third *Critique* concerning the conciliatory role of the aesthetic faculty of Judgment.[128] Yet the latter point does not prove the necessity of teleology as the theory underlying nature as art; it rather suggests that our aesthetic judgments must refer to *all of nature* itself. In the end, again, what these writers failed to recognize is that neither the idea of freedom nor the concept of nature, but rather the principle of transition presented in *Opus Postumum* (which takes place through human intuition and which is regulated by human judgment) is the common source of both "hinges" (nature and freedom) founding philosophy. Indeed while teleology reconciles these hinges solely by assuming a simi-

larity between them with regards to the principle of purposiveness, the merely aesthetic principle of transition constitutes a firmer grounding for both the philosophy of nature as a whole or cosmology and the philosophy of freedom covering the areas of ethics, politics and aesthetics.

To prove the necessity of the replacement of natural teleology by natural cosmology, we can refer to the dissatisfaction Kant expresses in *Opus Postumum* following the completion of the third *Critique* because of the lack of a *middle term* culminating in the *amphiboly of reflective judgement*:

> The amphiboly of reflective judgment is the self-deception of taking empirical apperception as intellectual apperception in composition (which takes place *a priori* according to principles). It is a conjunction, not by a stepwise progression from metaphysics to physics, [but] by a leap; because a middle term—namely, the consciousness of synthetic unity in the progress of the investigation of nature—is lacking.[129]

How can this amphiboly be avoided? Precisely, only through positing the reflective judgment in the midpoint between metaphysics and physics can it function as the mediating faculty between these realms of thinking. Accordingly, the middle term must be construed as the consciousness acquired through the aesthetic judgment regarding the synthetic unity of the principle underlying nature or namely *phusis*. And the very acquisition of this consciousness leads to the understanding of the principle of transition by means of which the apprehension of nature is aesthetically attained.

On the other hand, the underlying relation Kant draws between natural teleology and aesthetic judgment helps us understand the interdependence of art and nature, aesthetics and cosmology. He also mentions this relation in *Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, where he argues for "the natural need of all human beings to demand for even the highest concepts and grounds of reason something that *the senses can hold on to*, some confirmation from experience or the like."[130] While any teleological judgment requires cognitive-intuitive confirmation, any aesthetic judgment must be grounded on the products or forces of nature which is why he advocates, in the third *Critique,* the idealism of the purposiveness of nature and art as one of the chief principles of the power of aesthetic judgment. This is also evident in his definition of nature as art on account of its teleological character: "Nature is no longer judged as it appears as art, but to the extent that it really *is* art (albeit superhuman); and the teleological judgment serves as the foundation for the aesthetic."[131] For that reason, in his third *Critique* where he tries to assign totality and unity to his transcendental system, he chooses *aesthetics* among other disciplines and *judgment* among other human faculties to bridge his philosophy of nature and teleology with his ethics.

Lastly, following the arguments discussed above, we consider below whether it is right or wrong to reduce the mediating faculty of judgment to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. In his *First Introduction* to the third *Cri-*

tique, Kant defines the faculty of judgment as a receptive one, which culminates in the feeling of pleasure and displeasure as follows:

> The *faculty of cognition* in accordance with concepts has its *a priori* principles in the pure understanding (in its concept of nature), the *faculty of desire*, in pure reason (in its concept of freedom), and there remains among the properties of mind in general an intermediate faculty or receptivity, namely the *feeling of pleasure and displeasure*, just as there remains among the higher faculties of cognition an intermediate one, the power of judgment.[132]

Here, Kant is not entirely right to associate aesthetics with merely practical feelings of pleasure and displeasure because it is not a question of whether a sensible phenomenon or force is 'pleasing' but rather one of whether it is linking itself to a supersensible idea or transmitting the appearance of a thing in nature into a universal idea. Also, contrary to what Kant argues, judgment cannot naturally be construed as a 'receptive' faculty since a faculty or power (which is always active) cannot possibly be receptive (or passive) at the same time. Here, Kant seems to arbitrarily reduce the function of the faculty of judgment into merely receptive feelings of pleasure and displeasure in order for it to fit into his systems of nature and freedom and the respective cognitive faculties to which they correspond, namely understanding and reason. Nonetheless, as a possible response to this objection, Kant attempts to reconcile the two functions of the faculty of judgment assigning the feeling of pleasure a mediating role between the faculty of cognition (understanding) and the faculty of desire (reason).[133] Thereby, he continues, the faculty of judgment effects "a transition from the pure faculty of cognition, i.e., from the domain of the concepts of nature, to the domain of the concept of freedom, just as in its logical use it makes possible the transition from understanding to reason."[134] Consequently, the power of judgment comes to be both theoretical and practical in its function of intermediation between the concepts and ideas. But how can merely practical pleasure or displeasure regulate such a complex twofold transition? How is it possible to assign such a role to a critique of the practical faculty of taste? It is simply impossible to assign this role to a mere feeling of pleasure or displeasure. The title of Kant's third *Critique, Kritik der Urteilskraft* (*Critique of the Power of Judgment*) powerfully suggests the distinction of the critique of the intermediating faculty of judgment from his *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* (*Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen*). The fact that Kant distinguishes between his *Observations* and his *Critique* also supports our claim that both the beautiful and the sublime require higher critical treatment when considered not merely as feelings but as aesthetic (and thus active) judgments and even ideas beyond the limits of sensual receptivity. The discrepancy in meaning between *das Gefühl* and *das Urteilskraft* in itself suggests that it would be inaccurate to describe the faculty of judgment's function of intermediation as deriving from a mere feeling of pleasure and displeasure.

Kant's preliminary arguments on the aesthetic faculty of judgment prove the insufficiency of the customary understanding of aesthetic judgment as rooted in the feelings of pleasure and displeasure. While Kant associates the aesthetic faculty of judgment with mere feelings (so as to avoid ambiguity), he also adds, by aesthetic representation, we need to understand "the relation of the representation to an object, as an appearance." This elevates the aesthetic faculty of judgment's function to the cognition of the transition between the form of sensibility (merely receptive sense-perception or *Empfindung*) and the intuition of the totality of all phenomena. For Kant, this allows the development of a "transcendental aesthetics" as a discipline of thought.[135] In developing the framework of the cosmological aesthetics, we try to correlate aesthetics especially to the mediating faculties of sense-intuition (*Anschauung*) and reflecting judgment which, as cognitive faculties, exalt aesthetics over the mere feelings of pleasure and displeasure. The aesthetic judgment must be "regarded as grounded in special principles of the power of judgment" since it "belongs to the higher faculty of cognition and indeed to the power of judgment, under whose subjective but nevertheless still universal conditions the representation of the object is subsumed."[136] Finally, Kant accepts that the determining ground of the aesthetic judgment lies not only in the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, but also in a principle of the higher faculty of cognition or the faculty of judgment. On the other hand, he also underlines that it is equally important to distinguish aesthetics from logic.[137]

In conclusion, Kant construes the human faculty of the power of judgment as the faculty for thinking of the particular as contained within the universal (*das Allgemeine* or *ta panta*): "The power of judgment, through its a priori principle for judging nature in accordance with possible particular laws for it, provides for its supersensible substratum (in us as well as outside us) determinability through the intellectual faculty."[138] From this follows the argument that the power of judgment is the mediating faculty that determines the supersensible concepts with reference to the relation between the natural laws and human understanding, and categorizes them artistically under cosmological principles. Indeed, Kant even goes a couple of steps further and establishes the transition regulated by the faculty of judgment (linking it to the faculty of understanding) as the source from which the reason has been spawned: "Reason is only a mediately judging understanding. For the rule, and subsumption under it (its *casus*); namely, the conclusion, does not add anything further, but is only stated explicitly as inference or conclusion. The formula does not increase the content."[139] This is one of the most radical claims in *Opus Postumum*. While reducing the highest faculty of reason (as argued in the first *Critique*) to the faculty of understanding where the concepts reside, at the same time, it distinguishes the reason for its requirement of a mediation of the faculty of judgment. This very mediation regulates and determines the content of the argument and its formula is derived from this process.

THE PRINCIPLE OF TRANSITION AND COSMOLOGICAL TRANSCENDENTALISM

This section briefly attempts to reconcile the arguments developed in the earlier sections by examining the intuiting, self-positing and judging human being in Kant's *Opus Postumum* against the background of a cosmological-aesthetic picture of the idea of nature as a whole. This short examination of the aesthetic function of the twofold presence of man both as an active observing agent, and as a passive and dependent phenomenon of nature shall also pave the way for a better understanding of the Kantian sublime and Nietzschean Dionysian as the aesthetic theories representing the transition. The existence of human beings is set on two levels: on the natural level, like every other phenomenon, human beings are *moved by* the moving forces of matter that surround and penetrate them, and, on the other hand; on the intellectual level, they have the power to transform these forces into concepts through their understanding by means of which they become conscious of the way and extent of their movement and the movement of the phenomena that exist within their realm of nature. The transition from these forces into intelligible concepts takes place exactly "when 'I' apply these concepts not in metaphysical but in physical-dynamic functions, to real bodies."[140] In that sense, "experience is not given but made by the subject" and aesthetics is the philosophical set of doctrines that deal with the knowledge of the inner and outer sense-objects in experience generated by this transition. In other words, experience is *mediately* related to the object as it necessarily depends on the "form of intuition" (*Anschauung*) in the human mind.[141] Following these arguments, Kant claims, "intuition and concept belong to knowledge: that I am given to myself and thought by myself as object. Something exists (*apprehensio simplex*); I am not merely logical subject and predicate, but also object of *perception* (*dabile non solum cogitable*)."[142] This shows how the faculties of sense-intuition and judgment are brought together in the process of transition in the mind of a human being who reaches an understanding of himself and everything that exists both as a natural (sensible) phenomenon and as a sensing and cognizing, conceptualizing and theorizing active and free agent.

However, Kant continues, "Subjectively 'outer perceptions'—of phenomena—, as material for possible experience (which lack only their form of connection), are nothing other than the effect on the perceiving subject of the 'agitating forces of matter,' which are given a priori."[143] Therefore, while these agitating forces condition human perception and thus conceptualization, equally and simultaneously, the same forces acquire their meaning and subsequently their definition in the very same process of transition. But as this process is itself the determinant of the rules of the acts of cognition, the logical self-consciousness is not the determining act but the determined product of this very process. In other words, the physical things or phenomena and forces can exist for our sense-intuition only insofar as they are identified through their very relation or transi-

tion to/from the idea of the unity in nature; similarly, the idea of the unity in nature can exist as physical/phenomenal *appearances* only insofar as it is represented through the aesthetic transition to/from particular phenomena or forces. Again the sensing, intuiting and judging agent is at the very centre of this necessary reciprocal process of transition bridging between physics and metaphysics:

> The topic of the moving forces of matter (which, combined with consciousness, awaken perceptions, as empirical representations of objects of the senses) does not yet, on its own, found an experience—that is, empirical knowledge of these objects. Rather, it founds the objects only [as] they are initially [given] in *appearance*, according to the subjective characteristic of their intuition, insofar as they affect the intuiting subject.[144]

After having acknowledged this simultaneous dependence of object on subject and subject on object which also proves the falsity of positing these as antagonistic or dialectical concepts, Kant then associates the possibility of the experience of phenomena with the transition from the metaphysical foundations of nature to physics which simultaneously depends on the *a priori* form of intuition or *Anschauung* as appearance.[145] This would also be a good response to the questions Förster poses concerning the laws according to which we insert in ourselves the *actus* of cognition:

> What kinds of forces, what *actus* of cognition, do we have to insert into ourselves—prior to any distinction between *inner* and *outer*, a distinction itself dependent on these acts of cognition? The logical act of self-consciousness only yields something determining and something determined (something thinking and something thought) And then? Where do the concepts *inner* and *outer* come from? And where do such concepts as *right*, *duty*, *freedom*, on the one hand, and *attraction***,** *repulsion***,** *space occupation*, on the other originate?[146]

However, having posed all these important questions, Förster surprisingly errs as he chooses to address instead "how the self-positing and self-determining subject avails itself of these concepts."[147] Nevertheless, I maintain the argument made above for the a priori determining and active role of the process of transition not only for the generation and substantiation of the aforementioned concepts, but also for the anticipation and orientation of the human being within the senseless moving forces of matter. Regarding this, Tuschling underlines the following argument of Kant on the necessity of something persistent in perception: "perception of this persistent thing (what determines my existence in time empirically) is possible only through a *thing* outside me, not through the mere *representation* of a thing outside me."[148] Here, the necessity of the actual presence (rather than mere representation) of a thing outside me refers to the necessity of the phenomenal presence of the moving forces as a backdrop for the very possibility of the aesthetic perception and intuition, and thus for the human mind to continue sensing, intuiting and judging the things of nature. However, this does not justify a dialectics of the object and the subject. Rather this proves the very

necessity of positing the natural phenomena not as objects but as *things* of nature, and their appearance not as the forms of objects but as the forms of intuition for the possibility of aesthetic experience.

Nevertheless, in the last sections of *Opus Postumum* Kant once more associates the metaphysical principles of natural science with *God*, physical empirical laws with *the world*; and the transition from the former to the latter with *man* both as noumenon or metaphysical being (like God) and as phenomenon or physical being (like any other phenomenon in the world). Even though the first two correlations are arbitrary (especially the first one), the designation of man as the transition between the idea of God and concept of the world can be regarded as the further clarification of our earlier attempt to define human being in the world as twofold: both as an intelligent being who perceives, judges, and inquires into the physical objects and metaphysical concepts, and also as a phenomenon who is subjected to the moving forces of matter and is created, moved and affected and thus whose consciousness of the world is determined by the way he apprehends these forces. This last point is made apparent in the following passages from *Opus Postumum* where Kant presents a revision of his transcendental philosophy:

> Reason comes into being (generally speaking) when the original spontaneity of the power of representation limits itself or imposes laws upon itself. In order to posit oneself, the task is consequently to anticipate possible forces affecting reason.[149]

In another place, Kant suggests, "This ideal of God . . . is nothing other than pure practical reason in its personality, *with reason's moving forces in respect to world-beings and their forces*."[150] Coupling this with the passage in which Kant argues, "in this way I recognize through experience my own practical freedom as one of nature's causes, namely, as a causality of reason in the determination of my will (A803),"[151] Förster tries to prove the essential unity of the theoretical and practical reason. He intends to demonstrate the relationship between the anticipation of the spontaneous power of representation and the understanding of the laws of nature (namely the phenomenal consciousness). Taking all these new findings into consideration, in *Opus Postumum*, Kant distinguishes his new transcendentalism from classical metaphysics. Bearing Kant's description of *cosmotheoros* in mind, it would not be wrong to call this new theory *cosmological transcendentalism*:

> Transcendental philosophy is the system of ideas which, independently of all given objects, creates objects for itself and delivers to reason a necessary determined whole as the totality of beings. One must here proceed not from the one to the many, but from the totality to the one like the progress from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to transcendental philosophy.[152]

This is a very similar account to the Pre-Socratics who understood philosophy as the examination of the transition from the totality of cosmic moving forces

(*phusis*) to the concepts of human understanding, between nature and human nature. Regarding the aesthetic relation between nature and human nature, in his *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, Nietzsche employs an etymological proof for the role of the transition (based on the aesthetic judgment or taste) in the very foundation of human *ethos*:

> The Greek word designating 'sage' is etymologically related to sapio, I taste, sapiens, he who tastes, sisyphos, the man of keenest taste. A sharp savouring and selecting, a meaningful discriminating, in other words, makes out the peculiar art of the philosopher, in the eyes of the people.[153]

In Latin, *Homo sapiens* stands for wise man or knowing man. But, it is their capacity to "taste" that makes humans the only surviving members of the genus *Homo*. This capacity later evolved to encompass abstract reasoning, anticipating, problem solving and finally written language. The capacity to *taste* or *judge* also conditioned the human will-to-create, and this led to the establishment of human culture, history and arts. Therefore, the meta-criterion of being-human is his aesthetic taste, and it is not the consequence but the original source of the human faculty of reasoning. In Kantian words, the faculty of the power of judgment precedes the ideas of the faculty of reason and the concepts of the human faculty of understanding. This etymological proof strengthens the overall argument that the transition between *phusis* (or namely the idea of senseless nature or motion) and *ethos* (or the sensuous or tasteful human nature and concepts) is necessarily an aesthetic transition, and the sublime and Dionysian are the aesthetic ideas that represent and demonstrate how the senseless nature becomes sensuous through human power to taste. Being-human means being able sequentially to taste (representing keen-sensing in general), judge, understand, anticipate, reason, know, and finally create.[154]

Similarly, Kant associates transcendental philosophy with wisdom: "The love of wisdom is the least that one can possess; wisdom for man the highest—and hence, transcendent. The transcendental philosophy is the progression from the latter (wisdom) to the former (love of wisdom)."[155] Kant, assigning primacy to wisdom over any rational knowledge, states that the intuiting and judging *wise* man is the source of transition from nature to art:

> Without transcendental philosophy one can form for oneself no concept as to how, and by what principle, one could design the plan of a system, by which a coherent whole could be established as rational knowledge for reason; yet this must necessarily take place if one would turn rational man into a being who knows himself.[156]

But what epitomizes the man who knows himself as different from a rational man, and why? Here, Kant seems to define the wise man as the one who has acquired an apprehension of the principle that may be used to *design* a system on which he posits not only a coherent whole but also posits himself as a sensing, intuiting and judging being. On the other hand, the consciousness of a ra-

tional man is not based on an aesthetic design and thereby not regulated and governed by a principle but rather grounded on the logically acquired assumptions proved only at the level of human thinking without referring to sense-intuitions and aesthetic judgments that arise from appearances. This characteristic is also what distinguishes the philosopher from the mathematician. While the philosopher looks for a principle on which he can found a self-justificatory system employing not only ideas but also sense-intuitions and aesthetic judgments by way of positing himself against the background of the system of nature he has designed, the mathematician lacks a principle and has to look for multiple sets of formula to work on his equations, and while doing this he does not need to posit himself as a natural being within this logical system.

The comparison between the philosopher and the mathematician explains why we need the transcendental philosophy or cosmology for the reconciliation of physics and metaphysics through an artistic design representing a coherent whole (*kosmos*). However, how and by what principle does the philosopher accomplish this? As aforesaid, in *Opus Postumum,* Kant defends the argument that the transcendental philosophy forms a transition from the metaphysical foundations "through which the subject constitutes itself into an object of experience for physics; the latter does not introduce thoroughgoing determination from experience, but for it, as a system of perceptions."[157] In that the transition from the metaphysical foundations to physics is mediated by transcendental philosophy.[158] Here transcendental philosophy refers to "the principle of *synthetic a priori* knowledge from *concepts*; thus a principle of *philosophical* knowledge, not of mathematical knowledge by the construction of concepts."[159] However, Kant distinguishes this transcendental transitory principle from metaphysics, despite acknowledging that it belongs to metaphysics if the transition proceeds from the metaphysical realm. He defines it as an independent science, which contains "the conditions of progress to the possibility of physics (as a doctrine of experience)."[160] Several conclusions can be drawn from Kant's description of his own transcendentalism. First of all, transcendental philosophy is essentially the philosophy of the principle of transition that mediates between the conceptual realm of metaphysics and the sensible realm of physics. Secondly, like the Heraclitean *logos*, it tends to look as though it originates from the realm from which it initially proceeds, but as a separate independent system of thought it founds philosophy. Finally transcendental philosophy exposes the theoretical realm of the idea of nature (like the Pre-Socratic *phusis*), which becomes a doctrine of experience rather than a mere observation.

Following these conclusions, we can argue that Kant becomes the philosopher of *peri phuseôs* in his late period works as he attempts to redefine his own transcendental philosophy as a system of thought bridging between metaphysics and physics which then come to be construed as two interdependent and reciprocal ways of thinking and designing nature.[161] However, how are we to distinguish the transcendental philosophy, as the thought dealing with the principle of synthetic *a priori* propositions, from metaphysics in general, which has come to be understood by many philosophers as the *a priori* realm of theoretical ideas?

Is it not inconsistent with the Kantian thought to remove transcendentalism from the realm of metaphysical thinking? Yet we have already seen that *Opus Postumum* must be considered a revolutionary book where Kant finally overcomes the established doctrines of the traditional metaphysics. But how does he accomplish this? And more importantly does he really accomplish this overcoming? The only possible way to accomplish this would be to admit the necessity of positing metaphysics also as the unifying theoretical system aiming to explain and understand the physical forces, their interactions and their effects on the aesthetic faculties of the human mind. In other words, meta-physics must be construed as the theoretical reconstruction of nature as the totality of the sensible phenomena and apprehensible forces affecting them.

Nevertheless, the failure to reach a purely aesthetic idea of nature, which must essentially be based on the *appearances*, brings Kant back to his arbitrary attempt to justify the existence of the idea of God representing the entirety of nature as an aesthetic design. In the last fascicles of the *Opus* Kant designs his systems of nature and freedom by means of the principle through which the moving forces (of the physical world) are connected to each other and to the whole (as the metaphysical entity or God). But still constructed on the previous claim, his cosmotheology is essentially strengthened by the principle of transition.[162] All these transitions delineate the phases of one cosmologic-aesthetic transition between physics and metaphysics. Kant's definition of these phases as the processes of "cosmotheology" points at the fact that as a consequence, these transitions reveal the reciprocal relation between God and the world. However, once we admit the arbitrariness of identifying the all-encompassing idea of nature as God, we can see that *kosmos* better describes the idea of nature as an aesthetic unity. Thereby, it is more appropriate to call Kant's new approach cosmological-aesthetic transcendentalism.

Kant acknowledges this similarity in the following passage where he argues for the necessity of understanding the unifying theoretical principle of nature as *ens entium* rather than *ens summum*: "Transcendental *cosmology* and transcendental *theology* (cosmotheology). Not the highest being (*ens summum*), but the being of all beings (*ens entium*)."[163] But why do we need a transcendental cosmology? Why is Kant not content with transcendentalism? In other words, what is lacking in transcendentalism? It is the same thing that lacks in any other metaphysics that dominated the philosophical thinking since the very beginning of the monotheistic spiritual designs. They managed to dominate the intellectual debate for centuries in Europe owing to their strong affirmation of the will-to-universalize and will-to-unify the totality of things into one. The cosmological need to unveil the underlying unity has become the key principle for the God of monotheisms. However, since their way of reaching this *mono* is itself spiritual and dualistic, they fall short of attaining a principle underlying the cosmic unity, which essentially consists of the physical phenomena and forces.

In the end, there arises a transcendental or cosmological need for an aesthetic picture of humanity itself as the bridge mediating the forces of nature and the concepts of human mind by moving from the pure intuitions to intelligible con-

cepts, from the apprehensible to the comprehensible. It takes a wise man (as Heraclitus, Kant and Nietzsche would all agree) to establish the principle by which the system can be designed and a coherent whole or *kosmos* can be theorized. Likewise, in Fragments 1, 2 and 50, Heraclitus associates wisdom and being wise with the complete apprehension of the whole, and makes clear that the apprehension of *logos* is prerequisite for any judgment made on the forces and any meaning attributed to the concepts. After this further elaboration on the principle of transition through an analysis and interpretation of Kant's *Übergang*, which (like *logos*) actively determines and regulates the physical-natural phenomena and forces, and concepts of freedom, we are now ready to examine and compare the Kantian sublime and Nietzschean Dionysian as the aesthetic theories representing the transition.

THE KANTIAN SUBLIME AS A THEORY OF COSMOLOGICAL AESTHETICS REPRESENTING THE TRANSITION

Both the Kantian Sublime and the Nietzschean Dionysian represent a transition from the sensible-phenomenal to the supersensible-metaphysical through the faculties of sense-intuition and judgment by way of stimulating the process of conceptualisation of the cosmic-natural moving forces.[164] This also entails a transition from the perception of one's local microcosmic being to the apprehension of the universal macrocosmic being of the whole. In Kant's words, *the sublime pushes human mind to apprehend the transition from the sensible stratum to the supersensible substratum*.[165] In the following section, I attempt to demonstrate Kant's use of the experience and judgment of the sublime as a passageway between his theories of aesthetics and nature. It is crucial here to remember that Kant's theory of the sublime aims to show and set the rules for *how* we apprehend and understand nature and *how* the aesthetic judgments are essentially grounded on their transition from/to natural moving forces.
Main arguments with regard to the Kantian sublime:

I. *The sublime is the aesthetic representation of Totality and Universality ascribed to Nature (The Cosmological Argument regarding the Sublime).*

II. *The sublime, as an idea generated within the faculty of the power of Judgment, requires the mediation of the faculty of intuition (Anschauung) that goes beyond the limit of sensibility sustaining the transition from the sensible to supersensible (Argument for the Aesthetic Role of the Sublime).*

These arguments are initially presented and discussed by drawing on the differences between the judgments on the beautiful and those on the sublime so as to stay faithful to Kant's original approach in the third *Critique*. Initially, Kant associates the sublime with the feeling of "spirit" in the *Introduction* strictly distinguishing it from the beautiful which is determined in accordance with "taste": "The critique of the aesthetic power of judgment contains first the critique of *taste* (the faculty for judging the beautiful), and second the critique of the *feeling of spirit*, for thus I provisionally call the capacity for representing a sublimity in objects."[166] According to Kant, the spirit found in some works of art is the product of a *movement* in aesthetic faculties like imagination, and, unlike in the feeling of beauty, this movement does not entail harmony. However, later on while presenting his theory of genius (with which he generally associates the beautiful art rather than the sublime), Kant characterizes the genius as the artist or the work of art that shows *spirit*. Therefore, there is here an important gap in Kant's argument which must be complemented by showing the crucial link between his theories of the sublime and genius, which I purport to do in the last section of this chapter. At this stage however, it is necessary to underline the fact that on the one hand Kant associates the beautiful with the critique of taste, which employs the passive sense-perceptions (*Empfindung*) for its judging, on the other, he relates the sublime to the critique of the feeling of spirit which goes beyond mere sensibility through active sense-intuition (*Anschauung*) thereby realizing the transition from the sensible to supersensible.

Kant repeats his argument for the link between the sublimity of a phenomenon in nature and the feeling of spirit that arises as a result of the elevation of our inner motion above its usual level, in his discussion about the dynamically sublime in nature:

> We gladly call these objects sublime because they elevate the strength of our soul above its usual level, and allow us to discover within ourselves a capacity for resistance of quite another kind, which gives us the courage to measure ourselves against the apparent all-powerfulness of nature.[167]

"The elevation of the strength of our soul" leads to the courageous placement not only of our phenomenal (bodily) presence but also of our very determinative capacity of reasoning within the whole. The act of placement stimulated by the experience of and judgment on the sublime helps human reason to achieve an idea of nature that does not exclude our supersensible vocation. By contrast, the act of measuring oneself against the idea of all-encompassing nature makes one apprehend the necessity of the transition between the sensible and supersensible thanks to which the former acquires meaning and the latter acquires its initial power. This also explains the feeling of spirit or the excitement felt as an outcome of the experience of the sublime in nature. Through the aesthetic judgment on the dynamically sublime, the forces of nature aimlessly empower the aesthetic faculties of human mind and in turn the latter bestows meaning on the former and renders it *cosmic* rather than *chaotic*. Therefore, it is both self-contradictory

and in contradiction to the very essence of the aesthetic judgment itself to imagine the universe as a chaotic totality of individually moving unrelated bodies of matter. Instead the very aesthetic necessity imposed on the presentation of the universe through the faculty of judgment requires the understanding of the totality of natural phenomena as in unity and thereby generates an aesthetically created idea of *kosmos*.

This final reconciliation of *kosmos* with human mind can only be triggered by a phenomenon or force that represents unity, totality and unlimited motion. However, this necessity leads to the essential discrepancy between the sublime and the beautiful, setting the ground for our first (cosmological) argument on the sublime: "The beautiful in nature concerns the form of the object, which consists in limitation; the sublime, by contrast, is to be found in a formless object insofar as *limitedness* is represented in it, or at its instance, and yet it is also thought as a totality."[168] In that sense, while a critique of judgment on the beautiful is made only with regards to formal aesthetics (or the aesthetics of merely sensible qualities of the phenomenon), the one on the sublime must be cosmological as well as aesthetic since these phenomena are both formless and at the same time necessarily represented as limited. Moreover, the judgment on the sublime is both universal, as it relates itself to general ideas of totality like that of nature through intuition (*Anschauung*), and particular, as it needs to be represented as limited so as to render its initial perception (*Empfindung*) possible for human senses (for otherwise it would not "be" at all). This finding obviously echoes the reciprocal relationship between the intuitively acquired immediate unity represented by the universal Dionysian and the perceptively (passively) acquired mediated individuality represented by the Apollonian in Greek tragedy.

In addition, the dynamically sublime in nature, though formless, indifferent, and chaotic, "can bring universally communicable satisfaction" which finds itself a purpose "in the enlargement of the imagination itself."[169] Similarly, according to Nietzsche, the entrance of the Dionysian into the Greek world, as the representation of the formless and indifferent character of nature, led to the renewal of the epic imagination and created the *tragic imagination* which revolutionized the Greek life and thought in general. This renewal ultimately triggered the transition towards the supersensible principle of unity and thereby overcame the artificially constructed object-subject distinction. For, thanks to the judgment on the sublime, while nature as a whole comes to be the idea-object determined and represented by human reason, the human mind becomes aware of the fact that it is one of the objects (or phenomena) within (and not outside) the all-encompassing motion. Consequently, the fact that the sublime phenomenon or force is essentially formless and represents an unlimited totality makes us *reflect* while producing an aesthetic judgment on it, which leads to the process of transition between our perceptive and cognitive faculties.[170]

Secondly, Kant describes the sublime as contrapurposive or beyond the principle of purposiveness and thereby distinguishes it from the feeling of and judgment on the beautiful which is purposive for our power of judgment in its positive contribution to the general cognition of the *telos* of nature. On the other

hand, the contrapurposive nature of the feeling of the sublime leads human mind to re-examine this *telos* beyond the limits of mere sensibility. The sublime accomplishes this *transitory movement* by invoking the ideas of the faculty of reason for its representation, transmitting the feeling gathered from an initially sensible experience to the supersensible ideas that aim to ground these but without calling the essentially supersensible principle of purposiveness into action. The transitory role of the sublime does support the proposed reciprocity of natural cosmology and aesthetics, considering the former as the way of thinking rooted in the supersensible and unifying ideas on the sensible nature. It is not natural teleology but natural cosmology that complements and is complemented by the aesthetics of the sublime.

Nonetheless, the sublime, though emphasized as deriving from nature or the experience of nature itself, acts contrary to its adequate cognition by human mind. In this way, it comes to represent not nature but the unattainability of the idea of nature as a whole. On the unattainability of the idea of nature that can only be apprehended through the representation of the sublime in nature, Kant suggests that the *sublime* "is an object (of nature) *the representation of which determines the mind to think of the unattainability of nature as a presentation of ideas.*"[171] On the other hand, this challenge to find an idea to represent nature in unity (as an outcome of the experience of and judgment on the sublime) has a very positive and moving effect on the faculties of human mind. Thanks to the seemingly aimless process of the representation of the whole in one idea (such as the ideas of Nature in Spinoza, God in Leibniz, Being in Heidegger and *phusis* in Pre-Socratics), the concepts of understanding begin to acquire new meanings through their *transition* to these ideas. According to Kant this leads to the unveiling of the subjective purposiveness of our mind through the use of the faculty of imagination: "The feeling of unattainability of the idea by means of the imagination, is itself a presentation of the subjective purposiveness of our mind in the use of the imagination for its supersensible vocation, and something supersensible, subjectively, without being able to produce this presentation *objectively*."[172] This does not mean however, that these phenomena and forces (judged to be sublime) are initially purposive. This point rather shows that the purposiveness is later attributed to these phenomena merely as a result of the very process of transition while our mind is trying to represent the unattainable ideas of unity. Kant does indirectly endorse in the following excerpt the *a posteriori* character of the purposiveness given by human mind as a result of the aesthetic judging of nature that moves toward the domain of the supersensible by forcing the faculty of imagination to its limits:

> This idea of the supersensible, however, which of course we cannot further determine, so that we cannot *cognize* nature as a presentation of it but can only *think* it, is awakened in us by means of an object the aesthetic judging of which stretches imagination to its limit, whether that of enlargement (mathematically) or of its power over the mind (dynamically), in that it is grounded in the feeling of a vocation of the mind that entirely oversteps the domain of the former (the

> moral feeling), in regard to which the representation of the object is judged as subjectively purposive.[173]

Nevertheless, this second introductory argument regarding the purposiveness and unattainability of the sublime brings us to our aesthetic argument on the sublime. Here, by admitting the impossibility of reaching a primarily sensible representation in human imagination, Kant also accepts the transitory role of the sublime between the sensible and supersensible which can only be apprehended by sense-intuition (*Anschauung*). He clearly formulates this later in the following excerpt: "The *sublime* consists merely in the *relation* in which the sensible in the representation of nature is judged as suitable for a possible supersensible use of it."[174] In that the passive faculty of sense-perception (*Empfindung*) does not play an important role in the identification of the phenomenon because the judgment on the sublime involves a higher faculty, the faculty of reason, to contemplate the supersensible and unifying ideas. This implies the active participation of the agent in the experience for the representation of the sublime, unlike in the judgment on the beautiful where the person, as a detached sensor, observes (and does not experience) the phenomena. By assigning an internal and external space to the subject, this necessary detachment leads him, in the case of the judgment on the beautiful, to the total isolation from the phenomena of nature. Kant puts this as follows:

> For the beautiful in nature we must seek a ground outside ourselves, but for the sublime merely one in ourselves and in the way of thinking that introduces sublimity into the representation of the former which entirely separates the ideas of the sublime from that of a purposiveness of *nature*.[175]

Kant introduces this argument so as to totally distinguish the ideas of the sublime from the purposiveness of nature. This is where Kant famously declares the theory of the sublime as a mere appendix to the aesthetic power of judgment. Nonetheless, the very simultaneous involvement of the ideas devised in the faculty of reason and the aesthetic representations of sense-intuition renders the sublime special (and not just an arbitrarily declared appendix to the aesthetic faculty of judgment). The sublime, considered cosmologically and aesthetically, which is initially nothing but a human impression or expression (or idea in general), becomes the bridge between the sensible and supersensible. Any judgment on the sublime also involves a judgment on our own being since the sublime itself is the product of human ideas. Man, as a phenomenal being, is exposed to the experience of the sublime while, as a thinking being, he at-tributes his ideas onto it and thereby con-tributes to the supersensible and sensible use of it. We could refer here to the association of Ancient Greek Gods with literature and architecture, and of the Egyptian pyramids to their supersensible cosmic character. These works of art, as the representations of the sublime in nature—and not of the beautiful—, contribute to the relation between the sensible and supersensible, and confirm the role of aesthetic human ideas in the formation and refor-

mation of that relation. Thus, the sublime artworks that succeed in embodying this relation and transition reach the status of aesthetic *extensions* of nature through which the latter is artistically reconstituted and thereby rendered intellectually dynamic.

As Zammito rightly emphasizes, "now we can fully appreciate how profoundly Kant intended his claim that the essence of the sublime was its aspect of 'relation,' i.e., the relation of the sensible to supersensible."[176] Kant introduces the faculty of judgment as an intermediary faculty relating the particular to the universal, the sensible to the supersensible, and the microcosm to macrocosm. In other words, when one makes a judgment about the things and forces in nature (including oneself and all human beings), one unconsciously universalizes the particulars, thus reshaping, categorizing and hence transforming them into Ideas. The transformation of the things and forces of nature into the categorical-theoretical ideas of nature initiated by the reflecting judgment constitutes the *relation* between the sensible physical forces and the supersensible ideas representing the universal whole formed according to the process of transformation.

On the other hand, an object of nature itself cannot be called sublime. According to Kant the idea of the sublime "cannot be contained in any sensible form, but concerns only ideas of reason, which . . . are provoked and called to mind precisely by this inadequacy, which does allow of sensible presentation."[177] Similarly, the image of the wide ocean enraged by storms cannot be called sublime in itself. Rather it is made sublime because it affects human imagination enjoining it to transcend the limit of sensibility reaching out to the realm of the ideas of reason by initiating the process of transition. The sense-experience of a natural phenomenon such as an active volcano, earthquake or powerful hurricane fills human mind with many intuitively acquired ideas having penetrated beyond mere sense-perception and leads it to abandon sensibility and contemplate on sublime ideas with higher purposiveness.[178] At this stage, although Kant admits the plausibility of calling the ideas provoked by such experiences sublime, he does not consider the stormy ocean to be a sublime phenomenon even though it initiates the process of transition by forcing the one who experiences it to abandon sensibility. Further, Kant maintains that even the construal of the sight of the starry heavens (totality of infinite individual cosmic bodies) as a sublime phenomenon ensues not because the object is itself sublime but because of its representation by aesthetic imagination as an all-embracing aesthetic unity.[179] Similarly, he suggests,

> "(We) must not take the sight of the ocean as we *think* it, enriched with all sorts of knowledge (which are not, however, contained in the immediate intuition) . . . rather, one must consider the ocean merely as the poets do, in accordance with what its appearance shows, for instance, when it is considered in periods of calm, as a clear watery mirror bounded only by the heavens, but also when it is turbulent, an abyss threatening to devour everything, and yet still be able to find it sublime."[180]

The latter passage demonstrates that Kant does not (as it is generally presumed) restrict the feeling and judgment of the sublime to the merely supersen-

sible realm of the ideas of natural teleology or moral philosophy. Instead, alongside poets (such as Aeschylus and Hölderlin), he defends the necessity of interpreting the sublimity of a phenomenon in nature by way of its directly communicating appearance which already embodies in itself an aesthetic unity. This necessity can justly be called the *cosmologic-aesthetic* necessity; cosmological because it examines the phenomena of nature through their very embodiment of nature as a whole, and aesthetic because these phenomena communicate human faculties of sense-intuition and judgment through their appearance. We have previously examined this point on the function of *appearance* in the transition between the sensible forces and supersensible ideas with reference to the aesthetic argument in *Opus Postumum*. More importantly, here Kant comes very close to admitting the irrelevance of the subjective purposiveness (*telos*) found in nature to the judgment on the sublime, legitimizing our move to exclude the teleological scope in order to attain a better understanding of the aesthetic unity in itself. The criterion of unity preserved within the appearance of the phenomenon takes precedence over whether or not sublime appears purposive or contrapurposive for the general teleological concerns. Kant's following argument can trace this view:

> That which, without any rationalizing, merely in apprehension, excites in us the feeling of the sublime, may to be sure appear in its form to be contrapurposive for our power of judgment, unsuitable for our faculty of presentation, and as it were doing violence to our imagination, but is nevertheless judged all the more sublime for that.[181] . . . That is *sublime* which pleases immediately through its resistance to the interest of the senses.[182]

As a result, the judgment on the sublime has no direct relation to the objective purposiveness of nature, and only an indirect and secondary relation to the subjective purposiveness attributed or given by the higher faculty of reason *subsequent to* the judgment made on the phenomena or forces. This supports our earlier argument that the judgment on the sublime itself has nothing to do with any teleological construction but rather can be employed to substantiate the moral, teleological or theological ideas (such as the idea of God). Likewise, Greek tragedy as the artistic representation of the experience and idea of the sublime is essentially cosmological and aesthetic. However, by applying to it secondary and practical moral standards, Aristotle teleologically reconstructs the idea of tragedy. This Aristotelian teleological and moralizing tendency attributed to tragedy dominated the history of aesthetics and led philosophers and philologists to simplify tragedy's complex origin identifying it as the consequential approval of moral ideas. By this way, this teleological-moral reconstruction detached tragedy from its essential roots in the artistic representation of the microcosmic presence of humanity within the context of the sublime cosmic forces. Arguably, like Aristotle, Kant misunderstood the art of tragedy and thereby failed to regard it as the artistic representation of the sublime in nature despite rightly associating it with the feeling of the sublime in his *Observations*.

Nonetheless, Kant admits that it would not be a mistake to distinguish pure aesthetic judgment from teleological judgment on the sublime in the case where the judgment is not reinterpreted morally (by practical reason) or teleologically (by theoretical reason). He puts this as follows: "A pure judgment on the sublime . . . must have no end of the object as its determining ground if it is to be aesthetic and not mixed up with any judgment of the understanding or of reason."[183] In that the moral and teleological representations threaten the very possibility of positing the aesthetic judgment as a separate faculty. If we pursue this argumentation and remove the principle of purposiveness or *telos* from aesthetic judgments, then we need a higher principle (cosmological as well as aesthetic). The principle of transition, while providing a higher understanding of both nature and art by relating the cosmic forces and natural phenomena to artistically unifying ideas of reason, preserves neither an objective nor a subjectively attributed purpose.

Besides this important finding, another point that can be drawn from the passages above (from sections 23 and 29) is that the sublime exceeds the rational criteria for determining the content of an experience and thereby can only be categorized as an apprehensible (but not comprehensible) phenomenon. Intuition and apprehension initiate and transmit not only the feeling of excitement but also the subsequently constituted idea of the sublime, previously associated with the Heraclitean *logos*. This makes the sublime as indeterminable and unattainable as *logos*, establishing that the judgment of the sublime is neither a sense-intuition nor a concept:

> Sublime is great beyond all comparison. . . . What does the expression that something is great or small or medium-sized say? It is not a pure concept of the understanding that is thereby designated, still less an intuition of sense, and just as little a concept of reason, since it does not bring with it any principle of cognition at all. It must therefore be a concept of the power of judgment, or derive from such a concept.[184]

Therefore, the feeling of the sublime as the indefinite concept of the power of judgment, represents the transition between the sensible and the supersensible. This, for Kant, reveals the special quality of the experience of the sublime:

> Unlike the experience of beauty, it is not an unalloyed pleasure, but a complex feeling, consisting first of frustration at the inability of the understanding to grasp an absolute whole with the assistance of the imagination, followed by pleasure at the realization of the fact that our imagination also reflects the demands of our reason.[185]

However, contrary to Kant's claim, as we have previously shown, the secondary pleasure deriving from the experience does not come out of the realization of the superiority of moral ideas that may (sometimes but not always) arise as a result of the sublime. It rather arises from the final aesthetic representation of the apprehensible unity triggered by the movement in the power of imagination. For

even the mathematically sublime (judgment regarding the magnitude of a phenomenon) can only be an aesthetic one. Even though the judgment on the sublime can be assumed to be the same for everyone or universal, Kant resumes, it "is not usable for any logical (mathematically determinate) judging of magnitude, but only for an aesthetic one, since it is a merely subjective standard grounding the reflecting judgment on the magnitude."[186] Therefore, even though the mathematical judgment seems to be the one on the objectively possessed mass or magnitude of natural phenomena, once the object is judged to be sublime, it is judged not merely in accordance with its actual objective size or mass but rather with its appearance. So, the judgment itself must be called "aesthetic judgment" and does not require any logical rational criteria but the representation of the phenomenon through the apprehension of its aesthetic dependence on the unity of nature.

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Following these remarks, discussions and criticisms regarding the relation of the Kantian sublime to the main arguments defended in this chapter on transition, we now turn to Kant's exact definition of the sublime in an attempt to introduce its cosmological essence. In the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Kant defines the sublime as the presentation of an indefinite concept of reason symbolizing the formless and boundless idea or feeling which has developed from the idea of the object of nature, and which pleases immediately in multiple ways but arouses the idea of totality as ascribed to *nature*. According to this cosmological viewpoint, the sublime is a "whole" rather than an individual object and therefore it is absolutely great but equally incomprehensible (if not entirely inapprehensible) by the human mind since it requires a supersensible *purely intuitive faculty* as an extension of the mind which feels itself able in another (practical) point of view to go beyond the limit of sensibility.[187]

The very fact that Kant examines the experience, feeling and idea of the sublime in such categories as the "mathematical" and "dynamical" demonstrates his understanding of it as a cosmological as well as an aesthetic term. This understanding actually proves crucial in distinguishing the sublime from the beautiful. While the sublime represents a sensible mass or movement in nature and is represented as an entirely supersensible idea of human reason, the beautiful represents a sensible shape or form in nature and is represented as an individually existing self-defining concept. Mathematically, the massive sublime phenomenon (like the solar system or Milky Way galaxy) exceeds the limits of the human faculty of imagination and so sets all cognitive faculties in motion through which it acquires its very definition as *the sublime in nature*. Thereby, nature *becomes* an all-encompassing idea that actually represents the *not-yet-perceived limits* of the whole. Dynamically, the physical moving forces (such as the force of attraction or gravity) by encircling and penetrating the sensing and intuiting beings, move not only the physical body of all phenomena in nature but also the cognitive faculties of the allegedly separate realm of human thinking. Thus, the

representation of nature as a sublime idea is generated and comes to be associated with the motion that defines nature as a unity, i.e. the classification of the experience of "giving birth" as an experience of nature as a whole.[188]

Kant describes the dynamically sublime as follows: "Nature considered in aesthetic judgment as a power that has no dominion over us, is dynamically sublime."[189] The might of the natural object is apprehended with respect to the greatness of the resistance that can only be developed in human rationality again through a necessary separation of human from Nature so as to ensure the outcome of a free aesthetical judgment on the latter. For Guyer, Kant's dynamically sublime is rather "a feeling that suggests a certain interpretation that we can only spell out by means of concept, but at the same time gives us a certain palpable sense of the validity of those concepts before we have even spelled them out."[190] In other words, for Kant, it is impossible to schematize our Nature via Imagination and here, the sublime, to which the subjective purposiveness is directed, represents Nature beyond the grasp of the human mind. Thus, since nature itself is unattainable, we must and can only identify and examine nature as regards its phenomenal representation without really knowing it, but only by intuiting and apprehending its essential sublimity. Similarly, in Nietzschean aesthetics, this sublime movement (stimulated by the Dionysian in art) appears to be posited as a feeling which arises through the reconciliation of outer sensible nature and inner intuitive nature, or via the final apprehension of the oneness of things. In other words, it is posited as the essential unity of the moving forces and the human understanding which is indeed one of the phenomena of Nature.

Our cognitive faculties are inadequate to adopt a standard for the unlimited might of Nature and its aesthetic estimation. However, while this sublimity in Nature leads us to accept our physical powerlessness, it also reveals our capacity for judging ourselves independent of it.[191] For Kant, our experiences of the sublime objects of nature, which primarily generate fear as merely passive sensations, subsequently, after their reformulation as sublime ideas representing the underlying unity within nature or *kosmos*, elevate us or make us aware of the supremacy of human reason.[192] "Nature is here called sublime merely because it raises the Imagination to the point of presenting those cases in which the mind can make palpable to itself the sublimity of its own vocation even over nature."[193] However, the examples Kant provides to substantiate the claim for the externality of the experience of the sublime (such as the sublimity of war carried on with a sacred respect for the rights of the citizens and the sublimity of a courageous man who does not fear the boundless might in his nature and faces it with fullest deliberation and compassion)[194] ultimately fail to support it. This is because both examples actually consider internal rationality and external nature to be inherently related and sublimity to underlie both. On this point, Crowther backs Kant by asserting, "the major reason why, for Kant, war can be regarded as sublime is that, in the ultimate analysis, it is conducive to the realization of the final end—morality."[195] This could be a valid claim if we consider Kantian philosophy as a whole. However, while discussing the occurrences of the sub-

lime in human nature, he praises these not only for their pragmatic moral consequences but also for their aesthetic fullness and universality:

> For what is it that is an object of the greatest admiration *even to the savage*? It is a man who shrinks from nothing, who fears nothing, and therefore does not yield to danger, but rather goes to face it vigorously with the fullest deliberation.[196]

Here, Kant accentuates the universality ("even to the savage") and intensity ("with the fullest deliberation") of the sublime in human nature referring to its *motive force*. He then goes on to discuss the rationally generated moral pragmatic principles. From these examples, we can also conclude that human morality and goodness are essentially in need of the *energy* provided by the heroic human motives such as fearlessness and courage (which are amongst the moving characteristics of the sublime in human nature). In the end, Kant (not in his theory but in his examples) claims the inherent unity of man's internal and external nature. In order for human action to reach an ultimate sublimity, the rational (internal) human nature has to reveal its roots in the (externally oriented) natural feelings and desires derived from *phusis* or natural forces. The sublime human action, by showing the essential unity of man's internal and external nature, discloses the motivation underlying human rationality.

In the third *Critique* Kant completely rejects any unsystematic moving pleasure (as represented in the Ideas of religions from pagan cultures to Christianity, based on the bodily satisfactions and on the weaknesses of the human soul respectively) as a means to achieve sublime representations which, for him, must necessarily refer to the ideas of reason in order to become real and intellectually purposive.[197] This must be seen as the replacement of the cosmological idea of God or highest being, which was put forward in Kant's *Universal Natural History and the Theory of Heavens*.[198] Kant refers to the idea of God several times both in the third *Critique* and in *Opus Postumum* to represent the ultimate possible reach of the theoretical reason. The idea of God can neither be thought nor imagined devoid of its sublimity for this would completely empty its content and render it meaningless. Moreover, the person who subjects himself to this idea may only be subjected to it or can only imagine it through its very sublimity since he subjects himself to the Idea on account of its very sublimity. Therefore, the sublimity of the idea rather than the idea itself is the initiator both of the idea of God (like any other sublime idea) and of the actual self-positing of man who considers himself to be subjected to it. The transition between the supersensible (the idea of God) and the sensible (the phenomenal existence of man) determines the meaning and definition of both. In that sense, the transcendental idea of God and the moral existence of man derive from the aesthetic judgment of sublimity*, not vice versa.* A person initially judges an idea to be sublime and subsequently feels himself subjected to it. *The sublimity of an idea precedes the idea itself*. In other words, the aesthetic process of judgment itself is the very source from which the ideas of reason and concepts of understanding originate.

This ultimately implies the reversal of the reasoning Kant had employed in the three *Critiques* by positing the aesthetic principle of transition as the basis for both the theoretical and practical reason simply because they would not actually be active without their transition from/to each other.

Instead, in the third *Critique*, Kant accentuates the necessity of the feeling of the sublime for the non-conceptual immediate apprehension of the superiority of the moral law of reason over sensibility:

> For where the senses no longer see anything before them, yet the unmistakable and inextinguishable idea of morality remains, there it would be more necessary to moderate the momentum of an unbounded Imagination, so as not to let it reach the point of enthusiasm, rather than fear of the powerlessness of these Ideas to look for assistance for them in images and childish devices.[199]

Regarding the emphasis Kant puts on human reason and morality in his analysis of the sublime in nature and human nature, Guyer claims that "on Kant's conception, reason teaches us humility about our individual merits but pride in our humanity in general, pride in a faculty of our own in whose image God himself is created (rather than vice versa)."[200] According to Kant, the thing, which we judge to be sublime, is not sublime in itself but rather stimulates our Imagination and makes us define it as sublime. This takes place when our faculty of Imagination realizes its limits (having been forcibly moved by the sublime) and "so in judging a thing to be sublime the same faculty is related to reason, in order to correspond subjectively with its Ideas (though which is undetermined)."[201] Therefore, "true sublimity must be sought only in the mind of the one who judges, not in the object in nature, the judging of which occasions this disposition in it."[202] This leads Kant to argue for the triviality of Nature when compared to the Ideas of Reason. Here, Kant tries to set out the theoretical framework for his announcement of the sublimity of the subjective faculty of Reason with its ultimate dominion and elevation over the faculty of Imagination and thus the sublimity of the human being over the other objects of nature owing to his subjective superiority (which constitutes the basis for the creation of human morality). Therefore, the feeling of sublimity derives from our own subjective sublimity as human beings over the natural forces. For Kant, this makes intuitively evident the superiority of the rational determination of our cognitive faculties to the greatest faculty of our sensibility:

> It is a law (of reason) for us and part of our vocation to estimate everything great that nature contains as an object of the senses for us as small in comparison with ideas of reason; and whatever arouses the feeling of this supersensible vocation in us is in agreement with that law.[203]

This shows the essential subjectivity of the feeling of the sublime, which rather arises from the discovery of our own human nature embedded in the supreme ideas of reason. Thus the object of this pleasure is apparently *the purposive character of this self-discovery*.[204] However, this self-discovery cannot be ac-

complished without the apprehension of the natural context framed by the moving forces. Sufficient understanding of one's *ethos*[205] entails the thorough apprehension of the *phusis* and of the simultaneous transition between *phusis* and *ethos*. Therefore, this self-discovery has to be an aesthetic one since it is regulated by the reflective judgment on the sublime and initiates a simultaneous *transition* between the concepts of *ethos* and forces in *phusis.* This aspect of the Kantian sublime is the topic of the following section.

The sublime *disturbs* our mental powers that struggle hopelessly to provide satisfactory and rational explanations for this complex and difficult experience. As a result, this *movement* of the faculties of the mind causes the extension of the supersensible Idea of the sublime into the level of the human faculty of reason. But the sublime also positively and indirectly stimulates and strengthens the possible use of our intuitions[206] (the relationship between the sublime and *Anschauung*) by which it encourages our feeling of purposiveness "independent of nature." Our intuitions are stimulated because our apprehension of the sublime requires the faculty of Imagination to try to extend its limits to be able to make a satisfactory judgment about the idea of the sublime object, causing in this same struggle "a movement of the mind."[207] Therefore, for Kant, no object can be called sublime, as the sublime grows out of our faculty of Imagination, which falls beyond our standards of taste as an *entirely intuitive faculty*.

Kant acknowledges that for the pure judgment on the sublime to be an aesthetic one, it should not be grounded on an object or its conceptual representation. This confirms its suprarational essence since no cognitive faculty can apprehend the sublime in its purest state due to its magnitude and formlessness. The idea of the sublime is generated through our determining Judgment and is not to be sought in the things (phenomena) of nature hence "it is the disposition of the mind resulting from a certain representation occupying the reflective Judgment, but not the object, which is to be called sublime."[208] The sublime excites us and in our attempt to apprehend it, violates our faculty of Imagination with its irregular and chaotic character grounded in its vastness and extensive power. In the third *Critique*, all these direct and immediate characteristics of the sublime are presented as negative and unimportant by Kant both because these sublime phenomena display nothing purposive in their nature and because they irrationally force the mind to abandon direct sensibility and to obey the mechanism of nature.

On the other hand, in his *Observations* Kant directly and unsystematically identifies the sublime with the moral, exalted, virtuous, honourable, dutiful action and the good will insofar as they are built upon proper universality: "when universal affection toward the human species has become a principle within you to which you always subordinate your actions . . . it has been placed to its true relation to your total duty. . . . Now as soon as this feeling has arisen to its proper universality, it has become sublime."[209] Further down, in the same essay, he claims: "True virtue can be grafted only upon principles such that the more general they are, the more sublime and noble it becomes."[210] Therefore, in *Observations* Kant rhetorically declares that *the sublimity is not the essential character-*

istic of a moral feeling, but rather the latter acquires sublimity through its universalization. Crucially, in the third *Critique*, he replaces the "feeling of the sublime" with the "judgment of the sublime," which requires the intervention, and ultimate dominion of the faculty of reason and which, due to its initially supersensible and consequently rational character, involves a stronger possibility of universalizability.

Setting *universalizability* as the main criterion for his theory of the sublime, Kant construes the Burkean sublime as a feeling which rests on an impulse towards self-preservation and fear due to the movement it produces and the purification, excitement and satisfying horror it stimulates, and which contains psychological observations and phenomenological analysis of the human mind; in short as something non-universalizable. However, Kant suggests,

> It is not the pleasure but the universal validity of this pleasure perceived in the mind as connected with mere judging of an object that is represented in a judgment of taste as a universal rule for the power of judgment valid for everyone. It is an empirical judgment that I perceive and judge an object with pleasure. But it is an *a priori* judgment that I find it beautiful, i.e., that I may require that satisfaction of everyone as necessary.[211]

Accordingly, he stresses the necessity of a transcendental (or cosmological) universal ground for all of our aesthetical judgments. While the beautiful object becomes beautiful only when pictured by Imagination and conceptualized by human understanding according to its universal validity, the sublime in nature becomes sublime when considered in relation to the universal ideas of the whole or as a cosmological (and potentially moral) idea representing the unity in nature. In that sense, Kant distinguishes between our judgments regarding the beautiful in nature and those regarding the sublime in nature also in terms of their respective levels of universality. He asserts that while the beautiful is more universalizable thanks to its objective relation to the faculty of Understanding, the sublime is less so because of its qualitative dependence on the subjective (and thus social) faculty of practical Reason which is developed according to the level of cultural maturity.[212] The feeling of the sublime primarily stems from human nature, from the dissonance between human reason and imagination stimulated by the inadequacy of the idea of nature as a whole to the human mind. The human mind fails to picture nature adequately, thereby reaching a contradictory definition of the idea of Nature as both terrible and attractive. In fact, this contradictory universal feeling underpins every cultural description and representation of the sublimity of Nature. However, its ultimate acknowledgment ranges from the terrible (in immature tribal cultures) to the morally sublime (in the most intellectually mature cultures),[213] which allows Kant to focus here on the potential for morality present in human nature. He associates this potential with the feeling of the sublime in nature by means of its formative relativity to the faculty of the practical Reason although only under a subjective presupposition ascribed to everyone.

There are three main weaknesses in this teleological understanding of the sublime. Firstly, despite claiming to have a potential for universality, the moral interpretation of the sublime actually narrows its aesthetic content. The sublime has diverse yet naturally universal representations that link the general *phusis* to the particular *ethos* and that realize the transition between nature and art. The morally sublime actually entirely limits the aesthetic function of the sublime. Furthermore, in *The Birth of Tragedy* Nietzsche dismisses the moral sublime defining tragedy as the pure aesthetic delight or the aesthetically sublime: "The first demand of art must be for purity in its own realm. In order to explain the tragic myth, the very first requirement is to seek the kind of delight that is peculiar to it in the purely aesthetic sphere, without reaching across into the territory of pity, fear, or the morally sublime."[214] The very existence of several polytheistic religions proves the diversity and richness of the aesthetic content underlying the conception of the sublime. Among these, Greek polytheism, for instance, in which Zeus cosmologically unifies the diverse powers and characteristics of other gods artistically representing the forces and phenomena of nature, may be regarded a more thorough and complex representation of the idea of sublime than the moral interpretation.[215] The second failure, as the reason behind the first weakness, rests in Kant's construal of the intellectually mature European moral Enlightenment as the final *telos* of all humanity. This led to his construal of the human history as linear and progressive, and culminated in his understanding or misunderstanding of nature-oriented polytheistic cultures as barbarian and immature representations of the idea of the sublime.

Thirdly, Kant fails to justify his claim that the sublime in nature is merely dependent on the subjective faculty of practical reason. Indeed, according to the cosmological argument on the sublime presented above, the sublime is the representation of the idea of nature as a whole, and must thereby be related to the theoretical reason which inquires into the universal idea of nature. This is arguably the most crucial methodological failure in the third *Critique* undermining Kant's theory of aesthetics. The idea of the sublime is generated neither by the theoretical nor by the practical reason, but by the very transition between them, between the faculty examining the idea of nature or *phusis* and the one determining the human *ethos*. For, as aforesaid, the sublime is the representation of the aesthetic transition and reconciliation between these realms and the faculties that inquire into them. Only a *cosmologic-aesthetic* theory, judgment or idea may consequently lead both to the cosmological idea of God when generated through the theoretical reason, and to the ethical idea of the moral law when rationalized by the practical reason.

As a legitimate response to these weaknesses and shortcomings of the Kantian aesthetics of the sublime and aesthetics of nature, Nietzsche coins the Dionysian and Greek tragedy as the artistic representation of the sublime in nature and human nature. While acknowledging the terrible and the moral as the potential outcomes of the initial experience of and judgment on the sublime, at the same time, Nietzsche's aesthetic theory aims to maintain their original tragic

essence. The next section examines whether or not the Dionysian conveys a clearer and more direct account of the principle of transition.

THE NIETZSCHEAN DIONYSIAN AS A THEORY OF COSMOLOGICAL AESTHETICS REPRESENTING THE TRANSITION

Arguments:

I. The Dionysian is the theory representing the aesthetic unity of the universally valid and entirely senseless pure cosmic forces (The Cosmological Argument).

II. The Dionysian is an Aesthetic Theory linking Nature (phusis) to Human Nature (ethos) (Argument regarding the Aesthetic Character).

III. The Dionysian represented in the Chorus in Greek Tragedy serves as an intermediary link between the gods and humans, noumena and phenomena, nature and art (The substantiation of the second argument through the examination of the role of Tragic Chorus).

From the Sublime to the Dionysian

In *The Pre-Platonic Philosophers* lecture series, Nietzsche promotes an aesthetic worldview and introduces the metaphor of the Heraclitean "cosmic child."[216] In *The Birth of Tragedy*, he explicitly associates this metaphor (*Aion*) to the Greeks and the sublime to Greek tragedy: "The Greeks are eternal children, and in tragic art, too, they are mere children who do not know what sublime toy has been created—and smashed—by their hands."[217] He defines the entrance of Dionysian in the mythological Greek world as the supreme moment in Greek history when the Greek religion was sublimated by the reconciliation of Apollo and Dionysus or of the beautiful and the sublime within Attic tragedy. The most important function of the tragic art is its power to redirect the repulsive thoughts about the terrible or absurd nature of human existence into sublime representation of human life "whereby the terrible is tamed by artistic means." For example, the chorus of satyrs saves the Greek art by redirecting these terrible truths "in contemplation of the *intermediate* world of these Dionysian companions."[218] Nietzsche's Dionysian, as an essentially critical theory of the traditional *logos* of the Western (modern) metaphysics and morals, attempts to revive *Aion* or the child at play[219] which is necessary for the confirmation of the aesthetic transition or *logos* that defines humanity tragically as the most essential but microcosmic component of *phusis*.

Fourteen years after publishing *The Birth of Tragedy*, in his *Attempt at Self-criticism*, Nietzsche confesses to ruining the spirit of the Dionysian in his Schopenhauerian pessimistic stance on metaphysical aesthetics, grounded on the Kantian sublime. It seems therefore necessary, in order to acquire more insight in our comparison of the sublime and Dionysian, to understand the Schopenhauerian reception of the Kantian sublime.[220] Schopenhauer, in *The World as Will and Representation*, describes the Kantian theory of the sublime as "by far the most excellent thing in the *Critique of Judgment*" which touches on the real problem of aesthetics very closely but does not provide a real solution for it.[221] Keeping this in mind, Schopenhauer argues,

> I have sought to make clear the nature and extent of the share which the subjective condition has in aesthetic pleasure, namely the deliverance of knowledge from the service of the will, the forgetting of oneself as individual, and the enhancement of consciousness to the pure, will-less, timeless subject of knowing that is independent of all relations.[222]

In this passage, Schopenhauer claims that aesthetic pleasure and judgment serve as an intermediate process between the metaphysical unity or the Will and the subjective individuality or the Representation. Similarly, Dionysian art is the representative of an intermediary aesthetic realm between the primal unity and the *principium individuationis* in Nietzsche's *Birth of Tragedy*. Schopenhauer arrives at the conclusion that the subject is elevated "above himself, his person, his willing, and all willing"[223] through the reconciliation of the natural objects with their representations as subjectively comprehended Ideas in human mind. For Schopenhauer, as a result of this intuitive experience, the individual subject disappears or dissolves into the supersensible metaphysical nature having become free from all natural determinations as a will-less subject. Here, Schopenhauer obviously agrees with the Kantian theory of the sublime by valuing the ultimately arisen supersensible and potentially moral human subject as the primary purpose of the experience of the sublime. In contrast, Nietzsche criticizes this Kantian attempt to isolate the human mind from external nature. He attacks the Socratic philosophical reduction of the experience of the sublime in art into the presentations of the passive objects of nature via dialectics (internal-external) and logic:

> Here art becomes overgrown with *philosophical thought* which forces it to cling tightly to the trunk of dialectics. The *Apollonian* tendency has disguised itself as logical schematism; we have already observed a corresponding tendency in Euripides[224], along with the translation of the *Dionysian* into *naturalistic affects*.[225]

Despite accommodating our earlier attempt to posit the aesthetic Heraclitean *logos* against the modern (Socratic) logic, this passage also shakes the ground for the similarity and even the comparison between the Kantian sublime and the Nietzschean Dionysian. The sublime, for Kant, is generally a result of natural-

istic affects on human faculties, while the Dionysian itself is nothing other than the aesthetic representation of the unity within nature that cannot and should not however be reduced to a particular material object of nature. But this is also an important distinction for the Kantian sublime which deserves to be called sublime only insofar as it stimulates the transition towards that unity. This once more justifies our attempt to compare and contrast the sublime and the Dionysian under the principle of transition.

Although faithfully following the Socratic-Kantian line of argument, Schopenhauer, by contrast, substantiates his argument on the annihilation of the subjective will as the consequence of the experience of the sublime with the main theme of tragedy: suffering as a result of desire or ambition. The tragic hero, having suffered the greatest personal *pathos*, denies himself and all life together with his own will, and "We see him know himself and the world, change his whole human nature, rise above himself and above all suffering, as if purified and sanctified by it, in inviolable peace, bliss, and sublimity, willingly renounce everything he formerly desired with the greatest vehemence, and gladly welcome death."[226] In the second volume of the *Will as World and Representation*, Schopenhauer expands on the claim that tragedy is the sublime art underlining its identical characteristics with the Kantian dynamically sublime[227] such as its representation of the terrible side of life, arbitrary domination of chance and error, triumph of evil over good and righteous, and direct opposition to our will: "it raises us above the will and its interest, and puts us in such a mood that we find pleasure in the sight of what directly opposes the will;"[228] and thus demonstrates the necessity of negation or detachment from life *as it is* and leads us to take refuge in the moral and righteous life *as it ought to be*.

This Platonic view is definitely not faithful to the original principles of Greek tragedy. According to some scholars such as Sallis, Nietzsche realized, as early as *The Birth of Tragedy*, the inappropriateness of the Schopenhauerian thought (based on the Platonic distinction between sensible appearances and intelligible ideas) in understanding the principles guiding the Greek tragedy. The very Schopenhauerian distinction between Will and Representation is a continuation of the Socratic turn in philosophy, which expanded the space between the sensible and supersensible realms.[229] However, referring to the discussion between Fink and Heidegger, Sallis states that Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche's thought "regards the Schopenhauerian distinction between will and representation as still operative in *The Birth of Tragedy*, even if no longer as a demarcation between two separate regions but rather as structuring the originary *poiesis* of cosmic life."[230] But why would the Schopenhauerian distinction be necessary to ground the aesthetics of cosmic life as represented in the Dionysian in Greek tragedy? In the end, Nietzsche's critique of the oppositional thinking employed by Schopenhauer and Kant derives not from modern metaphysics but from the tragic (Dionysian) art and Pre-Socratic cosmology.[231]

Fortunately, other than Schopenhauer, Kantian and Nietzschean aesthetics tie in many other ways. Nietzsche, in the *Birth of Tragedy*, praises Kant and

Schopenhauer for having accomplished a victory over Socratic optimism and the Socratic aesthetics:[232]

> Let us recall how Kant and Schopenhauer made it possible for the spirit of *German philosophy* . . . to destroy scientific Socratism's contented pleasure in existence by demonstrating its limits, and how this demonstration ushered in an incomparably deeper and more serious consideration of ethical questions and art, one which can be defined as the conceptual formulation of *Dionysiac wisdom.*[233]

In this important passage, Nietzsche evidently defends Kant's critical philosophy for its successful demonstration of the limits and weaknesses of the post-Socratic thought as a whole, which dominated the philosophical thinking for more than two millennia. Nevertheless, Schopenhauer does certainly not mediate this link between Kant and Nietzsche. As Kant does in *Opus Postumum*, here Nietzsche distinguishes *wisdom* from logical or scientific knowledge, which are essentially limited to and structured by certain methods of thinking. Likewise, the Pre-Socratics, the philosophers of *peri phuseôs*, regarded philosophy and cosmology as a way to acquire wisdom into the nature of the constituent principles of *phusis* and *ethos*. But Nietzsche admits that the rebirth of this wisdom would not have been possible, had the Kantian critical philosophy failed to clear the philosophical understanding up to the Socratic-Platonic method and show its limits. In that sense, Nietzsche's philosophy as a whole can be considered an attempt to further the critical endeavour at a completely new level. Actually, looking at Nietzsche's books like *The Gay Science* and *The Genealogy of Morality*, it is even possible to argue that he establishes his entire philosophy on the combination of the tragic *Dionysian* and the Kantian critical worldview (which are both alien to the eras they emerged). Especially the third *Critique* among others extensively drives Nietzsche's early writings on aesthetics if not completely dominates them.

Before expanding on the Dionysian and Nietzschean aesthetics in general, it is also crucial to emphasize the link between the sublime and the Dionysian in terms of their contrast with the beautiful and the Apollonian. The Apollonian is the formative force in ancient Greek tragedy: "It is only Apolline art that seeks to replace suffering by beauty. The 'eternity' promised here is the eternity of the phenomenon. In Apolline art beauty replaces truth."[234] Apollo, the sculptural god of beauty and perfection, represents the beautiful appearance and the measured restraint with his ability to avert self-destruction caused by boundless attraction. In other words, he has a shielding effect on existence. Apollonian art is the plastic art that puts the non-visual art of music inspired by Dionysus into *form* by activating the principle of individuation and stimulating individual members to freely coexist within an architectural frame. While construing the Dionysian as the substance-giving, deepening, universalizing and transfiguring force, Nietzsche describes the Apollonian as the form-giving, personifying and thus beautifying creation which reinforces the Dionysian force, rendering it

long-lasting, more beautiful and sensible. In that the main difference between the Dionysian Greeks and Dionysian Barbarians is that, with the assistance of the Apollonian, the Greeks were able to transform the wild, senseless, terrible force into the sublime art of tragedy by which they could consciously encounter their true nature represented in aesthetic form.[235] While the overabundant, senseless and life-giving moving forces are represented in the Dionysian, the categorizing, limiting and creative aesthetic faculties comprise the Apollonian.

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In *The Birth of Tragedy,* Nietzsche introduces his thesis regarding the sublime function of the Dionysian representations in Greek tragedy. In doing so, following the romantic view, he presents a version of the abovementioned dissolution of the "rationally driven and sensibly judging" individual in the supersensible underlying natural unity of the Will (as the Dionysian art). He thus confirms the necessity of the individual's (or hero's) self-negation for the affirmation of the metaphysical existence. For instance, he defines the experience of true tragedy (most of all in the plays of Aeschylus and Sophocles) as "the (metaphysical) solace that in the ground of things, and despite all *changing appearances*, life is indestructibly mighty and pleasurable."[236] In this passage and in the second half of *The Birth of Tragedy*, where he overtly endorses Schopenhauerian metaphysics, Nietzsche contradicts some of the general aspects of his theory of the Dionysian. Firstly, in those sections, Nietzsche interprets tragedy as a completely static metaphysical art that neglects the cosmic dynamics of nature and thereby fails to overcome the Platonic distinction between the physical and metaphysical (mainly because of his uncritical affirmation of the Schopenhauerian philosophy). This conversion of the real life to a metaphysical one leads to the simplification of his aesthetics. By this way, Nietzsche's Dionysian comes to define the truth as hidden, above and beyond human life and the forces affecting it, as in the discourse of the static Christian god, the outcome of the separation of 'spirit' from nature (*phusis*) in Western thought.[237] On the other hand, it must be admitted that even Nietzsche's early conception of the Dionysian significantly differed from the Kantian and Schopenhauerian moral sublime. The second contradictory claim concerns the *justification of life* through the dissolution of the individual hero in the metaphysical will, truth or nature. The hero has to negate his life and the forces affecting it in order to reach that life-beyond (used in monotheistic religions). This has also led to the self-admitted failure of *The Birth of Tragedy* to explain the origins of Ancient Greek tragedy with regard to the Dionysian as a *transition* between the cosmological idea of the all-encompassing motion and the aesthetic *ethos* of the ancient Greeks.

However, then Nietzsche regrets his claim regarding the individual's self-negation in the process of his within the metaphysical unity of Nature and theorizes his own idea of the Dionysian, beyond the limits of Schopenhauerian aesthetics:

> But there is something much worse about the book (*The Birth of Tragedy*) which I regret even more than having obscured and ruined Dionysian intimations with Schopenhauerian formulations, and this is the fact that I had ruined the grandiose *Greek problem.*[238]

In the *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, as against Schopenhauerian construal of the tragic hero, Nietzsche suggests that the aesthetically mature tragic hero would just accept life and the world as it really is with all pain and suffering rather than denying his life and life as a whole and taking refuge in the metaphysical illusions.[239] He also accuses Schopenhauer of being subjected to the Christian construal of God claiming that even though "Schopenhauer's interpretation of the 'in-itself' as will was an essential step; he did not know how to *deify* this will and remained caught in the moral, Christian ideal."[240] In other words, he could not see the appropriate aesthetic deification of this will under the name of Dionysus in the Greek world.[241] Here, Nietzsche also criticizes the moralized and humanized version of this idea of the singular god which has been over-idealized or defined from within the narrow human valuations of good and evil. This critique rests on his earlier argument for the profundity of the amoral Greek myths as the deifications representing the existence in itself: "What speaks out of them is a religion of life, not one of duty or asceticism or spirituality. All these figures breathe the triumph of existence. . . . All that exists is deified in them, regardless of whether it is good or evil."[242] These gods were the only mirror in which the Greeks could see the truths concerning their existence and thus were able to know themselves and sketch the aesthetics of their nature.

Following this argument, Nietzsche theorizes his conception of the Dionysian, beyond the Kantian Sublime and the Schopenhauerian reconstruction of it. While for Kant it is impossible to attain a schema of our nature via imagination, the Dionysian strives to represent nature beyond the grasp of human mind (or the cosmic nature). However, since nature itself is unattainable, we have to and can only identify and examine it with reference to its phenomenal representations. Nietzsche claims that we cannot "know" the essential truths of Nature but he adds that at least there is an achievable "*middle world* between beauty and truth. . . . The world reveals itself in a playing with intoxication, not in complete entrapment by it."[243] This is "the artistic world of the Olympians. In order to be able to live, the Greeks were obliged, by the most profound compulsion, to create these gods."[244] Homer's poetry stands as a great example of this middle world between beauty and truth, or the aesthetic representation of the cosmic forces and their effects on the human sense-intuition. Discussing Homer's flowing representation of reality and/or nature Nietzsche claims that thanks to its direct and plain style and decontextualized character, Homer's poetry achieves a level of universality, vividness, reality, and nobility.[245] Homer's transformative emergence led the Ancient Greeks to the artistic unconcealment of the unknown nature. The cosmological substance of his poetry, purified from any nationalist or political or religious dogma, is another reason for its aforesaid qualities. Homer's moving, supra-contextual and timeless interpretation of human nature

renders his poetry more dramatic and universal, thus contributing to its higher artistic structure. This is why Homer constitutes an appropriate point of reference for linking the claim regarding the cosmological essence (which is furthered in the second chapter) to the mediating character of the Dionysian art.

Several terminological similarities can be found between the sublime and the Dionysian in terms of their descriptive qualities such as their representation of fearlessness, boldness and recklessness in human nature, and their grave, terrifying and intoxicating character in terms of experience. However, it does not seem appropriate to categorize these qualities of the Dionysian separately since the very unity of these *descriptive* and *experiential* qualities allows the Dionysian to go one step further than the sublime. Dionysus, as a god or personification of an aesthetic idea, accomplishes the representation of both the human experience of the sublimity of nature and the godly within human nature. Therefore, he stimulates a constant transition between *ethos* and *phusis*, and finally manages to build an aesthetic bridge between human life and cosmic moving forces.

Del Caro, in his essay on Nietzsche's transfiguration of the Dionysian, takes a further step toward confirming the intermediary nature of Nietzsche's theory of the Dionysian by suggesting, "The Dionysian is not a religion in the sense that requires religious faith or needs dogma to defend it. In fact, the Dionysian properties are conducive to life-affirmation. . . . For Nietzsche Dionysus became a 'philosopher god' or with less fanfare, a human."[246] Nietzsche's tendency to unveil the Dionysian myth within human nature is very apparent even in his earlier identification of it as "the god who experiences the sufferings of individuation in his own person (like the tragic hero . . . and who) has a *double nature*; he is both cruel, savage demon and mild, gentle ruler."[247] In his *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, Nietzsche associates the word "Dionysian" with originality, creativity, openness to change, constant destruction and regeneration, complexity (finding sorrow in joy, joy in sorrow), overabundance, painful but total affirmation of life, animation, motivation and finally the blissful reception of life itself with all its immoral qualities.[248]

In *Ecce Homo*, (after having announced himself as the disciple of the philosopher Dionysus), he describes his discovery of the phenomenon of the Dionysian as his own innermost experience, and presents it as a necessary motivational (religious) symbolism which empowers the human will for the final Yes to life: "Anyone who does not just understand the word 'Dionysian' but understands *himself* in the word 'Dionysian' does not need to refute Plato or Christianity or Schopenhauer—*he smells the decay* . . . "[249] Nietzsche's conception of the Dionysian represents the aesthetic affirmation of human life by means of the artistic representation of nature and human will, mainly the will to live and will to power. We can indeed trace back his life-affirming aesthetic thought to *The Birth of Tragedy*, where he endeavours to reconcile the phenomenal and metaphysical. He construes the representation of the sublime in art as the potential saviour of life through the aesthetic formation of the terrible forces of nature.[250] The Dionysian half-human and half-god satyr represents the godly features of human nature and human features of the gods: "what he (the Greek)

saw in the satyr was the original image (*Urbild*) of mankind, the expression of man's highest and strongest stirrings, an enthusiastic celebrant, ecstatic at the closeness of his god (Dionysus)," he "was something sublime and divine; and he was particularly bound to seem so to the painfully broken gaze of the Dionysian man . . . (whose) eye dwelt in sublime satisfaction."[251] That is how Nietzsche locates this metaphorical representation of the satyrs in between the phenomenal and metaphysical world as an intermediary realm that generates an aesthetic unification.

In the section called "Those Who Are Sublime," Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* echoes the Dionysian-Apollonian amalgamation he defended in *The Birth of Tragedy* for the creation of the sublime art of tragedy and the final embodiment of the sublime and beautiful in the overhero who is internally hard and enduring, and externally more beautiful and gentle (joyful).[252] This is also why, in *Ecce Homo*, he describes Zarathustra as the most affirmative spirit or the overman who says the loudest "Yes" to life, while embodying all oppositions in human nature such as the sweetest (the beautiful) and the most terrible (the sublime).[253] Nietzsche defines Zarathustra as "a seer, a willer, a creator, a future itself and a bridge to the future."[254] This demonstrates how Nietzsche's Zarathustra manages to symbolize the Dionysian not only as the transition from one realm to another (from *phusis* to *ethos*) but also as the bridge between the ancient wisdom of the *not-yet metaphysical / not-yet moral* thought and the *post-metaphysical / amoral* generation of the future. In the section, *Of Old and New Law-Tables*, Zarathustra announces one of the most important Heraclitean law-tablets as follows:

> When water is planked over so that it can be walked upon, when gangway and railings span the stream: truly, he is not believed who says 'Everything is in flux'. . . . *Over* the stream everything is firmly fixed, all the values of things, the bridges, concepts, all "Good" and "Evil": all are *firmly fixed*!' . . . Fundamentally, everything stands still'—the thawing wind, however, preaches to the *contrary*! . . . Ice, however—*breaks gangways*! O my brothers, is everything not *now in flux*! Have not all railings and gangways fallen into the water and come to nothing? Who can still *cling to* 'good' and 'evil'?[255]

This passage not only shows how Nietzsche employs the most important Heraclitean doctrine of change and the Dionysian theme of destruction as the grounding for the new law-tablets of Zarathustra, but also points out that from the Platonic times onwards the gangways and railings bridging *over* the stream were the main determinants of aesthetics and philosophy. However, whenever such concepts of *ethos* as good and evil get exhausted, the moving forces of flux swallow them and create new space for new definitions revising the relations between these concepts. And human faculties of intuition and judgment are responsible for this decision on whether or not the concepts get exhausted or misrepresent their original forces (or prime movers). Therefore, we need new principles that do not aim to go *over* the stream but instead go *through* it.

Another crucial point concerns the relevance of the faculty of sense-intuition for the understanding of Nietzsche's Dionysian – Apollonian duality.

The very first sentence of *The Birth of Tragedy* reads: "We shall have gained much for the science of aesthetics when we have come to realize, not just through logical insight but also with the certainty of something directly apprehended (*Anschauung*), that the continuous evolution of art is bound up with the duality of the *Apolline* and the *Dionysiac*."[256] This argument not only justifies the proximity of the Nietzschean Dionysian to the Kantian sublime which also requires the initiation of the faculty of sense-intuition *or* apprehension (*Anschauung*), but also endorses the relation of both aesthetic theories to *Weltanschauung* and also to *logos*. Therefore, both for Kant and for Nietzsche, aesthetics must not be considered as a systematic science based on merely logical premises but rather as a set of intuitively attained artistic ideas that constitute or reconstitute the sensible perceptions and supersensible representations into a new whole. The Dionysian—Apollonian duality, for instance, is one of these intuitively gathered aesthetic ideas gathering perceptions and representations into the artistic unity of Greek tragedy. Nevertheless, the duality between the moving Dionysian spirit and the shape-giving Apollonian form dies away in Nietzschean thought together with his belief in the Schopenhauerian duality between Will and Representation (which essentially derives from the spirit-form duality). In late Nietzschean aesthetics, the duality-generating principle of *polemos* becomes secondary to the life-giving principle of motion or *phusis* which renders his later thought *physiological* or *cosmological* and reveals itself in such important Nietzschean concepts as "will-to-power" and "eternal recurrence."[257] Thereby, after *The Birth of Tragedy*, the Dionysian, having transformed into an idea representing the general relation between *phusis* and *ethos*, comes to play an even more central role in his aesthetics as well as in his general *Weltanschauung*. In that the late conception of the Dionysian goes one step further (from its initial reactive state) and undertakes the task of explaining the transition from nature to human arts (including the art of self-creation and self-overcoming).

Indeed, the laws of transition are present in any process of deification. Any attempt to design a god has to understand and interpret them in detail and use them effectively. Using these laws effectively also requires a comprehensive knowledge of the *ethos* of the people for which the deification is intended. Consider, for example, the discrepancies between the Homeric and Jewish conceptions of deity all of which are the representations of supersensible force(s). These differences derive from the ways both intuit, apprehend and judge the transition between the universal *phusis* and their particular concepts of *ethos*. While the former uses multiple gods in shape and character of humans, to whom they actually relate, the latter considers all these forces intertwined in one intuition reconciling the multiple and diverse representations and strictly distinguishing between the contingent realm of humans and pure realm of God. Thus the process and manner by which the deities are envisaged constitute the major factor according to which the gods and the concepts such as justice, life, death, love and strife are defined. In other words, the *transition* from a moving force to an intelligible concept is the only way in which cosmological principles are to be

constructed. For instance, both Dionysus and Jesus are the individualized embodiments of the transition, former as the transition *between* the moving forces in nature and the tragic human concepts, and latter as the transition *from* God (as the spiritual representation of the cosmic oneness) *to* human morality.[258] While the former transition maintains its cosmological and aesthetic essence allowing the mutual presence of the dynamic moving forces and their multiple creative representations, the latter loses its cosmic and aesthetic significance and becomes a merely monist theology.

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Finally, in *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche explicitly criticizes the conception of beauty in contemporary aesthetics on the ground that it has entirely ignored the categorical qualities of the beautiful and the sublime:

> What a spectacle our aestheticians present as they lash about, with movements that are to be judged neither by the standard of eternal beauty nor of the sublime . . . an aesthetic pretext for their own sober-sided, impoverished sensibility.[259]

He furthers his critique of the rationalist and objectivist accounts of aesthetical education in the following section where he confronts it with the true art, tragedy, which celebrates its rebirth with Goethe, Schiller[260] and Wagner: "We understand why such debilitated education hates true art, for it fears that it will be destroyed by it."[261] By "*true art*" Nietzsche evidently refers to the Dionysian or the tragic art. He blames contemporary aesthetics for misinterpreting the purpose of tragedy—the exposure of the triumph of the universal moral order—and thus of lacking the ability to provide a serious analysis of human drives represented in the tragic art: "They (aestheticians) never tire of characterizing the true essence of tragedy as the struggle of the hero with fate, the triumph of a universal moral order."[262] Nietzsche also draws attention to the fallacy of the domination of the principles deriving from the moral view of the world in theorizing tragedy, the supreme art above and beyond all moral categories and principles. Hence he calls the morally sublime impure due to its ensuing appeal to the territory of ethical condolence through the feelings it evokes, such as pity and fear. Nevertheless, Nietzsche grounds his aesthetics neither on an antithesis of the moralizing tendency in art nor on *l'art pour l'art* which would render art and life purposeless and pointless. Instead, in the *Twilight of the Idols*, he explicitly announces art as "the great stimulus to life."[263]

According to Nietzsche, a culture can only be healthy, creative and energetic through the aesthetic mythical representation of the natural forces albeit in a mediated or humanized form. "Without myth, however, all cultures lose their healthy, creative, natural energy. Only a horizon surrounded by myths encloses and unifies a cultural movement."[264] Since people do not feel the necessity to train their imagination, the aesthetic ability of culture remains entirely superfi-

cial lacking both in artistic maturity and universality. So, for Nietzsche, the omnipresence of the metaphysical power of myths moves, disturbs, hence ripens and universalizes culture. Here, Nietzsche criticizes the dominance of a historical (by the philologists) and critical (by the philosophers) understanding of the myths which deprived them of their essential mediating function between nature and human nature. Now, I would like to substantiate the claim on the transitory role of the Dionysian through an examination of the role, place and essence of the tragic chorus in Greek tragedy.

The Dionysian and the Tragic Chorus

Before engaging in the demonstration of the *intermediary* role of the chorus in Greek tragedy between the gods and humans, I would first like to introduce its elements and uses with reference to the Aeschylean and Sophoclean drama. As argued by Walton in his *Greek Theatre Practice*, the essential source for Greek tragedy was Homeric poems and Theban cycle, and the primary form of the tragic chorus was the bard in Homer.[265] However, the Greek tragedy for the first time staged and visualized the Homeric poetry by introducing the *skênê* in the Greek world. In his illuminating book *From Homer to Tragedy*, Garner argues that tragedy is the advanced artistic form that perfects the art of allusion repeating and modifying the Homeric formulae. He argues, "Tragedy created new possibilities for allusion: suggestive echoes could be multiplied, dispersed, and made to resonate in a poetic space extended far beyond usual limits of polished lyric and pointed elegiac."[266] The tragic chorus is composed of primeval beings that retain their natural shape irrespective of the changes in civilization. The actors in the tragic chorus used to wear masks representing mythical half-goat, half-human wild characters.[267] As the primary element of early Greek tragedy, the chorus offers various background information, comments and recitation that substantiate the tragic action. It functions as a mediator between the actor and spectator, truth and appearance, inside and outside. In that sense, Walton argues, tragedy, as in Aeschylean plays, is a highly developed, complex, and totally serious dramatic form, displaying the only slightest links with Dionysus and completely ignoring his revelling companions.[268] One of the reasons for this lies in the very skilful way Aeschylus manages to raise the content of a particular story to the level of a general mytho-historical process and thus rendering it more universal and atemporal. Sophocles achieves the same result by rendering his tragedy as individual and psychological as possible through universalizing the hero. By contrast, the chorus in Aeschylus, as the narrating divine judge, tells the story using the language of the divine gods. He was the first tragedian to write the speeches of the chorus in *Ionic Greek* so as to distinguish them from the rest of the characters and accentuate their intermediary existence. In other words, Aeschylean tragedy begins and continues on a divine, universal or cosmological realm, depicting individual tragedies within a general framework

comprised of the pure natural forces acting through personified aesthetic concepts.[269] It employs the chorus as the far-sighted intuitive and divine judges guiding other actors in their unearthing of the truth which is revealed in the catastrophe of the play.[270]

After the fifth century B.C., the role of the chorus began to change with Sophocles. Indeed the Sophoclean tragedy marks the transformation of the *tragic* role of the chorus into a more psychological one. In Sophoclean tragedies, the chorus echoes the most intense emotions of the hero in an attempt to substantiate the hero's speech through the recitations of ancient sayings and songs. According to Garner, "Sophocles then has done what Aeschylus did not: the device of Homeric allusion, already familiar in lyric poetry, has been raised to a new level of complexity and sophistication."[271] After Sophocles, with Euripides in particular, the chorus's role becomes that of an outsider. Modern tragedies can thus be seen as the continuation of this post-Socratic Euripidean tradition which had a huge influence on the Roman drama, New Comedy and the French classicism. Euripides appeals to the modern taste because of the realism of his characters, sometimes even to the expense of a realistic plot. However, because of its simplified narration, the direct realism of its mise-en-scène and the detachment of the chorus from the action, Euripidean drama reduced the use of Homeric divine symbolism in Greek tragedy innovatively pursued by Aeschylus and Sophocles. As a result of the loss of the *noble* Homeric style, in Nietzsche's view, the Euripidean drama marked the end of the prolonged, intensified and multiplied poetic space, while only the flat scene survived.[272] However, Walton, alongside other scholars takes the defence of Euripides. Walton, in his *Greek Theatre Practice* accepts that until the mid-fifth century B.C. "The commonplace and sometimes deeply subtle sentiments of Euripides superseded the grandiloquent dramatic poetry of Aeschylus and the actor's emotional scope was extended."[273] As a third middle way between the Aeschylean and Euripidean style, some scholars also believe that the conventional Greek tragedy relied on the principle which consists in the equality of space and speech between the chorus and the actors.[274]

According to Nietzsche, Aeschylus represents the sublime in the "Olympian justice". In his tragedies, the godly and human concepts are in subjective communality with their constant influence on each other that amounts to an aesthetic unity: "the divine, the just, the moral, and the *happy* are seen by him as being intertwined in a unified whole."[275] On the other hand, Sophocles finds sublimity in the obscurity of justice in life, in the complexity of the transfiguring force of suffering and in the enigmas of human existence through his demonstration of the terrible fragility of human nature. The actor embodying the tragic sublime reaches beyond the senses, beyond the realm of beauty, although in so doing, seeks not truth but *probability*, not beauty but semblance. Thus, the sublime is here construed by Nietzsche as representative of the disturbing terrors of existence and unreasonable but inevitable nature of events.[276] These events can only be apprehended *intuitively* causing intense suffering as they lift the veil of beauty. Against Schlegel's argument that the only role of the chorus in tragedy is presenting the ideal spectator, Nietzsche maintains that the chorus generates an

emotional stimulus for tragedy owing to its essential Dionysian character (as the tragic chorus was originally the dithyrambic chorus taking part in the festivals of Dionysus). One could think of several other points both for and against the theory that the chorus is outside the play and thus purely objective (or external). But Nietzsche himself acknowledges that the tragic chorus became outsider in and after the Euripidean tragedy. After Euripides, the tragedy's language of Dionysian music transformed into daily Greek language due to the lack of reference to the ancient wisdom and the reduction of the original tragedy to the ethical realm where mortals wander.

Moreover, the tragic chorus sometimes intervenes in the dialogue as a divine voice in the midst of the action where the actors are confined to a private space. Wiles seconds Lefebvre who argues that the fifth-century Greek theatre had the qualities of "absolute space" and thus not entirely a mirror of life unlike in Homeric *topos* which "is vested with moral certainty. . . . In tragedy such certainties are open to intellectual challenge, but remain embedded in the consciousness of the spectators."[277] Regarding the relationship between the Dionysian and the priority of the scenes in the Greek tragedy Wiles confirms the importance of the scene as a façade on which the life is represented with its pure visible qualities.[278] In other words, visibility or appearance does not only represent the essence or substance but *is* the essence of the artistic *transition* accomplished by the tragic performance, through which human life on earth is aesthetically depicted. Throughout his philosophy Nietzsche underlines the importance of *skênê* or appearance as the actual essence, suggesting, like Homer and the tragedians, that we must prioritize the appearance while inquiring into the things.[279] As we have seen earlier, Kant uses a very similar definition of appearance in *Opus Postumum* where he argues for the necessity of understanding the appearance of a phenomenon while framing a synthetic judgment according to a principle of synthesis. He defines *Welt* as the sum total of all appearances to which the cosmological ideas belong and from which they are derived. Similarly, *Anschauung* as the faculty through which the transition takes place refers both to notion, idea and intuition, and to the visible appearance, and these are not necessarily independent from each other. Like Nietzsche, in *Opus Postumum*, Kant construes appearance as the subjective and formal element of intuition.[280] He further argues that the *a priori* knowledge is only possible when the phenomenon is represented as appearance rather than a thing-in-itself.[281] This is because the transition from nature to transcendental philosophy is only possible through the appearance of nature instead of the merely *noumenal* idea of nature. As argued earlier, the appearance of a natural phenomenon primarily determines our judgment on it, which may or may not be *sublime*.

In the end, Nietzsche defines the tragic chorus highlighting its intermediary role between the metaphysical ideas (or noumena) and the world of phenomena: "Just as tragedy, with its metaphysical solace, points to the eternal life of that core of being despite the constant destruction of the phenomenal world, the symbolism of the chorus of satyrs is in itself a metaphysical expression of that original relationship between the thing-in-itself and phenomenon."[282] However,

in accordance with the principle of transition, the Homeric gods invoked by the tragic chorus are not simply the deified versions of human passions but the actual human reconstruction of the cosmic forces (affecting human nature) through their direct or indirect association with human *ethos*. And the qualitative changes rooted in this reconstruction, Heraclitus argues, are not arbitrary but transpire according to *logos* or the laws regulating continuous change, the laws through which the forces of *phusis* and concepts of *ethos* continue to exist in balance, the laws of the transition between them. Taking further the discussion on the role of the tragic artist and philosopher plays in the transition, we now turn to the theory of genius in Kant, Nietzsche and Schopenhauer.

ON THE PRINCIPLE OF TRANSITION AS GENIUS IN KANTIAN AND NIETZSCHEAN AESTHETICS

One of the most important problems in aesthetics examined by Kant in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* is the way the faculties of the mind function in the generation of genius:

> We say of certain products of which we expect that they should at least in part appear as beautiful art, they are without *spirit*; although we find nothing to blame in them on the score of taste. A poem may be very neat and elegant, but without spirit. A history may be exact and well arranged, but without spirit. . . . What then do we mean by spirit? *Spirit*, in an aesthetical sense, is the name given to the animating principle of the mind. But that whereby this principle animates the soul, the material which it applies to that purpose, is that which puts the mental powers purposively into swing, i.e. into such a play as maintains itself and strengthens the mental powers in their exercise.[283]

In this passage, by "*spirit*," Kant means the *force* or *power*, which can animate or, principally in the case of the sublime, disturb the human mind by forcing it to rethink its communicative capacities and thus stimulating it to become more flexible, trained and powerful. In his application of the ensuing characterization of genius to his aesthetic theory, he defines spirit as an entirely purpose-oriented or teleological criterion, which cannot be comprehended by the mere capacity of human senses. However, he does not go so far as to examine the essence and elements of "spirit" except for the movement it produces, as in the experience of the sublime. Kant also relates the judgment on the feeling of the sublime and genius through the notion of *spirit*:

> The critique of the aesthetic power of judgment contains first the critique of taste (the faculty for judging the beautiful), and second the critique of the feeling of spirit, for thus I provisionally call the capacity for representing a sublimity in objects.[284]

Here, Kant refers to "the feeling of spirit" to distinguish the sublime from the beautiful. Therefore, grasping what Kant means by "the feeling of spirit" not only helps us to distinguish the ways in which the beautiful and the sublime must be judged, but also reveals the underlying sublime qualities of a work of genius which must be judged according to the way these qualities are represented. Genius (both as an artist and a work of art) is able to communicate the spirit (or motion) by way of its sublime representation of the idea of nature. Kant explicitly claims that art must not be considered as a product of understanding or reason but of aesthetic ideas.[285] If this construal renders the Kantian concept of genius purely aesthetic, it also makes genius indeterminate and inconceivable:

> The aesthetic idea is a representation of the imagination, associated with a given concept, which is combined with such a manifold of partial representations in the free use of the imagination that no expression designating a determinate concept can be found for it, which therefore allows the addition to a concept of much that is unnameable, the feeling of which animates the cognitive faculties and combines spirit with the mere letter of language.[286]

On this point, Caygill argues, "The production of aesthetic ideas exceeds the letter/law of the understanding, using it to point to what is indefinable, but quickens the powers. In this productive activity the imagination gains access to a proportion of the knowledge-powers hidden from the understanding. Genius consists in the 'union in a certain relation' of the imagination and understanding, a 'relation' discovered and produced by the imagination."[287] This incomprehensibility of the animation generated by genius, as in the case of the sublime, places it in the realm of transition between nature and art. This can be better explained if we associate primal nature with *phusis* and human nature with *ethos*. The concepts of *ethos* in themselves would not be sufficient for genius to constitute a totally independent set of ideas unless these concepts represent the invincible and timeless forces of *phusis*. Breazeale supports this view in his comment on Nietzsche's essay, *Philosophy in Hard Times*, where Nietzsche holds culture to be an improved or transfigured *phusis*. Breazeale underlines the importance of the reciprocal relation between nature (*phusis*) and culture (*ethos*) for the understanding of Nietzsche's theory of culture and man, tracing it back to Goethe's notion of the unifying mastery of natural drives.[288] But, according to Nietzsche, this is only possible from "the right height," from a sufficiently pure and universal (cosmic) point of view that reconciles all human ideas, concepts and actions, the thought of the philosopher, the work of the artist and the good deed.[289] In other words, genius must first be able to see human existence as a whole and draw the particulars from these discovered principles. But these principles and categories must neither be dominated by cosmic view (or pure *phusis*) nor by the worldly ethical[290] view (or *ethos*) but from the point where they arise or become meaningful (or *logos*).[291]

The right height is the level at which the aesthetic wisdom functions best, where the Dionysian and Apollonian are in perfect balance through the guidance

of the aesthetic *logos*. The relation between the Dionysian and the genius is crucial in understanding Nietzsche's aesthetic theory. For Nietzsche, what we call genius is the ability to reconcile the inspirational, instinctual, immediate and universal spirit with talent or intelligence.[292] He accuses the naïve art of lacking power, spirit and genius and of reducing the sublime art (i.e. Attic tragedy)[293] to the level of semblance. He defines this art as that which is restricted to the limited and the measurable and which moderates or rationalizes and even dismisses the terrible, ecstatic, and irrational force on account of its immeasurability.

Some arguments of the Schopenhauerian aesthetics of genius, founded on the Kantian aesthetic principles, provide crucial insight into the role of genius (both as a person and as an idea). In general, Schopenhauer argues that the mind of the genius "belongs not to himself, but to the world"[294] and his true nature lies in the "completeness and energy of the knowledge of perception."[295] But this perception must be accomplished through apprehension: "A *perceptive apprehension* has always been the process of generation in which every genuine work of art, every immortal idea, received the spark of life."[296] On the other hand, continues Schopenhauer, the work of art remains on the level of *concepts* (the concepts of *ethos*) thus failing to generate a whole new set of concepts based on their relations to apprehensible forces. To prevent this failure, genius needs to rise to the universal level of a priori forces or in other words, "the real object of genius is only the essential nature of things in general the universal in them, the totality."[297] On this relation between the genius and the universal cosmic forces, Schopenhauer states,

> Genius recognizes himself in all and thus in the whole; he does not live, like others, only in the microcosm, but still more in the macrocosm. For this reason, the whole concerns him, and he tries to grasp it, in order to present it, or explain it, or act on it in practice."[298] Then, "always to see the universal in the particular is precisely the fundamental characteristic of genius, whereas normal man recognizes in the particular only the particular as such."[299]

This point endorses the intermediary role of genius between the pure intuitions of cosmic forces (at the macrocosmic level) and the concepts of *ethos* (at the microcosmic level of human existence). It also recalls the Heraclitean claim that while many live according to their private understanding, only a few wise people apprehend the universality of the *logos*. Heidegger confirms this Heraclitean stance in his *Introduction to Metaphysics,* when discussing the characterization of the essence of *logos*: "Only those who are capable of this (bringing their *Dasein* to stand in the Being of beings), rule over the word—poets and thinkers.[300] The others just reel about within the orbit of their caprice and lack of understanding."[301] According to Schopenhauer, there is a very apparent link between the universality and purity of understanding: "the intellect is then of the greatest purity, and becomes the clear mirror of the world; for, wholly separated from its origin, that is, from the will, it is now the world as representation itself concentrated in *one* consciousness."[302] This argument is based on the alleged

necessity of the disconnectedness of intellect from nature (considered as an abstract concept), to acquire self-consciousness and to see itself *objectively* from outside. It is precisely this aspect of Schopenhauer's aesthetics of genius that Nietzsche counts as one of his mystical embarrassments.[303]

Nevertheless, Nietzsche initially maintains a Schopenhauerian stance regarding genius and defines the philosopher of genius as a timeless being who is independent of the contingent political, social and moral discourse of his historical context. By separating the philosopher from his context, Nietzsche believes that "nature will one day succeed in contemplating its drives clearly. The philosopher is a means for finding repose in the restless current"[304] and for grasping the continuously moving forces and envisaging them as such. However, later on in his middle period works, he criticizes the traditional and romantic conception of genius: "Genius is most readily to be ascribed to those men in whom, as with Plato, Spinoza and Goethe, the spirit seems to be only *loosely attached* to the character and temperament, as a winged being who can easily detach itself from these and then raise itself high above them."[305] Nonetheless, this negative attitude towards genius reverts back to a positive one in the *Gay Science*:

> *Historia abscondita*—Every great human being exerts a retroactive force: for his sake all of history is put on the scale again, and a thousand secrets of the past crawl out of their hiding places—into *his* sunshine. There is no telling what may yet become a part of history. Maybe the past is still essentially undiscovered! So many retroactive forces are still needed![306]

The genius possesses the pure, purifying eye, which is free from his psychological state and character, and looks at the world as "upon a god."[307] For Nietzsche, the genius philosopher both creates an ontic bridge between the godly cosmic reality and the mortal everyday reality, and serves as a temporal bridge between himself and the previous and later genii. Nietzsche articulates the latter as follows: "There is an invisible bridge from genius to genius. That is the genuinely real true 'history' of a people; everything else is murky, countless variations in inferior material, copies by unpractised hands."[308] Nehamas designates Heraclitus and Parmenides as examples of philosophers possessing the knowledge of *logos* hence as embodiments of the intermediary realm of philosophy *between* the godly and human: "The wise are not themselves gods, but they know what gods know and humans don't: intermediate between the divine and the everyday, they occupy, in fact, the space of philosophy. Parmenides and Heraclitus are the first to create that space, to envisage what they are doing as a radically new endeavour."[309] Like the tragedians and epic poets, philosophers also create an artistic intermediate space *between* the gods and humans in accordance with unifying aesthetic principles. This space *between* is necessarily an aesthetic space and the process of creating this space requires artistic genius. It does not actually matter *who* the first creators of this space *between* were. But it is important to inquire *what* this space stands for and *how* it is created. This is why we are interested in genius not necessarily as a person but rather as an idea.

Consequently, the genius constructs a *bridge* on the river. We are all inhabitants of that tiny, fragile and changeable *middle world* of the bridge created by genius (either as person(s) or idea(s)). In fact, all human cultures dwell on such bridges constructed by genii on the river of becoming (like Homer's Greece, Shakespeare's England, Goethe's Germany and Confucius's China). However, cultures have to continuously reinforce and expand the bridges in order to stay alive and move forward by maintaining their link to the a priori reality or dynamics of life. This definition of genius clearly resembles the Kantian *cosmotheoros* as presented in *Opus Postumum*. Genius is itself (either as a person or an idea) the purest representation of the transition between the natural forces and concepts of human life, it is the sublime bridge hanging over a steep canyon separating the microcosm from the macrocosm, humanity from the universe.

CONCLUSION

The possibility of cosmological aesthetics as a discipline of thought depends on the exposition of the transition between the cosmological forces of matter that comprise the idea of nature and the concepts of life that define the human culture or *ethos*. In establishing the structure of this transition, this chapter uses Kant's *Opus Postumum* as the primary source not only because of its provisional name (*Übergang*) and content (transition from the metaphysical principles to physics), but also thanks to its comprehensive and general character which encompasses several fields of philosophy and thus allows various alternative approaches to Kantian thought.

The following conclusions encapsulate this chapter's main ideas: the relationship between the a priori moving forces of matter and intelligible concepts of understanding rests neither on metaphysical principles, nor on empirical principles but on the *transition* between them. As Kant shows in *Opus Postumum,* the determination of the purity of the concepts of understanding is dependent on the demonstration of their links to the a priori forces constantly affecting the human understanding. On the other hand, these forces can only acquire meaning through the concepts generated by human understanding, though this does not mean that the human mind and its concepts are prior to the moving forces. Rather, this proves the necessity of a simultaneous transition between the sensible and supersensible realms for the completeness of human understanding. In that, the transition occurs only when the moving forces do not exceed the intellectual or intuitive capacities of the human mind. Reciprocally, human sense-intuitions and understanding are unable to apprehend and conceptualize any motion beyond their imaginative capacity.[310] Therefore, the *transition*, rather than the dualist formations like forces and concepts, objects and subjects, phenomena and noumena must be the starting point of any philosophical inquiry.

Similarly, Nietzsche seems to argue that the metaphysical transformation of the phenomenal is simultaneous with the phenomenal transformation of the met-

aphysical, while both processes require the aesthetic motivation and insight provided by the tragic sublime or the Dionysian. The reason for this simultaneity, I argue, is that neither the metaphysical nor the physical, neither the noumenal nor the phenomenal exists independently of its transition to and from each other and independently of a mind that initiates or apprehends this transition, for their primary qualities derive from this very process. The transition defines the seemingly separate realms of thought regarding nature and art since it is the principle of transition itself that (like the Heraclitean *logos*) determines the ways the forces of nature (*phusis*) are apprehended and the aesthetic, political, ethical and legal concepts understood and defined. As Greek tragedy was born from the spirit of Dionysian aesthetics, nature is apprehended through its representation as a sublime idea. Likewise, the human being and human concepts of understanding are the products of the ways to apprehend and conceptualize cosmic forces. *Logos* as transition is the determinant and creator of both *phusis* and *ethos*, of both nature and human nature.

NOTES

1. Kirk, G.S., *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957, p.187.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Heidegger also draws on the association of *logos* with Zeus as cosmic destiny in Fragment 64. See Heidegger Martin, *Early Greek Thinking*, trans by Krell, Harper & Row Publishers, London, 1975, p.72.

5. Kirk, G.S., *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957, p.186.

6. For instance, Kirk writes, "The effect of arrangement according to a common plan or measure is that all things, although apparently plural and totally discrete, are really united in a coherent complex of which men themselves are a part, and the comprehension of which is therefore logically necessary for the adequate enactment of their own lives." (Ibid., p.187.)

7. Kirk, G. S., *The Cosmic Fragments*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1954, p.403.

8. Minar, Edwin L. Jr., "Logos of Heraclitus" in *Classical Philology*, Vol.34, Oct., 1939, p.331.

9. Waterfield confirms this definition of *logos* as the common and communicative *principle* arguing, "(Logos) comes from the world at large, and is presumably what entitles Heraclitus to describe the world as 'wise' in Frag.4. The whole world is intelligent and alive, and speaks to the wise man subtly, communicating its inner nature and enabling him to model himself on it. The best I can do to encompass most of the range of Heraclitus' meanings is 'principle.'" (Waterfield, Robin, *The First Philosophers: The Pre-Socratics and Sophists*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p.32.)

10. Kirk confirms this last point: "Human laws are nourished by the divine universal law; they accord with the Logos, the formulaic constituent of the cosmos." (Kirk, G.S., *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957, p.212.)

11. Naddaf too construes *logos* as cosmic principle that regulates *phusis:* "The single most important thing to realize is that there is an impersonal, supreme cosmic principle (*logos*) or law (*nomos*) that regulates *all* physical laws . . . and which should be the basis or blueprint for *all* human laws, political, and moral." (Naddaf, Gerard. *The Greek Concept of Nature*, State University of New York Press, Albany: 2005, p.133.) On this important relation between *logos* and *nomos*, Minar states: "It (Logos) is analogous to Nomos; and as Nomos is custom and usage, the way men behave, finally crystallized into a rule for behaviour, so the Logos indicates the way in which the world-process moves, the usage of phenomena. . . . As we observe the history of the world unfolding, it appears to us as cosmos." (Minar, Edwin L. Jr., "Logos of Heraclitus" in *Classical Philology*, Vol.34, (Oct., 1939, p.341.) Then Minar continues, "The Logos then is the Nomos, the *ratio*, the explanation or meaning, and hence in a qualified sense the law or regularity inherent in the process." (Ibid.) Also see Sandywell, Barry. *Pre-Socratic Reflexivity*: *The Construction of Philosophical Discourse (c. 600 – 450 BC)*, London: Routledge, 1996, p.242.

12. Minar, Edwin L. Jr., "Logos of Heraclitus" in *Classical Philology*, Vol.34, (Oct., 1939), p.340.

13. Patrick states that "The central thought was the analogy existing between man and the universe, between the microcosm and the macrocosm, from which it results that the true ethical principle lies in imitation of Nature, and that law is founded on early customs which sprang from Nature." (Patrick, G.T.W., "A Further Study of Heraclitus" in *The American Journal of Psychology*, Vol.1, No.4, Aug., 1888, p.575.)

14. Ibid., pp.575-6.

15. Förster, Eckart. *Kant's Final Synthesis*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000, p.73.

16. Heidegger endorses this meaning of *logos* as *bringing together* in his *Early Greek Thinking*: "Since the antiquity the Logos of Heraclitus has been interpreted in various ways: as *Ratio*, as *Verbum*, as cosmic law, as the logical, as necessity in thought, as meaning and as reason. Again and again a call rings out for reason to be the standard for deeds and omissions. Yet what can reason do when, along with the irrational and the antirational all on the same level, it perseveres in the same neglect, forgetting to mediate on the essential origin of reason and to let itself into its advent? What can logic of any sort do if we never begin to pay heed to the Logos and follow its primordial essence? What *logos* is we gather from *legein*. . . . In *legen a* "bringing together" prevails, the Latin *legere* understood as *lessen*, in the sense of collecting and bringing together. *Legein* properly means the laying-down and laying-before which gathers itself and others." (Heidegger, Martin. *Early Greek Thinking*, trans by Krell, Harper & Row Publishers, London, 1975, p.60.)

17. Ibid., p.61.

18. Heidegger, Martin. "On the Essence and Concept of *Phusis* in Aristotle's *Physics* B, I" trans. Sheehan in *Pathmarks*, ed. McNeill, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.213.

19. Heidegger furthers this argument as follows: "In the Greek definition of the essence of the human being, *legein* and *logos* mean the relation on the basis of which what is present gathers itself for the first time as such around and for human beings. And only because human beings *are* insofar as they relate to beings as beings, unconcealing and concealing them, can they and must they have the word" or *logos*. (Ibid.)

20. Heidegger, Martin. *Early Greek Thinking*, trans. Krell and Capuzzi, Harper & Row, New York, 1975, p.70.

21. Ibid., pp.74-5 Heidegger defines *phusis* as presencing and *logos* as joining bridge "between" *phusis* and mortal thinking in *The Anaximander Fragment*. (Ibid., p.41.)

22. Heidegger associates *logos* with movement as follows: "I would only like to say that lightning, which tears open the dark of night and, in its gleam, lights up and lets all individual things be seen, at the same time is also the mobile power of *genesis* in the manner of *dia (prefix dia* means *thoroughly)*; and that this movement passes into the movements of things. Like the lightning, the *logos* of Fragment 1 also relates to *ta panta*. The movement of *logos*, which brings-forth and establishes, steers and determines everything, corresponds to the lightning movement that brings-forth." (Heidegger, Martin and Fink, Eugen, *Heraclitus Seminar*, The University of Alabama Press, 1980, p.9.)

23. "Properly understood, fragment 50 proves precisely the opposite of what people read into it. It says: you should not cling to words but apprehend logos." (Heidegger, Martin. *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Yale: Yale University Press, 2000, pp.136-7.) The world is familiar to us in a basic, intuitive way. Most originally, Heidegger argues, we do not understand the world by gathering neutral facts by which we may reach a set of universal propositions, laws, or judgments that, to a greater or lesser extent, corresponds to the world as it is. The world is tacitly intelligible to us (Bjørn Ramberg and Kristin Gjesdal. "Hermeneutics" in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hermeneutics/, 2005 Retrieved on August 1st, 2010). In other words, as Heraclitus puts, a hidden connection is stronger than an apparent one.

24. Kirk, G.S., *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957, p.191.

25. Waterfield, Robin, *The First Philosophers: The Pre-Socratics and Sophists*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p.33. Minar's argument on the fragments 51 and 54 would support Heidegger and Waterfield, "The relation of the Logos to empirical things is clearly indicated by frag. 54. . . . Real knowledge is apprehension of the 'hidden harmony.'" (Minar, Edwin L. Jr., "Logos of Heraclitus" in *Classical Philology*, Vol.34, Oct., 1939, p.334.)

26. "The tradition that hereby gains dominance makes what it 'transmits' so little accessible that at first and for the most part it covers it over instead. What has been handed down it hands over to obviousness; it bars access to those original 'wellsprings' out of which the traditional categories and concepts were in part genuinely drawn. The tradition even makes us forget such a provenance altogether. Indeed it makes us wholly incapable of even understanding that such a return is necessary." (Heidegger, Martin. "Introduction to Being and Time" in *Basic Writings* ed. Krell, Routledge: London, 1978, p.65). Krell, linking this argument to the Nietzschean philosophy, writes: "Nietzsche calls the disappearance of ontological ground "the death of God" and calls for the liberation of *ta onta* from the burden imposed on them by the shade of the dead God—the traditional *logos* of Western metaphysics and morals. "The world of things" must once again be thought in terms of Aion, the child at play. But the experience of Aion, is "this transformation of the Dionysian into a philosophical pathos." (Krell, David Farrell "Introduction" in Heidegger, Martin. *Early Greek Thinking*, trans. Krell and Capuzzi, Harper & Row, New York, 1975, pp.9-10.)

27. This argument is elaborated in the following sections.

28. He articulates this as follows: "On the one hand, to apprehend (*Vernehmen*) means to take in (*hin-nehmen*), to let something come to oneself—namely, *what* shows itself, *what* appears. On the other hand, to apprehend means to interrogate a witness, to call him to account, and thus to comprehend the state of affairs, to determine and set fast *how* things are going and *how* things stand. Apprehension in this double sense denotes a

process of letting things come to oneself in which one does not simply take things in, but rather takes up a position to receive what shows itself." (Heidegger, Martin. *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Yale: Yale University Press, 2000, p.147.)

29. This argument is elaborated in the section regarding the relation between the faculty of judgment and the principle of transition.

30. Kahn, Charles H., *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, p.286 (original italics.)

31. In *Heraclitus Seminar*, Fink associates the primal worldview with *logos* defining the former as the intuitive pre-ideological understanding of *kosmos*: "In the great domain of the world, the domain that presents itself to us in the view of the world, fire and water do not annihilate each other. The view of the world [*Welt-Anschaaung*] is not understood here ideologically; rather, it means the immediate view of the great relationships of the heavenly stars, the sea that lies under them and the earth." (Heidegger, Martin and Fink, Eugen, *Heraclitus Seminar*, The University of Alabama Press, 1980, p.80.)

32. Förster, Eckart. *Kant's Final Synthesis*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000, p.150. This argument is comprehensively discussed in the chapter on the principle of motion.

33. Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.173.

34. Heidegger, Martin. *Supplements: From the Earliest Essays to Being and Time and Beyond*, ed. Van Buren, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002, p.88.

35. Heidegger, Martin. *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Yale: Yale University Press, 2000, p.200.

36. This important argument contrasting *Überlegenheit* with *Übergang* is discussed in the following section on the principle of transition and *Opus Postumum.*

37. Krell confirms this via Heidegger: "In The Anaximander Fragment Hei-degger says that the essence of tragedy can be thought only in relation to the coming-to-presence of beings, since presencing implies approach *and* withdrawal, emergence *and* evanescence, rise *and* fall. Mortals share in the tragic essence in a peculiar way. . . . One of the central issues of 'Logos' becomes the need for mortals to become fit for their allotment (Moira) and not to mistake their participation in the Logos as some sort of conquest of mortality. . . . To recapture the tragic essence of early Greek thinking is an undertaking in which Heidegger joins Nietzsche." (Krell, David Farrell "Introduction" in Heidegger, Martin. *Early Greek Thinking*, trans. Krell and Capuzzi, Harper & Row, New York, 1975, p.9.)

38. Heidegger recounts the birth of logic as follows: ". . . So this handle for attaining truth can easily be grasped as a tool, *organon*, and the tool can easily be made handy in the proper way. This is all the more necessary the more decisively the *originary* opening up of the Being of beings has been suspended, with the transformation of *phusis* into *eidos* and of *logos* into *katēgoria*." (Heidegger, Martin. *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Yale: Yale University Press, 2000, p.201.)

39. Heidegger, Martin. *Supplements: From the Earliest Essays to Being and Time and Beyond*, ed. Van Buren, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002, p.107 Heidegger explains this further in his comments on Heraclitus's notion of *aletheia*: "Why is that we are ever and again so quick to forget the subjectivity that belongs to every objectivity? How does it happen that even when we do note that they belong together, we still try to explain each from the standpoint of the other, or introduce some third element which is supposed to embrace both subject and object? Why is it that we stubbornly resist considering even once whether the belonging-together of subject and object does not arise from something that first imparts their nature to both the object and its objectivity,

and the subject and its subjectivity, and hence is prior to the realm if their reciprocity?" (Heidegger, Martin. *Early Greek Thinking*, trans. Krell and Capuzzi, Harper & Row, New York, 1975, p.103.)

40. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Gay Science*, ed. Williams, Bernard, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp.213-4. Heidegger affirms this argument several times even in his latest writings like *Letter on Humanism*: "'subject' and 'object' are inappropriate terms of metaphysics, which very early on in the form of Occidental 'logic' and 'grammar' seized control of the interpretation of language. We today can only begin to descry what is concealed in that occurrence. The liberation of language from grammar into a more original essential framework is reserved for thought and poetic creation . . . we must free ourselves from the technical interpretation of thinking. The beginnings of that interpretation reach back to Plato and Aristotle." (Heidegger, Martin. "Letter on Humanism" in *Basic Writings* ed. Krell, Routledge: London, 1978, p.218.)

41. Ibid., p.219. He identifies the detachment of language from the truth of Being or *aletheia* as a consequence of the modern metaphysics of subjectivity. (Ibid., pp.222-3.)

42. Heidegger employs the phrase *not-yet-metaphysical* primarily in his *Heraclitus Seminar* associating his *post-metaphysical* approach regarding the conception of Being with the Heraclitean *pre-metaphysical* thought. (Heidegger, Martin and Fink, Eugen, *Heidegger – Fink, Heraclitus Seminar 1966/67* trans. Charles H. Seibert, The University of Alabama Press, 1979, p.75.)

43. Heidegger also claims that this isolation of logic from the thinking itself led to the collapse of the relation between Being and man (or *phusis* and *ethos*) which is its primary function. (Heidegger, Martin. "Letter on Humanism" in *Basic Writings* ed. Krell, Routledge: London, 1978, p.217.)

44. Tuschling, Burkhard. *Apperception and Ether: On the Idea of a Transcendental Deduction of Matter in Kant's Opus Postumum* in *Kant's Transcendental Deductions* ed. Förster, Stanford University Press: Stanford, California: 1989, p.210.

45. Ibid.

46. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*, ed. Guyer and Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.466. Some translators such as Politis also translate world-concepts or *Weltbegriffe* as 'cosmical concepts,' and I use them interchangeably. This can also be justified by Kant's own definition of 'world' as the absolute totality of the sum total of existing things, namely ordered *ta panta* or simply *kosmos.*

47. This point on the relation of *kosmos* and *phusis* is discussed in the next chapter.

48. This crucial point is further discussed in the section on the human faculty of *Anschauung*.

49. Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.82.

50. Since all forms of movement cause regulation and direction, the principle of motion is also a directing and regulating principle.

51. This principle resembles the Greek *phusis* discussed in the second chapter.

52. Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.235. Here, even though Kant uses *Beschauung* (observation or inspection) rather than *Anschauung*, it is not hard to see that the twentieth century term *Weltanschauung* is a version of the Kantian *Weltbeschauung*, or cosmo-theory..

53. Both referring to its original form, *Weltbegriff* and to Kant's own Latin translation, *conceptus cosmicus*, rather than cosmopolitan concept, it is far more appropriate to call this cosmic/cosmical concept or world-concept as chosen by most of the other translators.

54. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*, ed. Guyer and Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp.694-5.

55. Among many ocurrences, Kant never articulates this argument more apparently than in his *First Introduction* to the third *Critique*: "If philosophy is the *system* of rational cognition through concepts, it is thereby already sufficiently distinguished from a critique of pure reason, which, although it contains a philosophical investigation of the possibility of such cognition, does not belong to such a system as a part, but rather outlines and examines the very idea of it in the first place." (Kant, Immanuel. "First Introduction" in *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, sec.27, p.3.)

56. Lehmann was one of the first scholars to assert that the origins of the idea or schema of a transition are present in the *Critique of Judgment* and *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* in his *Kants Nachlasswerk und die Kritik der Urteilskraft* (1939).

57. Here, Förster particularly underlines Hölderlin's definition of art as the bridge from nature to culture (*phusis* to *ethos*). Furthermore, supporting Hölderlin's aesthetic argument he states, "Reason lays the ground with its principles (*Grundsätze*), which are laws of thought and action that are related to what Hölderlin views as the universal conflict in man. This universal conflict is the conflict between the striving toward the absolute on the one hand, and the striving for limitation on the other. It is a conflict that characterizes the human situation in what he calls the *Urtheilung*, or 'original separation.' The primordial being of which Hyperion speaks passed into the *Urtheilung* when we became conscious. As an original unity of subject and object that precedes every relation of a subject to an object, this 'being' can never itself become an object of knowledge." (Förster, Eckart. *Kant's Final Synthesis*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000, p.153.)

58. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, sec.27, p.141.

59. Förster, Eckart, "Introduction" in Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.xlii.

60. "The transition from one science to the other must have certain *intermediary concepts*, which are given in the one and are applied to the other, and which thus belong to both territories alike. Otherwise this advance is not a lawlike transition but a leap in which one neither knows where one is going, nor, in looking back, understands whence one has come;" "These two territories (metaphysics of nature and physics) do not immediately come into contact; and, hence, one cannot cross from one to the other simply by putting one foot in front of the other. Rather, there exists a gulf between the two, over which philosophy must build a *bridge* in order to reach the opposite bank. For, in order for metaphysical foundations to be combined with physical [foundations] (which have heterogeneous principles) *mediating concepts* are required, which participate in both." "Between metaphysics and physics there still exists a broad gulf (*hiatus in systemato*) across which the transition cannot be a step but requires a bridge of intermediary concepts which form a distinctive construction. A system can never be constructed out of merely empirical concepts." (Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp.37, 39, 40.)

61. Förster, Eckart, "Introduction" in Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.xxxvii.

62. Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.195.

63. What Descartes "discovered" in his "Wax Experiment" and founded his entire philosophy on, I argue, was nothing more than this difference between sense-intuition and sense-perception which was one of the main concerns of the Pre-Socratic Greek philosophers. Heraclitus says, for example, "Eyes and ears are worthless witnesses for humans if their souls are barbarous." (Heraclitus B 107.) We need the help of a cultivated inner sense to make a reflective judgment on the sense-data. Descartes observes that wax when melted does not appear to our eyes as wax anymore, and from this, jumps to the conclusion that thanks to the ideas of reason, we are able to understand the continuing existence of wax in another form. Kant of course prefers the Heraclitean explanation having categorized reason and its ideas as a separate faculty and described human understanding in three main phases that are not completely distinct from each other: sensing, intuiting and conceptualizing.

64. Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.111.

65. However, one has to be careful not to equate apperception to the inner sense. While the former entails a synthetic unity that applies to all sensible intuition of objects in general, the latter contains the mere form of intuition which also requires "the transcendental action of the imagination (synthetic influence of the understanding on the inner sense) . . . or namely 'figurative synthesis.'" (Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*, ed. Guyer and Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.258 – B154.)

66. Kant puts this as follows: "Intuition and concept: the first is for represen-tation of the senses, the second for the understanding, which combines the manifold of intuition according to a principle. Appearance is the subjective and formal element of intuition, as the subject affects itself or affected by the object." (Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.191.) In his introduction to the third *Critique*, Guyer comments on how Kant distinguishes between intuitions and concepts as follows: "the insuperable difference between our intuitions and concepts: our concepts can never fully comprehend the reality we can only intuit." (Guyer, Paul, "Editor's Introduction" in Kant, Immanuel *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.xxxvii.)

67. Kant confirms this argument as follows: "Since in us humans the understanding is not itself a faculty of intuitions, and even if these were given in sensibility cannot take them up into itself, in order as it were to combine the manifold of its own intuition, thus its synthesis, considered in itself alone, is nothing other than the unity of the action of which it is conscious as such even without sensibility, but through which it is capable of itself determining sensibility internally with regard to the manifold that may be given to it in accordance with the form of its intuition." (Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*, ed. Guyer and Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.257 – B153.) Then, continues Kant, "Under the designation of a transcendental synthesis of the imagination, it therefore exercises that action on the passive subject, whose faculty it is, about (B154) which we rightly say that the inner sense is thereby affected." (Ibid., pp.257-8 – B153-4.)

68. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, sec.35, p.167.

69. What Kant wanted to avoid when endorsing the necessity of conceptualization for the realization of an intuition is something like Schelling's theory of productive intuition: "The necessity of productive intuition, here systematically deduced from the entire mechanism of the self, has got to be derived, as a general condition of knowing as such, directly from the concept thereof; for if all knowing borrows its reality from an

immediate cognition, it is this alone that is to be met with in intuition; whereas concepts, in fact, are merely shadows of reality, projected through a reproductive power, the understanding which itself presupposes a higher power, having no original outside itself, and which produces from within itself by a primordial force." (Schelling, F.W.J., *System of Transcendental Idealism*, trans. Peter Heath The University of Virginia Press, 1978, p.73.) Referring to the first *Critique*, for example, Tuschling argues, "The apprehension of the manifold of an empirical intuition can only be an intuition of a particular something (of apparent objects) because it is necessarily related to those concepts by which an object is thought . . . because all existence, as existence of possible or actual contents of experience and objects of a cognizant subject, is subject to the conditions of conceptual synthesis or unity of thought." (Tuschling, Burkhard. *Apperception and Ether: On the Idea of a Transcendental Deduction of Matter in Kant's Opus Postumum* in *Kant's Transcendental Deductions* ed. Förster, Stanford University Press: Stanford, California: 1989, p.197.)

70. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*, ed. Guyer and Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.270 – A136. For further discussion on this see Förster, Eckart. *Kant's Final Synthesis*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000, pp.56-61.

71. Tuschling, Burkhard. *Apperception and Ether: On the Idea of a Transcendental Deduction of Matter in Kant's Opus Postumum* in *Kant's Transcendental Deductions* ed. Förster, Stanford University Press: Stanford, California: 1989, p.200. On this point, Förster agrees that the task assigned to the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* to ascertain the objective validity and real applicability of the pure concepts of understanding can only be undertaken by the Transition. (Förster, Eckart. *Kant's Final Synthesis*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000, p.74.) Friedman confirms this arguing that "the *Metaphysical Foundations* can actually contain nothing more than mere phoronomy or kinematics" as it is an examination of *kinēsis*." (Friedman, Michael. *Kant and the Exact Sciences*, Harvard University Press, 1992, p.225.) On the other hand, the *Transition* project is the examination of a more general (physical-transcendental) concept of nature. However, later on, having to contradict his earlier argument, Friedman accepts the *Transition* project as a continuation of the 'top down' approach already initiated in the *Metaphysical Foundations* which revolves around one unifying and all-encompassing principle of motion rather than a 'bottom up' procedure that considers the principle of motion or the metaphysical foundations as derivative of particular or exact sciences. (Ibid., p.260.) However, Friedman finally concludes that "the task of the *Transition* project is to extend the 'top down,' constitutive, procedure of the *Metaphysical Foundations* even further into the domain of the properly empirical in order ultimately to meet or connect with the 'bottom up,' merely regulative, procedure of reflective judgement." (Ibid., p.314.) This last point renders Friedman's description of the transition very similar to our construal of it as an intermediary force-principle generated by the regulative power of judgment and the constitutive principle of motion.

72. This crucial point is further discussed in the second chapter on the principle of motion along with the role *Anschauung* plays in the reciprocation between the principles of motion and transition and hence, indirectly between cosmology and aesthetics.

73. "Kant must also explain perception and how it is possible, not only with respect to its *form* seen as subject to a cosmological system of forces or primordial matter." (Tuschling, Burkhard. *Apperception and Ether: On the Idea of a Transcendental Deduction of Matter in Kant's Opus Postumum* in *Kant's Transcendental Deductions* ed. Förster, Stanford University Press: Stanford, California: 1989, p.200.)

74. Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.181.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid., p.117.

77. Nietzsche, in his early notebooks, extensively discussses the dependence of the intuitions of time and space on *Anschauung* or the sense-intuition of appearances considered as the most real representations of the underlying motion or becoming. Crawford successfully retrieves this argument from what she dubs Nietzsche's *Anschauung Notes*, as follows: "The will is simultaneously self-*Anschauung* and *Anschauung* of the world and since the will (as being) knows to time, it is "Timeless." Yet the will (as activity) is "in each *tiniest* point of time still *Anschauung* of world;" (Nietzsche) "space and time are not real . . . so there can be 'no becoming.' However, there is becoming, therefore it must be an appearance." Then she adds, "There is no *emptiness*, the *whole world is appearance*, through and through atom for atom without gaps." (Crawford, Claudia. *The Beginnings of Nietzsche's Theory of Language*, Walter de Gruyter, New York, 1988, p.165.)

78. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*, ed. Guyer and Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.228 (A97).

79. Ibid., p.228 (A98-99.)

80. Nietzsche, Friedrich, *Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the Early 1970's*, ed. Daniel Breazeale, Humanities Press, New Jersey, 1979, p.41 Breazeale's footnote on *Übertragen* explicitly endorses our attempt to demonstrate the crucial link between *Anschauung* and *Übergang* in Kantian philosophy: "This verb, with its noun form *Übertragung*, is an essential key to understanding the theory of knowledge and of language which Nietzsche develops in the notes. . . . The root meaning . . . *metaphor* is to 'carry across' or 'to carry over.' Depending upon the context, it has the sense of the English words 'transfer,' transmit,' 'translate,' etc.; i.e. it designates the process of moving something from one sphere into another, though often in a highly figurative sense." (Ibid.)

81. Crawford, Claudia. *The Beginnings of Nietzsche's Theory of Language*, Walter de Gruyter, New York, 1988, p.x. And she continues, "From the beginnings of his thinking about language, Nietzsche believed that its formal aspects, its unconscious forms and physiological processes (in his later formulations, the will to power) condition any conscious use of conceptuality and abstraction." (Ibid., p.xiv.) Furthermore, referring to Nietzsche's early writings, Crawford states "*Anschauung* can be translated as intuitive-perception or perception operating in the sense of intuitive or unconscious inference from the senses . . ." (Ibid., p.159.)

82. Ibid., pp.158-160.

83. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*, ed. Guyer and Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.230 (A101.)

84. "Only through the representation of the object as appearance, not as thing in itself, are synthetic propositions *a priori* possible according to the formulae of transcendental philosophy, and it is likewise necessary for the knowledge of the science of nature as a doctrine of experience;" "The presentation is the schema of a concept which, as mere appearance, makes *a priori* possible the form of the composite in the object and the ground of experience for knowledge of it. For only appearance permits *a priori* knowledge." (Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp.175, 112.)

85. Ibid., p.210.

86. Crawford, Claudia. *The Beginnings of Nietzsche's Theory of Language*, Walter de Gruyter, New York, 1988, p.xii.

87. Ibid., p.176.

88. On this point Crawford argues, "With this kind of thinking, Nietzsche, again, departs radically from Schopenhauer, and devalues the importance of the subjective individual . . . Nietzsche rejects, at this early point in his thinking, the identity of the subject, of conscious individuality**.** Rather, the human being consists in a multiplicity of representations, different in each moment, and a part of a huge self-engendering and self-maintaining organism which is the world." (Ibid., p.171.)

89. Förster, Eckart. *Kant's Final Synthesis*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000, p.78.

90. Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.175.

91. Here "syllogism" differs from its modern use in logical–deductive reasoning with two premises and a conclusion derived from them. Rather it refers to *logos* as "bringing together" in terms of the regulation of the particular perceptions of natural phenomena, the main function of the faculty of judgment.

92. Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.194.

93. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.64.

94. Kant puts this as follows: "if the understanding yields *a priori* laws of nature, reason, on the contrary, laws of freedom, then by analogy one would still expect that the power of judgment, which mediates the connection between two faculties, would, just like those, add its own special principles *a priori* and perhaps ground a special part of philosophy, even though philosophy as a system can only have two parts. Yet the power of judgment is such a special faculty of cognition, not at all self-sufficient, that it provides neither concepts, like the understanding, nor ideas like reason, of any object at all, since it is a faculty merely for subsuming under concepts given from elsewhere." (Kant, Immanuel. "First Introduction" in *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.8.)

95. Heidegger also endorses a similar meta-physical functioning of the faculty of judgment and *logos* in the discovery of the categories: "one can discover the categories by using the assertion, the *logos*, as a clue. This is why Kant has to *derive* the table of categories from the table of *judgments*. Thus, knowledge of categories as determinations of the being of beings—what people call metaphysics—is, in an essential sense, knowledge of *logos*—i.e., *logic*." (Heidegger, Martin. "On the Essence and Concept of *Phusis* in Aristotle's *Physics* B, I" trans. Sheehan in *Pathmarks*, ed. McNeill, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.194.)

96. Guyer too criticizes Kant's arbitrary inclusion of Dialectic in his treatment of aesthetic judgment which is taken from the first *Critique* but does not apply to the third *Critique* where the judgment of taste is concerned. (Guyer, Paul, "Editor's Introduction" in Kant, Immanuel *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.xxxv.)

97. In his *Kant and the Exact Sciences*, Friedman articulates a similar approach to the unifying role of the reflective judgment: "The doctrine of the regulative use of the ideas of reason becomes the doctrine of reflective judgment in the third *Critique*. Kant there argues that the foundation for the laws of natural science in the concepts and principles of the understanding articulated in the first *Critique*—and in the *Metaphysical Foundations*—is necessarily incomplete, because it does not yet show us how to achieve

a system of the totality of empirical laws of nature." (Friedman, Michael. *Kant and the Exact Sciences*, Harvard University Press, 1992, p.48). Later on, defining this incompleteness as the most important 'gap' in Kant's transcendentalism, Friedman states, "the filling of the 'gap' calls for a further elaboration of this 'top down' procedure, whereby constitutive a priori principles are extended even further into the domain of the empirical in order ultimately to meet or connect with the 'bottom up,' merely regulative, procedure of reflective judgment. . . . Hence, to carry out the *Transition* project—and thus to fill the 'gap' in the critical system—what we now require is a kind of *intersection* between the constitutive domain (of reflective judgment), for only so can there be a continuous connection between the two, formerly independent domains." (Ibid., 261-2.)

98. Kant, Immanuel. "First Introduction" in *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.8.

99. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, sec.77, p.276.

100. Kant, Immanuel. "First Introduction" in *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.9fn.

101. Ibid., p.10.

102. Ibid.

103. In the third *Critique,* Kant tries to formulate a principle through which he can connect aesthetics and teleology, judgments on taste and judgments about the purposiveness of natural objects. (Guyer, Paul, "Editor's Introduction" in Kant, Immanuel *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.xxi.)

104. What we take in as nature is going to be defined as *phusis* and thoroughly explored in the chapter on the principle of motion.

105. Kant, Immanuel. "First Introduction" in *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.15. Friedman also acknowledges that it is 'tempting' to construe Kant's principle of reflective judgment as the key to the *Transition* project and adds, "With the new principle of *reflective* judgment . . . we are able to go beyond mere application of the transcendental principles—beyond mere subsumption of the empirical under laws already present in the understanding." (Friedman, Michael. *Kant and the Exact Sciences*, Harvard University Press, 1992, p.245.) This is crucial because "whereas Kant had earlier suggested that a unified system of moving forces is possible a priori in virtue of the mathematical unity of motion as alteration in space, he now sees that a fundamentally different type of unity is required." (Ibid., p.248.) Moreover, he adds, "the desired system of moving forces cannot proceed purely a priori . . . , because the task of the *Transition* project is precisely to unite the a priori with the properly empirical" and this task is accomplished through the faculty of judgment. (Ibid., p.249.) This also shows the link between natural investigation (*historia peri phuseos*) and faculty of judgment.

106. Guyer, Paul, "Editor's Introduction" in Kant, Immanuel *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.xxiv.

107. Ibid., p.xxv.

108. Kant, Immanuel. "First Introduction" in *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.17.

109. However, Friedman states that it is impossible to expect the principle of reflective judgment to generate laws a priori to nature, rather this principle "acquires content solely through its application to aesthetic judgment, on the one hand, and physico-teleology—and thus, in the end, physico-theology—on the other." (Friedman, Michael. *Kant and the Exact Sciences*, Harvard University Press, 1992, p.252.) And this

is because, he explains, "reflective judgment yields no constitutive principles specifying the structure of the unified system of empirical laws it postulates, but only regulative principles for investigating empirical nature so as to discover such a unified system." (Ibid., p.251.) But here, Friedman defines the problem raised in *Opus* as solely scientific thereby neglecting its philosophical (transcendental) and aesthetic significance. This is because, he only takes into account the fascicles of the *Transition* project, namely those considering natural sciences and forces separately. However, later on Kant unifies these under *physics* and understands physics as dependent on one matter-force principle, namely caloric, or aether, or fire. So, referring to the later fascicles (where the *Transition* project expands into the entire realm of transcendental philosophy), we rather argue that the transition is equally based on the appearance of phenomena and that the aesthetic judgment can actually function as the bridge between metaphysics and physics.

110. Kant, Immanuel. "First Introduction" in *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.7.

111. Ibid., p.43.

112. Ibid., p.47.

113. Ibid., p.48.

114. Kant describes this as follows, "In the power of judgment understanding and imagination are considered in relation to each other, . . . and is therefore a relation which is *sensitive* (which is not the case in the separate use of any other faculty of cognition). Now although this sensation is not a sensible representation of an object, still, because it is subjectively connected with the process of making the concepts of the understanding sensible by means of the power of judgment, it can, as a sensible representation of the state of the subject who is affected by an act of that faculty, be reckoned to sensibility, and a judgment can be called aesthetic." (Ibid., pp.25-6.)

115. Ibid., p.23.

116. Ibid., p.26. We can also trace the relation between the reflecting judgment and the principle of transition in Kant's *Introduction* to the third *Critique*: "The reflecting power of judgment, which is under the obligation of ascending from the particular in nature to the universal, therefore requires a principle that it cannot borrow from experience . . . this principle can be nothing other than this: that since universal laws of nature have their ground in our understanding, which prescribes them to nature (although only in accordance with the universal concept of it as nature) . . . must be considered in terms of the sort of unity they would have if an understanding had likewise given them . . . rather this faculty (of reflecting judgment) thereby gives a law only to itself, and not to nature." (Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.67.)

117. Kant, Immanuel. "First Introduction" in *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.22.

118. Kant explains: "subjective purposiveness is a real (intentional) *end* of nature (or of art) aimed at correspondence with our power of judgment, or, in the second case, that it is, without any end, merely an intrinsically yet contingently manifested purposive correspondence with the need of the power of judgment in regard to nature and the forms generated in it in accordance with particular laws." (Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp.221-2.)

119. Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.118.

120. Moreover, Förster argues, "The analysis of judgments of taste for the first time showed the power of judgment to be a separate cognitive faculty with its own a priori principle: Nature for the sake of judgment, specifies its universal laws to empirical ones,

according to the form of a logical system." (Förster, Eckart, "Introduction" in Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.xxxv.)

121. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.339.

122. Ibid., pp.62-63.

123. Ibid., p.63.

124. Kant, Immanuel. "Introduction" in *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp.81-82.

125. Kant, Immanuel. "First Introduction" in *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.46.

126. Guyer, Paul. *Kant*, New York: Routledge, 2006, p.308.

127. Ibid.

128. Allison, Henry E., *Kant's Theory of Taste*, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p.200.

129. Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.110.

130. Kant, Immanuel. *Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson, London: Harper & Row, 1960, p.109. This is also necessary in order to secure the unity of theoretical and practical reason. Therefore, argues Friedman, a mere physico-theology would remain defective since "not only does it supply a mere idea of reason for which no actual object can be given, but the idea it supplies is too indeterminate for expressing the entire divine nature. For this idea yields no determinate conception of the final purpose of the world, which conception can only be provided by pure practical reason. Kant's mature conception of physico-*ethico*-theology therefore secures the unity of theoretical and practical reason." (Friedman, Michael. *Kant and the Exact Sciences*, Harvard University Press, 1992, p.50.) This is one of the purposes of the *Opus Postumum,* namely the reconciliation between *phusis* and *ethos*.

131. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, sec.48, p.190.

132. Kant, Immanuel. "First Introduction" in *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.12.

133. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.66.

134. Ibid.

135. Ibid., p.24.

136. Ibid., p.27.

137. Like the distinctness of the intuition and concepts, "logical distinctness is also totally different from aesthetic distinctness, and the latter can obtain even though we do not represent the object to ourselves by means of concepts at all, that is, even though the representation, as intuition, is sensible." (Ibid., p.29fn.)

138. Ibid., p.82.

139. Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.220.

140. Ibid., p.41 This point also justifies the argument that Kant is the real founder of philosophical phenomenology.

141. Ibid., pp.122-4.

142. Ibid., pp.194-5.

143. Ibid., p.88.

144. Ibid., pp.115-6.

145. Ibid., p.116.

146. Förster, Eckart. *Kant's Final Synthesis*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2000, p.161-2.

147. Ibid., p.162.

148. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*, ed. Guyer and Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.327 (B275).

149. Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.249.

150. Ibid., pp.201-2.

151. Förster, Eckart. *Kant's Final Synthesis*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000, pp.138-9.

152. Ibid., p.249.

153. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, trans. Cowan, Gateway Publishing: Chicago, 1962, p.43.

154. This sense is similar to what Heraclitus declares in the following fragment: "We acquire understanding by drawing in the logos through breathing, as we are forgetful when asleep, we regain our senses when we wake up again. For in sleep, when the channels of perception are shut, our mind is shaken loose from its surroundings. . . . But in the waking state it again looks out through the channels of perception as through a kind of window, and meeting with the surroundings it puts on the power of Reason." (Geldard, Richard. *Remembering Heraclitus*, Edinburgh: Lindisfarne & Floris Books, 2000, pp.103-4.)

155. Ibid., p.255 Heidegger endorses this argument in his *Early Greek Thinking*. (Heidegger, Martin. *Early Greek Thinking*, trans. Krell and Capuzzi, Harper & Row, New York, 1975**,** pp.65-68.)

156. Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.256.

157. Ibid., p.180.

158. Ibid., p.191.

159. Ibid., p.192.

160. Ibid.

161. Kant describes this as follows: "The investigation of nature can thus be regarded as a *philosophy* which is meant to have two subjects—metaphysics and physics—from which there yet stands open a perspective onto another subject, namely that of transcendental philosophy, which deals particularly with the principle of synthetic *a priori* propositions." (Ibid., p.194.)

162. Kant designs his cosmotheology as follows: "Transcendental philosophy is the principle of synthetic a priori knowledge from concepts. (1) Transition from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics. (2) Transition from physics to transcendental philosophy. (3) Transition from transcendental philosophy to the system of nature and freedom. (4) Conclusion. Of the universal connection of the living forces of all things in reciprocal relation: God and the world" (Ibid., p.224).

163. Ibid., p.227.

164. Swift argues in his recently published book, "Both the sublime and Dionysian represent underlying forces of nature that make the transcendental subject feel insignificant." (Swift, Paul A. *Becoming Nietzsche: Early Reflections of Democritus, Schopenhauer and Kant*, Lexington Books, 2005, p.111.) Nonetheless, I totally reject that the "subject" feels insignificant as a result of the experience of the sublime or Dionysian. Rather, according to the Kantian analysis, the sublime triggers human imagination and exalts the ideas of human reason over the objects of nature. Similarly, the Nietzschean

Dionysian causes intoxication and teaches how to transform into a stronger nature and higher consciousness through *pathos*.

165. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, sec.26, p.139. Also see Zammito's chapter on the sublime and symbolism.

166. Kant, Immanuel. "First Introduction" in *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.50.

167. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, sec.28, pp.144-5.

168. Ibid., sec.23, p.128. On this point, Guyer adds, "Formalism plays a role in Kant's introduction of this part of the work, in which he argues that judgments on the sublime, unlike judgments on the beautiful, do not need any deduction beyond their initial exposition because they are induced by the formlessness rather than the form of their objects." (Guyer, Paul, "Editor's Introduction" in Kant, Immanuel *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.xxxii.)

169. Guyer stresses the lack of use of the concept of reflecting judgment in the 'Analytic of the Beautiful.' Guyer, Paul, "Editor's Introduction" in Kant, Immanuel *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.xli.

170. Guyer argues that the abstract idea of reflecting judgment plays no role in the details of Kant's accounts of the beautiful and the sublime. That is not exactly true. The judgment on the sublime, mediates between the sensible and the supersensible and accomplishes the transition regulating it through the aesthetic reflecting judgment.

171. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, sec.29, p.151.

172. Ibid.

173. Ibid.

174. Ibid., p.150.

175. Ibid., sec.23, p.130.

176. Zammito, John. H., *The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992, p.283.

177. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.10.

178. Ibid., p.129.

179. Ibid., p.152.

180. Ibid., pp.152-3.

181. Ibid., sec.23, p.129.

182. Ibid., sec.29, p.150.

183. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp.136-7.

184. Ibid., sec.25, p.132.

185. Guyer, Paul, "Editor's Introduction" in Kant, Immanuel *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.xxxi.

186. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, sec.25, p.133.

187. Ibid., p.138.

188. The experience of giving birth defined as a sublime moment disproves Kant's argument that the 'subject' must necessarily be detached from the experience of nature for the experience to be called 'sublime'

189. Ibid., sec.28, p.143.

190. Guyer, Paul. *Kant*, New York: Routledge, 2006, p.308.

191. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, sec.28, p.145.

192. "Kant presents us with spectacle of a formless and boundless and chaotic nature of might and magnitude, on the one hand, and man with a consciousness of his 'supersensible destination,' on the other hand, finding delight in the feeling of the sublime precisely because of the contrast involved." This argument of Kant has been very popular among his followers including Hegel and Schopenhauer. For a more detailed discussion see Knox, Israel. *The Aesthetic Theories of Kant, Hegel and Schopenhauer*, Columbia University Press, 1936, p.64.

193. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, sec.28, p.145.

194. He actually borrows these examples from his *Observations*, see p.56.

195. Crowther, Paul. *The Kantian Sublime: From Morality to Art*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, pp.115-116. Then, Crowther concludes that Kant "wishes to show that the aesthetic experience's metaphysical raison d'être is, in the final analysis, to promote our existence as moral beings" and it "does not exist in a vacuum" (or it is not purposeless) "and the sublime in particular has the capacity to humanize." (Ibid., p.174.) While Kant tries to promote the justification of human existence by referring to the moral consequences of the feeling of the sublime, Nietzsche does so by emphasizing the immoral essence of the Dionysian representation of the transformation in human nature.

196. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, sec.28, p.146.

197. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, sec.29, pp.154-5.

198. "After frailty had exacted its due from human nature, the immortal soul will with a rapid swing raise herself above all that is finite and place her existence with respect to the entire nature in a new relationship which derives from a closer connection with the Highest Being." (Kant, Immanuel. *Universal Natural History and the Theory of Heavens*, trans. Stanley L. Jaki, Edinburgh, Scottish Academic Press, 1981, p.196.)

199. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.156. Kant's main argument here can be seen as a critique of Nietzsche's philosophical interpretation of the amoral and irrational Dionysian dithyrambs. However, Nietzsche maintains, rooted in these dithyrambs were the sublime art of Greek tragedy and the creative imagination of the tragic artist. The Dionysian tragic artist is the one who "has command over the chaos of the Will before it has assumed the individual shape." (Nietzsche, Friedrich. "Dionysian Worldview" in *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings* ed. Geuss and Speirs Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, sec.1, p.122.)

200. Guyer, Paul. *Kant and the Experience of Freedom*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.191.

201. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, sec.26, p.139.

202. Ibid.

203. Ibid., sec.27, p.141.

204. This argument can be compared with the *Heraclitean* 'Know thyself' which actually entails the knowledge of *Logos*.

205. The expression "sufficient understanding of ethos" is my Heraclitean attempt to replace the Kantian-Schopenhauerian "Principle of Sufficient Reason."

206. This is one of the links between the sublime and human faculty of sense-intuition that confirms the argument that the sublime generates an aesthetic transition

which links the physical effects of the moving forces on human perception to the ideas of reason and thereby strengthens the sensible grounding of our intuitions.

207. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, sec.24, p.131.

208. Ibid., sec.25, p.134.

209. Kant, Immanuel. *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime*, trans. J. H. Goldthwait University of California Press, 1960, p.58.

210. Ibid., p.60.

211. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, sec.37, p.169.

212. This entirely contradicts his early account in *Observation* according to which a feeling is sublime insofar as it is universal and deducible from human nature in general.

213. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, sec. 29, p.155-6.

214. Nietzsche, Friedrich. "The Birth of Tragedy" in *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*, ed. Geuss and Speirs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, sec.24, p.113.

215. But what distinguishes the Ancient Greek polytheistic tradition is its unique creation, the Greek tragedy. The artistic and philosophical perspective of the tragic principle of the Dionysian makes the depiction of the ancient gods much more profound.

216. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Pre-Platonic Philosophers*, trans., ed. Whitlock, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006, p.70. Here, Nietzsche also mentions the relation between becoming and justice in his *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks* restating Anaximander's interpretation of justice as the primary *telos* of becoming.

217. Nietzsche, Friedrich. "The Birth of Tragedy" in *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*, ed. Geuss and Speirs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.: "An Attempt at Self-Criticism," sec. 17, p.82.

218. Ibid., sec. 8, p.40.

219. In his Introduction to Heidegger's *Early Greek Thinking*, Krell suggests: "Nietzsche calls the disappearance of ontological ground 'the death of God' and calls for the liberation of *ta onta* from the burden imposed on them by the shade of the dead God—the traditional *logos* of Western metaphysics and morals. "The world of things" must once again be thought in terms of Aion, the child at play. But the experience of Aion, is "this transformation of the Dionysian into a philosophical pathos." (Krell, David Farrell "Introduction" in Heidegger, Martin. *Early Greek Thinking*, trans. Krell and Capuzzi, Harper & Row, New York, 1975, pp.9-10.)

220. Although Schopenhauerian aesthetics is one of the most important links between the Kantian and Nietzschean aesthetics given the epistemological and terminological similarities, it is certainly not the only one as shown in the upcoming sections.

221. Schopenhauer, Arthur. *The World as Will and Representation Volume I*, trans. E. F. J. Payne, Dover Publication, 1969, p.532.

222. Ibid., p.199.

223. Ibid., p.201.

224. Nietzsche criticizes Euripides for his conversion of the sublime myth-creating Dionysian into a mere counterfeit of a natural event such as a battle or a storm at sea.

225. Nietzsche, Friedrich. "The Birth of Tragedy" in *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*, ed. Geuss and Speirs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, sec.13, p.69.

226. Schopenhauer, Arthur. *The World as Will and Representation Volume I*, trans. E. F. J. Payne, Dover Publication, 1969, pp.392-393.

227. Kant primarily in his *Observations* mentions the sublime character of tragedy distinguishing it from comedy which he judges rather to be beautiful. (Kant, Immanuel. *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime*, trans. J. H. Goldthwait University of California Press, 1960, p.52.)

228. Schopenhauer, Arthur. *The World as Will and Representation Volume II*, trans. E. F. J. Payne, Dover Publication, 1969, p.433.

229. Moreover, Sallis asks, "Does Nietzsche's thinking of the Dionysian turn outside, turn against, exceed, the space between intelligible and sensible? Or does it not remain situated precisely within the compass of that distinction in the guise that it assumes beginning with Kant, as the distinction between thing-in-itself and appearances? Or even in its Schopenhauerian guise, as the distinction between the will (as the thing-in-itself) and appearances produced through the operation of representation? Is the fundamental distinction of *The World as Will and Representation*, the distinction that reinscribes the metaphysical order of fundament, that is, of ground—is this distinction not reinscribed in *The Birth of Tragedy*?" (Sallis, John. *Crossings: Nietzsche and the Space of Tragedy*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1991, p.60.)

230. Ibid. On the other hand, Sallis maintains that young Nietzsche's admiration of Schopenhauer was only regarding his philosopher-character, not the content of his philosophy which stems from the Platonic separation of reality and appearances. This view can be justified referring to Nietzsche's radical and critical approach against "the simple oppositional thinking" whose attributes ascribed to the will are simply the binary opposites of the attributes of appearances." (Ibid., pp.64-5.)

231. "Nietzsche's text cannot but have twisted free from the Schopenhauerian metaphysical axis. It is only a question whether there is a structural necessity that links the reinscription to that twisting. . . . A certain twisting commences as soon as the question of Dionysian art comes into play." (Ibid., p.68.) Furthermore, Sallis argues that Nietzsche's construal of the Dionysian art or music dislocates the metaphysical language he inherited from Schopenhauer collapsing the fundamental distinction between will (or thing-in-itself) and appearance. (Ibid., p.71-2.) This is because the Dionysian art leads to the negation of all logical Platonic dichotomies such as subjective-objective, will-representation sustaining the possibility to revive the Pre-Socratic cosmology.

232. Nietzsche also criticizes the Socratic tradition for reducing art to mere phenomenal representation under the hegemony of human rationality. (Nietzsche, Friedrich. "The Birth of Tragedy" in *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*, ed. Geuss and Speirs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, sec.17, p.84.)

233. Ibid., sec.19, p.94-95.

234. Silk, M. S. & Stern, J. P., *Nietzsche on Tragedy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, p.79.

235. Nietzsche, Friedrich. "The Birth of Tragedy" in *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*, ed. Geuss and Speirs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, sec.2, p.20.

236. Ibid., sec.7, p.39.

237. *On the Essence and Concept of Phusis* Heidegger explicitly argues that this separation is completely foreign to the Greek thought.

238. Nietzsche, Friedrich. "Attempt at Self-Criticism" in *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*, ed. Geuss and Speirs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, sec.6, p.10. He also adds, "How differently Dionysus spoke to me! How alien to me at that time was precisely this whole philosophy of resignation!" (Ibid.)

239. In the section 7 of his "Attempt at Self-Criticism" Nietzsche states the necessity of the complete abandonment of the metaphysical character of the Dionysian having named it as "Dionysian monster" and identified it with Zarathustra. (Ibid., sec.7, p.12.)

240. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, ed. Rüdiger Bittner, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.149.

241. It is crucial to note that the deification of Dionysus dates back to the pagan cultures and Nietzsche describes it as the purest and highest form of affirmation of life "*redeeming* the contradictions and doubtfulness of existence!" (Ibid., p.249.)

242. Nietzsche, Friedrich. "Dionysian Worldview" in *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings* ed. Geuss and Speirs Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, sec.2, p.124.

243. Ibid., sec.3, p.130.

244. Ibid., "The Birth of Tragedy" sec.3, p.23.

245. "What allows Homer to depict things so much more vividly than all other poets? It is the fact that he looks at things so much more than they do. We talk so abstractly about poetry because we are usually all bad poets. Fundamentally the aesthetic phenomenon is simple." (ibid., sec.8, p.43.)

246. Del Caro, Adrian. "Nietzschean Self-transformation and the Transformation of the Dionysian" in *Nietzsche, Philosophy and the Arts*, Kemal, Gaskell, Conway, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.70.

247. Nietzsche, Friedrich. "The Birth of Tragedy" in *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*, ed. Geuss and Speirs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, sec.10, p.52.

248. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, ed. Rüdiger Bittner, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp.249-50. Nietzsche depicts Dionysus as an "amoral artist-god who frees (*löst*) himself from the dire pressure of fullness and *overfullness*, from *suffering* the oppositions packed within him, and who wishes to become conscious of his autarchic power and constant delight and desire, whether he is building or destroying." (Nietzsche, Friedrich. "An Attempt at Self-Criticism" in *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*, ed. Geuss and Speirs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, sec.5, p.8.)

249. Nietzsche, Friedrich. "Ecce Homo" in *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings*, ed. Ridley and Norman Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p.109.

250. Ibid., sec.7, p.40.

251. Ibid., sec.8, p.41.

252. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale, London: Penguin Books, 2003, pp.139-40.

253. Nietzsche, Friedrich. "Ecce Homo" in *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings*, ed. Ridley and Norman Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, sec.6, p.130.

254. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale, London: Penguin Books, 2003, p.161.

255. Ibid., pp.218-9.

256. Nietzsche, Friedrich. "The Birth of Tragedy" in *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*, ed. Geuss and Speirs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, sec.1 p.14.

257. This point is later discussed in the chapter on the principle of motion.

258. "The problem here is that of the meaning of suffering: whether a Christian meaning, (or) a tragic meaning. . . . In the former case it's held to be the path to a blissful

existence; in the latter, *existence* is held to be *blissful enough* to justify even monstrous suffering. . .” (Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, ed. Bittner, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp.249-50.)

259. Nietzsche, Friedrich. “The Birth of Tragedy” in *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*, ed. Geuss and Speirs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, sec.19, p.94.

260. Nietzsche’s attitude about Schiller and Romanticism as a whole is very controversial. Generally, on the one hand, he confirms that Schiller enriches the aesthetics in German culture; on the other, he disapproves of Schiller’s appreciation of the Kantian ideal that the aesthetic education of individuals must lead to the transformation from the “Natural State into a Moral one.” (Schiller, Friedrich, On the Aesthetic Education of Man, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967, p.13.)

261. Nietzsche, Friedrich. “The Birth of Tragedy” in *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*, ed. Geuss and Speirs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999 sec.20, p.97.

262. Ibid., sec.22, p.105.

263. Nietzsche, Friedrich “Twilight of the Idols” in *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings*, ed. Ridley and Norman, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, sec.24, p.204.

264. Nietzsche, Friedrich. “The Birth of Tragedy” in *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*, ed. Geuss and Speirs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, sec.23, p.108.

265. Walton states, “In both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, the stories from the present and the past are related by a bard or minstrel.” Moreover he continues, “The exact nature of the bard’s performance is clearly of considerable significance here. The bards in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* seem to perform as much as the bard would have done who himself composed the poems for recitation, and as later rhapsodes who recited passages from the epic poems. . . . The kind of performance the Homeric bard aims at is *not in itself dramatic*, but it has *dramatic qualities*.” (Walton, J. Michael, *Greek Theatre Practice*, London: Greenwood Press, 1980,, pp.46-8.)

266. Garner, Richard, *From Homer to Tragedy*: *The Art of Allusion in Greek Poetry*, London: Routledge, 1990, p.21.

267. “The chorus of satyrs is first and foremost a vision of the Dionysiac mass, just as the world of the stage is in turn a vision of this chorus of satyrs; the strength of this vision is great enough to render the spectator’s gaze insensitive and unresponsive to the impression of ‘reality.’” (Nietzsche, Friedrich. “The Birth of Tragedy” in *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*, ed. Geuss and Speirs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, sec.8, p.42.)

268. Walton, J. Michael, *Greek Theatre Practice*, London: Greenwood Press, 1980, p.41.

269. As Garner states in his discussion on the use of Homeric allusion in the Greek tragedy: “Inasmuch as the primary field in lyric poetry is seldom devoted to mythological narrative, the lyric poets had little occasion to use the second allusive technique that Aeschylus found so fruitful in the *Oresteia*, the suggestive comparison of two different moments in a continuous history by alluding to such events in a secondary poetic field.” Garner, Richard, *From Homer to Tragedy*: *The Art of Allusion in Greek Poetry*, London: Routledge, 1990, p.47.

270. One example would be *The Persians* by Aeschylus where the ghost of Darius (father of Xerxes and husband of the Queen) represents the tragic view by narrating the

present course of events alongside the chain of past and future disasters by prophecy thanks to the maturity and wisdom of the experience of death.

271. Garner, Richard, *From Homer to Tragedy*: *The Art of Allusion in Greek Poetry*, London: Routledge, 1990, p.61.

272. Nietzsche's critical and sometimes demeaning comments on the Euripidean tragedy were heavily criticized by Henrichs who accuses him of having read only a few plays of Euripides at the time he wrote *The Birth of Tragedy*, and of taking Schlegel's argument on Euripides for granted. Therefore, Henrichs concludes, Nietzsche's condemnation of Euripides is not profound but just derivative. For a more detailed discussion on this, see Henrichs, Albert. "The Last of the Detractors: Friedrich Nietzsche's Condemnation of Euripides" in *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* No. 4., 1986, pp.369-397.

273. Walton, J. Michael, *Greek Theatre Practice*, London: Greenwood Press, 1980, p.133.

274. Wiles, David, *Tragedy in Athens*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp.91-2.

275. Nietzsche, Friedrich. "Dionysian Worldview" in *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings* ed. Geuss and Speirs Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, sec.3, p.131.

276. A Heraclitean argument by Nietzsche regarding the concept of natural justice and order incomprehensible to the human mind.

277 Wiles, David, *Tragedy in Athens*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.136.

278. Wiles articulates this as follows: "When the character exists, the actor changes his mask and the character ceases to exist. Just as the character is a mask, so the *skênê* is a façade, and both alike have meaning laid on them by the dense language of the play. The *skênê* remains a façade in accordance with the Homeric and classical understanding that only our visible lives on earth have meaning. Life is not predicated upon an unseen paradise or nirvana." (Ibid., p.169.)

279. Nietzsche explicitly confirms this in the following passage: "What is 'appearance' to me now! Certainly not the opposite of some essence—what could I say about any essence except name the predicates of its appearance. . . . To me appearance is the active and living itself." (Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Gay Science*, ed. Williams, Bernard, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp.63-4.)

280. Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.191.

281. Ibid., pp.175, 112.

282. Nietzsche, Friedrich. "The Birth of Tragedy" in *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*, ed. Geuss and Speirs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, sec.8, p.41-2. Deleuze, in his *Empiricism and Subjectivity* expands on the relation between the gods of polytheism and the world: "The gods of polytheism are the echo, the extension, and the reflection of the passions, and their heaven is our imagination only." (Deleuze, Gilles. *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1991, p.73.) Sandywell endorses this argument of Nietzsche stating that Heraclitus imparted the linguistic richness of the ancient Greek language and employed it in his *peri phuseôs* like the tragedians. (Sandywell, Barry. *Pre-Socratic Reflexivity*: *The Construction of Philosophical Discourse (c. 600 – 450 BC)*, London: Routledge, 1996, p.241.)

283. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, sec.49, p.191-2.

284. Kant, Immanuel. "First Introduction" in *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp.49-50.

285. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, sec.58, p.225. Moreover, he also distinguishes artistic genius from the rational-mathematical genius: "The genius appropriate to mathematics is quite different in species form that fixed by nature for philosophy." (Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.243.)

286. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.194.

287. Caygill, Howard. *Art of Judgment*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1989, p.360.

288. Nietzsche, Friedrich. "Philosophy in Hard Times" in Breazeale ed. *Nietzsche's Notebooks of the 1870s: Philosophy and Truth*, Sussex: Humanities Press, 1979, p.123 ff.68.

289. Nietzsche, Friedrich. "The Philosopher: Reflections on the Struggle between Art and Knowledge" in Breazeale ed. *Nietzsche's notebooks of the 1870s: Philosophy and Truth*, Sussex: Humanities Press, 1979, p.3.

290. Here, "ethical" is used as the adjectival form of *ethos* and must not be confused with its later moralistic interpretations.

291. Nietzsche describes the "right height" in the following poem:

Worldly Wisdom

Stay not where the lowlands are!
Climb not into the sky!
The world looks best by far
When viewed from halfway high.

(Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Gay Science*, ed. Williams, Bernard, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p.12.)

292. Nietzsche, Friedrich. "The Birth of Tragedy" in *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*, ed. Geuss and Speirs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, sec.3, p.25.

293. Ibid., sec.4, p.28.

294. Schopenhauer, Arthur. *The World as Will and Representation Volume II*, trans. E. F. J. Payne, Dover Publication, 1969, p.388.

295. Ibid., p.376.

296. Ibid., p.378.

297. Ibid., p.379.

298. Ibid., p.385.

299. Ibid., p.379.

300. Furthermore, Heidegger argues, "The thinker inquires into being as a whole and as such into the world as such. Thus with this very first step he always thinks out beyond the world and so at the same time back to it." (Heidegger, Martin. *Nietzsche II: Eternal Recurrence* trans., ed. Krell, D.F., San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1961, p.207.) This thinking out beyond the world as thinking back to it affirms the circularity of the process of transition in the creative will of the genius.

301. Heidegger, Martin. *Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Fried and Polt, Yale: Yale University Press, 2000, p.141.

302. Schopenhauer, Arthur. *The World as Will and Representation Volume II*, trans. E. F. J. Payne, Dover Publication, 1969, p.380.

303. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Gay Science*, ed. Williams, Bernard, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, sec.78, p.95.

304. Nietzsche, Friedrich. "The Philosopher" in Breazeale ed. *Nietzsche's notebooks of the 1870s: Philosophy and Truth*, Sussex: Humanities Press, 1979, p.6.

305. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Daybreak*, ed. Clark & Leiter, Cambridge University Press, 2004, sec.497, p.203.

306. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Gay Science*, ed. Williams, Bernard, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp.53-4.

307. Compare this interpretation of genius with Kant's *cosmotheoros* (world-observer). For Nietzsche, the *Anschauung* of the whole is left for genius who has the ability of pure seeing or seeing appearances purely as appearances. (Crawford, Claudia. *The Beginnings of Nietzsche's Theory of Language*, Walter de Gruyter, New York, 1988, p.173-174.) Regarding this point Crawford further argues that, according to Nietzsche, the purpose of *Anschauung* is "the enjoyment and affirmation of pure delight in appearance, and the projection of new appearance" and this is achieved "in the *activity* of the *Anschauung* of the genius. There is not universal and absolute idea to know for Nietzsche only the continuing, changing in each moment projection of *Anschauung* of the *Ur-Eine.*" (Ibid., p.175-6.)

308. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Pre-Platonic Philosophers*, trans., ed. Whitlock, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006, p.3 (fn.1).

309. Nehamas, Alexander. "Parmenidean Being/Heraclitean Fire" in *Pre-Socratic Philosophy* ed. Caston and Graham, Ashgate Publishing, 2002, p.46.

310. Nietzsche explicitly endorses this point: "Our senses have a particular quantum as a medium span within which they function, i.e., we experience large and small in relation to the conditions of our existence. If we sharpened or blunted our senses tenfold, we would perish." (Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, ed. Bittner, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.111.) He expands on this point in his Heraclitus seminar published within his *Pre-Platonic Philosophers.*

Chapter Two

On "*Motion*" as one of the Founding Principles of Cosmological Aesthetics with Regards to the Heraclitean, Kantian and Nietzschean Cosmology

Heraclitus said that the Sun is new every day.[1] Some 2,500 years later, we now know that what we call Sun is a main sequence star whose energy is generated by the fusion of hydrogen nuclei into helium. We also know that it has been gradually warming up for more than four billion years and will continue to warm for another five billion years until it transforms into a red giant, loses its mass and subsequently becomes a white dwarf and passes away as any other star, any other being, any other process. This chapter aims to demonstrate the philosophical foundations of the principle of motion underlying the processes of generation, growth, exhaustion and passing away of beings and concepts in conjunction with the principle of transition.

Aristotle, following the Heraclitean and Empedoclean arguments, maintained the double sense of *phusis* or nature that is both primary matter and formation, generation or essential growth: "The primary and proper sense of nature is the essence of those things which contain in themselves as such a source of motion; for the matter is called nature because it is capable of receiving the forms through motion." Accordingly, nature is the source of motion in natural objects, which is inherent in them, either potentially or actually.[2] Twentieth-century physical-cosmological discoveries such as Einstein's theory of relativity, the expanding dynamic universe of Hubble, as well as recent experiments on the gravitational field and its effects on time and space disclose for us new paths linking back to the Heraclitean wisdom (as the advanced culmination of the ancient *Weltanschauung*). The purely intuitive ancient definition of *phusis* began to reveal itself through the new discoveries on cosmos and the motion inherent in it.

This philosophical revival dates back to the eighteenth century, and our attempt to discover all-encompassing cosmological principles after the "death of God" or the final exhaustion of traditional metaphysics is comparable to that which drove Kant throughout his philosophy from his work on the element of fire and *True Estimations on the Living Forces* to his *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* and *Opus Postumum*. Indeed, in the first *Critique* (again conceived here as the dictionary of Kantian philosophy which is of fundamental use in uncovering the cosmological principle of motion developed in *Opus Postumum*), Kant defines the world as "nature" in the sense of the totality of all appearances which amount to a dynamic whole: "World is called nature insofar as it is considered as a dynamic whole and one does not look at the aggregation in space or time so as to bring about a quantity, but looks instead at the unity in the existence of appearances."[3] Similarly, in *Opus Postumum*, Kant establishes the necessity of positing the moving forces as unity by means of a principle to pave the way for a systematic inquiry into nature as a whole:

> This composition (or, rather, the composite of phenomena in a system) is not itself a phenomenon, but a connection of the moving forces by a concept of the understanding. By its means we systematically establish, according to a principle, the manifold (which has been fragmentarily composed by us, through observation and experiment) into a whole of empirical knowledge for the sake of the investigation of nature.[4]

Indeed, explicitly or implicitly, Kantian philosophy (even his first and third *Critiques*) is centered upon cosmological principles albeit in a rigorous metaphysical and systematic manner. Kant never gave up his faith in universalism, the oneness of nature, and the primordial essence of the living force although he was never completely convinced of the provability of the relation between cosmic principles and human morality, between the natural forces and the concept of *will*.

Nietzsche on the other hand was determined to revive the amoral cosmological principles from Pre-Socratic Greece that were not influenced by Platonic morality, Christianity or the Enlightenment—or in Heidegger's words "not-yet-metaphysical." Nietzsche chose to reintroduce the essentially immoral and tragic principles under the name of the Dionysian. The Dionysian as a cosmological principle represents the tragic essence of human existence in the universe. For instance, in *On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense* Nietzsche recounts the story of humankind in the universe as follows:

> In some remote corner of the universe, flickering in the light of the countless solar systems into which it had been poured, there was once a planet on which clever animals invented cognition. It was the most arrogant and most mendacious minute in the "history of the world"; but a minute was all it was. After nature had drawn just a few more breaths the planet froze and the clever animals had to die. Someone could invent a fable like this and yet they would still not have given a satisfactory illustration of just how pitiful, how insubstantial

> and transitory, how purposeless and arbitrary the human intellect looks within nature; there were eternities during which it did not exist; and when it has disappeared again, nothing will have happened. For this intellect has no further mission that might extend beyond the bounds of human life. Rather, the intellect is human, and only its own possessor and progenitor regards it with such pathos, as if it housed the axis around which the entire world revolved.[5]

This passage is only one of many that plainly demonstrate how Dionysian aesthetics and Heraclitean cosmology played out throughout Nietzsche's philosophy. Nietzsche was equally inspired by the Pre-Socratic cosmology and tragedy in his philological studies. Especially Heraclitus fascinated him throughout his philosophical life.[6] Thus, after a close analysis of the Heraclitean *phusis* and Kant's principle of motion, the following chapter regarding the cosmic-dynamic principle of motion examines Nietzsche's notions of becoming, eternal recurrence and will to power in conjunction with the cosmic fragments of Heraclitus.

PRELUDE: HERACLITEAN *PHUSIS* AS THE PRINCIPLE OF MOTION

On the Heraclitean *Phusis*

The Fragments on Phusis

Fragment 10: "Things taken together are whole and not whole, something which is being brought together and brought apart, which is in tune and out of tune: out of all things can be made a unity, and out of a unity, all things."[7]

Fragment 123: "The real constitution of things is accustomed to hide itself."[8]

Fragment 125: Theophrastus: For the things which by nature undergo this movement at other times even hold together because of it, but if it fails, then as Heraclitus says: "Even the barley-drink disintegrates if it is not moved."[9]

Fragment 40: "All things flow." (*panta rhei)*

Fragment 12: "Upon those who step into the same rivers different and again different waters flow."[10]

Fragment 91: "It scatters and again gathers, it comes together and flows away, and approaches and departs."[11]

Fragment 84: From Plotinus; "It rests by changing."[12]

Fragment 6: "The Sun is new every day."[13]

Fragment 30: "This (world-) order (*the same for all*) did none of gods or men make, but it always was and is and shall be: an ever-living fire, kindling in measures and going out in measures."[14]

Phusis as Kosmos

In anticipation of the upcoming section on Kant's principle of motion, the first description of *phusis* I would like to introduce is *phusis* as *kosmos*. As Naddaf claims in *The Greek Concept of Nature*: "When one closely examines the contents of these works entitled *peri phuseôs . . .* for the . . . pre-Socratics . . . the word *phusis* . . . means the origin and growth of the universe as a totality. And since humanity and society . . . (is) a part of this totality," so we must also follow an explanation of the world we acquire from *phusis*.[15] Naddaf goes on to argue that the Ionians (including Thales, Anaximander and Heraclitus) construed *phusis* as the designation for all things, thus maintaining the inseparability of *kosmos* from *phusis*. *Historia peri phuseôs* refers to a true history of the universe including the origin and development of human culture.[16] Therefore, *phusis* underpins the definitions of human concepts of understanding and ideas of reason. *Phusis* as *kosmos* encompasses not only the forces of nature as a whole or the macrocosmic dynamics of the universe but also the microcosmic human concepts from which these senseless forces acquire their meaning. *Phusis* can only acquire its identity from *logos* and through *ethos,* though this does not contradict the precedence of primordial *phusis.* What the Pre-Socratics sought was an explanation to account for the origin (*phusis* as *arkhē*), the processes (*phusis* as *growth*) and the final result (*phusis* as *kosmos*) of the universe: "Within the context of the early history of philosophy the term *phusis*, with its primary meaning of growth, arose to express not merely the result of a process or the form of a thing but the process, from origin to end, through which all that is came into being and continues to behave as it does."[17] Therefore, as confirmed by many scholars, the *phusis* of "all that is" or *phusis* as *kosmos* refers not only to what we call cosmology, but also to the origins and development of human beings and their social organizations or politics.[18] In *The Heraclitus Seminar,* Heidegger, identifying Heraclitean philosophy as not-yet-metaphysical, agrees with Kahn's and Naddaf's inclusion of Heraclitus in the *historia peri phuseôs* tradition alongside Anaximander and Thales. As cosmology is the predecessor of metaphysics, likewise, according to Heidegger, *phusis as kosmos* is the *arkhē* of philosophical thinking. Beets summarizes Heraclitus' strategy in the cosmic fragments as one which aims to justify the unity of being and its dependence on the principle of motion and change.[19] The relation between the principle of motion and the principle of unity is a symmetrical one: "If motion is universal, all being is a unity. Motion is universal. Therefore, all being is a unity." A better conclusion would be: "Therefore, all being is a *moving* unity." This echoes the Nietzschean argument that "all being is dynamic, and thus, being is essentially becoming," and "Becoming is universal," and even "the universe (*ta panta*) is in unity only insofar as it is moving." In order to acquire proper insight into *phusis* as *kosmos* we therefore need to examine the primary definition of *phusis* as *kinēsis*.

Phusis as Kinēsis

Naddaf claims that the first instance of the use of ***phusis*** in philosophy can be traced to Heraclitus' fragments, in which ***phusis*** means "not only the ***essential character*** of a thing, but also how a/the thing originates and develops and thus continues to regulate its nature . . . ***Phusis*** must be understood dynamically as the 'real constitution' of a thing as it is realized from beginning to end with all of its properties."[20] ***Phusis*** never simply refers to something static but always to a ***process*** or a ***temporary result of an on-going process***. Naddaf attempts to show the possible reconciliation of the material and formal or universal and particular meanings of ***phusis***, arguing that the knowledge of "the real constitution of a thing (what makes it behave and appear as it does) entails a knowledge of the processes that regulate its nature, and these processes are the same processes that were behind the origin of the present order of things."[21] Indeed, in fragment 125, Heraclitus says: "Even the barley-drink disintegrates if it is not moved."[22] Accordingly, ***phusis as*** *kinēsis* is the dynamic principle without which ***kosmos*** would not hold together and would eventually disintegrate into a chaotic self-destructive state.

At first Kirk finds Gigon's translation of ***phusis*** as "origin" or "becoming" unsatisfactory but he then argues that growth can be a derivative of ***phusis*** since "at the primitive stage of language there is no firm distinction between 'become' and 'be.' The root *phu-* simply implies existence, and the broad general sense of ***phusis***, from which all specialized senses are derived, is 'essence' or 'nature,' the way a thing is made and the way it normally behaves."[23] Later on, rejecting Aristotle's use of ***phusis*** as substantial and permanent nature but accepting his construal of it as "growth," Kirk concludes that "this does not alter the argument that the most common early sense of ***phusis*** is 'being,' though the idea of growth is not excluded and may be emphasized on particular occasions."[24] In doing so, however, he radically opposes Diels and Kranz's translation of ***phusis*** as a "transcendent principle" or namely the idea of nature. But Kirk goes further; by associating ***phusis*** to ***ta panta*** and ***kosmos***, he subsequently defines it as the real constitution of things or the idea of everything and continues:

> The hidden truth about things is that they are not separate from each other; they are compounded of opposites which are "the same," and in spite of their apparent separation and irreconcilability they are inextricably connected in a unity which goes beyond a simple interrelationship of separate parts.[25]

Many early twentieth-century scholars of early Greek philosophy subscribe to this interpretation of ***phusis*** as the essential or primary principle of motion. For instance, Lovejoy confirms Woodbridge's argument that by ***phusis*** the Pre-Socratics meant becoming or generation: "Their speculation dealt chiefly, not with the material cause or substrate of things, as Aristotle represents, but with the cause and process of the origination, transformation, and decay of things, 'the principle to which things owe their birth, growth, and nourishment, and to

lack of which they owe their death.'"[26] There is only one elemental force that contains and represents all these processes simultaneously and alternately, and this is precisely why Heraclitus chooses "fire" among other elements and identifies it as the *arkhē* of ***phusis.***

Phusis as Arkhē and Fire

Heidegger identifies *arkhē* as the founding ***principle*** (***principium***) of ***historia peri phuseôs***: "Principle comes from ***principium***, beginning. The concept corresponds to what the Greeks call *arkhē*, that on the basis of which something is determined to be what it is and how it is. Principle: the ground on which something stands, pervading it, guiding it in its whole structure and essence."[27] Heidegger's definition of ***principium*** endorses ***phusis*** as the principle of motion or the *arkhē* of all beings and things penetrating, driving and thereby directing them. In his examination of the essence and concept of ***phusis*** in Aristotle's ***Physics***, Heidegger attributes two meanings to *arkhē*. It is both the origin of things and the principle according to which the things emerge or appear. And then associating *arkhē* with ***phusis*** he continues, "***Phusis*** is *arkhē . . .* specifically in a moving being that has this *arkhē* in itself."[28] In that sense, all moving things (including animals and plants) are subject to the principle of motion, the governing and directing principle or *arkhē*, which thereby deserves to be called, in Aristotelian terms, *arkhē kinēseōs* or namely ***phusis***. As Heidegger points out, ***phusis*** as *arkhē kinēseōs* must be deemed the principle providing the essential fullness for the very being of the moving things.[29]

Nevertheless, Heraclitus knew that ***phusis*** as *arkhē* lacks phenomenal representation if detached from a cosmological-aesthetic elemental force representing natural processes. This is why his ***peri phuseôs*** revolves around the element of "fire" as the primary component of all things and driving force of the principle of motion. Among other Heraclitus scholars, Naddaf supports this view:

> Certain fragments and doxographies suggest how his cosmogonic process unfolded. Heraclitus chose fire as the ***phusis*** as *arkhē*. In other words, fire is not only the principle of movement (i.e., the continual source of natural processes), but also the fundamental constituent of all things.[30]

The motive force of fire also transforms ***ta panta*** into a "cosmic whole" not by regulating it (as this would require the involvement of a higher consciousness) but simply by ***moving*** it and thereby bringing it into existence. Fire as the archaic element of ***kosmos*** does not only fuel the movement of things in the universe, but also orders them by subjecting them to a singular ***phusis***. Referring to the fragment 30, where Heraclitus describes the *arkhē* of the universe as fire, Heidegger and Fink discuss the proximity of the meanings of ***ta panta*** and ***kosmos***:

> Heidegger: Do I understand you correctly when you comprehend *kosmos* as identical with *ta panta* in your interpretation?
> Fink: *Kosmos* and *ta panta* are not identical, but *kosmos* does not indeed mean the jointed whole of *ta panta*, the whole stamping, which is not fixed but moved. Heraclitus speaks of manifold ways of movement, as in strife or war.
> Heidegger: Does *kosmos* then belong in the sequence of lightning, sun, and fire?
> Fink: Not without further consideration. That could only be said if *kosmos* were thought not as the order brought forth by fire, but as the ordering fire.[31]

Furthermore, Kahn crucially argues that both Aristotle and Theophrastus misunderstood Heraclitus. While Aristotle construed Heraclitus' idea of fire only as a physical theory of matter, Theophrastus treated the mode of expression as irrelevant to the meaning of the fragments on natural change or elemental transformation.[32] According to Kahn, however, the term *kosmos* in fragment 30 refers to "the entire organized cycle of elementary and vital transformation."[33] Kirk agrees with this construal and explains the role of fire in this process of transformation as follows:

> Could the order be fire itself, which we know mixes with things not fire? This is attractive: the idea behind *kosmos* would be similar to that of *logos*—a constituent formula which applies to all things, which inheres in and actually is a part of all things, and therefore could be treated as concrete. The characterization as fire would be made because fire is both *motive* and *regulated*.[34]

The functional resemblance between *phusis* as the primal ordering fire that renders *ta panta kosmos*, and *logos* as the constituent formula of all things that links *phusis* to human *ethos* (thereby making fire meaningful) makes us consider the usually overlooked but vital relation between *phusis* and *logos* in Heraclitus and the Pre-Socratic cosmology as a whole.

Phusis and Logos

> The relation between *logos* and *phusis* is far more complex in the case of Heraclitus. The term *logos* is not only employed by Heraclitus to qualify his true account, but he believes that the world exhibits an objective structure that can be revealed through *logos*.[35]
>
> (Naddaf, *The Greek Concept of Nature*)

This account of *logos* and *phusis* echoes the cosmological-aesthetic Dionysian-Heraclitean worldview in the Nietzschean philosophy. The world exhibits not only an objective-cosmological but at the same time a Tragic-Dionysian structure which is revealed in the aesthetic representation of *phusis* through *logos*. *Phusis* as *arkhē kinēseōs* keeps moving human imagination as a sublime idea only when communicated by *logos* which reveals the real constitution of *kosmos*. However, as Naddaf describes, for Heraclitus, the relation between *logos* and *phusis* is very complex. As *phusis* refers to the archaic nature of all existing

things, *logos* is the way reaching to and representing the *arkhē* of being as a whole which in turn deserves to be called *logos* only insofar as it reveals *phusis* and manages to bridge it to human *ethos*. Kahn articulates this as follows:

> [According to Heraclitus' fragments on *phusis*] the characteristic nature of things (*phusis*), the prize of wisdom hunted by philosophical gold seekers, is not simply there for the taking. Even if the *logos* is common to all, so that the structure of reality is "given" in everyday experience, recognition comes hard. It requires the right kind of openness on the part of the percipient. . . . And it requires inquiry and reflection—digging up a lot of earth and judging it with discretion.[36]

Constant digging and judging (or the wisdom of *logos*) is required because as Heraclitus says "*phusis* loves to hide" by continuously moving, becoming and transforming. According to Sandywell, Heraclitean thought is rooted in the claim that all previous attempt to reveal the hidden *phusis* "has failed to embody the truth that 'Being' does not name an object, thing, or unity, but the transience of manifestation itself. . . . Any intelligible speech (*logos*) which desires to express the *Logos* as unity-in-difference must in principle exemplify the inescapable principle of transformation in its own organization."[37] Sandywell then asks the following important question: "how to provide a reasoned *logos* of that which transcends and evades all stability and formal presence—the *Logos* of Being as 'becoming,' and 'manifestation' as absolute flux?"[38] The successful positing of the *logos* of being as becoming or as a dynamic whole requires us to define it as an aesthetic process of transition representing *phusis* by relating it to the human *ethos*.

However Plato paved the way for the extinction of this original *logos*, or the aesthetic (measured or reflectively judged) representation of the becoming-dynamic whole or *phusis*. Heidegger declares that the decline of the determination of *logos* sets in with Plato and Aristotle who made logic possible, leading on to the covering up of the relation between *logos* and *phusis*. However, he continues, "*logos* as the revealing gathering—Being, as this gathering, is fittingness in the sense of *phusis*—becomes the necessity of the essence of historical humanity."[39] One should here recall Heraclitus' own fierce criticism of the reductive philosophy of his time such as those of Hesiod and Pythagoras. But it was Heraclitus' contemporary Parmenides, the most influential predecessor of Plato, who caused the misunderstanding of *logos* in the post-Platonic Western philosophy. Indeed Parmenides was the first to equate *phusis* to *logos*, instead of positing them as two interrelated principles.

Heidegger translates Parmenides' fragment 8 as follows: "Apprehension and that for the sake of which apprehension happens are the same" and adds: "Apprehension happens for the sake of Being. . . . Apprehension *belongs* to *phusis*; the sway of *phusis* shares its sway with apprehension."[40] And in another place, he adds, "The relation to *logos* as *phusis* makes *legein* into the gathering that apprehends, but makes apprehension into the apprehension that gathers."[41] In addition, in order to construct an acceptable metaphysics we must convey the

fact that "the Being of the human first determines itself on the basis of the happening of the essential belonging together of Being and apprehension."[42] Notwithstanding, both for Nietzsche and Kant *phusis* and *logos* are separate principles dependent on each other; though at first sight Kant's philosophy (when understood as a reformed Platonism) strikes a certain similarity with Parmenides. Hence we should be careful not to pin Nietzsche against Kant, despite Nietzsche's own misleading labelling of Kant as Platonic or Parmenidean in his early works such as in *Richard Wagner in Beyreuth*.[43] But then how does Nietzsche interpret the complex relation between *phusis* and *logos*? The answer to this can be found in his lectures on the Pre-Platonics.

The Heraclitean *Phusis* in **Nietzsche's Lectures** on the Pre-Platonics

In *Pre-Platonic Philosophers*, Nietzsche claims that the unifying notion in Heraclitean philosophy is *phusis* (as *kinēsis*), which fittingly represents "the oneness and eternal lawfulness of nature's processes."[44] This is what makes him a cosmologist *par excellence* unlike Pythagoras and Socrates, despite their attempt to found their philosophies on the ideas of unity and universality. Heraclitus described *kosmos* alongside *phusis* (like Thales, Anaximander and Empedocles) instead of reducing it to an all-encompassing idea or being. In the following Heraclitean passages, Nietzsche explicitly criticizes the unchanging being of Parmenides and Plato advocating the notion of becoming and *kosmos* as *phusis*:

> The total character of the world is for all eternity chaos, not in the sense of a lack of necessity but of a lack of order, organization, form, beauty, wisdom, and whatever else our aesthetic anthropomorphisms are called. . . . It is neither perfect, nor beautiful, nor noble, nor does it want to become any of these things; in no way does it strive to imitate man! In no way do our aesthetic and moral judgments apply to it. . . . Let us beware of saying there are laws in nature. There are only necessities. . . . Once you know that there are no purposes, you also know that there is no accident. Let us beware of thinking that the world eternally creates new things. There are no eternally enduring substances; matter is as much of an error as the god of the Eleatics (unchanging being.) . . . When will all these shadows of god no longer darken us? When will we have completely de-deified nature? When may we begin to naturalize humanity with a pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature?[45]

> The idiosyncrasies of the philosophers: Their lack of historical sense for one thing, their hatred of the very idea of becoming. . . . For thousands of years, philosophers have been using only mummified concepts; nothing real makes it through their hands alive. . . . They see death, change, and age, as well as procreation and growth, as objections—refutations even. What is, does not *become*; what becomes, *is* not. . . . So, they all believe, desperately even, in being.[46]

Here, by nature Nietzsche means *phusis* in its Heraclitean sense or in the sense of the dynamic, irrational, amoral cosmic moving whole. In doing so he criticizes all kinds of teleological, theological and ontological interpretations that define nature as an entirely supersensible notion reducing it to *telos*, *theos* and *ta onta* respectively. He rightly calls these approaches "aesthetic anthropomorphisms." To understand the essence of *phusis*, it is necessary not to take refuge in anthropomorphic or ethical or formal conceptions, but as Heraclitus did, to approach it cosmologically. All designations of nature revolving around such concepts as beautiful, good, rational and noble are essentially human or *ethic* as derived from the logical realm of *anthropoi*. Therefore, Nietzsche rightly argues that all human concepts associated with nature are the outcomes of the understanding of *kosmos* as a mere *reflection* of humanity believing in a meaningful or purposeful existence. For the existence of *anthropoi* can only be made meaningful or causal through an ethical or teleological conception of *phusis*. However, Heraclitus avoids this teleological construction and declares, "it is in changing that things find purpose" once again categorizing *phusis* (and his doctrine of change) as the supreme cosmological principle that encompasses and determines the others like *telos* and *ethos*.

To what extent can we argue that it is not the world that imitates man but man who by his nature strives to represent the unity of the moving forces (or *phusis*) cosmologically in a way that would not allow an irreconcilable multiplicity among the processes and principles comprising the moving whole in its entirety? Through the very existence of human judgment *ta panta* becomes *kosmos*, not because it is constituted and held together by a meaning or an end but through the aesthetic measure of transition or namely *logos*. A cosmologist does not posit appearances in opposition to essence knowing that cosmological concepts are the outcomes of the interrelated appearances brought together by universalizing aesthetic ideas that can shoulder the sublime consistency and successfully form a passageway between *phusis* and *ethos*. Only through these aesthetic ideas can the motion and life inherent in *phusis* and apparent in sensible phenomena be harnessed. This leads Nietzsche to posit the totality of appearances as the living whole or *phusis*:

> What is "appearance" to me now! Certainly not the opposite of some essence—what could I say about any essence except name the predicates of its appearance! . . . To me, appearance is the active and living itself, . . . that the one who comes to know is a means of prolonging the earthly dance and thus is one of the masters of ceremony of existence, and that the sublime consistency and interrelatedness of all knowledge may be and will be the highest means to *sustain* the universality of dreaming.[47]

This passage from *The Gay Science* demonstrates the reciprocal relationship of *phusis* and *logos*. *Phusis* signifies the underlying heat that empowers the phenomena and makes them *appear* and thereby *exist*. *Logos* can be defined as the aesthetic measure that represents the transition from the cosmological idea of the inherent heat or fire to the phenomena of nature as they appear to human senses.

Nietzsche further claims: "*What things are called* is unspeakably more important than what they are. The reputation, name, and appearance, the worth, the usual measure and weight of a thing . . . what started as appearance in the end nearly always becomes essence and *effectively acts* as its essence."[48] The appearances represent the inherence of *phusis* in all worldly things in the form of change and renewal. Nietzsche seems to be convinced that the one and only reliable reality (from which human judgment must originate) lies in the aesthetic sense-intuition (*Anschauung*) of the becoming appearances as the phenomenal recurrences of *phusis*.

In fact, the latter claim on the necessity of considering the appearances as the foremost and sensible representations of *phusis* ties in with our earlier definition of *logos* as an aesthetic transition primarily based on the so-called appearances (*morphe*) ignoring the dualities of a detached abstract reason. We will further examine the role of Heraclitean *phusis* in Nietzsche's philosophy in the section on his cosmology and physiology. For now, in order to provide a strong argument on the relation between the dynamic appearances of *phusis* and the aesthetic transition or *logos*, it seems appropriate to revert to our earlier discussion on the relation between *phusis* and *logos* in conjunction with the late Heideggerian metaphysics, which shifts from the midpoint between the Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics to the midpoint between the Parmenidean and Heraclitean cosmology. In order to understand Heidegger's shift, we first need to look at his definition of *phusis* and the way it relates to his own ontology.

The Heraclitean *Phusis* and Late Heideggerian Metaphysics

Heidegger claims that the term slightly departs from the terms *birth* or *nature*. It has become the key concept of Western philosophy standing for the antagonistic and mutually exclusive relation of humanity to its being (human nature, culture etc.) and to other beings (animals, plants, moving forces etc.). This representation is apparent in several "dichotomies that have become prevalent: nature and grace (i.e. super-nature), nature and art, nature and history, nature and spirit."[49] He rather identifies *phusis* as the underlying cosmological principle determining these dichotomies:

> In all such dichotomies, nature is not just one of two equal terms but essentially holds the position of priority, inasmuch as the other terms are always and primarily differentiated by contrast with—and therefore are determined by—nature. . . . Therefore in our thinking, even the distinction between nature and history must be pushed back into the underlying area that sustains the dichotomy, the area where nature and history *are*.[50]

This is precisely why both Heidegger and Nietzsche define *metaphysics* as knowledge of *phusis*.[51] According to Heidegger, this construal of *phusis*, central

to any philosophical inquiry, is inherited from the influential Pre-Socratic cosmologists like Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides.[52] Heidegger describes physics or *phusis* as the primary determinant of what we call metaphysics:

> Physics determines the essence and the history of metaphysics from the inception onward. Even in the doctrine of Being as *actus purus* (Thomas Aquinas), as absolute concept (Hegel), as eternal recurrence of the same will to power (Nietzsche), metaphysics steadfastly remains physics.[53]

Contrasting with modern thinking rooted in dichotomies, he argues that the modern translation of *phusis* is an oversimplification that narrows the original dynamism of the term, impeding our understanding of the early Greek philosophy. Referring to Aristotle's projection of *phusis* as *kinesis*, he translates *phusis* as the "emerging-abiding-sway" to present a more complex and accurate understanding of existence than the earlier translation. To acquire a better picture of *phusis*, we first need to grasp the essence of movement or motion (as the essential mode of being).[54] So, he selects the best definition of *phusis* as "*arkhē kinēseōs*, origin and ordering of change, such that each thing that changes has this ordering within itself."[55] *Arkhē kinēseōs* as the principle of motion remains loyal to the original *phusis*, the moving unity that provides order for all phenomena (thereby making them cosmic) by its very dynamism. In other words, "*phusei onta* are *kinoumena*: their being is movedness."[56] This however does not limit *phusis* (as *kinēsis*) to the movedness and ordering. Indeed, as a principle, it belongs to the moving whole itself.[57] For Heidegger *phusis* is the origin and the ordering power of *kinēsis*, it is the principle from which the motion of all moving things derives and according to which the movement is ordered.[58]

Heidegger manages to overcome the Parmenidean equation of *logos* to *phusis* by acknowledging that *logos* or the principle of transition guides the perspective through which Being or *phusis* can be apprehended. "The origin of the division between Being and thinking, the disjunction of apprehension and Being, shows us that what is at stake here is nothing less than a determination of Being-human that springs from the essence of Being (*phusis*) that is to be opened up."[59] He further argues that thinking and Being ceased to exist as entirely separate realms once "the Western spirit withdraws from the mere dominance of reason by wanting the 'irrational' and seeking the 'alogical.'"[60] But what does he mean by "irrational" and "alogical"? What constitutes the "irrational" and "alogical" in human nature or *ethos*? The very relation of human being to Being explains the illogical nature of human beings. But why is becomingness of humanity irrational and alogical? Heidegger would probably argue that this is due to the first *polemical* distinction between *phusis* and *ethos*, or nature and human nature, earth and world.[61] However, this distinction must not be taken for granted. Indeed, we attempt to define *logos* as a *cosmo*logical and apprehensible principle rather than an alogical and irrational one. Assuming the polemical approach and describing whatever way of thinking *beyond* the commonly accepted logical reasoning as *alogical* and whatever system of thought *beyond* the commonly

qualified as rational as irrational, would require building our system and arguments in opposition to rationality and logic which would be absurd. Instead, we try to portray *ethos* and its *beyond* within the canvas of *phusis.* If we follow Heidegger's definition of *ethos* as the conceptual abode or dwelling, then in order to understand how it is constructed, we first need to observe the vast land on which it is constructed. So, while defining *logos* as the aesthetic act of constructing this conceptual home, one must not oppose *ethos* to *phusis*. *Polemos*, as the sub-principle through which the effect of *phusis* on *ethos* will prevail, must not be deemed a main principle, as this would lead us to philosophize on *phusis* and *ethos* by way of oppositions, such as the one between man and nature.

Ultimately, Heidegger further parts with Parmenides' interpretation by explicitly choosing to inquire Heraclitean *phusis* over Aristotelian *phusis*. He understands that in Aristotle's understanding, *phusis* can only be a derivative of the original *phusis*, and that the philosophy of nature must be thought as *historia peri phuseôs* or the inquiry into the essence of *phusis*: "In conclusion let us give thought to the saying of a thinker from those beginnings, one who speaks directly of *phusis* and who means by it the being of beings as such as a whole."[62] Referring to the fragment 123 (*phusis kruptesthai philei*) "Nature loves to hide," Heidegger defines *being* (or *phusis*) as an emerging appearance intrinsically inclining towards self-concealment.[63] He furthers this point in his analysis of the relation between *phusis* and *morphe*: "We find what is *phusis*-like only where we come upon a *placing into the appearance*; i.e., only where there is *morphe*. Thus *morphe* constitutes the essence of *phusis*, or at least co-constitutes it."[64] This becomes more evident through the association of appearance with *kinēsis*, the change from one stage or thing to another through appearing.[65] Therefore, *phusis* must not be split into *ule* and *morphe* (matter and form),[66] but rather this dualism must be abandoned altogether to approach the original *phusis*, the elemental and timeless dynamism of the whole. Whatever comes to appearance appears as a part of *phusis* and their coming into being requires the ordering of *logos* which relates the individual appearances to the unity of *phusis*, the appearing movedness of all things. But why do we need to refer to *logos* in our discussion of the relation between *morphe* and *phusis*? Heidegger suggests that Aristotle does not rely on *logos* as a linguistic principle but rather uses it to relate the original motion of beings to the ways in which they appear as the individual parts of this moving unity (or *kosmos*).[67]

Nonetheless, Heidegger also maintains that *phusis* cannot be solely reduced to the sensible appearing *nature*: "*Phusis*, the emerging sway is not synonymous with these (natural) processes, which we still today count as part of nature. This emerging and standing-out-in-itself-from-itself may not be taken as just one process among others that we observe in beings."[68] Then, associating *phusis* with "becoming," he continues, "This emerging, abiding sway includes both becoming as well as Being in the narrower sense of fixed continuity. *Phusis* is the event of *standing forth.*"[69] Indeed if one construes *phusis* as *nature* only, then "the inceptive philosophy of the Greeks turns into a philosophy of nature, a representation of all things according to which they are really of a material na-

ture."[70] For a satisfactory clarification of the Heraclitean *phusis* in the present task of defining the principles of motion in Kantian and Nietzschean philosophy, Heideggerian metaphysics and physiology can provide substantial insight. According to Heidegger, early Greek philosophy genuinely captured the dynamism of Being; but, with the passage of time, the theological doctrines (during the reign of Christianity), and the supremacy of rationalism (Plato, Aristotle and the Enlightenment thought) burdened and crystallized the idea of Being This is why Heidegger extensively borrows from the "original dynamics" unique to Heraclitean thought. Consequently, *phusis* (in Heraclitus' fragments) is not identical to the modern concept of "physics." In any case, Heraclitus did not use it simply to mean external-formal or internal-substantial nature, but rather to refer to nature as becoming, change, constant destruction and reconstruction. Thus we use the Heraclitean *phusis* as the central term while discussing the evolution of the concept of "physics" and principle of motion in Kant's *Opus Postumum*.

From the Heraclitean Phusis to Kant's Metaphysics of Nature

In his introduction to *Being and Time*, Heidegger construes Kantian transcendental logic as "an *a priori* logic of the realm of Being called nature."[71] In the *Metaphysical Foundations*, Kant confirms this point arguing that the metaphysics of nature "must always contain solely the principles that are not empirical (for precisely this reason it bears the name of a metaphysics), but it can still either: *first*, treat the laws that make possible the concept of a nature in general," and thus not determined according to the things of the sensible world "in which case it is the *transcendental* part of metaphysics of nature; or *second*, concern itself with a particular nature of this or that kind of thing, for which an empirical concept is given" but here "such a science must still always be called a metaphysics of nature."[72] That is what allows Kant (in *Opus Postumum*) to define physics as follows:

> Physics is not an *empirical system* (for that would be a contradictory concept) but a doctrinal system of all empirical representations. The latter, as regards their form, are initially *given a priori* in appearance [through] the relation of the moving forces; then, however, *thought* through the understanding as in combination under a principle—not apprehended, but inserted *a priori* into empirical intuition (into sensible representation) by the subject itself.[73]

These passages raise the following important questions feeding into the comparison between the Kantian and Heraclitean cosmology on the grounds of the principle of motion: How does physics become "*phusis*" in *Opus Postumum*? Can we substantiate Kant's acknowledgement of the complexity and unity of Nature through an examination of the Heraclitean *phusis*? And if so, how? To what extent is the demonstration of the dynamic relation between *phusis* (as motion) and *logos* (as transition) compatible with Kant's attempt to generate a *new* met-

aphysics of nature through *Übergang*? How does this relate to the dependence of the realization of nature on its transition to intelligible concepts?

KANT'S PRINCIPLE OF MOTION AND METAPHYSICS OF NATURE

Introduction to **Kant's Principle** of Motion

> *Physiology* (as pure product of reason) can be either the doctrine of science [*Wissenschaftslehre*] or the *doctrine of wisdom* [*Weisheitslehre*]. As the doctrine of science it founds physics, and as the doctrine of wisdom, it founds philosophy.[74]
>
> (Immanuel Kant, *Opus Postumum*)

Motion, as the *arkhē* of *kosmos*, defines the cause of existence of matter because matter communicates itself to human inner sense and outer senses through motion, and even matter itself is a temporary form of motion. Heraclitus articulates this as follows: "Things exhausted fall back to fire, and fire exhausted falls back into things." Aristotle confirms this by defining *ule* (matter) as the whence of *kinēsis* (motion). [75] Therefore, any physical or metaphysical claim concerning an individual matter should refer to its internally or externally oriented motion. Cosmologically, we need to refer to the moving forces of matter (instead of the matter itself) and the self-moving active human understanding (instead of the movable object). What would be Kant's take on these Pre-Socratic cosmological arguments? Can we establish an intrinsic relation between Kant's principles of motion and the *historia peri phuseôs* tradition?

Tuschling argues that "Kant begins not as a metaphysician but as a natural philosopher with a decided interest in metaphysics."[76] Guyer too stresses Kant's aim to found his metaphysics of nature as a deductive and theoretical philosophy on the system he developed in the first *Critique*.[77] In other places such as the *First Introduction* to his third *Critique*, Kant describes the knowledge of nature as the theoretical (principle-generating) part of philosophy without which we cannot set up experiments.[78] This shows not only that Kant viewed physics as dependent on the philosophy of nature, and ethics on the philosophy of freedom, but also that his concept of nature is not limited to physics itself, but encompasses the entire territory of theoretical philosophy. Thus, his philosophy of nature recalls the Pre-Socratic *historia peri phuseôs* tradition in which nature, both as a sensible and a supersensible entity, provides the principles for the philosophical systems of these thinkers (who are rightly called cosmologists).

This approach views Kant as a "cosmotheoros who creates the elements of knowledge of the world himself, *a priori*, from which, as, at the same time, an inhabitant of the world, he constructs a world-vision [*Weltbeschauung*] in the

idea."[79] Therefore, according to Tuschling, Kantian philosophy in general (and not only in his critical period) is similar to the philosophies of Leibniz and Wolff. In our view, however, what distinguishes Kant from these other thinkers is not only his alternative take on the idea of the autonomous will as the *consequence* of the metaphysical-moral character of the faculties of human mind, but also his understanding of physics or *phusis* as the main source of every cosmological idea—for the generation of every universal *Weltanschauung*. This type of thinking, which brings Kant closer to the Pre-Socratics, reveals itself most manifestly in the unfinished *Opus Postumum*. Only in *Opus Postumum* does Kant become a fully-fledged natural philosopher as he attempts to construct a philosophy of nature through the systematic approach he developed in his critical period.

While designing his philosophy of nature, Kant sought to address the following persistent question: what would be the most appropriate term to stand for the *arkhē* of all matter in the universe and underlie the dynamism and force of all organisms including humans? Kant recurrently and interchangeably uses "ether," "caloric"[80] and "motion" in *Opus Postumum*. But a common characteristic brings these terms together: they all essentially represent the primordial all-penetrating movement. Moreover, in *Metaphysical Foundations*, his extensive analyses of the qualities, directions, modes and forms of the moving forces that are essentially linked to one motive source makes "motion" eligible to encompass and stand for all these concepts. He himself approves the possibility of transposable identification of this primordial material: "One wishes to know whether something like this all-penetrating material distributed throughout the universe (call it caloric or ether or whatever) *exists*"[81] and he answers that "a material in cosmic space *exists*, which forms the basis for all moving forces of matter, may be inferred *a priori*, according to the principle of identity, from the fact that the actuality of empty space (without limitation by full space) would not be an object of possible experience."[82] That is, we can only perceive moving things, which leads to the conclusion that only the things that are in movement exist and that only their movement makes them possible objects of experience.

In *Opus Postumum*, Kant summarizes his arguments on the primary qualities of the principle of motion as follows:

> The basis of all possible perceptions of the moving forces of matter in space and time is the concept of an elementary material, distributed everywhere in cosmic space, attracting and repelling only in its own parts, and which is continuously internally self-moving. Its concept is made into the sole principle (i.e. the principle of motion)[83] for the possibility of experience of an absolute whole of all internally moving forces of matter. . . . This form of a universally distributed, all penetrating world-material, which is in continuous motion in its own location, characterizes the originally moving matter as a real, existing material, according to the principle of the possibility of experience itself.[84]

Following Kant's argumentation, we analyze his presentation of the principle of motion (especially its role in *Opus Postumum*) in the following order: Motion as

the Primary Cosmic Principle, Motion as a Dynamic Continuum, Motion as the Determinant of Time and Space, and the Role and Necessity of Transition in the Communication of Motion.

Motion as the Primary Cosmic Principle

In 1929, after ten years of intense observation of the universe, the physical cosmologist Hubble concluded that the universe is not static but constantly and dynamically expanding. This led Einstein to admit the failure of his theory of "the cosmological constant," and proved that actually the universe involves a dynamic primal force which sets everything in motion. Kant initially presents this idea in his *True Estimations of Living Forces* through such arguments as "Everything begins with force. It is even prior to extension;" "Nature's units are active forces. Their action is constructive; they make and sustain the fabric of nature;" "The world is a tapestry of energy concentrations;" "Forces rule everything, not only bodily motions, but all activities. This includes mind-body interaction—materially produced ideas and mentally intended actions."[85] Motion constitutes the primary cosmic principle that guides every other principle. In other words, motion is the *arkhē* of cosmos underlying all elemental and dynamic moving forces of matter and all human concepts of understanding. In *Opus Postumum*, Kant describes the priority and necessity of this kind of matter as follows:

> The whole of cosmic space as an object of possible experience is not empty in any of its parts, but is a full space, for empty space is not an object of possible experience. The material, which must be attributed to it in this regard, is, with its properties . . . not a hypothetical material, but one that emerges from *a priori* concepts, according to the law of identity. For, in virtue of this all-penetration, the unity of this material (as of space itself) is the highest principle for the possibility of experience of outer sensible beings, and, since matter in this space independently resists all other matter of the same kind, this material is the elementary material.[86]

In the later fascicles of *Opus Postumum*, he continues,

> One all-embracing, all-penetrating material of the manifold . . . lies at the basis of these materials (without being hypothetical) in a whole of the elementary system; it is this which dynamically forms the subject of the moving forces in a single system.[87]

Moreover, in the *Metaphysical Foundations*, as Friedman argues, "Kant suggests that the only way we can realize or instantiate concretely the abstract concepts and principles of transcendental philosophy is precisely by the objects of specifically outer intuition by matter as the movable in space."[88] In that sense,

motion is inherent in any matter and any concept representing it, and thus is the life-giving or identifying element of all matter.

Regarding the inherence of motion in any object of the senses, Förster draws attention to the following passage in the first *Critique*: "The material for the possibility of all objects of the senses must thus be presupposed as given in one *Inbegriff* or whole, upon whose limitation and determination of all things and their distinction from one another must be based."[89] However, in his Postulate of Dynamics in *Opus Postumum*, Kant goes one step further and abandons the distinction between appearances and things in themselves and establishes the confounding of unity as a *task*. But, how does *Inbegriff* or the dynamic whole become *Weltbegriff*? Or how does the neutral *kinēsis* transform into *phusis* to become the cosmological principle? To be able to address these questions, we must first consider the following ones: what does this *Inbegriff* stand for? What happens if we accomplish this task of the unity of the allegedly distinct realms of thought? Would this verify motion as the primary cosmic element both for the empirical objects and intelligible concepts? And how would this lead to a deconstruction of the supposed distinction between the *a priori* and *a posteriori*?

First, Kant's emphasis on the necessity of an all-unifying *Inbegriff* bridges the gap between his system of the metaphysics of natural science and *phusis*. By bringing the empirical experience and intuitive idea together to represent the collective dynamism of being (as Heidegger too would agree), he avoids reducing it to the mere empirical understanding of the physical moving forces: "Collective idea of all moving forces of matter precedes a priori the distributive idea of all the particular forces, which are only empirical."[90] For Förster, this key argument of *Opus Postumum* reduces "the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* of 1786 to a mere 'doctrine of motion.'"[91] But, why is it important to recognize motion as the unifying principle or doctrine? What would motion as the metaphysical foundation stand for? Referring to Kant's early essay, *Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicae nova dilucidatio*, Tuschling notes that Kant "interprets the principle of sufficient reason, not as a logical principle, but as a cosmological one . . . Both of his 'new' principles result from this cosmological interpretation of the principle of sufficient reason as applied to the representation of a world consisting of physical substances."[92] In line with this argument, in *Kant's Final Synthesis*, Förster writes, "Since the divisions of metaphysics were still seen as stemming from the nature of what exists rather than from 'the essential nature of the thinking faculty' itself (4:472), metaphysical 'foundations' of natural and practical philosophy had to *precede* the philosophical analysis and, by providing cases *in concreto*, vouchsafe the correctness of its methodological procedure."[93] Precisely, the critical philosophical analysis depends on the aptness to understand the cosmological foundations of philosophy.

Subsequently, if we establish that the principle of motion is central to Kant's cosmology, would it be fair to say that it derives from Leibniz's *influxus physicus*? What, if any, is the principal difference between the Kantian and Leibnizian cosmology? And what distinguishes *Opus Postumum* from his early writings? Tuschling claims that even though in his early cosmology Kant did not

take Leibniz's *influxus physicus* for granted, he still felt the need to retain the latter's doctrine of absolute isolationism to build his cosmological argument.[94] But, in *Opus Postumum* Kant explicitly rejects the idea of isolationism and multiplicity of finite individual substances as separate sources of motion. Instead, he proposes a very pre-Socratic understanding of the dependence of all phenomena on one singular source or *arkhē*. Leibniz's *influxus physicus* remains important but is pursued on a more metaphysical-cosmological level, the level of Heraclitean *phusis*. Tuschling rightly stresses that in several books (among them *Monadologia Physica* and *Metaphysical Foundations*) Kant attempts to reconcile what Leibniz was careful to keep apart: physics and metaphysics, dynamically interacting empirically observable matter and self-sufficient supersensible substances.[95]

Yet, how are we to reconcile physics and metaphysics? The answer lies in the era of "not-yet-metaphysical" ideas. There is simply no need to consider physics and metaphysics separately. As such, the only form of thought or science that did not categorize them as two distinct realms of thought is the not-yet-metaphysical cosmology, namely Pre-Socratic *historia peri phuseôs*. How does cosmology embody both physics and metaphysics simultaneously? Cosmology is a science and/or philosophy that claims absolute completeness with regards to the dependence of the existence of what is changeable in appearance. Unlike Plato and Descartes, Kant does not regard appearances as the opposite of truth. On the contrary, since appearances constitute the direct experience of phenomena, they are the main source of the object-determining judgments. Cosmology regards totality not as a fully distinct, unobservable, inapprehensible and spiritual being, but as all-encompassing motion, which is itself the source of change in appearance. As a result, in *Opus Postumum*, Kant distinguishes between the "infinite" and the "totality of reality" and extracts a priori principles from the latter definition of cosmos. Beiser, in his comments on the *Living Forces* and Kant's early metaphysics in general, associates this *kosmos*-creating principle of motion with the inner living-force instead of empirical physics (which observes the mechanical laws of nature).[96]

The intent to show the essential inseparability of physics and metaphysics remained an active motivation in Kantian thought and revealed itself most explicitly in *Opus Postumum*. In fact, following the Pre-Socratics, Kant also used physical observations of the dynamics of nature to draw metaphysical conclusions capable of generating cosmological and/or universal principles that underlie the dynamics of nature and their effects on human understanding. In the end, Tuschling concludes, Kant proceeds to revise in *Opus Postumum* his entire system of the first *Critique*, especially the relations between Aesthetic, Analytic and Dialectic, in accordance with a new principle endorsing the view that *a priori* knowledge and *a posteriori* or empirical observation cannot be separated and examined deprived of the presence of one another.[97]

Motion as the **"Dynamic Continuum"**

In the first *Critique*, Kant crucially defines the world and nature as the dynamic unity of appearances: "World is called nature insofar as it is considered as a dynamic whole and one does not look at the aggregation in space or time so as to bring about a quantity, but looks instead at the unity in the existence of appearances."[98] In the *Metaphysical Foundations of the Natural Science*, Kant explicitly emphasizes the importance of motion for the experience of matter: "The concept of matter is reduced to nothing but moving forces, and one could not expect anything else since no activity or change can be thought in space except mere motion."[99] Therefore, as Friedman rightly argues, Kant's metaphysics of natural science defends, "in general, the 'metaphysical-dynamical' approach which views matter as a true dynamical continuum" and opposes the mathematical-mechanical approach, "which postulates precisely an interspersing of hard elementary corpuscles and empty space from the beginning." [100] Friedman's demonstration of the reducibility of all matter to mere motion (*kinēsis)* and of Kant's explicit support of the metaphysical-dynamical or "cosmological" approach strengthens the argument that motion as represented diversely in moving forces like attraction and repulsion or elemental forces such as fire, water and air, is the primary dynamic continuum.[101]

In line with this argument, Kant underlines the necessity of fire (heat) and energy for moving matter to preserve its state as dynamic continuum, which does not give way to an entirely certain predictable repetitive state. In *Opus Postumum*, he relates the fluidity or dynamism of matter to the element of fire (which thereby has to be the primary cosmic element) as follows: "Since all fluidity requires heat, and since, however, the generation of all cosmic bodies requires a preceding fluid state, and, since this latter is now preserved (at least) by the light of the sun, one may regard the fire-element as a type of matter which moves and is contained in all bodies; by means of heat and light it is the cause of all fluidity."[102] The nineteenth century scientist and physiologist Helmholtz, defending the constancy, transformability and indestructibility of the natural forces, endorses the view that forces possessed by organisms relate to a priori moving forces (or dynamics).[103] More importantly this finding validates the Heraclitean anticipation of *fire* as the primary element for the transformation of the repetitive and totally predictable force into constantly changing dynamic force. This constitutes the central argument of Kant's early writings where he distinguishes moving forces that are not necessarily life-generating from the living force whose being is intrinsically linked with constant becoming.[104]

Opus Postumum while suggesting the incomprehensibility of the idea of a beginning of the all-sustaining motion, also wrestles with the controversy between the impossibility of positing the concept of matter and spontaneous existence of a *primordial* motion inherent in any matter:

> The concept of a primary beginning of motion is itself incomprehensible, and a spontaneous motion of matter is incompatible with [the concept] of matter; nevertheless, a primordial motion of matter and the existence of its moving forces must inevitably be postulated simply because there is motion in cosmic space.[105]

Incidentally, this insight into the role of motion in *kosmos* relates to Hubble's conception of the dynamic expanding universe. Today, most of the physicists studying motion, following Einstein's theory of relativity, agree that motion is always observed and measured against a specific backdrop. However, in the absence of an absolute frame of reference, *absolute motion* cannot be determined. There lies the significance of the concept of *relative motion*. A seemingly unmoving phenomenon according to a certain reference frame is in motion within many other frames. Therefore, all the matter in the universe is moving.[106] In *Opus Postumum*, Kant articulates a similar view as follows:

> Matter, which can begin its own (internal) motion and preserve itself in it, [can] be neither solid, nor fluid, nor coercible. It must, rather, be permanently moving, by its own attraction and repulsion alone. . . . A matter whose function (as possessing moving force) is just this: to make space in an object of experience in general. Attracting and repelling itself internally, it displaces no other [matter] but wholly penetrates it. It naturally moves primordially in order to be an object of experience.[107]

Moreover, in the last pages of his third *Critique*, contrasting the concept of moving force with the *prime mover*, he argues:

> If I conceive of a supersensible being as the prime mover, thus conceive of it by means of the category of causality with regard to the same determination in the world (the motion of matter), then I must not conceive of it as existing in some location in space, nor as extended, indeed I may not even think of it as existing in time and simultaneously with other things. . . . Consequently, I do not have any cognition of it through the predicate of cause (as prime mover); rather, I have only the representation of something that contains the ground of motions in the world; and the relation of these motions to this something, as their cause, since it tells me nothing else about the constitution of this thing which is the case, leaves the concept of it completely empty. The reason for this is that with predicates that find their object only in the sensible world I can certainly progress to the existence of something which must contain the ground of those predicates, but I cannot progress to the determination of its concept as a supersensible being, which excludes all those predicates.[108]

This passage constitutes one of Kant's many attempts to show the impossibility of proving a supreme intelligent being or God through the causal relation between the prime mover and the moving forces in the sensible realm. Yet he seems to have believed in their correspondence through the "moral being of man," especially in the last fascicles of *Opus Postumum*. However, for our pur-

pose, this passage specifically works to demonstrate how Kant's thinking about motion and nature is very reminiscent of Pre-Socratic *phusis*. For both contain the cosmological ground for the predicates whose objects lie in the sensible realm, and both find a purely supersensible (or metaphysical) being unthinkable and indeterminable. While Kant accepts the existence of a cosmic ground or prime mover that encompasses all the appearances, he also points to the emptiness of its concept. Here he does not explore this point any further but, as we have seen in the earlier section on the principle of transition, in *Opus Postumum*, Kant struggles from the beginning with this problem, and hints at the possibility of the transition from the metaphysical foundations of natural science (or the principle of motion) to physics (or the sensible world). In one of his attempts to converge metaphysics and physics, he argues:

> The matter which fills space can, at any one place, only be internally in motion. And yet it can be an object of possible experience . . . as a primordially moving material—not hypothetically invented, but one whose forces give it reality and which underlies all motion of matter; a continuum which, taken in its own right, forms a whole of moving forces, whose existence is known *a priori*.[109]

Physically present motion is itself *a priori* as its metaphysical foundations, and can therefore be analysed both empirically and cosmologically, both through scientific experiments and through cosmological or philosophical speculation. Yet the speculations regarding the reality and dynamism of motion are *not* hypothetical. Since motion and its moving forces communicate with human inner and outer sense simultaneously, they are directly related to the essence of being—hence *categorical*.[110]

Remarkably, as if to confirm the legitimacy of our attempt, Kant makes a much-unexpected confession in a much-unexpected place. In the *Criticism of the third paralogism of transcendental psychology* of the first *Critique* Kant accepts the irrefutability of the Heraclitean notion of universal becoming or the transitory nature of all things, admitting the impossibility of positing a totally persistent and self-conscious subject:

> Even if the saying of some ancient schools, that everything is transitory and nothing in the world is persisting and abiding, cannot hold as soon as one assumes substances, it is still not refuted through the unity of self-consciousness. For we cannot judge even from our own consciousness whether as soul we are persisting or not, because we ascribe to our identical Self only that of which we are conscious; and so we must necessarily judge that we are the very same in the whole of the time of which we are conscious. But from the standpoint of someone else we cannot declare this to be valid because, since in the soul we encounter no persisting appearance other than the representation "I," which accompanies and connects all of them, we can never make out whether this I (a mere thought) does not flow as well as all the other thoughts that are linked to one another through it.[111]

The major Heraclitean doctrine of *panta rhei* makes it impossible to conduct philosophical inquiry by assuming a self-conscious subject or "I," which would potentially be in constant motion as other thoughts, as it rules out the possibility of completely detached reasoning for which is required an unchanging state of mind.

Similarly, Tuschling stresses the necessity of demonstrating the role the dynamic continuum (*kinēsis*) plays in the construction of the unity of all phenomena for the completeness and validity of any philosophical inquiry. This demonstration must extend its focus in relation to and beyond the categories of time and space intuited by the human faculties in accordance with the moving unity (which is individualized in each "I"). The relation between *kinēsis* and the categories of time and space is the subject of the following section.

Motion as the Determinant of Time and Space

In his *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* Heidegger summarizes Kant's *Transcendental Aesthetics* as follows:

> I deliberately call attention to the phenomena of transition, change, alteration, modification, motion, and happening. When Kant in the transcendental aesthetic excludes the motion of objects, the change of place etc., this must not gloss over the fact that, according to the Kantian interpretation of these phenomena, in the end motion—understood more originally—has a far more radical function in the entirety of ontology than space and time.[112]

This section discusses whether it is philosophically possible to demonstrate the primacy of the principle or intuition of motion over the categories of space and time. Motion is regarded as one of the supreme unifying categories together with time and space. Yet, unlike the latter two, it is not imposed *by* the human mind but rather imposed *on* it. It is an unconditioned active category on which the perception of time and space depend. In other words, motion is *the cosmological* category that makes the logical understanding (which necessarily depends on the categories of space and time) possible. Kant argues that the positing of moving forces affecting the human mind precedes the apprehension and conception of spatial and temporal relations.[113] Therefore, the person's relation to motion initially determines his relation to the categories of space and time, and serves as the *prime mover* in the transition that takes place in the human mind. While motion is directly related to being or becoming, the intuitions of time and space are indirectly related to it. While motion is the determining force constantly present in any form of being, time and space are the determined products of the processes and locations of the movements of being. The qualities of space[114] are relative to the movement that has been creating it, and time is only the measure and fragmented representation of this space-generating movement. Referring to

Opus Postumum, Tuschling stresses the *a priori* dependence of the categories of time and space on the dynamic continuum without which they would have no demonstrable (sensible) existence and states that the universal continuum of the moving forces (or the material cosmic totality underlying the formation of physical phenomena) "transforms space and time into an object capable of being experienced."[115] Following this argumentation and in line with Kant's early writings on cosmos and physics, Tuschling wonders how the subjective categories of time and space are essentially related to the system of force.[116] With the inclusion of this new cosmological principle in Kantian philosophy, Tuschling states, "the argument from void space and time, already used in the first *Critique* . . . is replaced by a more radical version, namely, that space and time as such do not refer to existent things at all; they lose, therefore, their rank as supreme conditions of empirical existents and are now seen as mere attributes of the dynamical material or primordial matter."[117] As a result, Kant had to devise a new, a priori deduction of cosmic matter through a new cosmological principle that must be founded on the moving forces.[118]

Unlike in the *Metaphysical Foundations* and *Opus Postumum*, in his early writings, as Schönfeld points out, Kant was looking for an explanation for the definition of force rather than a thorough and systematic examination of the category or principle of motion:

> In *Living Forces* he explicitly argues that force is the essence of action (# 4). This action is a pulse that "broadens out" (# 9-10). Out-broadening of force (*ausbreiten*; 1:24.23) is an out-stretching of space (*Ausdehnung*; 1:24.6). Force makes the continuum, being governed, in turn, by the created structure (# 10). Dynamic interaction turns force into a field and the void into a plenum. Kant anticipated that momentum-energy is the substantial correlate of spacetime. Bypassing Newton, he caught up with Einstein.[119]

Highlighting the accord between Kant's claims regarding the nature of our intuitions of space and time and the early fascicles of *Opus Postumum*, Tuschling suggests that the argument that "empty space and empty time cannot be objects of possible experience turns out to be of crucial importance." As Kant writes in *Opus Postumum*:

> The basis of all possible perceptions of the moving forces of matter in space and time is the concept of an elementary material, distributed everywhere in cosmic space, attracting and repelling only in its own parts, and which is continuously internally self-moving.[120]

Regarding this point, Tuschling underlines the necessity of revising the transcendental philosophy as a whole alongside Kant's theory of space and time.[121] Kant outlines his argument concerning the dependence of time and space on the existence of an elementary motion in several occasions:

> As the principle of possible experience of all the dimensions of space, it is the opposite of empty space. Since, in space, everything can change position, except for space itself, and no space, as empty, is an object of experience, it follows that this matter is extended through the entire cosmos and that its existence is necessary—necessary, that is to say, relative to objects of the senses.[122]

In another instance, Kant construes space as "a quantum, which must always be presented as part of a greater quantum—hence, as infinite, and *given* as such. Progress in this quantum is not to be regarded as given; the progression, however, is."[123] Still, although acknowledging the necessity of recognizing the principle of motion as that which contains all empirical laws, Kant also deems it impossible to use the law of the continuity of change as a ground for a theory of nature. As a result, in the third *Critique*, he still reduces this principle to the formal condition of inner intuition, or time.[124] However, in *Opus Postumum*, Kant finally concedes that the principle of motion is a separate principle that governs the law of the continuity of change both in empirical science and rational thought, thus preceding and determining the intuitions of time and space.[125]

In that sense, *phusis* as *kosmos* determines the intuitions of space and time since both are subject to the principle according to which they are/become the intuitions of a whole—one that must always be considered a part of a greater whole: "One sees from this that the manifold in space and time does not contain things in themselves, but only appearances, which are given synthetically *a priori.*" Kant then repeats the supreme transcendental problem, and states: "They are possible only insofar as their object is restricted merely to appearance."[126] This view endorses the shift in Kantian transcendentalism from a general critical metaphysics to a cosmological one, particularly when we recall his definition of the cosmical concepts in the first *Critique*. Tuschling seconds this observation referring to the argument that the revision of the concept of empirical existence in space and time makes it impossible to posit a clear-cut distinction between the intuitions of space and time. Rather, along with Kant's admission of the principle of motion, the categories of time and space need to be conceived as different ways of positing the moving cosmic whole.[127] Tuschling then endorses Kant's categorization of the primordial moving matter as the determining dynamic force on the categories and concepts like time, space, substance, causality and interaction stressing the requirement of a new approach to the systematic philosophical thinking. This necessarily goes beyond the dyadic system of the faculties of reason and understanding and which thereby revolutionizes the intuitive categories of space and time.[128]

Recently, Russian and American scientists conducted several experiments on the relationship between the physical processes affected by the gravitational force and the measurement of time.[129] One of the most striking experiments proving the role of the moving matter in the determination of time is the measurement of the delay of a radio signal in the gravitational field of the Sun. This demonstrates the dependence of frequency and time on the gravitational field of the object, which changes according to the magnitude, and motion of the object.

The dependency of space and time on the dynamic principle of motion has also been explored by cosmological theories such as the space-time background dependence theory.[130]

In conclusion, both for Kant and for modern physical cosmology, "the doctrine of space and time as pure forms of intuition no longer establishes the possibility of experiencing space, time, and objects in space and time."[131] Rather, they have become the conceptions determined by the moving forces. Since motion must be preliminary to time, each motion generates another definition and version of time rather than vice versa. The transition of the intuitions of space and time to metaphysical foundations takes place through our judgments on the intuition of motion. This finding brings us back to our earlier discussion on the relation between the principles of motion and transition which we will now examine from the point of view of the Kantian cosmology.

The Role and Necessity of Transition in the Communication of Motion (*Phusis* and *Logos*)

The previous discussion outlined two distinct concepts of *transition:* first a state of constant motion, change or becoming, or *phusis,* and second a link between different realms of thought or types of concepts, or *logos*. This is why *logos* is not *logos* if it fails to connect human thinking and conceptualization to the primordial forces in nature; and *phusis* is not *phusis* (in the sense of nature, dynamism and life) where it is not communicated to human understanding through *logos* even though both principles tend to remain hidden from most[132]. Kant relates the moving forces to the human senses for their representation: "Motion, like everything that is represented through the senses, is given only as appearance. For its representation to become experience, we require, in addition, that something be thought through the understanding—namely, besides the mode in which the representation inheres in the subject, also the determination of an object thereby."[133] The moving thing becomes an object of experience only when it is determined according to the principle of motion by the human senses and understanding. This point demonstrates the relevance and necessity of a philosophy, which contemplates how motion is perceived or intuited by the human senses and intuitions, and conceptualised by human understanding, and examines the inherent relation between the principles of motion and transition, and hence between cosmology and aesthetics.

In *Opus Postumum*, Kant asserts that the primordial motion is only demonstrable *a priori* by way of the transition from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics:

> Primordially moving matters presuppose a material, penetrating and filling the whole of cosmic space, as the condition of the possibility of experience of the moving forces in this space. This primary material is not conceived hypotheti-

> cally, for the explanation of phenomena; it is, rather, identically contained for reason, as a categorically and *a priori* demonstrable material, in the transition from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics.[134]

This extract explicitly illustrates a *shift* in Kant's arguments concerning the representation of motion. While in *Metaphysical Foundations of Phenomenology* Kant was satisfied that moving matter is thought and represented through understanding, here, he seems to assign the task of explaining and demonstrating motion to the faculty of *reason* which makes the principle of motion *categorical* and *a priori*. In that sense, motion is not simply sensed and empirically represented; but it is inherent in the process of *transition* from the metaphysical foundations to physics. Meanwhile, in his advanced theory of motion, Kant returns again to the faculty of understanding: "Understanding and experience form, indeed, the sum of all our knowledge: both the *a priori* and the *a posteriori*. But what do we mean by the understanding? [To say that] it is an ability, derived from experience, to use the understanding in accordance with its laws, is an explanation in a circle. It is the faculty of connecting representations with consciousness of their rule."[135] In the end, both human understanding and human reason are instrumental in the derivation of the principle of motion.

Although in the early fascicles of *Opus Postumum* Kant tries to solve the problem of the representation of motion through the demonstration of the existence of an "a priori demonstrable material," he later returns to his transcendental method to show the unity of all empirical existence of moving forces as the products of the a priori synthesis generated within human apprehension. Guyer underlines that Kant, as early as the first *Critique*, associates the systematic thinking to the unity of reason in an idea which precedes the knowledge of the separate parts and determines them as related parts. He adds, Kant "goes on to suggest that what accomplishes this are explanatory concepts of pure, fundamental substances, e.g. pure earth, pure water, pure air,[136] etc. Such concepts are necessary so as to determine the share that each of these natural causes has in the appearance. . . . What reason requires is explanation in terms of a pure principle, indeed not several but just one such principle."[137] I argue that this principle is the cosmological principle of motion, which, as a cognitive idea, precedes, determines and unifies all things and processes of nature according to the character of the whole or *kosmos*. Both elemental forces such as fire, air and water, and dynamical forces like attraction and repulsion are the versions, phases or directions of the principle of motion or *phusis*. As if to prelude the fundamental principle of motion he later developed in *The Metaphysical Foundations* and *Opus Postumum*, Kant expands on this argument in the first *Critique* as follows:

> The idea of a fundamental power—though logic does not at all ascertain whether there is such a thing—is at least the problem set by a systematic representation of the manifoldness of powers. The logical principle of reason demands this unity as far as it is possible to bring it about, and the more the appearances of this power and that power are found to be identical, the more probable it becomes that they are nothing but different expressions of one and

> the same power, which can be called (comparatively) their fundamental power. . . . These comparatively fundamental powers must once again be compared with one another so as to discover their unanimity and thereby bring them close to a single radical, i.e., absolutely fundamental, power.[138]

Consequently, Guyer points out that in the first fascicles of *Opus Postumum*, Kant repeatedly tried to prove the existence of an ether, that is, a continuous matter which is "all-extended, all-pervasive, uniformly agitating itself throughout all parts of the space which it occupies or also fills by repulsion and infinitely enduring in this motion (21:593.12-15)."[139] Yet, Tuschling asks, how is it possible to deduce the experience of the totality of moving forces in general from the self? In other words, how does the cosmological idea of collective unity of the moving forces ensure the transition? This is only possible if and when we consider motion as the *constitutive* and transition as the *regulative* principle: transition must, through the regulative judgment, be founded on the constitutive intuition of motion representing the nature as a whole.[140] In that, the physical moving forces constituting the synthesis have irretrievable effects on the faculties of sense-intuition and perception through which the transition takes place.[141]

On the possibility of the relation between the relation between the cosmological principle of motion and aesthetic principle of transition Nietzsche writes, "Our senses have a particular quantum as a medium span within which they function, i.e. we experience large and small in relation to the conditions of our existence. If we sharpened or blunted our senses tenfold, we would perish."[142] He further expands on this point in his Heraclitus seminar discussing the significance of the particular balance (or special measure sometimes used to describe the Heraclitean *logos*) of human senses for the maintenance of the life-sustaining principle of necessity. While the principle of transition checks and balances the capacity of human senses for their compatibility with the moving forces of nature, the principle of necessity sustains the physiological ground for the continuity of human existence. But both principles are essentially fuelled by and therefore dependent on the principle of motion—*phusis*.

In the following section, I attempt to provide further clarification on the Kantian principle of motion in light of the Kantian sublime (also with reference to its function in the process of aesthetic transition), as the representation of the principle of the underlying constitutive dynamism inherent in things in nature, before moving on to Nietzsche's cosmology and physiology.

The Principle of Motion and the Kantian Sublime

After elucidating the aesthetic argument with regard to the sublime presented in the first chapter on the principle of transition, it is now crucial to relate it to the cosmological argument constructed regarding the principle of motion with references to the Heraclitean and Kantian cosmology. The following passage from

the third *Critique* links the two main points regarding the notion of the sublime, namely the aesthetic argument on its representation of the transition and cosmological argument on its dynamical relation to the principle of motion:

> The mind feels itself moved in the representation of the sublime in nature, while in the aesthetic judgment on the beautiful in nature it is in calm contemplation. This movement (especially in its inception) may be compared to a vibration, i.e., to a rapidly alternating repulsion from and attraction to one and the same object. What is excessive for the imagination (to which it is driven in the apprehension of the intuition) is as it were an abyss, in which it fears to lose itself, yet for reason's idea of the supersensible to produce such an effort of the imagination is not excessive but lawful, hence it is precisely as attractive as it was repulsive for mere sensibility. Even in this case, however, the judgment itself remains only aesthetic because, without having a determinate concept of the object as its ground, it represents merely the subjective play of the powers of the mind (imagination and reason) as harmonious even in their contrast.[143]

First of all, this passage reveals the necessity to consider sublime in nature both cosmologically and aesthetically. Any judgment made on the sublime must be analysed in accordance with the reconciliation of these complementary approaches. The simultaneous effect of the natural forces of attraction and repulsion creates a pulsating imagination by initially disturbing or penetrating in the aesthetic faculties of the human mind. This plays an important role in the determination of the quality of the satisfaction in the judging of the sublime. Here, the sublime as the product of a merely subjective play of human faculties (unlike in the case of the judgment on the beautiful) clearly demonstrates the *total involvement of the "judge" within the judgment*. The latter has indeed become "attached" to the phenomenon or force he is judging within the process of judgment itself, as he ceases to be mere subject and becomes exposed to the natural phenomenon or force being attracted and repelled and thereby moved by it. In his *Pre-Platonic Philosophers* lecture series, Nietzsche suggests that the judgment on the motion in nature is actually part of that motion or eternal becoming, which is why the judge must be viewed as an extension of the flux:

> Eternal Becoming possesses something at first terrifying and uncanny: the strongest comparison is to the sensation whereby someone, in the middle of the ocean or during an earthquake, observes all things in motion. It calls for an astonishing power to transmit the effects of sublimity and joyful awe to those confronting it. If everything is in Becoming, then, accordingly, predicates cannot adhere to a thing but rather likewise must be in the flow of Becoming.[144]

Hence, the tie that bonds simultaneously judge and judgment allows one to artistically transmit (the sublimity) and be naturally transmitted to the theoretical realm of ideas while categorizing the judgment under an idea, i.e. the idea of nature. The simultaneity of the tie mirrors the simultaneity of the apprehension of the principle of motion and its representation through the aesthetic transition. Thereby while the judge or the artist begins to see himself aesthetically within a

cosmic picture, at the same time, he transmits the aesthetic representation of the natural force or phenomenon affecting him through the faculty of reflecting judgment. The former transformation occurs as a result of the movement of his sense-intuition and the latter owing to the play between the faculties of reason and imagination which causes the experience to be called sublime in the first place. This relation between the motion in nature felt, sensed or intuited during the experience and the movement of the cognitive faculties of the mind reinforces our claim that the representation of the sublime in the faculties of human mind links nature to art by representing the latter as an aesthetic idea.

On what condition does the objective (phenomenal) movement transform into the subjective movement of imagination through the experience of the sublime? How can they be apprehended in one intuition? And how is it possible to represent them aesthetically as the stages of one transition? Sublime is the judgment on an experience or feeling that represents nature as an idea encompassing the entirety of the sensible phenomena by transforming the sensible nature into an aesthetic idea: "That is sublime which even to be able to think of demonstrates a faculty of the mind that surpasses every measure of the senses."[145] Kant implies here that the sublime surpasses the sense-perception (*Empfindung*) as well as the sense-intuition (*Anschauung*), and thus necessarily resorts to the ideas of reason. But as this surpassing alters our way of conceiving the phenomena (e.g. the astronauts' experience of seeing the Earth from the Moon), the sublime becomes the aesthetic representation of the totality which is ascribed to nature. It reaches this cosmological level by aesthetically unifying our conceptual understanding in a higher, solely apprehensible idea of the whole. The sublime leads our faculty of judgment to embark on a process of transition from the sensible to the supersensible only to surpass mere perception of phenomena and affirm the unified totality (*kosmos*) it represents. Kant puts this as follows: "Just because there is in our imagination a striving to advance to the infinite, while in our reason there lies a claim to absolute totality, as to a real idea, the very inadequacy of our faculty for estimating the magnitude of the things of the sensible world awakens the feeling of a supersensible faculty in us."[146] Clarifying the link between the cosmological and aesthetic arguments on the sublime, the progression toward the infinite unity reveals why the sublime must be posited as the aesthetic representation of the universal *logos*. On another occasion, Kant emphasizes the importance of the progression towards the supersensible unity that represents nature through the aesthetic process:

> The proper unalterable basic measure of nature is its absolute whole, which, in the case of nature as appearance, is infinity comprehended. But since this basic measure is a self-contradictory concept (on account of the impossibility of the absolute totality of an endless progression), that magnitude of a natural object on which the imagination fruitlessly expends its entire capacity for comprehension must lead the concept of nature to a supersensible stratum (which grounds both it and at the same time our faculty for thinking), which is great beyond any standard of sense and hence allows not so much the object as rather the disposition of the mind in estimating it to be judged sublime.[147]

In other words, the imaginative and thought-provoking attempt to comprehend the natural phenomena and forces as parts of the universal whole makes the very concept of nature supersensible alongside our idea-producing faculty of reason. Here, Kant makes clear that it is not the natural phenomena but rather this aesthetic process of transition between the sensible and supersensible, and the final apprehension (through human reason) of the unity within nature that must be called *sublime*. Hence, in the case of the judgment of the sublime, it is neither the idea nor a specific phenomenon that initiates the process but rather the process of transition generates them through the reflecting judgment activated by the experience of nature as appearance (which finally culminates in the imaginative idea of nature).

Furthermore, according to Kant, the sublime pushes human mind to apprehend the transition from the sensible stratum to the supersensible substratum.[148] By clearly stating that the sublime *pushes* the human mind, he identifies the sublime as the aesthetic representation of the moving forces of nature that have sensible and direct effect on the human being. Moreover, he argues that the sublime leads to "the consequent comprehension of the manifold unity of intuition." The sublime represents abundance, vastness, and the manifold unity of nature containing human subjects as the objects of Nature. However, he then reduces the quantitatively unbounded and limitless, and qualitatively non-purposive nature of the imagined sublime to our faculty of Reason. His idea of the absolute whole converts the non-purposive and irrational nature of the sublime into a purposive and rational one (as purpose and rationality of a phenomenon are the main constituents for it to be represented as concept).

As a consequence, the principle of motion plays a crucial role in Kant's categorization of the beautiful and the sublime. He classifies these conceptions according to the ways they relate to motion:

> [The beautiful] directly brings with it a feeling of the promotion of life, and hence is compatible with charms and an imagination at play, while the latter [the feeling of the sublime] is a pleasure that arises only indirectly, being generated, namely, by the feeling of a momentary inhibition of the vital powers and the immediately following and all the more powerful outpouring of them. . . . Hence it is also incompatible with charms, and, since the mind is not merely attracted by the object, but is also reciprocally repelled by it, the satisfaction in the sublime does not so much contain positive pleasure as it does admiration or respect, i.e., it deserves to be called negative pleasure.[149]

The sublime natural phenomenon, by simultaneously attracting and repelling, causes the inhibition and outpouring of the vital powers. Therefore, for Kant, it is not charming and pleasurable but provides a negative satisfaction. But should we call this a "negative pleasure" just because the experience of the sublime while attracting also repels human senses? On the contrary, as attraction followed by repulsion provides a *pulsation* the experience transforms into something tangible and continuous by forcing human imagination to adapt to the formless dynamism it represents. This is exactly what we mean by the *motive*

role of the sublime transmitting between the motion inherent in nature and the movement it causes in the faculties of human mind. Similarly, Kant crucially refers to *pain* (*pathos*) as the trigger of the required extension of our Imagination. Hence, this experience should and cannot be called negative just because it repels the human faculties because it, as in the case of the beautiful, also *promotes* life. However, according to Kant, it is possible to call the experience of the sublime negative because human mind has less control over it or because it is simply *moved* by it. Yet as suggested above this response is not satisfactory because it fails to describe the creative motivation the sublime phenomenon activates in the faculties of the one experiencing it.

Kant also argues that the categories of the mathematical and dynamical do not only apply to the sublime. All phenomena are subjected to the aesthetic measure applied by the faculty of judgment which serves as a mediator between the quanta and appearances of phenomena:

> The judging of things as great or small applies to everything, even to all their properties; hence we call even beauty great or small; the reason for which is to be sought in the fact that whatever we may present in intuition in accordance with the precept of the power of judgment (and hence represent aesthetically) is entirely appearance, and hence is also a quantum.[150]

This crucial passage demonstrates not only the essential relation between the mathematically and dynamically sublime, but also more importantly the relation between appearance and motion or *morphe* and *phusis*. This substantiates the link between the aesthetic power of judgment and the cosmic principle of motion as the unifying principle of all quanta.

Likewise, Kant demonstrates how the intuitions of space and time are essentially related to simultaneous attempts to link the mathematical judgment on the movement in space to the aesthetic judgment on the movement in human imagination as follows:

> The measurement of a space (as apprehension) is at the same time the description of it, thus an objective movement in the imagination and a progression; by contrast, the comprehension of multiplicity in the unity not of thought but of intuition, hence the comprehension in one moment of that which is successively apprehended, is a regression, which in turn cancels the time-condition in the progression of the imagination and makes simultaneity intuitable. It is thus (since temporal succession is a condition of inner sense and of an intuition) a subjective movement of the imagination, by which it does violence to the inner sense, which must be all the more marked the greater the quantum is which the imagination comprehends in one intuition.[151]

In that sense, both the experiences of the mathematically sublime phenomena and the judgment we make on them are essentially the products of the greatest quantum the faculty of imagination can comprehend in one intuition momentarily cancelling the intuitions of time and space and paving the way for the imagi-

nation of the idea of nature. The successively apprehended motive elements of the sublime entail the annihilation of time in our aesthetic judgment due to the movement of our Imagination.[152]

Finally, one last point needs to be raised to complete our examination of the principle of motion in Kant's aesthetics of the sublime. Sublime actions (alongside sublime works of art), as the representations of the underlying *phusis*, are the most important components of human *ethos*. Among these, Kant mentions war conducted in an ordered and careful way as an example:

> Even war, if it is conducted with order and reverence for the rights of the civilians, has something sublime about it, and at the same time makes the mentality of the people who conduct it in this way all the more sublime . . . whereas a long peace causes the spirit of mere commerce to predominate, along with base selfishness, cowardice and weakness, and usually debases the mentality of the populace.[153]

Accordingly, it would be appropriate to define war as the confrontation of the repelling moving forces after which the weaker force becomes annihilated and the stronger and more ordered force survives to enhance and reconstruct its culture. War, when understood as the pulsation created by the clash of repulsive forces, is a necessity for the destruction, revival or regeneration of a culture weakened and exhausted by the static, peaceful and repetitive state of commerce and selfishness. As a result, war is sublime because it functions as the disclosure of the real state of different civilizations determining whether they are exhausted or powerful and thus strengthening the link between human *ethos* and primordial forces. This argument echoes the Heraclitean strife or *polemos* as used by Nietzsche particularly in his notions of eternal recurrence and will-to-power.

Like Nietzsche, Kant here stresses the relation between the power of nature (*Macht*) and the human faculties (*Krafte*) indispensable for the perception, conceptualization, judgment and categorization (as ideas) of the motion in/of nature: "Everything that arouses this feeling in us, which includes the power (*Macht*) of nature that calls forth our own powers (*Krafte*), is thus (although improperly) called sublime."[154] In fact, here Kant's purpose is to demonstrate the superiority (*Überlegenheit*) of human rationality over the senseless forces of nature. However, irrespective of his purpose (to show why the motion in nature is improperly called sublime), he essentially approves of the implicit and explicit relation of the power of nature to the human faculties that are *called forth* by the power (*Macht*) of nature or *phusis*. This *calling-forth* of nature moves our faculties and makes us define the experience and action as sublime. Nietzsche's *Wille-zur-Macht* is very comparable to Kant's *Macht* since it similarly defines *Krafte* as the derivation of *Macht* in our own powers. Sublime acts transform *Macht* (motion) into *Krafte* (force). But before embarking on a comprehensive discussion of Nietzsche's *will-to-power* as a cosmological-aesthetic notion, we need to introduce his cosmology and physiology along with his notion of the *eternal recurrence* on which the will-to-power is founded.

NIETZSCHE'S PRINCIPLE OF MOTION AND THE DIONYSIAN AS A COSMOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE

> The question of whether the creation was caused by a desire for fixing, for immortalizing, for *being*, or rather by a desire for destruction, for change, for novelty, for future, for *becoming*. . . . The desire for *destruction*, for change and for becoming can be the expression of an overflowing energy pregnant with the future (my term for this is, as is known, Dionysian) . . . there *could* be a completely different pessimism, a classical one—this intuition and vision belongs to me as inseparable from me, as my *proprium* and *ipsissimum* . . . I call this pessimism of the future—for it is coming! I see it coming! — (*Dionysian* pessimism)."[155]
>
> (Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*)

What desire rules nature? Is it the dynamic desire for multiplication, destruction and becoming, or the logical, calculative and partly mechanical desire for survival, preservation and being? Which one better represents life? How can "superabundance" be a component of any sort of pessimism? These are the questions Nietzsche answers in this crucial passage. This passage is one of the many showing the prominence of Heraclitean and Dionysian views in Nietzsche's thought. The Heraclitean thought informs his doctrine of *becoming* which entails an understanding of life (and human life) as an outcome of *phusis,* while the Dionysian worldview refers to the tragic, aesthetic but direct representation of the reciprocity of overabundance and destruction[156]. Therefore, it is necessary to understand and define Nietzschean aesthetics and ethics in light of his cosmology and physiology, which in turn requires a satisfactory exploration of his interpretation and use of the principle of motion.

The Principle of Motion in **Nietzsche's Cosmology** and Physiology

Unlike Kant's physiology primarily founded on seventeenth and eighteenth-century European physics, Nietzsche's physiology derives from the Pre-Socratic notion of *phusis* and the *historia peri phuseôs* tradition. This is apparent in many of his writings from the *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks* to his *Writings from the Late Notebooks*. In the latter, for instance, he puts forward the following cosmological argument: "The synthetic nature is the *higher* one. Now, all organic life is specialization; the *inorganic world* behind it is the *greatest synthesis of forces* and therefore the highest and most worthy of reverence—In it there is no error, no narrowness of perspective."[157] This also explains his construal of the living force as the extension of the senseless and inorganic forces that comprise the universal moving whole.[158] Heidegger, referring to such notions as the eternal recurrence and will-to-power, suggests that Nietzschean met-

aphysics "steadfastly remains *physics.*"[159] Indeed, the following passage from *The Gay Science* seems to prove Heidegger right:

> We want to *become who we are*—human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves! To that end we must become the best students and discoverers of everything lawful and necessary in the world: we must become *physicists* in order to be creators in this sense—while hitherto all valuations and ideals have been built on *ignorance* of physics or in *contradiction* to it. So, long live physics! And even more long live what *compels* us to it—our honesty![160]

Nevertheless, this approach must not be misunderstood. Nietzsche does not consider *physiology* in terms of modern natural science and does not prioritize specialization over the theoretical thinking of nature. Instead, he posits *physics* as the Pre-Socratics posited *historia peri phuseôs*. Accordingly, scientific concepts such as force, space, time, chaos and necessity are essentially philosophical or cosmological rather than belonging to a specific area of modern science.[161] Nietzsche's physiology supports the foundational significance of the principle of motion and *physics* in aesthetics and philosophy in general.[162] Here he situates the concept of motion at the heart of any thought about the phenomena in nature including the philosophy of the perception of and judgment on phenomena—namely aesthetics. In doing so, he aims to demonstrate the necessity of positing every concept and category produced by "the sensual language of man" under the cosmic principle of motion:

> A translation of this world of effect into a *visible* world—a world for the eyes—is the concept of "motion." Here the implication is always that *something* is moved, and whether in the fiction of a lump atom or even of its abstractions, the dynamic atom, we still conceive of a thing which effects—that is, we haven't left behind the habit that senses and language seduce us to. Subject, object, a doer for every doing, the doing separated from what does it: let's not forget that this is mere semiotics and does not refer to something real. Mechanics as a theory of *motion* is itself already a translation into the sensual language of man.[163]

This line of thought, which understands motion not only as a modern-physical but also as an archaic-cosmological concept and which therefore is free from the modern philosophical terminology or semiotics (such as subject, object etc.), constitutes the framework for the theory of cosmological aesthetics and distinguishes it from the psychological and ontological worldviews. In contrast with the psychological and ontological categories and concepts, Nietzsche again adopts a Pre-Socratic *Weltanschauung* in an attempt to relate *psyche* to *phusis* in his *Late Notebooks* declaring the primacy of the latter to the former: "Even if the *centre of 'consciousness'* doesn't coincide with the physiological centre, it would still be possible that the *physiological* centre is also the *psychic* centre. . . . The *intellectuality of feeling* (pleasure and pain), i.e., it is *ruled* from that

centre."[164] Nonetheless, later on in his *Late Notebooks*, Nietzsche adds, "mechanistic language—matter, atom, pressure and impact, gravity—are not 'facts-in-themselves' but interpretations aided by psychological fictions."[165] These points reveal the need to be careful not to downgrade Nietzsche's later philosophy to mere psychologism or physiologism. Indeed, even the abovementioned passage, which defines the scientific language of the mechanical understanding of nature as psychological, actually follows a similar line of thought (presented above) criticizing the "mechanics" as a theory of motion (which is itself only human and thereby sensual and psychological). This is neither an attack on physiology and cosmology nor on the actuality and universality of the principle of motion, but rather translates his attempt to create a dynamical theory of matter, which would encompass every definition regarding natural phenomena and thereby govern any theoretical sub-principle explaining the nature of things as a whole.

Heidegger defends this point in his criticism of the narrowing of the meaning of *phusis* through the arbitrary opposition between the "physical" and "psychical" generated by the modern philosophy: "This narrowing of *phusis* in the direction of the 'physical' did not happen in the way that we picture it today. We oppose to the physical the 'psychical,' the mind or soul, what is ensouled, what is alive. But all this, for the Greeks, continues even later to belong to *phusis*."[166] Nietzsche thinks that the Greek *Weltanschauung* did not distinguish "body from spirit [*Geist*] as matter and nonmatter; these things are considered much differently today. Heraclitus still maintains a proto-Hellenistic, meaning internalizing, attitude toward these matters. Opposition between matter and the nonmaterial simply does not exist, and that is proper."[167] In that sense, Heidegger is right to say that the Greeks and above all the Pre-Socratics are *not-yet-metaphysical*. That is why we need to analyze Nietzsche's thought with regard to the principles of *phusis* underpinning Pre-Socratic cosmology. Even though this does not entail a direct return to the "not-yet-metaphysical," it would strengthen the framework of the "post-metaphysical" cosmology based on the scientifically accurate and advanced but still philosophical *phusis*.

Furthermore, toward the end of his lectures on Nietzsche's *Will to Power*, Heidegger states that Nietzsche's overturn of Platonism contributed to the genesis of his physiological aesthetics or the aesthetics based on *phusis*.[168] Heidegger grounds Nietzschean aesthetics in the cosmological argument for the underlying unity of the supersensible-intelligible and the apparent-sensible world ignoring their alleged opposition advocated in Platonic tradition. Like Kant, Heidegger emphasizes the cosmological and universal definition of the world as the totality of all reality (*die Welt* or *das Dasein*):[169]

> The "true world," the supersensuous, and the apparent world, the sensuous, together what make out what stands opposed to pure nothingness; they constitute beings as a whole. When both are abolished everything collapses into the vacuous nothing. . . . Nietzsche wishes to ground art upon embodying life by means of his physiological aesthetics, we note that this implies an affirmation of the sensuous world, not its abolition. . . . With the abolition of Platonism the way

> first opens for the affirmation of the sensuous, and along with it, the nonsensuous world of the spirit as well.[170]

Although in this passage Heidegger seems to have grasped the core of Nietzsche's critique of Platonism and the essence of his aesthetics, he fails to acknowledge that the *spirit* in Nietzsche's *Late Notebooks*[171] (where he says we ought to offer our senses in return the very best of spirit we possess) is radically distinct from the "nonsensuous world of the spirit."[172] Let us remember the following passage from the *Twilight of the Idols*:

> With the greatest respect, I will make an exception for the name of *Heraclitus*. When all the other philosophical folk threw out the testimony of the senses because it showed multiplicity and change, Heraclitus threw it out because it made things look permanent and unified. Heraclitus did not do justice to the senses either. . . . "Reason" makes us falsify the testimony of the senses. The senses are not lying when they show becoming, passing away, and change, . . . But Heraclitus will always be right in thinking that being is an empty fiction. The "apparent" world is the only world: the "true world" is just a *lie added on to it*.[173]

Likewise, on the inseparability of essence and appearance, or the essentiality of appearance for human mind, Nietzsche says, "What is 'appearance' to me now! Certainly not the opposite of some essence—what could I say about any essence except name the predicates of its appearance! . . . To me, appearance is the active and living itself."[174] Therefore, Nietzsche assigns even more importance to appearances and the senses that transform them into concepts and experiences, while dismissing the possibility of existence of a realm of truth beyond the appearances and the experiences based on them. *The very thingliness of the things is in their motion*. The motion of phenomena constitutes their appearance and thus makes them what they are. For example, what we call Sun is essentially not the matter itself but its appearance given by the motion of matter, the continuous fusion of hydrogen nuclei into helium. So, for the completeness of the perceived phenomenon, matter, motion and appearance cannot be considered separately. This is why Nietzsche views being or spirit as merely empty fiction. But why does Nietzsche use the term "spirit" (in the earlier quotation) if he assumes that the apparent or sensible world is the only real world, and any supersensible metaphysical notion beyond this world is simply fictional? What does he try to achieve by attributing to the senses force and ability to apprehend and reveal the *phusis* of things? What does the "spiritualization and augmentation of the senses" stand for?

Could Nietzsche's "spirit" simply mean fire (as the primary elemental characteristic and source of change for all matter)? To what extent does the "spiritualization of senses" show how the constant change triggered by and eternal recurrence regulated through fire appear to the senses once the senses are sharpened or augmented? The apparent world is the only world lit by fire, and the senses must be supplemented by fire, heat and light to perceive things properly.

In his early lecture series, Nietzsche declares that "the highest form of nature is not humanity but fire."[175] Physiologically, the senses require a certain amount of heat to function fully and adequately. We find a similar point in Kant's *Opus Postumum*: "The five outer senses, to which belongs further an inward one (sensation of warmth)."[176] Similarly, neurons in human brain interact and communicate by firing or releasing heat towards one another. This example also demonstrates the fundamental role the element of fire plays in the transmission between the perceptive and cognitive capacities of the human mind.

Aesthetically, the Apollonian sculpting force of the senses requires a Dionysian spirit (or fire) by which the former's subtlety is augmented and gratified, as in Greek Tragedy. Here, we encounter not only the reconciliation of Nietzsche's theories of will-to-power and Dionysian art, but also the upgrade of his physiological aesthetics to cosmological aesthetics. The perfection of the senses does not suffice for will-to-power to become art, for it must constantly be nourished by the elemental cosmic forces, and the elemental force that is most related to art, creation, destruction and power is also fire. This also suggests a *cosmological* definition of the senses because, as argued earlier, cosmology is the thought or science of a realm where the sensible or apparent and supersensible or spiritual are not thought to be distinct. An aesthetics based on modern physiology simply cannot overcome this problem having been divorced from its primary component, *phusis*.[177] The sense-augmenting fire is the most faithful representation of the senseless, eternally building and destroying motion. Nietzsche confirms this point in his *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks* associating fire to Zeus and the cosmic child.[178]

The Heraclitean worldview does not however completely tie in with Nietzsche's aesthetics and his doctrine of *will-to-power* since the elemental force of fire would not be an entirely adequate representation of the Dionysian art, as the mediating, transitory art between the cosmic forces and human life. This is discussed further in the section on the will-to-power. Nonetheless, in his *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks,* Nietzsche attempts to reconcile the Heraclitean stance with his aesthetic Dionysian worldview arguing that the cosmic child or fire builds and destroys according to the inner laws and continues: "Only aesthetic man can look thus at the world, a man who has experienced in artists and in the birth of art objects how the struggle of the many can yet carry rules and laws inherent in itself."[179] I agree with Heidegger on the necessity of defining reality afresh.[180] It is more appropriate to identify this as Nietzsche's revival of the ancient cosmology and tragic thought.[181]

But to what extent does his philosophy revert to the commencement of philosophy? What is the purpose of this revival of ancient *phusis*? The answer lies in the very inseparability of *phusis* and *ethos* both in ancient and modern thoughts. Nietzsche thinks that like plants the concepts of *ethos* grow compliant with each other and belong to a naturally regulated system that derives from *phusis*. He repeats this point in *Beyond Good and Evil*: "Individual philosophical concepts are not arbitrary and do not grow up on their own, but rather grow in reference and relation to each other; that however suddenly and randomly they

seem to emerge in the history of thought, they still belong to a system just as much as all the members of the fauna of a continent do."[182] Then he uses the resemblance of the concepts in different philosophical traditions as a proof for this claim. Concepts of *ethos* resemble the members of the fauna of a continent though they are still somehow different in terms of their constitution and use. Although they all originate and are fuelled from the same source or *phusis* (which is also the source of the continental fauna), they are still conceived through the transition between common *phusis* and particular *ethos* (of different peoples). Nevertheless, this does not change the crucial facts that they derive from the same source; they are all the products of the process of transition and thus are just the separate branches of the same tree.

Resuming his attempt to revive the ancient *phusis* by re-discovering it, Nietzsche accepts the fact that the Pre-Socratics posited the principle of becoming as a single substance divided into several substances. However, defending the Heraclitean and Anaxagorian account, he adds, "Only motion tumbles them about into new patterns. And motion is truth and not semblance, as Anaxagoras proves in spite of Parmenides. . . . The inert stable dead being of Parmenides has been disposed of."[183] And after approving the archaic character of motion and thereby defending the necessity of positing it as a primary principle, he then addresses the question of the origin of motion.[184] Although ultimately unresolvable, determining the answerability of this question is equally important in assessing whether or not motion has a definite essence. According to Anaximander, *phusis*, as the ultimate unity of all things, is indefinite. Nietzsche associates the construal of *phusis* as indefinite with the Kantian thing-in-itself:

> This ultimate unity of the "indefinite," the womb of all things, can . . . be designated by human speech only as negative, as something to which the existent world of coming-to-be can give no predicate. We may look upon it as the equal of the Kantian *Ding an sich*.[185]

Thus, for Nietzsche, any being claimed to be *beyond* the realm of becoming is necessarily indefinite for human understanding. Kant would partly agree with this observation. Nietzsche then presents and highlights Heraclitus's negation of Anaximander's Indefinite and the negation of Being claiming, "he denied the duality of totally diverse worlds. . . . He no longer distinguished a physical world from a metaphysical one, a realm of definite qualities from an indefinable indefinite. And after this first step, nothing could hold him back from a second, far bolder negation: he altogether denied being."[186] But then Heraclitus declares (louder than Anaximander) that the only nature of things is their becoming and passing away and that it is futile to believe that any phenomenon or name can endure the constant change which is not only in their nature but is their nature.[187]

This affirmation of the idea of change firstly acknowledges the fact that Heraclitus tries to negate the principle of contradiction and the dualities it promotes such as being and becoming. This also plainly shows the Hegelian misinterpretation of Heraclitus that regards *logos* and *phusis* as functional and *pole-*

mos as the categorical principle. Thus, the Heraclitean idea of change is not compatible with the logical combinations, dualities and teleological continuum (which are essential in the Aristotelian and Hegelian philosophies):

> Heraclitus' regal possession is his extraordinary power to think intuitively. Toward the other type of thinking, the type that is accomplished in concepts and logical combinations, in other words towards reason . . . he seems to feel pleasure whenever he can contradict it with an intuitively arrived-at truth. He does this in dicta like Everything forever has its opposite *along with it*, and in such unabashed fashion that Aristotle accused him of the highest crime before the tribunal of reason: to have sinned against the law of contradiction.[188]

But where does Aristotle's anxiety stem from? What threat does cosmological-intuitive thinking represent for logical-rational thinking? What happens to human reason without the law of contradiction? Why should it be classified as a "crime?" Crucially, intuitive thinking proved the most important rival of Aristotelian logic by continuously undermining the main principles of the Western thought constructed upon logical combinations, one being the principle of contradiction. In contrast, intuitive Pre-Socratic thought prioritizes the notion of becoming above others stressing the need to omit dualities, the most important of which are being and becoming, and essence and appearance. Nietzsche agrees with Aristotle on the heavy toll sustained by admitting the principle of becoming and the negation of the principle of contradiction:

> The everlasting and exclusive coming-to-be, the impermanence of everything actual, which constantly acts and comes-to-be but never is, as Heraclitus teaches it, is a terrible, paralyzing thought. Its impact on men can most nearly be likened to the sensation during an earthquake when one loses one's familiar confidence in a firmly grounded earth. It takes astonishing strength to transform this reaction into its opposite, into sublimity and the feeling of blessed astonishment.[189]

So how does the negation of the principle of contradiction relate to the connection between *phusis* and *ethos*? The connection can prevail only insofar as the negation of their duality is maintained. The Platonic and Cartesian understanding of metaphysics (as the foundations of the Christian and Enlightenment metaphysics respectively) founds its primary principle on the duality between being and becoming. On the other hand, Dionysian aesthetics, Heraclitean *peri phuseôs* and Nietzschean *meta ta phusica* (as the foundations of the Greek Tragedy, most of the Pre-Socratic cosmology and late Heideggerian cosmology respectively) consider being (thus being-human) to belong to becoming and *ethos* to be a special part of *phusis*. It is a special part of *phusis* insofar as it represents the moment when the forces of *phusis* acquire sense and meaning through their transition to the conceptual human dwellings.

The re-admission of the principle of motion to philosophical thinking potentially triggers an earthquake by bringing about the negation of reasoning based

on the teleological duality of cause and effect. In an early passage from the third book of *The Gay Science* Nietzsche presents "becoming" or *phusis* as a dynamic continuum on which such dualistic descriptions as cause and effect are constructed:

> We have perfected the picture of becoming but haven't got over, got behind the picture. The series of "causes" faces us much more completely in each case; we reason, "this and that must precede for that to follow"—but we haven't thereby *understood* anything. . . . Cause and effect: there is probably never such a duality; in truth a continuum faces us, from which we isolate a few pieces, just as we perceive a movement only as isolated points, i.e. do not really see, but infer. . . . An intellect that saw cause and effect as a continuum, not, as we do, as arbitrary division and dismemberment—that saw the stream of the event—would reject the concept of cause and effect and deny all determinedness.[190]

In this passage Nietzsche underlines the irrelevance of the cause and effect duality and thus the principle of causality (dominant in the Kantian thought) which tries to explain every phenomenon and event mechanically on a linear continuum, the basic requirement for the grounding of the category of time. Thus it denies the dynamical essence of the relation between the interdependent moving forces in nature that do not condition each other as cause and effect.[191] These constant interactions, culminating in a single quantum of force, lead to the notion of becoming, the recurring attractions and repulsions between the sources of motion. This final point regarding Nietzsche's principle of motion entails Nietzsche's notion of the eternal recurrence.

The Principle of Motion in **Nietzsche's Theory** of Eternal Recurrence

> Heraclitus internalized Anaximander's perception that the earth dries out; a destruction [*Untergang*] by fire awaits. This playful cosmic child continually builds and knocks down but *from time to time begins his game anew*:[192] a moment of contentment followed by new needs. His continuous building and knocking down is a craving, as creativity is a need for the artist; his play is a need. From time to time he has to fill [*Übersättigung*] of it—nothing other than fire exists there; that is, it engulfs all things. Not *hybris* but rather the newly awakened drive to play [*Spieltrieb*] now wills once more his *setting into order.*[193]
>
> (Nietzsche, *Pre-Platonic Philosophers*)

Nietzsche's doctrine of eternal recurrence derives from a cosmologic-aesthetic worldview recalling the Heraclitean metaphor of the "cosmic child," a sublime metaphor representing,

> a Becoming and Passing Away without any moralistic calculations. He (Heraclitus) conceives of the *play of children* as that of spontaneous human beings: here is innocence and yet coming into being and destruction. . . . The eternal living fire plays, builds, and knocks down . . . directed by justice, may be grasped only as an *aesthetic phenomenon*. We find here a purely aesthetic view of the world. We must exclude even more any moralistic tendencies to think teleologically here, for the cosmic child (*Weltkind*) behaves with no regard to purposes but rather only according to an imminent justice.[194]

Becoming and passing away define respectively the presence and the lack of motion. They arise from the cosmic child's or fire's continuous building and knocking down. The cosmic child's drive to play underlies the whole or *ta panta* and makes it an ordered whole or *kosmos*. Indeed the child at play embodies the drive to create and destroy independent of any calculations or cause and effect. By this way, the process remains dynamic and does not follow a pattern set by a teleological or moral state of being. Heidegger acknowledges the construal of the doctrine of eternal recurrence as the cyclical notion of cosmic occurrence as advocated by Heraclitus.[195] He thereby admits that the question of being as a whole[196] is essentially a cosmological question, and that the eternal recurrence represents the determination of how the world *is* or *functions* as a finite totality.[197] Because of the exhaustion of the possibility of different occurrences, the cosmic becoming must repeat itself by spiralling or move forward by repeating the shape of its constitutive movement rather than simply circling around itself (indicative of a merely mechanical state of being which is prone to exhaustion.)[198] This is why it is more appropriate to call Nietzsche's doctrine "eternal recurrence" rather than "eternal recurrence of the same." As Deleuze suggests, "We misinterpret the expression 'eternal return' if we understand it as 'return of the same.' It is not being that returns but rather the returning itself that constitutes being insofar as it is affirmed of becoming and of that which passes" and "*Returning is the being of that which becomes.*"[199] This is because the energy necessary for the becoming and passing away of phenomena can be conserved only through the circular motion. Nietzsche says, "The principle of the conservation of energy demands *eternal recurrence.*"[200] This makes the eternal recurrence the key notion of Nietzschean philosophy underlying and grounding his principle of motion and becoming.[201]

Nietzsche's Heraclitean passages continue alongside his critique of the Eleatics and Kant in the *Gay Science*. These sections set the milestones of his philosophical endeavour such as his direct association of *logos* with *phusis*, his backing of the notion of change or flux to re-establish the connection between *phusis* and humanity and to de-deify nature,[202] and his critique of the ideas of the free-will and the good in itself as some of the basic errors produced by the intellect. He then supports Heraclitus stating that the universe is neither organic nor mechanical; but rather senseless, chaotic, and more importantly *dynamic*, and thereby adopts the cosmological aesthetic (Heraclitean-Dionysian) worldview as opposed to the anthropomorphic aesthetics. This makes him an advocate of the chaotic identity of the eternal recurrence of the musical (dynamic) essence of

kosmos. So Nietzsche uses *dynamic* or *musical* as synonyms of *the Dionysian.*[203] Nietzsche's late work on the *Dionysian* comes to encompass the principles of motion and transition simultaneously.[204] Yet Nietzsche only achieves this by re-interpreting the Heraclitean eternal becoming, which holds important clues for the essential ideas grounding his theory of eternal recurrence.[205] The experience of destructive natural phenomena such as earthquakes, storms and other disasters reveal the connection of humanity to the flow of becoming, reminding us of necessity of apprehending the essence of eternal recurrence and of becoming to recognize and fully embrace the will-to-power inherent in us.[206] This marks the intersection between the Heraclitean and the Dionysian or between the eternal recurrence and the will-to-power which must therefore be understood as willing the eternal recurrence of the prevailing motion. It delineates the eternal recurrence of transition both in the sense of *logos* as the transition from one realm of thought to another, i.e. from nature to art, and in the sense of *phusis* or the constant dynamic motion or change (in Heraclitus' words: "it rests by changing".)[207] Compare Heraclitus' analogy of the *cosmic child* with Nietzsche's first reference to the idea of *eternal recurrence* in *The Gay Science*:

> *The heaviest weight* . . . The eternal hourglass of existence is turned over again and again, and you with it. . . . If this thought gained power over you . . . it would transform and possibly crush you; the question in each and every thing, "Do you want this again and innumerable times again?" would lie on your actions as the heaviest weight! Or how well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life *to long for nothing more fervently* than for this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal?[208]

While the former analogy (the cosmic child) proceeds from a cosmological level of moving forces and the principle of motion, the latter directly relates this cyclical play of forces to human existence and apprehends the possible effects of the alleged Heraclitean pessimism regarding humanity. So Nietzsche, by revising the tragic thought of Heraclitus and eternal recurrence[209] proclaims a new path toward the affirmation of human existence through the notions of will-to-power and self-overcoming.[210] Heidegger defines will-to-power as becoming a counterweight against the greatest burden of the thought of eternal recurrence.[211] But how are we to understand that burden? For Heidegger it is a focal point, which draws and gathers all forces hurdling and pulling them downwards forcing them to deviate from their regular routes.[212] This stands for one of the few possible definitions of *chaos*, which can cause the renunciation of life or the affirmation of the lack of *phusis* when it contacts humanity. Nihilism is a good example of the renunciation of the eternally recurring motion. But according to Nietzsche even the affirmation of the lack of *phusis* initially requires the will-to-power to carry the burden.[213]

On the other hand, in *The Gay Science,* Nietzsche presents his notion of eternal recurrence as an optimistic notion affirmative of human existence. The very admission of it is a visit to the realm of senseless blind moving forces by which one gains an understanding of the principles of motion. However, for this

grandiose accomplishment, one has to be prepared to bear the heaviest burden through one's will-to-power,[214] face the terrible, tragic nature of things, and accept the possibility of being transformed and possibly crushed by it. But the reward is as great as the carried burden: the eternal con- and af-firmation of one's existence. Indeed Heidegger calls *art* the will-to-power that places one's being in the eternal flow and recurrence of the ever-living motion. But this is unlike any human art, it is one through which the entire human existence on earth is affirmed,[215] the Dionysian art that represents the artistic apprehension of the highest principle, *logos*. Consequently, the inherent relation between the Nietzschean notions of eternal recurrence and will-to-power also upholds the inseparability of the understanding of *phusis* and *logos*.

Following a similar line of argumentation, Heidegger interprets the overman as the one who carries humanity's existence from one level to another. To accomplish this task "the overman proceeds beyond prior and contemporary humanity: thus he is a transition, a bridge. In order for us learners to be able to follow the teacher who teaches the overman, we must first get onto the bridge."[216] We can only follow the teacher by inquiring about the departure or *phusis* of transition, about the transition or *logos* itself, and lastly about toward which the transition is heading or *telos*. This does not exactly match our definition of transition as a permanent and ahistorical principle. Though the type of transition defined here by Nietzsche and Heidegger consists in the change from one level of existence to another, our definition of transition is the passage from one state or level of thought to another. While according to the first definition, *phusis* and *telos* guide *logos*, according to the second, *logos* as transition guides *phusis* and *telos*. While the former postulates transition as a historical principle dependent on the contemporary conditions determining humanity, the latter identifies it as an ahistorical principle through which the humanity as a whole can be restructured and redefined on the background of the *historia peri phuseôs*. Likewise, Heidegger sees the *how* (referring to the aesthetic transition) of the communication of the thought of eternal recurrence as preceding the *what* (referring to the historical) of the transition.[217] The *what* of the communication or namely *phusis*, as eternal flux, is the greatest burden. By contrast, the *how* of the communication—or *logos*—is the aesthetic (or poetic) way to carry that burden simply by adequately representing or teaching it.[218]

Finally, Nietzsche arrives at a similar reconciliation between his notions of the eternal recurrence and will to power relying again on Heraclitus:

> Heraclitus' vision has been locked onto two sorts of considerations: eternal motion and the negation of all duration and persistence in the world . . . [For pre-Socratic physiologists] "all things flow" is a main proposition. Nowhere does an absolute persistence exist, because we always come in the final analysis to forces, whose effects simultaneously include a desire for power (*Kraftverlust*). Rather, whenever a human being believes he recognizes any sort of persistence in living nature, it is due to our small standards.[219]

On the other hand, it is equally necessary to posit the eternal recurrence and the will-to-power as separate notions so as to remain truthful to Nietzsche's original approach. There remains an important discrepancy between these ideas: while the former (eternal recurrence) provides a dehumanising and de-deifying understanding of life reducing it to a mere motion (*kinēsis*), the will-to-power appears as the supreme humanization of the things that constitute the totality of reality.[220] While the eternal recurrence represents the endurance of the passing away and transience of things for the purposeless recurrence being entirely independent of time,[221] will-to-power is the source of the communication and localization of this eternally recurring force by man through which *kinēsis* is transformed into *phusis*.[222] The localization of motion enables human beings to produce the representations of space and time "in us and out of us with the necessity of a spider spinning its web."[223] In turn we also need to reconcile the eternal recurrence with will-to-power to situate human existence within the totality of moving things. Therefore, the will-to-power or *Wille-Zur-Macht* (as the advanced version of *Kraftverlust*) is an equally significant notion both for the task of localization of motion and for the final transition between the eternally recurring motion and its artistic human representations.

The Principle of Motion in **Nietzsche's Theory** of the Will To Power

> How far does *art* reach down into the essence of *force*?[224]
>
> *Historia abscondita*—Every great human being exerts a retroactive force: for his sake all of history is put on the scale again, and a thousand secrets of the past crawl out of their hiding places—into *his* sunshine.[225]
>
> Let us roar . . . Free spirit's spirit,
> Joy uplifts me when you're near, it
> Makes me bluster like a gale!—
> And to mark this joy forever,
> Leave a will that time can't sever,
> Take this wreath up where you are!
> Hurl it higher, further, madder,
> Storm the sky on heaven's ladder,
> Hang it there—upon a star!
> (Nietzsche, "To the Mistral, a Dance Song")[226]

Nietzsche's will-to-power as *pathos* relates to his construal of the Heraclitean notion of eternal recurrence.[227] The cosmological idea of eternal recurrence entails eternal confirmation or seal once it is apprehended by human imagination, while this confirmation requires a will that time can never sever or swallow. But this *will* is no ordinary will; it must be so strong and hardened that it lives "as

long as a star." For Nietzsche, freedom is not the struggle against or rejection of the eternally recurring motion, but rather a full understanding and affirmation of its essence and becoming, and by willing to accept this abundant power, willing-through this motion[228] rather than willing-through a rejection of it as in the willing Kant and Schopenhauer portray. Thus, "storming the sky on heaven's ladder" entails the Dionysian *self-overcoming* and becoming *Übermench.*[229]

In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche defines willing-to-power as willing through becoming: "You put your will and your values upon the river of becoming; what the people believe to be good and evil betrays to me an ancient will to power. . . . It is not the river that is your danger and the end of your good and evil, you wisest men, it is that will itself, the will to power, the unexhausted, procreating life-will."[230] Thus, one of the most important characteristics of Nietzsche's doctrine of the will-to-power consists in its self-affirmation through the abundance of motion rather than its limitedness. In *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche advocates "the abundance of motion," criticizing Darwin's doctrine of "the struggle for existence" and describing it as an exception or a temporary restriction to will to life.[231] He thereby posits the will to power against any endeavour to define life through *polemos* and defines life as the total disregard for the dying or weak (traditions, valuations and concepts).[232] Life therefore is the necessary negation of the lack of *phusis*. While the eternal recurrence defines the general tendency and circularity of the river or the modality of *phusis*, will-to-power is the inexhaustible tide of the river or the quantity and quality of *phusis.*[233] Nietzsche further distinguishes between the eternally recurring motion and the life-will that wills *phusis* and the constancy of its relation to human *ethos* (which poses the greatest threat to the traditional metaphysics). Deleuze rightly links Nietzsche's critique of the mechanistic interpretation to will-to-power, "the characteristic that cannot be thought out of the mechanistic order without thinking away this order itself."[234] This is precisely why Nietzsche's Heraclitean notion of eternal recurrence was not sufficient to unravel the role of human presence within *kosmos* despite perfectly representing the *kosmos* itself.

The principle of becoming embodies both the will-to-power and eternal recurrence, and we can only see the inseparability of these ideas by recognizing *phusis* in the name of art and art in the name of *phusis.*[235] Life requires eternal recurrence because it needs to overcome itself again and again.[236] On the other hand, eternally recurring life needs to be represented and thereby perpetuated through the "supreme will to power."[237] In Heidegger's words, "the living creature values many things higher than life itself; yet out of this evaluation itself speaks—the will to power."[238] However, the eternal recurrence as transience or the cyclical becoming supervises the will, which eventually falls back to the recurring motion or attracts it toward itself.[239] The will-to-power, initially the genetic element and synthesis of forces, is never beyond the interactions between them but rather "always plastic and changing" in accordance with these forces.[240] This is the way the will-to-power relates to the principle of motion by complementing the eternal recurrence. According to Deleuze, this reveals the complex relation of Nietzsche's philosophy with "Kantianism" that "centres on

the concept of synthesis which it discovered."[241] On the other hand, in Nietzschean philosophy, the notions of the will-to-power and eternal recurrence transform the Kantian synthesis into a synthesis of forces.[242] Deleuze identifies it as the radical transformation of Kantianism (overcoming its dialectical approach to philosophy) and the re-invention of the critical project run by Kant against the traditional metaphysics.[243] Nonetheless, it is important to note that Nietzsche's concept of will-to-power remains an ambiguous concept and that it must be distinguished from the concept of "will" and defined through "becoming" rather than "being." Consider, for instance, the following crucial passage from the *Twilight of the Idols*:

> In the beginning there was the great disaster of an error, the belief that the will is a thing with *causal efficacy*,—that will is a *faculty* . . . These days we know that it is just a word . . . these categories could not have come from the empirical world,—in fact, the entirety of the empirical world stood opposed to them. *So where did they come from?* . . . In fact, nothing has ever had a more naïve power of persuasion than the error of being.[244]

The first half of this passage challenges most of the twentieth-century ontological interpretations that attempted to reduce Nietzschean philosophy and aesthetics to mere subjectivism. The second part contains a Heraclitean critique of the metaphysics of being with regard to its empirical (physical) groundlessness and repudiates most of the post-Platonic and modern philosophical traditions including Kant and German idealism.

One of the important philosophical outcomes of the cosmological re-invention of the Kantian critical project (against traditional metaphysics) consists in Nietzsche's revision of the teleological and moral understanding of *ethos* prevailing in philosophy from Plato and Aristotle to Kant and Hegel. How does Nietzsche avoid being trapped by the teleological and moral characteristics of *ethos*? How does he employ the notion of the will-to-power to achieve this? As Heraclitus famously declared, "it is in changing that things find purpose." Accordingly Nietzsche associates *ethos* directly to *phusis* or becoming, and shows how *ethos* can be purified from the "ancient error." In other words, *ethos* becomes moral once it is interpreted teleologically, once a direction or a goal is assigned to it. The following passage, in which the neutral "quantum" refers to *phusis*, human "acting" refers to *ethos* and action in a certain way or purposeful action refers to *telos*, constitutes a good example of the way Nietzsche posits *ethos* as an extension of *phusis*:

> I learned to distinguish the cause of acting from the cause of acting in a certain way, in a certain direction, with a certain goal. The first kind of cause is a quantum dammed-up energy waiting to be used somehow for something; . . . The usual view is different: one is used to seeing the *driving* force precisely in the goals (purposes, professions, etc.), in keeping with a very ancient error; but it is only the *directing* force—one has mistaken the helmsman for the stream. And not even always the helmsman, the driving force. . . . Is the "goal," the "pur-

> pose," not often enough a beautifying pretext, a self-deception of vanity after the fact that does not want to acknowledge that the ship is *following* the current into which it has entered accidentally? That it "wills" to that way *because it—must*? That it certainly has a direction but—no helmsman whatsoever? We still need a critique of the concept of "purpose."[245]

Will to power is designed as a result of this perspective. Willing, for Nietzsche, is willing through *phusis*. All willing has to follow the stream of *phusis,* which gives it its direction, on which the willing person may induce only minor diversions. The arrival point is always unknown and accidental. The dammed up quantum or energy inherent in *phusis* and in human nature is the original driving force behind any human action and concepts. Thus, *phusis* is *directly* linked to *ethos*, not through *telos*. This contradicts both Platonic and Aristotelian schools that defend the precedence of *telos* in the determination of *ethos*. This major revision seals the irreversible shift in critical philosophy. But how is the direct relation between *phusis* and *ethos* secured? This question requires us to go beyond the cosmological-aesthetic frame we used so far and expand to a cosmological-political one. Powerful individuals stimulate change and continuity in history through their judgments, actions and creations, "they have the courage to own up to their *phusis* and to heed its demands down to its subtlest tones. Their aesthetic and moral judgments are such 'subtlest tones' of the *phusis.*"[246] They make, remake and represent the *phusis* in its subtlest tones through the complete apprehension of *logos* and its artistic application into the life they pursue and concepts they use and redefine. It follows that the artistic process of self-overcoming represents the transition from nature to art.

By mastering the Dionysian art, the individual artist becomes conscious of the terrible and absurd aspects of his existence. In such state of awareness of his nature the artist transforms baseless existence into tragic representations in order to make life justifiable. In his *Late Notebooks*, Nietzsche refers to the achievement of our higher and stronger second nature through self-overcoming and self-sublimation. In this process of self-creation, the artist has to face his most primitive fears and the deepest ills of his nature such as chance, uncertainty and suddenness in order to learn how to take delight in his essentially chaotic existence without taking refuge in an artificially constructed moral God generated out of man's escape from the "horrors" of existence. Accordingly, Nietzsche regards the actual world as the highest possible ideal whose sublimity can only be discovered not through reason (or the categorical imperative) but through strength, will-to-power, and through the concentration of motion in one man's (or overman's) imagination. For this world makes him and his ideals truly universal and substantial by assigning him the task of representing the artistic *extension* of nature thanks to which he can mediate between humanity and the forces in nature, between *ethos* and *phusis*. Likewise Heidegger argues, the matter most worthy of question is the relation of Being to that living being, man.[247] Regarding this Nietzsche writes,

> The fundamental fact, which has been *overlooked*: contradiction between "becoming more moral" and the heightening and strengthening of the human type. . . . Homo natura (the man as nature). The "will to power" . . . The grandiose prototype: man in nature; the weakest, cleverest being making itself master, subjugating the more stupid forces.[248]

Man as nature wills through the eternal motion and alters the flow of time or eternal recurrence by *becoming* the "grandiose prototype," the master of the blind or senseless natural forces. He does so by revealing the principle of "homo natura." As the master of all forces men are nature and there is no nature beyond them. They are the ones who "secure a new and harmonious relation to the *sensible* in general, to the *elements* (fire, water, earth, light), . . . and . . . in virtue of this new relation these people bring "the elemental" into their power and by this power make themselves capable of the mastery of the world."[249] Everything in nature is either beautiful or ugly, necessary or unnecessary, young or old, strong or weak according to human judgment. For example, *ethos* affects the way the gods are created and experienced, as Aeschylus's Eteocles says before the war in *Seven Against Thebes*: "The Gods, they say, of a captured town desert her."[250] Thus, the gods disappear when the city or people who created them are not free. For that reason *ethos* is as effective as *phusis* in the process of deification and, according to *ethos* not only does the name but also the experience of god change, as Heraclitus puts: "God is day/night, winter/summer, war/peace, fullness/hunger; the experience of God changes in the way that [wine], when it is mixed with spices, is named according to the scent of each."[251] For Heraclitus, the process of naming or conceptualization can alter the experience or at least the description of the experience. Kant's own account of the experience of the sublime is in fact very similar to this. The names and concepts each culture uses to describe the sublime change in accordance with the culture's stage of artistic maturity. This is why Heraclitus derives *phusis* from *logos* rather than vice versa. Without the transition that takes place in human apprehension and imagination, the alleged forces in nature remain meaningless and thus devoid of force. Thus, while eternal recurrence defines the attempt to demonstrate the cosmic processes and their effect on human life, will-to-power is an aesthetic theory glorifying the creative and regulating faculties of man and their function to represent the elemental and dynamic forces of nature. By willing-through *phusis* one does not only revive *phusis* in oneself, but further harness and alter it for one's artistic purposes.

Furthermore, Nietzsche borrows and applies the Heraclitean and Kantian arguments regarding the principle of motion to one of his most distinguished theories, *will to power* as *pathos*:

> If we eliminate these (phenomenal) ingredients, what remains are not things but dynamic quanta in a relationship of tension with all other dynamic quanta, whose essence consists in their relation to all other quanta in their "effects" on these—the will to power not a being, not a becoming, but a *pathos* is the most elementary fact, and becoming, effecting, is only a result of this.[252]

Human *ethos* must be aesthetically linked to the moving forces of nature by which human beings preserve their freedom *over* other beings. But this freedom is neither freedom *to* nor freedom *from* since it is neither moral nor political. It is neither the freedom of the will (as in moral freedom) nor the freedom of the body (as in political freedom). Rather, it is freedom *over*, in other words, *aesthetic freedom*, namely the freedom of the *eye*. Aesthetic freedom is the primary freedom without which neither moral nor political freedom can remain intact. Without it, being-human or *ethos* would be deprived of its sight and thus its essential enlivening relation to *becoming* as a whole. In the absence of aesthetic freedom, moral and political freedom, by failing to establish the artistic transition to the rich source of *phusis*, would suffer stagnation and exhaustion and of course final death or *nihilism*. How so? Nihilism, as lack of will-to-power, preaches the loneliness of humanity and its split from motion or *phusis*. It is not a motive but a consequence caused by the long and ambitious rule of the strict and stiff moral *ethos*. Nihilism signals culture's final exhaustion and separation from *phusis*. This is why Nietzsche regards aesthetics as above and beyond ethics and politics, and describes it as the affirmation of human life against the peril of nihilism. Only the artistic creations devoid of moral and political arbitrariness can establish the necessary relation of human *ethos* to essential becoming. The tragic Dionysian is the primary criterion Nietzsche proposes against the commonly accepted formal aesthetic criteria because it *understands* the becoming and then *represents* it. The full understanding of the flow or becoming precedes the playful construction of the bridge. The original name for this full understanding is the tragic wisdom.

Finally, the necessity of aesthetics for the justification of life and *phusis* entails Nietzsche's notion of *amor fati*, which reconciles his will-to-power as art with the principle of necessary suffering. Nietzsche defines *amor fati* as the aesthetic way of seeing life by looking straight into the tragic *pathos* of human existence so as to affirm it as it is.[253] Heidegger is therefore right to interpret Nietzsche's will-to-power as art. But does the reconciliation of necessity and beauty presented here tie in with his arguments in *The Gay Science*? Yes and no. So, what are we to do to present these arguments as a coherent whole? How can we render necessity beautiful, and beauty necessary? How can love of necessity be beautiful? The only way forward is considering the tragic *pathos* as the aesthetic *pathos* and the tragic *ethos* as the aesthetic *ethos*. The aesthetic *ethos* must reclaim the rule to re-establish the link between being-human and being as a whole. There lies the way to overcome nihilism. Nietzsche denounces nihilism as both the representation (*mythos*) of moral *ethos* and the reason behind the exhaustion in being-human and the nihilistic rupture. In contrast, Nietzsche recognizes the Dionysian as both the *mythos* of aesthetic *ethos* and the signaller of the necessity for the regeneration of the essential mediation between *ethos* and *phusis* by means of the will-to-power or the artistic synthesis of moving forces.

CONCLUSION

This chapter defends the idea of *phusis* (as it is used in Heraclitus' fragments) against the modern conception of "physics" (contrasted with metaphysics). Heraclitus does not use it simply to mean external-formal nature but rather, by purposefully neglecting the oppositions, refers to nature as becoming and change inherent in the recurrence of creation and destruction. *Phusis,* as the central term or principle of the chapter, is discussed with reference to the Heraclitean fragments drawing on its defining relations with other cosmological principles like unity (*kosmos*), motion or becoming (*kinēsis*), nature or essence (*arkhē*), and transition (*logos*). This componential analysis of *phusis* alongside its Nietzschean and Heideggerian interpretations launch the project of defining the principle of motion in the Kantian and Nietzschean cosmology and allow us not only to restructure their philosophies consistent with the Pre-Socratic understanding of the principle of motion but also to show the similarities and differences in their adoption of the principle. Both philosophers construe nature as the underlying and constantly appearing moving unity that communicates through its conceptualization by the process of transition.

The second part aims to revise the predominantly ethical and metaphysical (in its modern sense) construal of Kantian philosophy, drawing attention to his early and late philosophy of nature with specific reference to the *Metaphysical Foundations* and *Opus Postumum*. The frequent appearance of motion as a principle (the primary principle of nature) throughout Kant's philosophy alongside his analysis of the moving forces support our postulation of his philosophy of nature and art at one with his conceptualization of motion. The idea of nature, as the primary domain of the theoretical reason, is redefined according to the very character of this principle which founds the transition in *Opus Postumum*. Likewise, in the third *Critique*, while being relatively absent in Kant's definition of the beautiful, the principle of motion is evidently dominant in the sublime both in the sense of the movement inherent in the very appearance of things and beings and of the movement of the faculties of human mind as a result of the experience of the sublime.

To what extent does the exploration of the principle of motion contribute to philosophy? What purpose would this principle serve? What is lacking in today's philosophy? What was lacking in Nietzsche's times? Nietzsche addresses these crucial questions in many different places in various ways from his early lectures on the Pre-Socratics to his later writings on physiology and cosmology, through his notions of *becoming*, *eternal recurrence* and *will to power*. In light of Nietzsche's responses one could claim that only those phenomena in *ta panta* that agree to human senses and judgment become a part of *kosmos.* Similarly, *kosmos* must be defined with direct reference to human *ethos*. However, this is possible only if *logos* as the aesthetic measure is not divorced from the principle of motion or *phusis* as any attempt to do so would eventually limit the conception of the latter to the contingent understanding of the microcosmic human

ethos.[254] Indeed even though the human arts are versions of nature's processes, humans often fail to recognize the interdependence of *ethos* and *phusis*.[255]

Could this Pre-Socratic worldview be an answer to Nietzsche's quest for the discovery of new worlds and new philosophers who view *ethos* as the extension of *phusis*? In his *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, Nietzsche affirms that Pre-Socratic Greeks began to speculate from *phusis* but again only in comparison with man. In that nature is itself an idea generated by the human mind, and the measure of human senses (*ratio*) and aesthetic faculties play the most important role in the judgment on and the conceptualization of the effects of the moving forces. The idea of the priority of human faculties while philosophizing about life or existence very much echoes the Kantian theory of the sublime. Nevertheless, the Greek understanding of the cosmic god-man should not be construed as over or above nature but within the process of transition (*Übergang*) between *phusis* and *ethos*. As Heidegger argues, the very nature of the meanings of concepts (given by humans) essentially belongs to the all-encompassing dynamic living whole and its eternal motion.[256] Visibly or invisibly and directly or indirectly, motion inherent in nature surrounds and moves everything without exception. It must follow that, although indirectly, any concept representing any object in nature is determined by life and meaning giving motion, and must be called a *concept of motion*[257] Heraclitus, Kant and Nietzsche have been aware of this throughout their philosophies, which allowed them to criticize, alter and renew the definitions of philosophical concepts while theorizing their own idea of nature.

NOTES

1. Heraclitus, fragment 6, Kirk, G. S., *The Cosmic Fragments*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1954, p.264.

2. Aristotle, *The Metaphysics*, trans. Lawsoon-Tancred, London: Penguin Books, 1998, pp.118-9 (1014b-1015a).

3. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*, ed. Guyer and Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.466–A419/B447.

4. Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.110.

5. Nietzsche, Friedrich. "On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense" in *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*, ed. Geuss and Speirs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p.141.

6. Nietzsche supports this in *Ecce Homo*: "Nobody had ever turned the Dionysian into a philosophical pathos before: *tragic wisdom was missing*—I could not find any sign of it, even among the *eminent* Greek philosophers, those from the two centuries *before* Socrates. I had some doubts in the case of *Heraclitus*; I generally feel warmer and in better spirits in his company than anywhere else. The affirmation of passing away *and destruction* that is crucial for a Dionysian philosophy, saying yes to opposition and war, *becoming* along with a radical rejection of the very process of "being"—all these are more closely related to me than anything else people have thought so far." (Nietzsche, Friedrich. "Ecce homo" in *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other*

Writings, ed. Ridley and Norman, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, sec.5, p.110.)

7. Kirk, G. S., *The Cosmic Fragments*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1954, p.168.

8. Ibid., p.227.

9. Ibid., p.255.

10. Ibid., p.367.

11. Ibid.

12. Kahn, Charles H., *The art and thought of Heraclitus*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, p.53.

13. Kirk, G. S., *The Cosmic Fragments*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1954, p.264.

14. Ibid., p.307.

15. Naddaf, Gerard. *The Greek Concept of Nature*, State University of New York Press, Albany: 2005, p.1.

16. Ibid., p.4.

17. Ibid., p.35.

18. Kahn confirms Naddaf's interpretation of *phusis* as the cosmic *historia* of *ta panta* and the importance of this for any comment made on Heraclitus. (see Kahn, Charles H., *The art and thought of Heraclitus*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, p.99). Kirk also approves this point in his *Cosmic Fragments* (see Kirk, G. S., *The Cosmic Fragments*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1954, p.315.)

19. Beets, M.G.J., *The coherence of reality: experiments in philosophical interpretation: Heraclitus, Parmenides, Plato*, Eburon, Delft, 1986, p.63.

20. Naddaf, Gerard. *The Greek Concept of Nature*, State University of New York Press, Albany: 2005, p.3.

21. Ibid., p.15.

22. Kirk, G. S., *The Cosmic Fragments*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1954, p.255.

23. Ibid., p.228.

24. Ibid., p.229.

25. Ibid., p.231. This argument is definitely loyal to the Heraclitean philosophy considering such fragments as "the way up and the way down are one and the same."

26. Lovejoy, Arthur O. "The Meaning of *Phusis* in the Greek Physiologers" in *The Philosophical Review*, Vol.18, No.4 (July 1909), p.370. Following this, Woodbridge concludes: "The dominant conception of early Greek philosophy seems to be, not a permanent material substance out of which all things are made, but that nature is a process of physiological generation, a succession of births and deaths, of coming into existence and passing out of existence, mediated by some natural principle, as water, or a nameless inexhaustible substance, or air, or fire." (Woodbridge, Frederick J. E., "The Dominant Conception of the Earliest Greek Philosophy" in *The Philosophical Review*, Vol.10, No.4, July 1901, p.374.)

27. Heidegger, Martin. *Nietzsche: Volume I Will-to-Power as Art*, trans., ed. Krell, D.F., San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1961, p.31.

28. Heidegger, Martin. "On the Essence and Concept of *Phusis* in Aristotle's *Physics* B, I" trans. Sheehan in *Pathmarks*, ed. McNeill, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.189.

29. Ibid., p.190.

30. Naddaf, Gerard. *The Greek Concept of Nature*, State University of New York Press, Albany: 2005, p.132.

31. Heidegger, Martin and Fink, Eugen, *Heidegger–Fink, Heraclitus Seminar 1966/67* trans. Charles H. Seibert, The University of Alabama Press, 1979, p.78.

32. Kahn, Charles H., *The art and thought of Heraclitus*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, p.20.

33. Ibid., p.131.

34. Kirk, G. S., *The Cosmic Fragments*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1954, p.315.

35. Naddaf, Gerard. *The Greek Concept of Nature*, State University of New York Press, Albany: 2005, p.128.

36. Kahn, Charles H., *The art and thought of Heraclitus*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, p.105.

37. Sandywell, Barry. *Pre-Socratic Reflexivity: The Construction of Philosophical Discourse (c. 600 – 450 BC)*, London: Routledge, 1996, pp.240-1.

38. Ibid., p.241.

39. Heidegger, Martin. *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Yale: Yale University Press, 2000, p.182.

40. Ibid., p.148.

41. Ibid., p.184. In support of his ontological argument Heidegger links the previous claims on *phusis* and *logos* to his notion of Being as follows: "Being holds sway, but because it holds sway and insofar as it holds sway and appears, apprehension *also* necessarily occurs *along with* appearance. But if human beings have a part in the happening of this appearance and apprehension, then they must themselves be, they must belong to Being. . . . *But then the essence and the manner of Being-human can be determined only on the basis of the essence of Being*. . . . If appearing belongs to Being as *phusis*, then the human, as a being, must belong to this appearing. . . . Insofar as apprehension belongs to such appearing, the apprehension that takes in what shows itself, one may presume that this is precisely the basis for determining the essence of Being-human." (Ibid., p.148.)

42. Ibid., p.149.

43. "As its influence has waned, the power of the Hellenic cultural world has again increased; we experience phenomena which are so peculiar they would hang in the air incomprehensible to us if we could not look back over a tremendous space of time and connect them with their Greek counterparts. Thus there are between Kant and the Eleatics, Schopenhauer and Empedocles, Aeschylus and Richard Wagner." (Nietzsche, Friedrich. "Richard Wagner in Beyreuth" in *Untimely Meditations*, trans. Hollingdale ed. Breazeale, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.208.) If Nietzsche refers to the Kantian philosophy as the German counterpart of Parmenides and the Eleatics, his own philosophy, as he admits in his early and late works, is thoroughly Heraclitean.

44. Here is the full passage in which Nietzsche distinguishes Heraclitean universalism from other Pre-Platonics: "Three types discovered three incredible unified ideas by which they developed away from the norm: Pythagoras by belief in the identity of the countless races of humanity, indeed more so by the identification of all souls with all time, Socrates by his belief in the unity and binding power of thought, eternally the same for all time and in all places; and finally Heraclitus [by his belief in] the oneness and eternal lawfulness of nature's processes." (Nietzsche, Friedrich. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Pre-Platonic Philosophers*, trans., ed. Whitlock, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006, p.58.)

45. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Gay Science*, ed. Williams, Bernard, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, sec.109, pp.109-10. Heidegger comments on this argument in his book on Nietzsche's notion of "eternal recurrence" as follows: "the dehumanising

of beings—keeping that which rises of itself, *physis*, *natura*, 'nature' clear of human admixtures of every kind—amounts to a de-deification of beings. With a view to this interconnection . . . it is an error to label Nietzsche's representation of the world, or Nietzsche's Weltanschauung with 'naturalism' and 'materialism.' Matter (tracing everything back to some elemental 'stuff') is as much an error as 'the god of Eleatics.'" (Heidegger, *Nietzsche Volume II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same*, trans. Krell, Harper & Row, San Francisco, 1984.)

46. Nietzsche, Friedrich "Twilight of the Idols" in *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings*, ed. Ridley and Norman, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p.167.

47. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Gay Science*, ed. Williams, Bernard, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp.63-4.

48. Ibid., pp.69-70.

49. Heidegger, Martin. "On the Essence and Concept of *Phusis* in Aristotle's *Physics* B, I" trans. Sheehan in *Pathmarks*, ed. McNeill, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.183. Specifically, the one between nature and spirit "is simply *foreign to the Greeks*." (Ibid., p.186.)

50. Ibid., p.184. At this point, referring to Hölderlin, Heidegger adds, "And finally 'nature' becomes the word for what is not only above everything 'elemental' and everything human, but even above the gods. . . . Nature becomes the word for being: being is prior to all beings, for they owe what they are to being. And the gods likewise: to the degree that they *are*, and however they are, they too all stand *under* being." (Ibid.)

51. Ibid., p.185.

52. Heidegger, Martin. "On the Essence and Concept of *Phusis* in Aristotle's *Physics* B, I" trans. Sheehan in *Pathmarks*, ed. McNeill, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.186.

53. Heidegger, Martin. "Introduction to Being and Time" in *Basic Writings* ed. Krell, Routledge: London, 1978, p.19.

54. Heidegger, Martin. "On the Essence and Concept of *Phusis* in Aristotle's *Physics* B, I" trans. Sheehan in *Pathmarks*, ed. McNeill, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp.186-7.

55. Ibid., p.191.

56. Ibid., p.216.

57. Ibid., p.195. In addition, Heidegger continues, "*phusei onta* are *kinoumena*, that is to say: *phusei*-beings are beings in the state of movedness. . . . Only when this [understanding] is accomplished can we understand *phusis* in its essence as the *origin and ordering of the movedness of what moves from out of itself* and toward itself." (Ibid., p.200.)

58. Ibid., p.207.

59. Heidegger, Martin. *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Yale: Yale University Press, 2000, p.219.

60. Ibid, p.154.

61. Heidegger defines the Heraclitean *polemos* as the necessary principle of confrontation for humanity's coming into being. (see Ibid., pp.153-4.)

62. Heidegger, Martin. "On the Essence and Concept of *Phusis* in Aristotle's *Physics* B, I" trans. Sheehan in *Pathmarks*, ed. McNeill, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.229.

63. Also see Heidegger, Martin. *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Yale: Yale University Press, 2000, p.121.

64. Heidegger, Martin. "On the Essence and Concept of *Phusis* in Aristotle's *Physics* B, I" trans. Sheehan in *Pathmarks*, ed. McNeill, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.212.

65. Ibid., p.217, p.219.

66. According to Heidegger, Kant explains this distinction as the one between the determinable and its determination. (Ibid., p.209.)

67. Ibid., p.214.

68. Heidegger, Martin. "Introduction to Being and Time" in *Basic Writings* ed. Krell, Routledge: London, 1978, p.15.

69. Ibid., p.16.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid., p.52.

72. Kant, Immanuel. *Metaphysical Foundations of the Natural Science*, ed. Friedman, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.5.

73. Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp.120-1.

74. Ibid., p.255.

75. Heidegger quoting Aristotle 985a13 in his *Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy*, trans. Rojcewicz, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2008, p.31.

76. Tuschling, Burkhard. *Apperception and Ether: On the Idea of a Transcendental Deduction of Matter in Kant's Opus Postumum* in *Kant's Transcendental Deductions* ed. Förster, Stanford University Press: Stanford, California: 1989, p.193.

77. Guyer, Paul, "Editor's Introduction" in Kant, Immanuel *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.xiii.

78. Kant, Immanuel. "First Introduction" in *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.6.

79. Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.235.

80. Referring to *Opus Postumum* Friedman defines the ether or caloric as a universally distributed continuous, space-filling, perpetually vibrating, imponderable expansive fluid which penetrates all matter in universe and according to which all physical phenomena are to be explained. (Friedman, Michael. *Kant and the Exact Sciences*, Harvard University Press, 1992, p.220.)

81. On the one hand, Friedman describes Kant's conception of ether as a "kind of compromise between a mechanical theory of heat and a true caloric fluid theory." (Ibid., p.292); on the other, he affirms Kant's point that "the caloric theory of the states of aggregation can easily be viewed as a possible foundation for a unified system of physics." (Ibid., p.295.) This endorses the view that these concept-matters are essentially transposable. However, according to Friedman, postulation of all-encompassing and all-penetrating matter cannot solely make use of physical or empirical theorizing, and therefore "it is incumbent upon Kant to inject some kind of transcendental content into the idea of caloric, to connect it not so much with explanations of particular empirical phenomena as with the conditions of the possibility of experience." (Ibid., p.297.)

82. Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.74.

83. My addition.

84. Ibid., p.73-4.

85. Kant, Immanuel. *Thoughts on the True Estimations of Living Forces*, (# 1; 1:17), (# 1-3; 1:17-18), (# 2; 1:18.6-8), (# 3; 1:18.27-36), (# 6; 1:20.35-21.1; 21.14-16) in Schönfeld, Martin. "Kant's Philosophical Development" in *Stanford Encyclopedia of*

Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-development/, retrieved on June 2nd 2009.

86. Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.75.

87. Ibid., p.120.

88. Friedman, Michael. "Introduction" in Kant, Immanuel, *Metaphysical Foundations of the Natural Science*, ed. Friedman, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.xxii. According to Tuschling, this new approach to the transcendental philosophy, which implements the principle of motion and takes the moving material whole as its reference point, successfully revises the very concept of transcendental idealism. (Tuschling, Burkhard. *Apperception and Ether: On the Idea of a Transcendental Deduction of Matter in Kant's Opus Postumum* in *Kant's Transcendental Deductions* ed. Förster, Stanford University Press: Stanford, California: 1989, p.209.)

89. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*, ed. Guyer and Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.558 (A581/B609.)

90. Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.55.

91. Förster, Eckart. *Kant's Final Synthesis*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000, p.19.

92. Tuschling, Burkhard. *Apperception and Ether: On the Idea of a Transcendental Deduction of Matter in Kant's Opus Postumum* in *Kant's Transcendental Deductions* ed. Förster, Stanford University Press: Stanford, California: 1989, pp.193-4.

93. Förster, Eckart. *Kant's Final Synthesis*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000, p.55. Förster also points to Stock's argument that "the moving forces of matter that can be known a priori are those principles of its motion according to which we ourselves make the motion synthetically, as causes, not think it analytically; for the other [principles] yield only empirical laws of motion and belong to physics, not to the transition from metaphysics and the tendency of metaphysics to physics." (Werner Stark, "Loses Blatt Leipzig I: Transkription und Bemerkungen" in *Übergang. Untersuchungen zum Spätwerk Immanuel Kants,* Herausgegeben vom Forum für Philosophie Bad Homburg (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1991), p.146.

94. Tuschling, Burkhard. *Apperception and Ether: On the Idea of a Transcendental Deduction of Matter in Kant's Opus Postumum* in *Kant's Transcendental Deductions* ed. Förster, Stanford University Press: Stanford, California: 1989, p.194.

95. Ibid., p.195. This is because, Tuschling argues, "The existence of an individual substance, considered on its own, has no relation to the existence of any other, the reality of their interaction and mutual determination is both a special *kind* of existence and a special way of existing." (Ibid., p.194.) Friedman also endorses this point arguing that as early as the *Living Forces* Kant began liberating his philosophy of nature from Leibnizian monadology in light of the Newtonian physics: "Since the primary and general notion of active force is that by which one substance changes the inner state of a second substance, there is no difficulty in conceiving of an action of matter upon the soul or of the soul upon matter: there is no obstacle, therefore, to the triumph of physical influx over pre-established harmony." (Friedman, Michael. *Kant and the Exact Sciences*, Harvard University Press, 1992, p.5.) Furthermore, continues Friedman, "Kant proceeds on this basis to argue against both subjective idealism (since the soul can experience no inner changes except in virtue of a connection with other substances external to it) and the Leibnizian pre-established harmony." (Ibid., p.6.) Kant's critique of Leibniz is guided by the great achievement of Newtonian methodology which successfully demonstrated "how one could begin with the most certain and uncontroversial experience—that is, with

phenomena—and ascend from there by means of evident mathematical reasoning to a knowledge of the first principles of natural bodies. And this procedure of 'deduction from the phenomena' . . . was held to be infinitely more secure than all merely hypothetical attempts to begin with first principles and work one's way down to phenomena." (Ibid., p.15.)

96. As Beiser explains, "according to Kant, the task of the metaphysics of nature is to discover the inner forces of things, the first causes of the laws of motion and the ultimate constituents of matter. Unlike empirical physics, which determines by observation the mechanics of nature, the laws of external motions, the metaphysics of nature determines by reason the dynamics of nature, the laws of its inner forces. . . . The essence of matter was not simply extension . . . but inner living force." (Beiser, Frederick C., "Kant's Intellectual Development: 1746-1781" in *The Cambridge Companion to Kant* ed. Paul Guyer, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.31.)

97. Tuschling describes this as follows: "Considering the delicate texture of the critical system of transcendental principles, unsurprisingly, the method of transcendental analysis changes too. The idea, the object, and the procedure of a transcendental deduction are revised, as are the task and method of transcendental philosophy in general. A priori and empirical knowledge can no longer be strictly separated." (Tuschling, Burkhard. *Apperception and Ether: On the Idea of a Transcendental Deduction of Matter in Kant's Opus Postumum* in *Kant's Transcendental Deductions* ed. Förster, Stanford University Press: Stanford, California: 1989, pp.208-9.) Friedman seconds the necessity of revising the transcendental philosophy as a whole, arguing that the 'gap' the principle of transition attempts to fill is not only in the doctrine of nature but also in the critical system as a whole. (Friedman, Michael. *Kant and the Exact Sciences*, Harvard University Press, 1992, pp.214-5.)

98. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*, ed. Guyer and Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.466–A419/B447.

99. Kant, Immanuel. *Metaphysical Foundations of the Natural Science*, ed. Friedman, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.63.

100. Friedman, Michael, "Introduction" in Kant, Immanuel, *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, ed. Friedman, Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp.xviii-xix.

101. Referring to Kant's *Universal Natural History*, Schönfeld confirms the centrality of the argument for the requirement of the primary cosmic-dynamic continuum in Kant's natural philosophy (see Schönfeld, Martin. "Kant's Philosophical Development" in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-development/, Retrieved on June 2nd 2009.)

102. Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp.20-1.

103. Harman, P. M., *Energy, Force, and Matter: the Conceptual Development of Nineteenth-Century Physics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, p.41.

104. We have already discussed this point earlier in our comparison between Kant's principle of motion and the Heraclitean *phusis*.

105. Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp.71-2.

106. De Grasse Tyson, N., Liu, C., & Irion, R. *One Universe: At Home in the Cosmos*. Joseph Henry Press 2000, p.20-21.

107. Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.73.

108. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.345.

109. Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.72.

110. Also see Tuschling, Burkhard. *Apperception and Ether: On the Idea of a Transcendental Deduction of Matter in Kant's Opus Postumum* in *Kant's Transcendental Deductions* ed. Förster, Stanford University Press: Stanford, California: 1989, pp.200-1. This point also relates the argumentation followed in this section to the next.

111. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*, ed. Guyer and Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.424 (A364.)

112. Heidegger, Martin, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Emad & Maly, Indiana University Press, Indianapolis: 1997, p.99.

113. Förster, Eckart, "Introduction" in Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.xlii.

114. Heidegger underlines that "what we call space, something for which the Greeks had neither a word nor a concept." (Heidegger, Martin. "On the Essence and Concept of *Phusis* in Aristotle's *Physics* B, I" trans. Sheehan in *Pathmarks*, ed. McNeill, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.187.)

115. Tuschling, Burkhard. *Apperception and Ether: On the Idea of a Transcendental Deduction of Matter in Kant's Opus Postumum* in *Kant's Transcendental Deductions* ed. Förster, Stanford University Press: Stanford, California: 1989, p.200-3.

116. Tuschling puts this as follows: "He has yet to answer, however, the question whether these transcendentally ideal, subjective formal systems are necessarily related to a third formal system: remembering the Kantian triad of the 1770's—space, time, and force—we might call the third system "force." Moreover, he must also demonstrate how this relation can be shown. Kant is undoubtedly convinced that it *can* be shown, but again, *how* is the problem." (Ibid., p.201.)

117. Ibid, p.212.

118. Similarly, according to Tuschling, this primordial matter "is set up as the supreme principle of the unity of external experience. It guarantees that what exists in space and time I connected together into one single, continually perceptible world, and that thereby it is connected with the senses of perceiving subjects, uniting both, objects and subjects, into a unique whole of possible experience." (Ibid., p.213.)

119. Schönfeld, Martin. "Kant's Philosophical Development" in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-development/ Retrieved on June 2nd 2009.)

120. Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.73.

121. Tuschling, Burkhard. *Apperception and Ether: On the Idea of a Transcendental Deduction of Matter in Kant's Opus Postumum* in *Kant's Transcendental Deductions* ed. Förster, Stanford University Press: Stanford, California: 1989, p.205.

122. Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.73. Referring to Kant's early writings, Friedman also supports the argument that space is essentially generated by the active force as follows: "Since space depends upon the connection and order of simple substances, without an active force whereby substances act outside themselves there is not extension and no space. Indeed, the basic properties of space are entirely derivative from the fundamental law of interaction by which substances are connected into a single world." (Friedman, Michael. *Kant and the Exact Sciences*, Harvard University Press, 1992, p.5.) However, after *Living Forces* and until *Metaphysical Foundations* (including the period he undertook the writing of the first *Critique)* Kant's philosophy of nature was dominated by the idea that "space and time are no longer realities derivative from or constituted by the underlying

monadic realm of non-spatio-temporal simple substances; rather, they are autonomous forms of pure sensible intuition through which this underlying monadic realm manifests itself or appears to creatures with our particular faculty of sensibility. . . . It follows that space and time are both phenomenal and ideal in a radically new sense. Human cognition has two distinct principles: the intellectual faculty of understanding or reason by which we represent the underlying monadic realm as it is in itself, and the new faculty of sensibility by which we represent this underlying reality as it appears to creatures like ourselves." (Ibid., pp.30-1.)

123. Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.171.

124. Kant, Immanuel. "First Introduction" in *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.38.

125. One of the most crucial outcomes of this relates to the problem of transcendental philosophy: "The unity of the manifold in intuition, in the manifold's composition (synthesis) *a priori* in the sensible representation of the object in space and time, together with the unconditional unity of space and time as a whole . . . contain *axioms* of intuition in the latter's formal aspect." And in conformity with this the subject posits itself as object and this leads to the supreme problem of transcendental philosophy: "How are synthetic propositions *a priori* possible? (Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.171.)

126. Ibid., p.172.

127. Ibid., p.72. Also see Tuschling, Burkhard. *Apperception and Ether: On the Idea of a Transcendental Deduction of Matter in Kant's Opus Postumum in Kant's Transcendental Deductions* ed. Förster, Stanford University Press: Stanford, California: 1989, p.205.

128. See Ibid., p.207.

129. For instance, in *Theoretical and Mathematical Physics*, Russian scientists suggest, "The rate of atomic clocks is influenced by the value of the gravitational potential. Therefore, clocks at points with different gravitational potentials will run differently, as a result of which the difference of their readings may reach $\delta T \sim 10\text{-}9T$ in the neighbourhood of the earth and $\delta T \sim 10\text{-}6T$ in the neighbourhood of the sun. The gravitational field has a similar influence on the natural frequency of frequency standards, the magnitude of the measuring scale, and a number of other physical quantities." (Avduevskii, Denisov, Kovtunenko, Logunov, Uspenskii and Tsimbalyuk, "Gravitational Experiments in Space" in *Theoretical and Mathematical Physics*, Springer New York Vol.78, no.1, January, 1989, p.1.)

130. "Fundamental lesson of general relativity is that there is no fixed spacetime background, as found in Newtonian mechanics and special relativity; the spacetime geometry is dynamic. While easy to grasp in principle, this is the hardest idea to understand about general relativity, and its consequences are profound and not fully explored, even at the classical level. To a certain extent, general relativity can be seen to be a relational theory in which the only physically relevant information is the relationship between different events in space-time." (Lee, Smolin, *Three Roads to Quantum Gravity*, Science Masters, Basic Books, 2001, pp.20-25.)

131. Tuschling, Burkhard. *Apperception and Ether: On the Idea of a Transcendental Deduction of Matter in Kant's Opus Postumum* in *Kant's Transcendental Deductions* ed. Förster, Stanford University Press: Stanford, California: 1989, p.206.

132. Tuschling endorses this reciprocal dependence of apperception, the key faculty in the generation of transition, and primordial matter, the material basis of the principle of

motion: "Taken together, all these revisions concern the relationship between primordial matter and apperception as the basis of all intellectual synthesis." (Ibid.)

133. Kant, Immanuel. *Metaphysical Foundations of the Natural Science*, ed. Friedman, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.93.

134. Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.72.

135. Ibid., p.73.

136. In *Opus Postumum* Kant categorizes moving forces into elemental forces that are directly moving and sensible and dynamical forces that are apprehended by the inner sense: "These forces are either directly moving forces (outer) such as material or elemental ones (fire, air, water) or forces acting on the (inner sense.)" (Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.127.)

137. Guyer, Paul. *Kant's System of Nature and Freedom*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005, p.16.

138. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*, ed. Guyer and Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp.593-4 A 649/B 677.

139. Guyer, Paul. *Kant's System of Nature and Freedom*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005, p.74.

140. For a further discussion on this, see Förster, Eckart. *Kant's Final Synthesis*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000, pp.82-5. Construing ether as the unifying matter-principle Friedman argues that Kant's *Opus Postumum* and particularly the ether deduction aims to find a representation of the idea of collective or synthetic universality which can represent the entire nature. This principle must be both constitutive (like motion or *phusis*) and regulative (like transition or *logos*) moving beyond the dichotomy between regulative and constitutive principles. (Friedman, Michael. *Kant and the Exact Sciences*, Harvard University Press, 1992, p.305.)

141. Kant makes a similar point as follows: "How is it possible that that which can only be represented as empirically given (immediate sensible representation—*intuitus*) may yet, as made by the subject itself (hence mediately—*per conceptus*), and thought *a priori*, be counted among the objects of experience? The reason is namely, that sensation (which is the perceiving subject's own effect) is, in fact, nothing other than the moving force which determines itself to composition, and the perception of outer objects is only the appearance of the automacy of the conjunction of the moving forces affecting the subject themselves." (Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.121.)

142. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, ed. Bittner, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.111.

143. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, sec.27, pp.141-2.

144. Nietzsche, Friedrich. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Pre-Platonic Philosophers*, trans., ed. Whitlock, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006, pp.64-5.

145. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, sec.25, p.134.

146. Ibid.

147. Ibid., sec.26, p.139.

148. Ibid. Also see Zammito's chapter on the sublime and symbolism.

149. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, ed., trans. Guyer, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. sec.23, pp.128-9.

150. Ibid., sec.25, p.133.

151. Ibid., sec.27, p.142.

152. Nietzsche, agreeing the necessary annihilation of time in the aesthetics of human nature, defines the real meaning of life as metaphysical. (Nietzsche, Friedrich. "The Birth of Tragedy" in *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*, ed. Geuss and Speirs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999: sec.23, p.110.)

153. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, ed., trans. Guyer, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, sec.28, p.146.

154. Ibid., p.147-8. This passage continues as follows: "And only under the presupposition of this idea in us and in relation to it are we capable of arriving at the idea of the sublimity of that being who produces inner respect in us not merely through his power, which he displays in nature, but even more by the capacity that is placed within us for judging nature without fear and thinking of our vocation as sublime in comparison with it." (Ibid.)

155. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Gay Science*, ed. Williams, Bernard, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, sec.371, pp.234-6.

156. Nietzsche believed and regretted that Heraclitus misinterpreted the Dionysian in Greek mythology, which explains his endeavour to reconcile them in his philosophy.

157. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, ed. Bittner, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.62. Heidegger affirms this view on the cosmological character of eternal recurrence. (See Heidegger, Martin. *Nietzsche II: Eternal Recurrence* trans., ed. Krell, D.F., San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1961, p.84.)

158. Heidegger summarizing a passage from Jaspers' *Psychology of Worldviews* confirms that the finite life-force is founded on the infinite driving force or motion: "When we attempt to understand life, we find only the finite and the particular. But we can see that behind all of this something is astir as its driving force, namely, a movement oriented in the direction of the infinite. Since life is 'motion,' the essence of mental life lies in the fact that it is always 'on a path leading to the actualisation of its qualities.'" (Heidegger, Martin. *Supplements: From the Earliest Essays to Being and Time and Beyond*, ed. Van Buren, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002, p.83.)

159. Heidegger, Martin. *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Yale: Yale University Press, 2000, p.19.

160. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Gay Science*, ed. Williams, Bernard, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, sec.335, p.189.

161. See Heidegger, *Nietzsche Volume II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same*, trans. Krell, Harper & Row, San Francisco, 1984, pp.111, 116.

162. Heidegger too confirms this view and adds: "To say that a science is philosophical means that it knowingly and questioningly reverts to being as such and as a whole, and inquires into the truth of beings; such science *sets itself in motion* within the fundamental positions we take toward beings." (Ibid., p.112.)

163. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, ed. Bittner, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.246. Nietzsche repeats and furthers this argument in the following passage: "The genesis of 'things' is wholly the work of the imaginers, thinkers, willers, inventors—the very concept of 'thing' as well as all qualities.—Even 'the subject' is something created in this way, is a 'thing' like all the others: a simplification to designate as such the *force* which posits, invents, thinks, as distinct from all individual positing, inventing, thinking." (Ibid., p.91.) Heidegger takes on this point Nietzsche makes in his critique of the 20th century subjectivist thought pointing at the vast humanization of beings as a whole through their construal in accordance with the subject–object dichotomy.

164. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, ed. Bittner, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.113.

165. Ibid., p.248.

166. Heidegger, Martin. *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Yale: Yale University Press, 2000, p.17.

167. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Pre-Platonic Philosophers*, trans., ed. Whitlock, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006, p.72.

168. Heidegger furthers this argument referring to Aristotle's conceptions of *dunamis* and *energeia*. (Heidegger, Martin. *Nietzsche: Volume I Will-to-Power as Art*, trans., ed. Krell, D.F., San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1961, p.61.)

169. Heidegger, Martin. *Nietzsche II: Eternal Recurrence* trans., ed. Krell, D.F., San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1961, p.26.

170. Heidegger, Martin. *Nietzsche: Volume I Will-to-Power as Art*, trans., ed. Krell, D.F., San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1961, p.209.

171. "For myself and for all those who live—are *permitted* to live—without the anxieties of a puritanical conscience, I wish an ever greater spiritualization and augmentation of the senses. Yes, we ought to be grateful to our senses for their subtlety, fullness, and force; and we ought to offer them in return the very best of spirit we possess." (Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Will To Power*, trans. Kaufmann & Hollingdale ed. Kaufmann, New York: Random House, 1968, sec.820, p.434.)

172. Even though he admits that Nietzsche intended to use the Dionysian as a bridging aesthetic notion between the sensuous and supersensuous realms, Heidegger explicitly argues for the unavoidability of the distinction or gulf between these realms. (Heidegger, *Nietzsche Volume II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same*, trans. Krell, Harper & Row, San Francisco, 1984, p.230.)

173. Nietzsche, Friedrich "Twilight of the Idols" in *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings*, ed. Ridley and Norman, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp.167-8.

174. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Gay Science*, ed. Williams, Bernard, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p.63.

175. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Pre-Platonic Philosophers*, trans., ed. Whitlock, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006, p.74 Furthermore, Kirk also approves this point in his *Cosmic Fragments*. (See Kirk, G. S., *The Cosmic Fragments*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1954, p.315.)

176. Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.112.

177. On the other hand, modern physical cosmology embraced the challenge and recovered the status of the principle of motion through the new scientific theories about the cosmos. Similarly, in *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche interprets the new scientific achievements as the sharpener of the senses.

178. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, trans. Cowan, Gateway Publishing: Chicago, 1962, p.58.

179. Ibid., p.62.

180. Heidegger says, "The overturning derives the force and direction of its motion from the new inquiry and its fundamental experience, in which true being, what is real, "reality," is to be defined afresh." (Heidegger, Martin. *Nietzsche: Volume I Will-to-Power as Art*, trans., ed. Krell, D.F., San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1961, p.211.)

181. Heidegger famously defines Nietzschean thought as the end of metaphysics but only insofar as it can revive the not-yet-metaphysical Pre-Socratic cosmology. (Heidegger, *Nietzsche Volume II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same*, trans. Krell, Harper & Row, San Francisco, 1984, p.199.)

182. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Beyond Good and Evil*, ed. Horstmann and Norman, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. p.20.

183. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, trans. Cowan, Gateway Publishing: Chicago, 1962, p.92.

184. Ibid. Even though Nietzsche seems to champion Anaxagoras in his examination of the Pre-Socratic construal of *phusis*, in the following passages he criticizes Anaxagoras's mistake of associating motion with the metaphysical *nous* which is understood by the latter to have a constant primordial existence and which thereby causes itself. (Ibid., pp.100-1.)

185. Ibid., p.47.

186. Ibid., p.51. Heidegger defends the Heraclitean point of view drawing on the necessity of guarding against such unworldly conceptions as "infinite" and "indeterminate." (Heidegger, *Nietzsche Volume II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same,* trans. Krell, Harper & Row, San Francisco, 1984, p.88-9.) Krell too pointed this out in his introduction to Heidegger's *Basic Writings*. (Krell, David Farrell. "Introduction" in *Basic Writings: Martin Heidegger* ed. Krell, Routledge: London, 1978, pp.7-8.)

187. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, trans. Cowan, Gateway Publishing: Chicago, 1962, p.51-2.

188. Ibid., p.52.

189. Ibid., p.54.

190. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Gay Science*, ed. Williams, Bernard, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, sec.112, p.113. This passage also reflects Nietzsche's general stance against Kant's idea of the superiority (*Überlegenheit*) of humanity.

191. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, ed. Bittner, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.88-9.

192. My emphasis.

193. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Pre-Platonic Philosophers*, trans., ed. Whitlock, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006, p.72. Heidegger too confirms that Nietzsche's eternal recurrence echoes the Heraclitean doctrine of the eternal flux. (Heidegger, Martin. *Nietzsche II: Eternal Recurrence* trans., ed. Krell, D.F., San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1961, p.232, p.145.)

194. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Pre-Platonic Philosophers*, trans., ed. Whitlock, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006, p.70.

195. Heidegger, Martin. *Nietzsche II: Eternal Recurrence* trans., ed. Krell, D.F., San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1961, p.232.

196. Heidegger uses this phrase "in order to designate basically everything that is not simply nothing: nature (animate and inanimate), history . . . God, the gods, and demigods. When we speak of things that are in being, we are also referring to what comes to be, what originates and passes away." (Ibid., pp.25-6.) He thereby stresses the fact that Nietzsche too is concerned with the totality of beings. (Ibid., p.114.)

197. Ibid., p.109. Nietzsche elaborates on this as follows, "All knowing is a mirroring in quite specific forms which did not exist from the beginning. Nature is acquainted with neither *shape* nor *size*; only to the knower do things appear to be large or small. Nature's *infinity*: it has no boundaries anywhere. Only for us is anything finite. Time is *infinitely* divisible." (Nietzsche, Friedrich. "The Philosopher" in Breazeale ed. *Nietzsche's notebooks of the 1870s: Philosophy and Truth*, Sussex: Humanities Press, 1979, p.43.) Thus time is not a definite category on which we can construct the processes of *phusis*.

198. Despite its cyclicality, the eternal recurrence cannot simply be characterized as the circular motion because it is designed to represent the dynamic and unpredictable

essence of *phusis*. (Also see Deleuze, Gilles. *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Tomlinson, London: The Athlone Press, 1983, pp.47-9.)

199. Ibid., p.48.

200. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, ed. Bittner, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.112.

201. Heidegger also claims that Nietzsche designs the notion of the eternal recurrence to explain the nature of the world. (Heidegger, Martin. *Nietzsche II: Eternal Recurrence* trans., ed. Krell, D.F., San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1961, pp.116-7.)

202. This is exactly why Heidegger claims (but later on disproves) that "Nietzsche also pursued a 'scientific side' to the doctrine of return." (Ibid., p.83.)

203. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Gay Science*, ed. Williams, Bernard, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, sec.109, pp.109-10. However, contrary to what Heidegger argues, the dynamic and musical (or cosmologic-aesthetic) construal of the Dionysian renders it a *not-yet-metaphysical* principle representing *phusis*.

204. Heidegger supports the key role of Nietzsche's eternal recurrence in understanding the Dionysian as a new principle (of motion): "The words Dionysos and Dionysian mean to Nietzsche will be heard and understood only if the 'eternal return of the same' is thought." (Heidegger, Martin. *Nietzsche II: Eternal Recurrence* trans., ed. Krell, D.F., San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1961, p.203.)

205. Heidegger puts this as follows: "To believe in Nietzsche's sense is thus to fixate the ever-changing throng of beings we encounter in the specific guiding representation of whatever is permanent and ordered" Heraclitus: "The being is in being by virtue of its permanent becoming, its self-unfolding and eventual dissolution." (Ibid., p.126.)

206. As Heidegger suggests, "Nietzsche argues that being is fixated, as permanent; and that it is in perpetual creation and destruction. . . . The essence of being is becoming, but what becomes is and has being only in creative transfiguration, liberating transfiguration." (Ibid.)

207. Kahn, Charles H., *The art and thought of Heraclitus*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, p.53 Nietzsche agrees with Heraclitus in his construal of "becoming" as transformation and change.

208. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Gay Science*, ed. Williams, Bernard, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, sec.341, pp.194-5.

209. At this point, Heidegger simply equates the Nietzschean and Heraclitean physiology claiming that both the Heraclitean flux and the thought of the eternal return present essentially pessimistic views on humanity. (Heidegger, Martin. *Nietzsche II: Eternal Recurrence* trans., ed. Krell, D.F., San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1961, p.117.)

210. Heidegger calls Nietzsche's doctrine of return pseudo-Heraclitean. (Ibid., p.91.)

211. "Our thinking must penetrate in thought the innermost abundance of beings, must probe in thought the uttermost limits of being as a whole." (Ibid., p.25.)

212. Ibid., pp.21-2.

213. He famously voices this thought in *The Gay Science*. (Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Gay Science*, ed. Williams, Bernard, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, sec.285, pp.161-2.)

214. Heidegger claims that the doctrine of eternal recurrence constitutes the sole and proper ground of will to power and that eternal recurrence as hammer thought, "conducts the thinker to supreme decisions in such a way that he expands beyond himself, thus attaining power over himself and willing himself. In this way, such a man *is* as will to power." (Heidegger, Martin. *Nietzsche II: Eternal Recurrence* trans., ed. Krell, D.F., San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1961, pp.153, 15.5.)

215. Similarly, Heidegger identifies the eternal recurrence of the same as the earthly religion (Ibid., p.122).

216. Ibid., p.215.

217. Ibid., p.32.

218. Ibid., p.34. Heidegger too voices this as follows: "In thinking the most burdensome thought *what* is thought cannot be detached from the *way in which* it is thought. The *what* is itself defined by the *how*, and, reciprocally, the *how* by the *what.*" (Heidegger, Martin. *Nietzsche II: Eternal Recurrence* trans., ed. Krell, D.F., San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1961, p.119.)

219. Nietzsche, Friedrich, *The Pre-Platonic Philosophers*, trans., ed. Whitlock, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006, p.60. Then he continues, "At his core he is the opposite of a pessimist because he does not deny away sorrows and irrationality: for him, war reveals itself as the eternal process of the world." (Ibid., p.74.)

220. Heidegger, Martin. *Nietzsche II: Eternal Recurrence* trans., ed. Krell, D.F., San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1961, p.93. He also adds, "Inasmuch as these humanizations for the most part simultaneously involve notions in which a cosmic ground—in the sense of a moral Creator-God—is represented, the humanization proceeds in tandem with a deification."

221. Ibid., p.225.

222. Heidegger identifies this as the World interpretation of the thought of the eternal return claiming that "a relation to man announces itself in the essence of eternity as midday and moment. Here that very circle plays a role, requiring that man be thought on the basis of world, and world on the basis of man." (Ibid., p.105.)

223. Ibid., p.90.

224. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, ed. Bittner, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.84.

225. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Gay Science*, ed. Williams, Bernard, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p.53.

226. Nietzsche, Friedrich. "To the Mistral. A Dance Song" in *The Gay Science*, ed. Williams, Bernard, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p.260.

227. Willing requires the initial intuition of *motion*. The advocate of the circle is not time but the motion itself. Raw Motion in itself must be affirmed rather than its representation by the intuition of time, "will becomes the advocate of the circle." (Heidegger, Martin. *Nietzsche II: Eternal Recurrence* trans., ed. Krell, D.F., San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1961, p.226.)

228. Will-to-power is the full understanding and action through the dynamism of the strongest path of nature for the preservation of motion and progress in history. Heidegger voices a similar view: "Understanding the undefined word 'life' in the service of will to power, Zarathustra asks whether his will corresponds to the will which, as will to power, pervades the whole of being." (Heidegger, Martin. *Nietzsche II: Eternal Recurrence* trans., ed. Krell, D.F., San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1961, p.214.)

229. Heidegger argues that Dionysian can only be thought through a world-picture that embodies the doctrine of will to power together with the eternal return. (Ibid., p.204.)

230. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. Hollingdale R.J., Penguin Press, 1961, p.136-7.

231. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Gay Science*, ed. Williams, Bernard, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, sec.349, p.208.

232. Ibid., p.50. At this point, quoting another passage from Nietzsche's *Late Notebooks*, Heidegger argues that for Nietzsche, "life not only exhibits the drive to maintain itself, as Darwin thinks, but also is self-assertion, . . . which wants to be ahead of things,

to stay on top of things, . . . going back into its essence, into the origin. *Self-assertion is original assertion of essence.*" (Heidegger, Martin. *Nietzsche: Volume I Will-to-Power as Art*, trans., ed. Krell, D.F., San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1961, p.61.)

233. Deleuze evidently agrees with these descriptions: "The will to power is thus ascribed to force, but in a very special way: it is both a complement of force and something internal to it. It is not ascribed to it as a predicate. . . . *The will to power is the element from which derive both the quantitative difference of related forces and the quality that devolves into each force in this relation*. The will to power here reveals its nature as the principle of the synthesis of forces." (Deleuze, Gilles. *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Tomlinson, London: The Athlone Press, 1983, pp.49-50.) Similarly, in another place Deleuze suggests: "Nietzsche was interested in physics as a science of intensive quantities, and ultimately he was aiming at the will to power as an 'intensive' principle, as a principle of pure intensity—because will to power does not mean wanting power; on the contrary, whatever one desires, it means raising this to its ultimate power." (Deleuze, Gilles. "On the Will to Power and the Eternal Return" in *Desert Island and Other Texts* trans. Taormina ed. Lapoujade, Semiotexte, Los Angeles, 2004, p.122.)

234. Deleuze, Gilles. *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Tomlinson, London: The Athlone Press, 1983, p.49.

235. Nietzsche also acknowledges will-to-power as willing through motion or *phusis* in the following poems:

Higher Men

He climbs on high–him we should praise!
But that one comes from high up always!
Immune to praise he lives his days,
He *is* the sun's rays!

Ecce Homo

Yes! I know now whence I came!
Unsatiated like a flame
My glowing ember squanders me.
Light to all on which I seize,
Ashen everything I leave:
Flame am I most certainly!

(Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Gay Science*, ed. Williams, Bernard, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p.23.)

236. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. Hollingdale R.J., Penguin Press, 1961, p.138. Nietzsche adds, life continues to tell its secret: "That I have to be struggle and becoming and goal and conflict of goals: ah, he who divines my will surely divines, too, along what *crooked* paths it has to go!" (Ibid.)

237. Heidegger, Martin. *Nietzsche II: Eternal Recurrence* trans., ed. Krell, D.F., San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1961, p.228. He further interprets the supreme will to power as the stamping of becoming with the character of Being. "[T]he sense is that one must shape Becoming as being in such a way that as becoming it is preserved, has subsistence, in a word, *is*. Such stamping, that is, the recoining of Becoming as being, is the supreme will to power" (Ibid., p.202.) "In Nietzsche's language 'life' means will to power—as the fundamental trait of all beings, and not merely human beings." (Ibid., p.212.)

238. Ibid., p.232.

239. Ibid., p.224.

240. Deleuze, Gilles. *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Tomlinson, London: The Athlone Press, 1983, p.47.

241. Ibid., p.48.

242. But Nietzsche "turned synthesis into a synthesis of forces . . . he understood the synthesis of forces as the eternal return. . . . He established the principle of synthesis, the will to power and determined this as the differential and genetic element of forces which directly confront one another." (Ibid., p.52.) Deleuze seconds this defining reality as a play of forces with reference to Nietzsche's *Late Notebooks*.

243. Ibid.

244. Nietzsche, Friedrich "Twilight of the Idols" in *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings*, ed. Ridley and Norman, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, sec.5, pp.169-170.

245. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Gay Science*, ed. Williams, Bernard, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, sec.360, p.225.

246. Ibid., sec.39, p.56. He also works on this thought in the following poem:

Stellar Morals

Ordained to move as planets do,
What matters, star, the dark to you?
Roll blithely through our human time!
Beyond its wretched misery climb!
The furthest world deserves your shine:
For you compassion is a crime!
One law applies to you: be thine!
(Ibid., p.23.)

247. Heidegger, Martin. *Nietzsche II: Eternal Recurrence* trans., ed. Krell, D.F., San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1961, p.232. He adds, "*if* a thought related to beings as a whole must at the *same time* be related to the human being who is thinking it—indeed, must be thought in terms of the human being pre-eminently and entirely." But, "every conception of the being and especially of beings as a whole, merely by the fact that it is a *conception*, is related *by* human beings *to* human beings. The relation derives from man." (Ibid., p.98.) He also adds that "humanization also extends to every imposition of order, articulation, beauty, and wisdom on the 'world.' These are all results of the 'human aesthetic habit.' It is also humanization when we ascribe 'reason' to beings and aver that the world proceeds rationally." (Ibid., p.92.)

248. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, ed. Bittner, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp.86-7. This is also evident in the following passage: "every *heightening of man* brings with it an overcoming of narrower interpretations; that every increase in strength and expansion of power opens up new perspectives and demands a belief in new horizons . . . the world *which matters to us* is false . . . it is 'in flux,' as something becoming, as a constantly shifting falsity." (Ibid., p.80.)

249. Heidegger, Martin. "On the Essence and Concept of *Phusis* in Aristotle's *Physics* B, I" trans. Sheehan in *Pathmarks*, ed. McNeill, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.183.

250. Aeschylus, "Seven Against Thebes" in *Aeschylus II* ed.Grene & Lattimore, University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1991, p.97 (216-7).

251. Geldard, Richard. *Remembering Heraclitus*, Edinburgh: Lindisfarne & Floris Books, 2000, p.52.

252. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, ed. Bittner, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.247.

253. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Gay Science*, ed. Williams, Bernard, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, sec.276, p.157. Heidegger rightly interprets *amor fati* or 'love of necessity' as taking a stand in Dionysian fashion on behalf of existence.

(Heidegger, Martin. *Nietzsche II: Eternal Recurrence* trans., ed. Krell, D.F., San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1961, p.206.)

254. "The Greeks, among whom Thales stood out so suddenly, were the very opposite of realists, in that they believed only in the reality of men and gods, looking upon all of nature as but a disguise, a masquerade, or a metamorphosis of these god-men. Man for them was the truth and the core of all things; everything else was but semblance and the play of illusion. . . . They were the exact opposite of modern man." (Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, trans. Cowan, Gateway Publishing: Chicago, 1962, p.41.)

255. Nietzsche, Friedrich. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Pre-Platonic Philosophers*, trans., ed. Whitlock, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006, p.59.

256. Heidegger, Martin. *Supplements: From the Earliest Essays to Being and Time and Beyond*, ed. Van Buren, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002, p.80.

257. Heidegger puts forward a similar idea: "The most *intrinsic* of 'inner forces' are thoughts." (Heidegger, Martin. *Nietzsche II: Eternal Recurrence* trans., ed. Krell, D.F., San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1961, p.23.)

Excursus

A Cosmological-Aesthetic Analysis of Van Gogh's *Starry Night*

There is a chance that initial responses to Van Gogh's *Starry Night* may be just as diverse and unpredictable as to any other painting. However, one can safely say that a mere "beautiful!" does not adequately account for the striking experience of seeing *The Starry Night* for the first time. Some artworks are called sublime because of their capacity to *move* human imagination in a different way than the experience of beauty. The following discussion explores how Van Gogh's *Starry Night* accomplishes this peculiar movement of imagination thus qualifying as "sublime." This painting fulfils indeed the most important requirement for a sublime artwork: it pushes human faculties and relates this movement to the essential motion of the substratum, thus generating a *transition* between the sensible and supersensible realms. This takes place through the continuous repetition of this process of transition leading the faculty of judgment to define it as sublime. *The Starry Night* achieves that by representing not only the artist's imagination of a physical experience of the night sky but also the gathering of the dynamic forces within the act of creation. It constitutes an example of the higher aesthetic principles we have been trying to establish throughout this book and must be judged according to the cosmological-aesthetic criteria.

The Starry Night generates a transition between *ethos* and *phusis* and presents them in unity. Van Gogh achieves this effect by extending the motion inherent in *phusis* not only to the landscape but also to the human dwellings. *The Starry Night* is *dynamic* as it relates immediately to human sense-intuition (*Anschauung*), thus moving the human imagination and subsequently stimulating the power of judgment, which by then has already classified the experience as *sublime*. Once acknowledged as sublime, this dynamic-aesthetic quality of the artwork actualizes the transition between the moving forces it represents and the human concept it has activated. Therefore, the dynamic-aesthetic quality comes

to be part of the universal *logos* which is timeless, in other words is, was, will be, and spaceless, or which is there, here, closer, further, inside and outside. When *looking at* this painting one is also looking at *logos*, the bridge on which humanity dwells. The moving experience of the artwork means witnessing the very grounding of humanity within the senseless cosmic forces. To what extent can we say, then, that a technically perfect photograph of the Milky Way would fail to create a similar effect? Is it bound to fail?

While the photograph aims to present the "thingly" qualities of the Milky Way, the painting goes *beyond* merely phenomenal characteristics of the landscape and thereby becomes the artistic creation reconciling the phenomenon *with* its concept. Heidegger explains this as follows:

> Art presences in the art-work . . . the artwork is something over and above its thingliness. This something else in the work constitutes its artistic nature. The artwork . . . says something other than the mere thing itself is. . . . The work makes publicly known something other than itself, it manifests something other: it is an allegory. In the artwork something other is brought into conjunction with the thing that is made.[1]

This perfectly applies to Heidegger's example of Van Gogh's *A Pair of Peasant Shoes*. Even though no background or setting is provided for the viewer, thanks to the artful rendering of the artist, one senses that "this equipment belongs *to the earth* and finds protection in the *world* of the peasant woman. From out of this protected belonging the equipment itself rises to its resting-within-itself."[2] Here, not only does the equipment but also its very concept belongs *to the earth*, precisely as the stars, moon and human dwellings belong to the absolute motion and/or fire in *The Starry Night.* Earthiness, as an elemental characteristic, prevails in the physical qualities of the painting like color, tone, and vividness of the painting as well as in the conceptual qualities like the weariness, antiquity, and usualness of the painted thing. Earth is present in the painting both as a physical element and as an aesthetic concept, and these phenomenal and conceptual qualities are essentially dependent on each other. For instance, the weariness of the shoe is not only demonstrated by the shades of dark brown but it also *belongs to* the color as the color belongs to the conceptual quality of weariness of the shoes heavily used in farming. Only then, adds Heidegger, does the painting make the characteristics of the shoes explicit and aesthetic. Accordingly, the work of art makes the invisible visible, the conceptual physical, and the noumenal phenomenal by way of actively transmitting one to another. While the physical and conceptual qualities of the element of *earth* are transmitted in *A Pair of Peasant Shoes*, the very principle or idea of motion itself (which is essentially only apprehensible) has become physical and sensible in *The Starry Night*. These sublime artworks serve as transition between the essentially physical qualities of the concept of the thing and the essentially conceptual (metaphysical) qualities of the phenomenal presence of the thing. The very accomplishment of this

transition regenerates the thing artistically depicted in its unity. In other words, the artful depiction brings the thing together with its *phusis*.

The most obvious physical fact that distinguishes *The Starry Night* from Van Gogh's other paintings is the presence of vegetation (especially the tall poplar on the left side adding depth to the painting), human dwellings (that are not scattered across but rather centered in the landscape surrounding the church) and lights inside the houses. The very existence of human dwellings alters the landscape not only because of their material presence but also because of their direct impartation of the motion and the light inherent in nature. Van Gogh uses the same brush to paint the lights radiating from the human dwellings as the stars and the moon. Their color is that of fire from distance. Human beings only make use, transform and transmit the fire inherited from the stars and the Sun. The link between the cosmic fire and human lights strengthens Van Gogh's representation of the immediacy of this connection. The cosmic fire inherent in *phusis* and the fire used by humans to make and craft tools and artworks, to warm themselves to keep their senses alert, to scare their prey, to cook and gather—or simply the fire that shapes their *ethos*—is one and the same. And, as the fire used by humans is the extension of the cosmic fire and as the earth is the extension of the Sun, *ethos* is the extension of *phusis*. Heraclitus describes this as follows: "This (world-) order (*the same for all*) did none of gods or men make, but it always was and is and shall be: an ever-living fire, kindling in measures and going out in measures."[3] Thus fire, by instilling its essential motion into *phusis*, renders it subject to a fiery cyclicality and thereby transforms *ta panta* into *kosmos*.[4] Hence fire acts as *logos* in the cosmic realm. Nietzsche also associates *phusis* and fire with *logos* and concludes that "the one overall Becoming is itself law; *that* it becomes and *how* it becomes is its work. Heraclitus thus sees only the One, but in the sense opposite to Parmenides."[5] The Heraclitean singularity is *neither* metaphysical *nor* merely phenomenal but cosmological or both conceptual and phenomenal. Van Gogh's *Starry Night* is exemplary for its success in bringing together the conceptual and phenomenal under the cosmological principle of *phusis* with specific reference to the element of fire.

The element of fire renders Van Gogh's paintings cosmic especially with regard to his later works that finalized his particular style. In these paintings, cosmic colors dominate the landscape thereby depicting and emphasizing the heat and movement inherent in *kosmos*. In other words, by the addition of extra heat on actual or earthly colors, the fire within rocks, mountains, trees, farms, houses, people is represented as their primary component. This makes the paintings warmer, moving and vivid. Unlike the white dots on a black background rendered by a photograph of the night sky, the use of a strong all-encompassing blue brings life to *The Starry Night*. The prevalence of blue in the entire landscape generates a unity between the sky and the earth by artfully conveying the motion from the former to the latter. Moreover the white stars of the "actual" photograph have become yellow and gold in the "artistic" painting. While the photograph portrays a strict opposition between the sky and the earth, the painting performs their unification. The lifeless contrast of black and white is re-

placed in the painting by the complementary colors of blue and yellow which make the human *ethos* moving and living. Ultimately, the cosmic and the earthly can only be reconciled artistically, through the aesthetic human representation which serves as *logos*.

Another crucial point regarding the unifying scope of *The Starry Night* lies in the very essence of the night sky. While the morning sky detaches the lit area from the rest of the universe, the night sky reconciles the area previously isolated by the light with the *kosmos*. Light is usually employed as the phenomenon of truth and unconcealment (*aletheia*) owing to its simplifying effect on the sense-perception of phenomena. However, the morning light, while illuminating and heating the earth, covers it with a light blue veil and renders other planets, stars and moons invisible. Shedding light on the earthly things and thereby warming them, the Sun puts them in motion, and by doing so, localizes the human understanding. This is why it is natural for most animals to hunt and for humans to work during the day. But the same activating power of light is also what defines human beings as *phenomena of nature*. In the spotlight of the Sun and wrapped in a blue veil, the earthly phenomena *live* the day under fire's reign. However, as night lifts daylight's veil, *ethos* physically reconnects with *kosmos*. This explains Van Gogh's fascination with the night sky and the sunset. *The Starry Night* represents this reconciliation of the sky with the earth, hence reaffirms the essential unity underpinning *kosmos*. In the painting, while a massive moon represents the weakened but still pervasive light emanating from the Sun, the abundance of other stars and the swirls stand for the unity of the morning light with the rest of the universe.

The created sense of "unity" is among the most important characteristics of the Kantian mathematically sublime along with "massiveness" which is also present in Van Gogh's painting in the form of the massive sky dominating and penetrating earthly things (as in the paintings of Da Vinci). The Kantian sublime also establishes the relation between massiveness and the all-encompassing unity of individual members. The sublime violates our faculty of imagination through its irregular, chaotic, and wild character deriving from the *vastness* and *extensive* power underlying in the manifold unity of nature. "The imagination reaches its maximum, and in the effort to extend it, sinks back into itself, but is thereby transported into an emotionally moving satisfaction."[6] Kant then refers to the Egyptian pyramids and Saint Peter's Basilica in Rome. It would not be wrong to describe *The Starry Night* as the painterly equivalent form of such sublime architectural artworks. Yet, such physical facts (as the unity in color, massiveness of the night sky and unifying presence of fire) are certainly not enough to call this painting sublime. Indeed, the painting is rendered sublime by the use of the spiralling motion represented right at the centre of the artwork and the waves of motion that penetrate the entire landscape. This does not mean that the all-penetrating motion represented in Van Gogh's other paintings like *The Sower*, *Lane of Poplars at Sunset*, *Landscape at Twilight*, *Evening*: *The End of the Day*, *Landscape with Wheat Sheaves and Rising Moon* is less artful. However, the eye-catching swirls are unique and specific to *The Starry Night*. Two spirals,

an immense one and its smaller extension, constitute undoubtedly the most distinguishing feature of this painting. What do these spirals signify? And why are they placed in the center of the painting? From a cosmological point of view, they are the products of the interactions (such as attraction and repulsion) between the forces of *phusis*. The constant interactions of the forces of attraction and repulsion lead to pulsation, defined by Kant as "the continuous sequence of impacts and counter-impacts in an intermediate space."[7] Pulsation produces the necessary excitation of world-material for the continuation of motion or life. As such the spiral is the living image of the intermediate space constituted by the moving forces of nature. It represents the constant process of creation and destruction in nature or the dynamic (and not mechanical) force of the eternal recurrence, which defines the endless and unpredictable *becoming*.[8] The image of the spiral perfectly depicts a pulsating, becoming and thus moving universe. In his *Universal Natural History and the Theory of Heavens* Kant uses a similar picture of the cosmic-dynamic continuum underpinning the inevitable coexistence of chaos and order in an expanding and pulsating (moving) universe. Schönfeld summarizes Kant's argument on *motion* as follows:

> Nature, in the Universal Natural History, streams outward in a wavefront of organization (1:314.1-2), generating worlds (1:314.8), biospheres and sentience (1:317.5-13, 352-3) and finally reason, human and otherwise (1:351-66). Organization is fragile, and spontaneity, pushed far enough, invites chaos. Mature cosmic regions decay, chaos sets in, and entropy follows in the wake of complexity. But entropy provides the very conditions that allow the cosmic pulse to bounce material points back to order. Thus the expanding chaos curdles at its center into order, followed by chaos, by order, by chaos.[9]

Deleuze, in his essay on the eternal recurrence sees "coming back (as) the only being of becoming," which is why he describes the eternal recurrence as "the instantaneous return to a kind of intense focal point."[10] Hence the spiral is the most appropriate aesthetic symbol of the eternal recurrence. In addition, according to Deleuze, "if we insist on thinking of the eternal return as the movement of a wheel, we must nevertheless endow it with a centrifugal movement, by means of which it expulses everything which is too weak, too moderate, to withstand the ordeal."[11] This centrifugal movement is the driving force of the spiral or the zenith of *phusis* that drills into the abyss of non-being to *create* being through becoming. According to Heidegger, "*Phusis* is a going in the sense of a going-forth, and in this sense it is indeed a going *back* into itself; i.e. the *self* to which it returns remains a going-forth. The merely spatial image of a circle is essentially inadequate because this going-forth that goes back into itself precisely lets something go forth from which and to which the going-forth is in each instance on the way."[12] "*Going-forth"* is the equivalent of the will-to-power in Nietzschean thought. Only through the will-to-power can eternal recurrence of *phusis* be affirmed. Only through drilling into the static block of the abyss, can the drill itself come into being. The very categories of time and space emerging from the static abyss are the outcomes of the spiralling motion's contact with

humanity.[13] Aesthetically, spirals symbolize the passageways reaching out to a timeless and spaceless realm. This effect resembles the central Dionysian effect in Greek tragedy without which the latter would not be sublime.[14] The Dionysian is the artistic representation of the spiral and its zenith. The spirals remind the spectator of the existence of a superhuman cosmic reality to which all human concepts are linked. They generate an affirmation of this reality by absorbing the gaze of the spectator. As the spirals endow the painting with movement and depth, the Dionysian, as the aesthetic representation of *logos*, performs the extension of *phusis* within human *ethos*. A cosmologic-aesthetic understanding of eternal recurrence (or the spiralling movement at the centre of this painting and life as a whole) presupposes the artistic connection of the principles of transition and motion, thus generating raw material for the advancement and renewal of human *ethos*.

Could the spiral(s) symbolize Nietzsche's doctrines of eternal recurrence and the will-to-power at the same time?[15] In other words, how can we reconcile the cosmological and the aesthetic using this simple analogy? The will-to-power can be conceived as the spiral's *extending-forward*, while the eternal recurrence is its *circling-around-itself*[16]. Crucially, unless it extends forward, the spiral ceases to be a spiral and remains a circle eventually (after eternities of circling-around-itself) collapsing back into itself. On the other hand, if defined solely by its extending-forward, the spiral transforms into a comet-like linear figure ultimately running into exhaustion. It is humanity's extending-forward that attracts the overabundant moving cycle of eternal recurrence. In other words, the extension draws the attention of the cyclical *phusis* which flows-towards this point of convergence and discharges its forces like a lightning strike. The lightning brings eternal recurrence and will-to-power together. When applied to the realm of *ethos*, the spiral's local or earthly extending-forward pertains to humanity's zeal to *create* and *represent*—human art, while the spiral's circular movement represents humanity's zeal to *see*, *understand* and *know*—human philosophy and science as its derivative. The necessity of bringing art and philosophy together requires the reconciliation of cosmology (distinguished from other branches of metaphysics) with aesthetics. Van Gogh's stylistic spiral accomplishes this reconciliation between the artistic and philosophical goals.

What do we want to achieve by defining humanity as an *extension* of *phusis*? How does such reversal contribute to our philosophy and aesthetic theory? In Heidegger's view, "we will get closer to what *is* if we think everything in reverse—assuming, of course, that we have, in advance, an eye for how differently everything then faces us. A mere reversal, made for its own sake, reveals nothing."[17] How can things come to face us differently or indeed more clearly when we attempt at this reversal? Does Heidegger refer to the reversal of thinking from *ethos* to *phusis*? Does he aim to attain a better picture of humanity as a part of the presencing of *phusis*? Though Heidegger does not explain this thoroughly, this reversal actually motivates the original purpose of this excursus, while the reversal of the dialectical logic constitutes the main purpose of this book. Both *phusis* and *ethos* originate from and are defined through their transi-

tion to each other—the synthesis comes first and determines how thesis and antithesis face us. Similarly, *logos* determines how we see *ethos* or being-human and *phusis* or being as a whole.

Heidegger uses the example of the Greek temple, which gives surrounding things their appearance and humans their outlook on themselves. The temple and the sculpture of the god within it, as the aesthetic representation of the divine in human nature and of the human in divine being, serves as a transition between the conceptual realm of humanity and the physical realm of *phusis*. In doing so, it creates and recreates the background or landscape where it is placed. The temple gathers around itself the unity of all possible concepts of humanity and the things of nature, and thus functions as *logos* or, in Heidegger's words, as the "gathering gatheredness." In the specific case of the temple, the gathering gatheredness of *logos* comes to be the "rising-up-within-itself" by which "the work opens up a *world* and keeps it abidingly in force."[18] This intermediary world serves as a passageway, as the extension of *phusis*, which not only establishes a link but also, by doing so, determines and identifies its two ends. This allows *phusis* to flow into the particular realms of being, i.e. being-human. However once the connection is made and the flow starts, *phusis* itself begins to transform according to the type of being it has been connected and this occurs because it actually needs this transformation to remain self-sufficient in-itself as a meaningful motion. Based on the human definitions of temporality, the motion *phusis* embodies comes to be defined as growth and progress. Likewise, this connection brings life to human concepts, which remain alive as long as their connection to the essential motion is maintained. The maintenance of this connection requires the continuity of the flow in the passageway. Timeless artworks of human genius such as the Greek temples, the Egyptian pyramids, the tragic plays of Aeschylus, Sophocles, Shakespeare, Van Gogh's paintings, Mozart's music etc. transform and strengthen both *phusis* and *ethos* thus reinforcing the flow in the passageway and enlarging the bridge set between the two rims of the canyon on which the later generations will dwell, gather, produce and regenerate.

How does *The Starry Night* reach the level of *logos*? Van Gogh's *presence* within the painting is reinforced through his powerful intertwining of the human dwellings with the night sky set in *motion*. The landscape metamorphoses into a self-portrait as well as a portrait of *logos*. This corresponds to our earlier claim that genius, both as idea and artist, functions as the transition between nature and art. Van Gogh's art is incorrectly called *expressionism*: he does not express his feelings about the natural phenomenon as a detached rational observer (nor, as romanticists would argue, does he become nature's tool for self-expression) but rather, I argue, he operates his own transformation into the artistic and dynamic bridge or passageway between *phusis* and *ethos*. The oneness of the colors accentuates the essential unity of the sky and earth, nature and human, *phusis* and *ethos* while emphasizing the motion inherent in both. However, this would never have been accomplished had the painter failed to represent and embody *logos* or the aesthetic principle of transition. Every work of genius is the self-portrait of the artist as idea, and the idea as artist. The artist transforms into

the artwork by channelling his *phusis* into his creation: his artistic powers flow into and actualize the aesthetic phenomenon. Heidegger agrees with this construal of the (genius) artist as the transition through which the artwork manages to stand-for-itself:

> Through him (the artist), the work is to be released into its purest standing-in-itself. Precisely in great art (which is all we are concerned here) the artist remains something inconsequential in comparison with the work — almost like a passageway which, in the creative process, destroys itself for the sake of the coming forth of the work.[19]

This explanation not only fits into the argument made above about the self-embodiment of the artist with the artwork but also strengthens our point on the function of the genius as the transition between the ideal-conceptual and the thingly character of the artwork. The artwork's standing-in-itself depends on the continuous repetition of this very transition between the phenomenal and conceptual existence of the artwork. The permanence of this transition, initially fuelled by the artist's creative force, depends on the affirmation of the existence of the passageway but this time within the artwork itself. Thus, contrary to Heidegger's point, the artist is not exactly a self-destructive passageway that eventually ceases to exist, but rather, linking his genius to *phusis* and becoming its extension, he himself transforms into *logos* that transmits between nature and art. Viewers looking at the painting are not looking away from the artist but rather looking directly at the artist's gaze that defines his *style*.

The *style* is the artistic gathering or summation of the ways the artist uses to reconcile the physical and conceptual within the artwork. But the artist is not fully aware of his style until having properly attained this reconciliation where his ultimate *Weltanschauung* lies. The artist's way of depicting the world remains to determine the way the spectators look at and understand the artwork. *The Starry Night* cannot and should not be seen and analyzed devoid of the understanding of the style through which Van Gogh has undertaken its creation. The *motion* present in all of his paintings after the maturation of *his style* is equally or even more intensely present in *The Starry Night*. Nevertheless, it would appear simplistic to associate this motion with the psychological state of the painter even though *psyche* or spirit itself is considered essentially linked to *phusis*. The artist's *Weltanschauung* after the maturation of his style transforms into *logos* itself and comes to portray the ways *phusis* is apprehended, seen and understood. Indeed, most of Van Gogh's late landscape paintings display such quality. The peasants, their equipment, the houses and farms are all part of the motion in nature or *phusis*. This artistic representation is not a product of *logos* but *logos* itself. *Ethos* is aesthetic only insofar as it is placed in *phusis* through its immediate connection to *logos*. Heidegger here defends a similar line of argument:

> Within *human* relation lies the other ambiguity in the setting-to-work which . . . is identified as that between creation and preservation . . . it is the art*work* and

> art*ist* that have a "special" relationship to the coming into being of art. In the label "setting-to-work of truth," in which it remains undetermined (though determin*able*) who or what does the "setting," and in what manner, lies concealed *the relationship of being to human being.*[20]

The relationship between *phusis* and *ethos* is revealed through the self-attachment of the artwork and the artist to the aesthetic principle of transition or *logos*. Humans are mediately linked to the moving forces of nature by the reflective power of judgment. By contrast, other organisms are the outcomes of nature's on-going evolution; just a phase in its quantitative and qualitative growth. Being-human is not only the simple continuation of other organisms but also the meaningful representation of the archaic dynamics within nature in the form of the advanced aesthetic representations such as the art of tragedy. This entails a renewal of our understanding of *ethos*. In his *Letter on Humanism*, Heidegger argues, "If the name "ethics," in keeping with the basic meaning of the word *ēthos*, should now say that "ethics" ponders the abode of man, then that thinking which thinks the truth of Being as the primordial element of man, as one who ek-sists, is in itself the original ethics."[21] However, Heidegger continues, this is not ethics itself but ontology, namely the philosophical inquiry that thinks Being. So, for a more specific and coherent picture of ethics, what we need is a philosophical inquiry that thinks humanity in relation to Being in general. The argument follows that this inquiry must not be isolated from the original thinking, or the thinking that thinks *phusis*. This is because the thinking of *ethos* must be grounded on a much larger background; the image of human can only be perceived within a greater landscape. For neither the human image nor the whole canvas is coherent once separated from each other. Van Gogh's *Starry Night* represents them as intertwined and becomes the artwork of *logos*, which, by bridging the gap between *phusis* and *ethos*, generates a new *Weltanschauung*.

What does this bridge stand for? What does "artwork of *logos*" mean? How does the reversal of thinking affect aesthetics? Heidegger responds as follows:

> The artist is the origin of the work. The work is the origin of the artist. Neither is without the other. Nonetheless neither is the sole support of the other. Artist and work *are* each, in themselves and in their reciprocal relation, on account of a third thing, which is prior to both; on account, that is, of that from which both artist and artwork take their names, on account of art.[22]

The so-called "third thing" corresponds in our analysis to the aesthetic *logos* through which we should define and redefine the phenomenal existence of the artwork as well as the conceptual existence of the artist. It is equally wrong to call a thing or an artwork pure "object" and to call a person or artist pure "subject." An object is not an object unless seen by the subject and a subject is not a subject until it sees or senses an object. This very reciprocal relation determines and defines them. Thus, neither can a thing be called an object, as it is necessarily defined through its relation to a sensing being, nor can a person be called sub-

ject, since he can only become a sensing being when there are sensible things around him. Heidegger makes a similar point in his analysis of *phusis*:

> Under the spell of our modern way of being, we are addicted to thinking of beings as *objects* and allowing the being of beings to be exhausted in the objectivity of the object. But for Aristotle, the issue here is to show that artefacts *are what* they are and *how* they are precisely in the movedness of production and thus in the rest of having-been-produced.[23]

The act of creation or art (or the movedness of production) is the origin of both the artist and the artwork, and aesthetics must be understood neither as a system of thought inquiring the formal qualities of "objects" nor as a vast set of doctrines based on the experiences of "subjects" including artists. It can neither be reduced to the senseless and meaningless realm of phenomena, nor be considered the outcome of mere subjective imagination. But rather it is the philosophy of "art" as the origin of the created and the creator, the produced and the producer, the artwork and the artist. Art must be studied as the foundation of human *ethos*, not as an outcome of it.

Likewise, *phusis or* the idea of nature is apprehensible and requires human imagination and artistic creativity to connect to *ethos*. Heidegger associating the World with *phusis* writes:

> World is not a mere collection of the things—countable and uncountable, known and unknown—that are present at hand. Neither is world a merely imaginary framework added by our representation to the sum of things that are present. *World worlds*, and is more fully in being than all those tangible and perceptible things in the midst of which we take ourselves to be at home. World is never an object that stands before us and can be looked at. World is that always-nonobjectual to which we are subject as long as the paths of birth and death, blessing and curse, keep us transported into being.[24]

Then, continues Heidegger, "The setting up of a world and the setting forth of earth are two essential traits belonging to the work-being of the work. Within the unity of that work-being, however, they belong together."[25] This belonging togetherness of the world and the earth within the repose of the artwork brings forth the essential motion the artwork embodies and represents. This occurs when *logos* meets *phusis* just as the physical or earthly and conceptual or worldly characters counterbalance each other within the artwork. But, at the same time, this simultaneous balancing can only take place if *logos* approaches *phusis*. The senselessly moving but resourceful earth must be kept in constant and creative interaction with the conceptual human world(s) or *ethos* through the artwork or *logos*.

A last crucial point concerns the triviality of the concept of "beauty" in the judgment of artworks like *The Starry Night*. One of the most important purposes of the theory of cosmological aesthetics is to disprove the authority of the concept of beauty in aesthetic judgment. For instance, it would be absurd to claim

that we can judge Homeric epic and Aeschylean, Sophoclean, Shakespearean tragedy, or Egyptian pyramids on the sole basis of the concept of beauty. It is simply not sufficient to use the criterion of the beautiful to judge most of the artworks that transcend the time and culture in which they have been produced. Van Gogh's *Starry Night* is certainly one of these.

The sublime and the Dionysian come to the fore as more encompassing criteria for the judgment of artworks that are not simply "beautiful." As the representations of the transition from nature to art, these concepts encompass most of the characteristic adjectives depicting the gods in polytheistic myths such as the terrible Zeus, ecstatic, inspiring and foreign Dionysus, vengeful Hera, obscure Hermes and disturbing Poseidon. Kant and Nietzsche frequently resort to these adjectives in their definitions of the sublime. This does not make the form-giving Apollonian (namely the beautiful) less necessary but rather suggests that in modern and contemporary aesthetic theory, such category dominates a much broader territory than initially intended. The domination of the formal qualities of the artwork in the theories of aesthetic judgment denies the essential dynamism underpinning the processes of creation and judgment. This is why, in their analyses of artworks, modern art critics occasionally have recourse to exhausted paradigms like object and subject, and thereby fail to theorize the sublime artworks such as *The Starry Night*. The exhaustion in aesthetics and the philosophy of art is the direct result of the exhaustion of the beautiful as an idea, as a concept and as a mere adjective. The theory of cosmological aesthetics extends beyond the earthly, familiar, tame, formal and static realm of the beautiful.

Both the sublime and the Dionysian cover a realm beyond that of the beautiful, beyond the mere outcome of human *ratio* or the reduced measure of formal perception. This *ratio* serves humanity as the earth's atmosphere shields her from the destructive force of meteors and excessive sunlight. But the foremost element *fire* (the Sun) exists outside the atmosphere and sustains life on the planet. Similarly, beauty serves human *ethos* as a protective beneficent shield against the overabundance of cosmic forces. However, the shield itself cannot simultaneously function as a stimulating or primary moving force. For this, the penetration of the heat of the sunrays—the motion they embody— is necessary. As an experience, the sublime acts like the potentially destructive but essential life-giving moving force, and as a judgment it determines the extent of the movement within the aesthetic phenomenon. This is why it is more appropriate to call the Sun sublime rather than beautiful just as it is to associate it to the element of fire rather than earth. The earthly is formal or sculptural (like the Apollonian) and the beautiful is the earthly individuating judgment made on the aesthetic phenomena. By contrast, the cosmic is moving and fiery (like the Dionysian) and the sublime is the cosmic unifying judgment made on the aesthetic phenomena. Van Gogh's style is Dionysian and cosmic especially with regard to his late colourful works that finalized his unique style. Unless acknowledged as such, the concept of beauty will continue to veil the vast realm of aesthetics by perpetuating its inherent dualities, ultimately preventing the advent of appropriate criteria for the judgment of artworks like *The Starry Night*. Therefore, I pro-

pose that the principles of motion and transition be the new *cosmologic-aesthetic categories* for the judgment of sublime artworks as well as for the understanding of the world (*Weltanschauung*) they represent.

NOTES

1. Heidegger, Martin. "The Origin of the Work of Art" in *Off The Beaten Track* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp.2-3.

2. Ibid., p.14.

3. Kirk, G. S., *The Cosmic Fragments*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1954, p.307.

4. Also see Heidegger, Martin and Fink, Eugen, *Heidegger – Fink, Heraclitus Seminar 1966/67* trans. Charles H. Seibert, University of Alabama Press, 1979, p.78.

5. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Pre-Platonic Philosophers*, trans., ed. Whitlock, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006, p.63.

6. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge University Press, 2000, sec.26: p.136.

7. Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*, ed. Förster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.24.

8. In his essay on Nietzsche's eternal recurrence, Deleuze voices a similar view: "how does one explain it is both cycle and moment: on the one hand continuation; and on the other, iteration? On the one hand, a continuation of the process of becoming which is the World; and on the other, repetition, lightning flash, a mystical view on this process or this becoming? On the one hand, the continual rebeginning of what has been; and on the other, the instantaneous return to a kind of intense focal point, to a zero moment of the will?" and later on he continues, "the eternal return is predicated only of becoming and the multiple. It is the law of a world without being, without unity, without identity. Far from presupposing the One or the Same, the eternal return constitutes the only unity of the multiple as such, the only identity of what differs: coming back is the only being of becoming." (Deleuze, Gilles. "On the Will to Power and the Eternal Return." in *Desert Island and Other Texts* trans. Taormina ed. Lapoujade, Semiotexte, Los Angeles, 2004, p.121, p.124.)

9. Schönfeld, Martin. "Kant's Philosophical Development" in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-development/ Retrieved on June 2, 2009.)

10. Deleuze, Gilles. "On the Will to Power and the Eternal Return" in *Desert Island and Other Texts* trans. Taormina ed. Lapoujade, Semiotexte, Los Angeles, 2004, p.125.

11. Ibid. Friedman defines this centrifugal force as *elastic force*: "whether it be the gravitational force due to a central body around which the moving body rotates, the elastic force in a sling used to twirl the rotating body, the pressure directed towards the center of an external aether or whatever. . . . Thus if we use 'central force' to denote the (Newtonian) force responsible for the centripetal acceleration, we thereby necessarily go beyond the merely mathematical moving forces." (Friedman, Michael. *Kant and the Exact Sciences*, Harvard University Press, 1992, p.228.) Thereby the primary purpose of Kant's *Transition* project was, like Newton, to advance from mathematical kinematics to physical (cosmological) dynamics and philosophical foundations (Ibid. pp.230-5.)

12. Heidegger, Martin. "On the Essence and Concept of *Phusis* in Aristotle's *Physics* B, I" trans. Sheehan in *Pathmarks*, ed. McNeill, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.224.

13. We have defined spiralling earlier as the state of moving forward by repeating the shape of the movement of which it is constituted.

14. This has already been discussed in the chapter on the principle of transition.

15. Heidegger poses the same question: "How can being as a whole be will to power and eternal recurrence at the same time? . . . . It is a mistake to oppose these thoughts to each other." (Heidegger, Martin. *Nietzsche Vol II*: *Eternal Recurrence*, trans., ed. Krell, D.F., San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1961, pp.198-9.)

16. Heidegger confirms this as follows: "The configurative forces collide," "Circle is the sign of the ring that wrings back to itself" (Ibid., p.213).

17. Heidegger, Martin. "The Origin of the Work of Art" in *Off The Beaten Track* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p.21.

18. Ibid., p.22.

19. Ibid., p.19.

20. Ibid,. p.55.

21. Heidegger, Martin, "Letter On Humanism" in *Basic Writings* ed. Krell, Routledge: London, 1978, p.258.

22. Heidegger, Martin. "The Origin of the Work of Art" in *Off The Beaten Track* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p.1.

23. Heidegger, Martin. "On the Essence and Concept of *Phusis* in Aristotle's *Physics* B, I" trans. Sheehan in *Pathmarks*, ed. McNeill, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.194.

24. Heidegger, Martin. "The Origin of the Work of Art" in *Off The Beaten Track* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p.23. The link between world and artwork echoes the archaic relation between *phusis* and *logos* as the setting-forth and transmitting: "To the work-being belongs the setting up of a world". "In setting up a world, the work sets forth [*Herstellen*] the earth. . . . *The work lets the earth to be an earth.*" (Ibid.)

25. Ibid., p.26.

Conclusion

The new principle introduced by Kant in *Opus Postumum* not only complements but also, by revising Kant's entire metaphysics, encompasses the third *Critique*. Thus, as Förster points out, the primary motivation of *Opus Postumum* cannot solely be found in the problems and ideas arising in Kant's theory of the reflective judgment. Rather, I argue that the third *Critique* itself (especially from the section on the sublime onwards) is a product of the very same unresolved motivation that possessed Kant throughout his philosophy, and which culminated in the unfinished *Opus Postumum*. This is precisely why the reading of Kant should begin with his last work. But what do we mean by unresolved motivation? It is unresolved because, despite revolutionizing the old methods of philosophical argumentation, Kant never gave up the tradition of thinking through oppositions. Instead, throughout his critical works he attempted to develop a systematic method to mediate between these oppositions. Indeed, the metaphysical thought had become so detached from physics that Kant was never convinced of the possibility of schematizing a transition between them until he conceived it as an archaic principle in *Opus Postumum*. However, acknowledging this very possibility requires positing human freedom *within* the arbitrary forces of nature rather than *external* to them.

This leads us to our second point. Kant hints in *Opus Postumum* at the fact that the need for the reconciliation of nature and freedom in itself does not directly relate to purposiveness or teleology but rather to cosmology as the set of doctrines and principles defining nature as a systematic-artistic whole. Distinct from teleology, cosmology, in its examination of nature, does not unify the particular phenomena and laws through a self-explanatory *telos*, but uses instead an archaic principle-matter to artistically represent the aggregate of things (that culminate in the archaic matter) and laws (that culminate in the archaic principle) of nature. In teleology, every thing and rule has to follow a certain predetermined *linear* aim (as in theology) determined according to previously antici-

pated or wanted conclusion so as to respond to the question *what for* with the already known answer. In cosmological aesthetics every thing and every rule is artistically represented as *spiralling* around a centrifugal archaic force-principle, hence becoming part of an all-encompassing cosmic system.

Any attempt to reconstruct Kantian metaphysics from the point of view of the principle of motion cannot ignore the contradictory fact that Kant's *ding-an-sich* does not have direct phenomenal representation in the realm of becoming. On the other hand, Kant's entire philosophical endeavour aims to overcome the Cartesian philosophy by reconciling the seemingly separate realms of the noumenal with the phenomenal as shown in his zeal to unite theoretical and practical, rational and empirical, metaphysics of morals and practical maxims, metaphysics of the natural science and physics. In fact, one could say that the ultimate purpose of the third *Critique* and *Opus Postumum* is to accomplish these reconciliations. Kant attempts to shoulder the entire philosophy *beyond* Descartes' dualisms. Indeed, Nietzsche acknowledges this achievement despite Kant's failure to integrate his philosophy with his cosmology and to completely overcome Plato and Parmenides. This is why Nietzsche, seeing himself as the successor of Kant (more than Hegel or Schopenhauer), sets himself the task and to some extent accomplishes Kant's philosophical revolution. In this endeavour, he uses Heraclitus to integrate the physical with the metaphysical by establishing motion or *phusis* as a philosophical category as well as an empirical one.

Both Platonic and Cartesian attempts to establish an unmediated separation between reality and appearances are, in the late Kantian philosophy, unacceptable. Appearances, as the formal elements of intuition, are the intuitively driven forms of reality. Once we accept that the phenomenon is inseparable from what we sense and intuit it to be, we finally come closer to a cosmological (not-yet-metaphysical or post-metaphysical) phase of philosophical reasoning. The most important characteristic of the Heraclitean *logos* is that it is not isolated from the world of phenomena and thus does not consider the sensed appearances minor or illusionary. Likewise, Kant re-examines and re-theorizes appearances while revising the Platonic understanding of "appearances" as complete illusions in radical contrast with the real supersensible ideas. Kant shows instead that appearances, as the play of our representations, do not exist in themselves but are part of our understanding of the world (*Weltanschauung*)—thus not only essentially related to our ideas and concepts, but also as real as the ideas of the faculty of reason. This very relation and constant transition between ideas and appearances is regulated by the power of judgment.

The argument regarding the transitory role of the power of judgment is founded on the claim that the forces of nature can only acquire meaning through their transition to the concept of freedom. To unify one hinge of philosophy with the other, the transition requires the mediation of the detached (disinterested) human understanding and the power of free reflective judgment. However, these ways of thinking must not be linked through a leap or complete shift in the reasoning like the leap from mere philosophical-metaphysical speculation to physical-empirical method, for while the former entails the total isolation of the facul-

ty of reason from the world of phenomena, the latter leads to the separation of the faculty of understanding from the philosophical principles and categories. Instead, this link must be actualized through an aesthetically regulated and repetitive *transition* based on the faculty of judgment, which can construct an artistic bridge between these faculties and the knowledge they produce. The power of judgment is the mediating faculty of transition from the universal to the particular. Agreement of natural laws with our power of judgment necessitates an understanding of transition regulated and determined by the faculty of judgment for a complete and thorough picturing of *ethos* within *phusis*.

In Kant's theory of the sublime, nature seems to be considered to some extent distinct from human mind. Nevertheless, as emphasized throughout the book, Kant also acknowledges nature as the source of all sublime feelings and movement in the faculties of the human mind. The ideas of the dynamic (moving) unity and mathematical boundlessness and incomprehensibility proved the necessity of construing the sublime as the representation of the *not-yet-perceived* "content" of the whole which in turn entails the transformation of the sublime in nature into a cosmological idea. Crucially, this inevitability of cosmological understanding does not conflict with the reflecting judgment but instead calls for an aesthetic reconstruction of the whole. The representation of *ta panta* as *kosmos* requires the use of aesthetic faculties, namely the faculties of sense-intuition and reflecting judgment. Indeed neither the limits nor the content of the *sublime* can be represented and judged deprived of these faculties. This follows from the argument that *the motion in nature and the movement occurring in the aesthetic faculties are essentially linked* not only by means of their effects but also of their source. The process of transition, as the neutral reconciliation of the transformation with relation**,** actualizes both sensible forces and supersensible ideas by rendering the former meaningful and the latter natural or moving. While the practical ethical predicaments need the unifying theoretical principle as a natural grounding, the theoretical realm of the idea of nature is made human and thus meaningful by its practical use for the self-positing of humanity in the macrocosmic context. Both processes demand the deployment of the aesthetic judgment. As a result it becomes necessary to place aesthetics of nature, limited for now to the concepts of the beautiful and *ratio*, into the forefront of philosophical thinking grounding both metaphysics and ethics.

Similarly, we employed the Nietzschean Dionysian to highlight aesthetics as the grounding and ordering element of philosophical thinking. The Dionysian, as the *proprium* and *ipsissimum* of Nietzschean aesthetics, constitutes the *transition* between the abundant cosmic motion that consists in the natural processes and the concepts of human *ethos*. By doing so, it inserts motion in the human *ethos* and moves it *forward*. Only through this aesthetic driving force could *ethos* move toward the future and could the dead and mummified human concepts be renewed. Only through the Dionysian transition and its tragic representation of the constancy of destruction could human *ethos* be situated on the background of *phusis* and the all-penetrating motion. Philosophy was born from the spirit of tragedy, not vice versa, just as *ethos* was born from *logos*. Like *log-*

os, tragedy embodies the movement it inherits from the senseless cosmic forces or *phusis* by which it gives life to these concepts. And thus philosophical ideas are alive only insofar as they remain connected to their tragic origins by way of an artistic transition. Like Kant, Nietzsche goes one step further and attributes systematicity, relationality and prevailing order to these sets of concepts. This marks the point where the discursive universality becomes *cosmological*. Philosophical concepts are defined over and over again by their transition to and from physiological judgments. The existence and continuity of philosophical concepts depend on their relation to each other and the dynamic schema of *logos*. The discursive and intuitive universality are related since the concepts of *ethos* (as the derivations of *conceptus cosmicus*) are the products of the *intuitus cosmicus*—the general process of derivation or one universal principle of transition.

Finally, the forces in nature can only acquire meaning and identity through the supersensible concepts of understanding, and these concepts of understanding are alive and dynamic insofar as they continue to represent these forces. This transition is only apprehensible because it functions simultaneously: neither the metaphysical nor the physical, neither the noumenal nor the phenomenal exists independently of its reciprocal transition and of a mind that initiates or apprehends this transition, as their primary qualities derive from this very process. There is no static atemporal being but always only the moving forces and the processes deriving from their mutual agitation. So being as becoming or *phusis* does not respond to a *what* but rather to a *how*; it does not refer to any original being but to the ways and processes of the apprehension of forces and composition of concepts. An analysis of *logos* must address *how* questions,[1] in other words, it is the very process of unearthing the underlying transitions. Neither a purely empirical science (e.g. modern physics), nor a purely metaphysical system of thought (e.g. monotheistic religions) alone can explain the nature of things. But we propose that neither the empirical nor the metaphysical are directly dependent on each other—they are themselves the products of the *aesthetic transitions* between cosmic forces and human concepts as they are formed and reformed according to these transitions. These transitions between the motion underlying nature and concepts defining and determining human *ethos* constitute the sublime bridge hanging over a steep canyon separating the microcosm from the macrocosm, humanity from the universe; they are the reminders of the *a priori* interconnectedness of reason, as the device for the uncovering of nature, and nature, as the reason-giving dynamic whole.

NOTES

1. See the Fragments 2, 5 and 6. Heraclitus, *On Nature*, Frs.5-6: "The majority of people have no understanding of the things with which they daily meet, nor, when instructed, do they have any right knowledge of them, although to themselves they seem to have. They understand neither how to hear nor how to speak." (Bywater, Ingram. *The Fragments of the Work of Heraclitus of Ephesus on Nature*, N. Murray, 1889, p.85.)

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