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Party Politics and Democratization in Indonesia

Golkar in the post-Suharto era

Dirk Tomsa

Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asia Series

Party Politics and Democratization in Indonesia

Party Politics and Democratization in Indonesia: Golkar in the post-Suharto era provides the first in-depth analysis of contemporary Indonesian party politics and the first systematic explanation why Golkar is still the strongest party in Indonesia.

Applying a multidimensional conceptual framework of party institutionalization theory, the book examines Golkar's organizational infrastructure, its decisional autonomy and programmatic platform as well as the party's relations to the mass media. Strengths and weaknesses in the individual dimensions of institutionalization are then contrasted with the corresponding levels of institutionalization reached by Indonesia's other major parties. Tomsa argues that Golkar remains Indonesia's strongest party because it is better institutionalized than its electoral competitors. However, while highlighting the former regime party's strengths in key aspects of party institutionalization, he shows that Golkar also has some considerable institutional weaknesses which in 2004 prevented the party from achieving an even better result in the general election.

As an empirical study on Golkar, and Indonesia's other major political parties, this book will be of huge interest to students and scholars of Southeast Asian politics, political parties and elections and democratization.

Dirk Tomsa is an associate lecturer at the University of Tasmania, Australia. He holds a joint appointment in the School of Asian Languages and Studies and the School of Government.

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Preface

In April 2004 Indonesia held its second free and fair legislative elections after the fall of Suharto. With 21.58 per cent of the vote, the former regime party Golkar topped the voting tally and thus re-emerged as the strongest party in Indonesia just six years after the end of the authoritarian New Order regime. The results were described by some observers as the 'return of Golkar,' but in actual fact Golkar had not returned. Put simply, it could not return because it had never disappeared. Indeed, even though it had only finished second in the 1999 elections, Golkar has continued to be the strongest force in Indonesian party politics and looks set to achieve another good result in the 2009 elections.

In the early stages of the post-Suharto era Golkar's enduring strength seemed to surprise many observers, while others said 'I always told you so'. But regardless of their convictions, no one actually seemed interested in seriously investigating why and how the former regime party had been able to transform itself from an artificially created electoral vehicle into a highly competitive political party. Neither was I. It was Professor Merle Ricklefs, back in 2002, who first suggested that I should look into this as a potential topic for my planned doctoral dissertation at the University of Melbourne. Initially reluctant, I soon realized how little was known about Golkar, and indeed about post-New Order party politics in general, so I gradually warmed up to the idea and by 2003 I was ready to go. The decision to work on Golkar earned me a fair share of jeers from some of my Indonesian friends who had been involved in the 1998 demonstrations that helped bring the New Order regime to its knees. But after a while I convinced them of the academic value of such a study and that I was not going to be an adviser for the former regime party.

And so I embarked on a fascinating academic journey which offered me unprecedented insights into the dynamics of party politics in Indonesia. The research project was effectively concluded in early 2006, but several revisions and amendments have been added since the completion of the original dissertation, resulting eventually in the manuscript for this book. Significantly, my research helped me understand not only why Golkar was able to redefine itself as a competitive party, but also why it is likely to continue to influence the course of Indonesia's democratization process for the foreseeable future. Indeed, although many indicators point to a decreasing role for political parties in

Indonesia, predictions of their complete demise appear greatly exaggerated. Contemporary representative democracy is, in the vast majority of countries, party democracy, and if Indonesia continues its arguably protracted, but relatively steady progress towards democratic consolidation, it is unlikely to be an exception.

Golkar, as the best-institutionalized of all Indonesian parties, looks set to remain an integral part of this maturing Indonesian democracy. The party has in fact made a number of significant contributions to the country's democratization process in the last ten years. At the same time, however, it has also been one of those forces that have repeatedly slowed down the progression towards democracy. This book will explain how and why Golkar has been so instrumental in Indonesia's political development after the fall of Suharto – in both a positive and a negative sense. Approaching the topic from the perspective of party institutionalization theory, it will be argued that compared to the other parties Golkar possesses some crucial institutional advantages, which have helped the party to maintain much of its strength in the post-New Order period. In 2004 these institutional strengths translated directly into votes at the ballot box, catapulting the party back to the top of the voting tally. Golkar's 'victory,' however, was by no means as resounding as many observers had predicted. Indeed, the party's failure to win the elections by a larger margin indicated that Golkar apparently had certain weaknesses which have directly conferred disadvantages at the ballot box. In other words, there are good reasons to argue – and this book will in fact do so – that Golkar owed its 'victory' more to the weakness of the other parties than to its own prowess.

In about a year from now, Indonesians will go to the polls again. At this stage, Golkar looks set to achieve yet another good result. Consecutive opinion polls throughout 2007 have confirmed that impression. However, it seems as if little has changed with regards to the reasons for Golkar's enduring strength. Since 2004 the party has done fairly little to sharpen its profile and attract new supporters. But as most of the other parties have done even less, there may be no need to worry. And yet, as the rising popularity of the Democrats Party (*Partai Demokrat*) in the wake of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's performance in the presidential palace shows, it may not be the best strategy for Golkar to simply rely on the expectation that the others will not improve.

This book is not intended to give advice to the Golkar leadership on how to run the party or how to prepare for elections. Rather, its purpose is to provide a scholarly explanation as to why Golkar has been able to maintain much of its strength after the fall of Suharto. At the same time, however, the book will also elucidate why Golkar has only been able to shape, not to dictate, the course of Indonesia's democratization process. In doing so, it will hopefully enhance our understanding of party politics in Indonesia and the overall implications of party institutionalization for processes of democratization.

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A research monograph on a political party would of course not be possible without access to members of the party concerned. Throughout my various stays in Indonesia, I was positively surprised by the openness of many Golkar politicians, and their readiness to discuss the latest political developments. Among those who have been of particular assistance were Theo Sambuaga, Andi Mattalatta, Fahmi Idris, Slamet Effendy Yusuf and Nurul Arifin. In addition, I would also like to thank Hulfa, Lina, Dave, Arfandy and Syafiuddin for their extraordinary help. And of course special thanks go out to Professor Dr B. J. Habibie who effectively set the ball rolling on a sunny afternoon in mid-2003.

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Some sections of this book have been published elsewhere previously. Parts of Chapter 3 appeared as ‘The Defeat of Centralized Paternalism: Factionalism, Assertive Regional Cadres, and the Long Fall of Golkar Chairman Akbar Tanjung,’ *Indonesia*, No. 81 (April 2006), pp. 1–22. Chapter 3 also uses material from ‘Bloodied but Unbowed,’ *Inside Indonesia*, No. 83 (July–September 2005), pp. 17–18 and from ‘Uneven Party Institutionalization, Protracted Transition and the Remarkable Resilience of Golkar,’ in Marco Bünte and Andreas Ufen (eds), *Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia*, forthcoming (the latter also includes some material from Chapter 2). Finally, part of Chapter 6 was, with some minor amendments, published as ‘Party Politics and the Media: Creating a New Dual Identity for Golkar,’ *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (April 2007), pp. 77–96.

Abbreviations and glossary

<i>abangan</i>	Nominal Muslims who do not strictly follow the five pillars of Islam
ABRI	<i>Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia</i> (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia), now the TNI
<i>Al-Hidayah aliran</i>	Golkar-affiliated Islamic organization Ideological streams, term used to differentiate socio-cultural cleavage structures in Indonesia
AMPG	<i>Angkatan Muda Partai Golkar</i> (Golkar Party Youth Brigade), one of Golkar's youth organizations
AMPI	<i>Angkatan Muda Pembaharuan Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Renewal Youth Brigade), another of Golkar's youth organizations
ANC	African National Congress
BIN	<i>Badan Intelijen Nasional</i> (State Intelligence Agency)
BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party, Indian Hindu-Nationalist party
<i>bupati</i>	District chief, head of a <i>kabupaten</i> (regency or district)
Bulog	Indonesian State Logistic Agency
<i>dangdut</i>	Traditional Indonesian music, often used at election campaign events
decisional autonomy	Structural/external dimension of party institutionalization
DPD	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Daerah</i> (Regional Representatives Council), Indonesia's upper house
DPD	<i>Dewan Pimpinan Daerah</i> (Regional Leadership Board)
DPP	<i>Dewan Pimpinan Pusat</i> (Central Leadership Board)
DPR	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat</i> (People's Representatives Council), Indonesia's lower house
DPRD	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah</i> (Regional People's Representatives Council), Indonesia's regional parliaments
FKPPI	<i>Forum Komunikasi Putra-Putri Indonesia</i> (Communication Forum of the Sons and Daughters of Indonesian Veterans), lobby organization closely affiliated to the military
GAM	<i>Gerakan Aceh Merdeka</i> (Acehnese Independence Movement)

genetic model	The process of a party's formation and its subsequent organizational consolidation
<i>gizi</i>	literally, 'nutrition'; in the context of Indonesian politics usually refers to money and other material contributions given as bribery
<i>Hasta Karya</i>	Collective term for Golkar's three founding organizations Soksi, Kosgoro 1957, and MKGR, as well as five autonomous mass organizations that had been founded by Golkar during the New Order (AMPI, HWK, MDI, Al-Hidayah and Satkar Ulama)
HMI	<i>Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam</i> (Islamic Student Association), a modernist Islamic student group
HWK	<i>Himpunan Wanita Karya</i> (Workers Women's Association), Golkar-affiliated women's organization
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICMI	<i>Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia</i> (Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals)
ICW	Indonesia Corruption Watch
IFES	International Foundation for Election Systems
<i>Inpres</i>	Presidential instruction
IPKI	<i>Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia</i> (League of Supporters of Indonesian Independence)
<i>Iramasuka</i> faction	Caucus group from Eastern Indonesia
IRI	International Republican Institute
<i>kabupaten</i>	Regency or district
KADIN	Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry
KAMI	<i>Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia</i> , student organization
Keppres	Presidential decision
<i>kiai</i>	Islamic religious leader
KKN	<i>korupsi, kolusi, nepotisme</i> (corruption, collusion and nepotism)
KMT	<i>Kuomintang</i> (Nationalist Party of Taiwan)
KNPI	<i>Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia</i> (Indonesian National Youth Committee)
<i>Koalisi</i> <i>Kebangsaan</i>	Nationhood Coalition
Korpri	Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia (Civil Servants Corps of the Republic of Indonesia)
Kosgoro	<i>Kesatuan Organisasi Serba Guna Gotong Royong</i> , one of Golkar's founding organizations
KPPG	Kesatuan Perempuan Partai Golkar (Golkar Party Women's Association)
KPPSI	<i>Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam</i> (Preparatory Committee for the Implementation of Islamic Law)

xviii *Abbreviations and glossary*

KPU	<i>Komisi Pemilihan Umum</i> (General Election Commission)
LSIM	<i>Lembaga Studi Informasi dan Media Massa</i>
<i>Masyumi</i>	Influential modernist Muslim party in the 1950s
MDI	<i>Majelis Da'wah Islamiyah</i> (Islamic Propagation Council); Golkar-affiliated Islamic organization
MKGR	<i>Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong</i> , one of Golkar's founding organizations
MPR	<i>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat</i> (People's Consultative Assembly)
Muhammadiyah	Largest modernist Muslim organization
MUI	<i>Majelis Ulama Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Ulama Council)
<i>Munas</i>	<i>Musyawarah Nasional</i> (national party congress)
<i>Munaslub</i>	<i>Musyawarah Nasional Luar Biasa</i> (extraordinary party congress)
<i>Muspida</i>	<i>Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah</i> (Regional Leaders Consultative Forum)
<i>musyawarah</i> and <i>mufakat</i>	Consultation and consensus (pattern of decision-making process in parliament)
NDI	National Democratic Institute
New Order	The Suharto era (1966–98)
NU	<i>Nahdlatul Ulama</i> (revival of the religious scholars), largest traditionalist Muslim organization
NGO	Non-governmental organization
PAN	<i>Partai Amanat Nasional</i> (National Mandate Party)
<i>pancasila</i>	Five pillars, the five guiding principles of the Indonesian state as laid out in the preamble of the constitution
<i>panja</i>	<i>panitia kerja</i> (Working committee)
<i>pansus</i>	<i>panitia khusus</i> (Special committee)
PBB	<i>Partai Bulan Bintang</i> (Crescent Star and Moon Party)
PBR	<i>Partai Bintang Reformasi</i> (Reform Star Party)
PD	<i>Partai Demokrat</i> (Democrats Party)
PDI	<i>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Democratic Party)
PDI-P	<i>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan</i> (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle)
<i>pembangunan</i>	Development (New Order mantra which implied that political freedoms can be sacrificed for the sake of economic development)
<i>penekaran</i>	The process of administrative restructuring
<i>pengajian</i>	Islamic Koran reading group
<i>pesantren</i>	Traditional Islamic boarding school
<i>pilkada</i>	<i>pemilihan kepala daerah</i> (direct elections of governors, mayors and district heads)
PJ	<i>Partido Justicialista</i> , the Peronist Party of Argentina
PKB	<i>Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa</i> (National Awakening Party)
PKI	<i>Partai Komunis Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Communist Part, outlawed since 1965)

PKP	<i>Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan</i> (Justice and Unity Party)
PKPB	<i>Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa</i> (Concern for the Nation Functional Party)
PKS	<i>Partai Keadilan Sejahtera</i> (Prosperous Justice Party)
PNI	<i>Partai Nasional Indonesia</i> (Indonesian National Party)
PPDK	<i>Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan</i> (United Democratic Nationhood Party)
PPP	<i>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan</i> (United Development Party)
<i>preman</i>	thugs
PRI	<i>Partido Revolucionario Institucional</i> (Institutional Revolutionary Party)
<i>pribumi</i>	Indigenous Indonesian; term used to distinguish between Chinese Indonesians and indigenous Indonesians
<i>priyayi</i>	Old Javanese aristocracy
<i>putra daerah</i>	Son of the region (term used to describe politicians originating from a specific region, and the ethnic sentiment felt towards them by people from that region)
<i>rapat pleno</i>	Plenary meeting of the central board
<i>rapat pengurus harian</i>	Meeting of the executive board
<i>Rapim</i>	<i>Rapat Pimpinan</i> (leadership meeting)
<i>reformasi</i>	Reform (term associated with the post-Suharto era)
reification	Attitudinal/external dimension of party institutionalization
RSS	<i>Rashtriya Sevak Sangh</i> (radical Indian Hindu organization)
santri	Pious Muslims
SARS	<i>Sindrom Amat Rindu Suharto</i> (acronym used to describe the widespread New Order nostalgia in 2003–4, alluding to the fatal epidemic disease that hit large parts of Asia in 2002–3)
<i>Satkar Ulama</i>	Golkar-affiliated Islamic organization
<i>Sekber Golkar</i>	Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups, predecessor of Golkar
Soksi	<i>Serikat Organisasi Karyawan Sosialis Indonesia</i> , one of Golkar's founding organizations
systemness	Structural/internal dimension of party institutionalization
TNI	<i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia</i> (Indonesian National Army), title of the Indonesian armed forces after 1998
<i>tokoh</i>	Influential or charismatic leader, often though not always in a local context
<i>ulama</i>	Islamic religious scholar
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
value infusion	Attitudinal/internal dimension of party institutionalization
<i>yayasan</i>	Charity foundation
<i>Yayasan Dana Karya Abadi</i>	Eternal Work Fund Foundation or <i>Yayasan Dakab</i>

1 Introduction

The remarkable resilience of Golkar

Writing about political parties in Indonesia makes one suddenly aware of how little research has been done on the subject.

(Lev 1967: 52)

Introduction

When the late Daniel Lev lamented the lack of research on political parties back in 1967, Indonesia was still a young republic with a short, yet already turbulent post-colonial history. In the 22 years since the declaration of independence the country had experienced a revolutionary war (1945–9), a brief spell of parliamentary democracy (1950–9) and an even shorter period of so-called ‘Guided Democracy’ (1959–65). By the time Lev’s article went to print, Indonesia’s second president Suharto was just about to establish what would later become known as the New Order (*Orde Baru*).

As it turned out, the New Order proved much more durable than the previous political systems. Designed as a military-backed bureaucratic-authoritarian regime with strong corporatist elements,¹ it lasted for more than 30 years (1966–98). Throughout these years political parties found themselves relegated to passive bystanders as the Suharto regime systematically depoliticized and de-ideologized all political processes. In view of this situation it was hardly surprising that most academics who conducted research on Indonesian politics during this period remained largely indifferent towards political parties. Put simply, there was nothing to do research on. In fact, parties were so discredited during the New Order that the Suharto regime even refused to define its own *de facto* regime party as a party. Instead, the organization that was used by the regime as its electoral vehicle was constructed as an amalgamation of so-called ‘Functional Groups’ (*Golongan Karya* or *Golkar*), and it was supposed to remain aloof from the allegedly divisive squabbling of political parties. Despite the rhetoric, however, Golkar was essentially a political party, at least from 1971 onwards when it participated in its first general election.²

Based on conceptualizations by Sartori (1976: 63) and Puhle (2002: 81), political parties can simply be defined as political organizations with an official

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label that present candidates for elections (competitive or non-competitive), with the goal of placing these candidates for public office. According to this definition, Golkar was indeed a political party and it is arguably irrelevant whether the regime actually called it a party or not. Of course, Golkar did not fulfil most of the ideal-type functions which theorists routinely attribute to political parties, such as the representation, integration and aggregation of societal interests or the crafting and implementation of policy agendas.³ But it did fulfil most of the functions which Randall (1988) had once described as key functions of political parties in the so-called 'Third World': it was used to enhance the regime's domestic and international legitimacy, to recruit political personnel and to provide the ruling elite with an institutional structure down to the lowest administrative level.

Thus, Golkar was primarily an instrument of the regime. As such, the party was an important mosaic stone in the New Order regime's drive for hegemony. According to Gramsci (1971: 244) hegemony is defined as 'the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules.' Without a doubt, the construction of Golkar as the regime's corporatist tool and electoral vehicle was a crucial part of these activities. Thus, from 1971 onwards Golkar had once and for all ceased to be 'an alternative to the party system,' as Reeve (1985) had once famously labelled it. Instead, it had become a hegemonic regime party, acting in a hegemonic party system (Gaffar 1992).⁴

Between 1971 and 1998 the hegemonic status of Golkar was reinforced during six consecutive 'democracy festivals' (*pesta demokrasi*), as the Suharto regime euphemistically called its inherently non-competitive legislative elections. But when in 1998 the New Order came to an abrupt end, Golkar suddenly 'seemed destined for the dustbin of history' (Tomsa 2005: 17). As competitive party politics was enthusiastically reinvigorated with the formation of more than 100 new parties within a few months, Golkar's chances of political survival suddenly seemed to be slim. Amien Rais, one of the key figures of the reform (*reformasi*) movement, for example, opined that Golkar was likely to 'become just a small party.'⁵

As is now well-known, Amien was wrong. Of course Golkar could not maintain the ridiculously inflated levels of artificial support which it had enjoyed during the New Order, but by no means did it become a small party, and it definitely did not enter the dustbin of history. On the contrary, the party easily shrugged off initial demands for its disbandment and managed to achieve a respectable 22 per cent in the first post-Suharto election in 1999. The result was enough to secure second place on the voting tally, well behind the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan*, PDI-P) of reform icon Megawati Sukarnoputri, but comfortably ahead of other highly fancied parties including Amien Rais's National Mandate Party (*Partai Amanat Nasional*, PAN) or Abdurrahman Wahid's National Awakening Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa*, PKB). Following the 1999 election, Golkar quickly re-

established itself as the most capable political force in national parliamentary procedures and regional elections. When in 2004 Indonesia held its second legislative election of the post-Suharto era, Golkar re-emerged as the strongest party on the voting tally, prompting some commentators to describe the election result as ‘the return of the Golkar Party.’⁶ In actual fact, however, Golkar had not returned. It could not return because it had never disappeared. As one former high-ranking party member who left the party in 1998 remarked rather graphically, ‘Golkar is like a zombie; you think it is dead but in fact it is always there.’⁷

The main argument

Indeed, while it is true that the party was only the second-largest fraction in parliament between 1999 and 2004, the statistical figures never reflected the real power structure in Indonesian party politics during these years. Under the leadership of its chairman Akbar Tandjung (1998–2004) Golkar was able to steer most of the important political developments in Indonesia in its own favour. Significantly, the party was not only instrumental in orchestrating the rise and fall of Indonesia’s first elected president Abdurrahman Wahid (1999–2001), but also in overseeing the formulation of crucial constitutional amendments and new election and party laws. Moreover, the party secured numerous governor, mayor and district head (*bupati*) posts in the regions, often at the expense of inexperienced PDI-P candidates.

In view of these developments, Golkar’s election victory in 2004 was hardly surprising. On the contrary, many observers had actually expected that the former regime party would not only emerge as the strongest party, but even that it would win the election by a bigger margin (Lembaga Survei Indonesia 2003). These predictions, however, turned out to be wrong, and this very fact illustrates how little is actually known about the real strengths and weaknesses of Golkar. Indeed, until the present day there has been no systematic analysis of Golkar and its role in Indonesia’s ongoing democratization process. This book aims to fill this gap by examining the former hegemonic party’s position in post-New Order Indonesia from the perspective of party institutionalization theory. More precisely, the book will analyse whether Golkar’s perpetuated strength can be explained as a result of uneven party institutionalization in post-1998 Indonesia.

A number of political observers have already pointed to Golkar’s institutional superiority as a reason behind the party’s extraordinary tenacity (Suryadinata 2002, Kingsbury 2002, Budiman 1999). However, despite frequent references to ‘Golkar’s massive party machinery’ no methodical analysis of Golkar’s institutional features exists so far. This work will conduct this urgently needed analysis and provide a comprehensive overview of Golkar’s degree of institutionalization in accordance with a multidimensional model developed by Vicky Randall and Lars Svåsand (2002a). The analysis will not only help to explain why and how Golkar managed to win the 2004 election, but also why it did not win by a larger margin.

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In short, the book puts forward three main arguments. First, it will be highlighted that Golkar is indeed the best-institutionalized party in Indonesia and that most of its institutional advantages are direct consequences of its long history as a hegemonic party during the New Order. Significantly, the uneven degree of party institutionalization has conferred immediate electoral advantages to Golkar as the party has harnessed its strengths to secure the highest number of votes in the 2004 elections. Second, despite its overall supremacy Golkar is not a particularly well-institutionalized party. It is strong in certain aspects of party institutionalization, but it also has considerable institutional weaknesses, and it is these weaknesses that primarily account for the party's failure to achieve an even better result in the 2004 election. Most remarkably, the party appears to have entered an incremental process of de-institutionalization, triggered by a combination of internal and external factors, which may pose some serious challenges to the party in the future. Third, in spite of these challenges Golkar's strong position in the party system seems set to last, simply because most of the other parties remain weakly institutionalized and unable to capitalize on Golkar's problems. With the exception of the Prosperous Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, PKS) all other parties have failed to develop effective party infrastructures and/or appealing policy platforms. Instead, they have tried to build their existence primarily on the charismatic appeal of individual leaders, the use of old-style money politics or the exploitation of narrowly focused sectarian sentiment. As a result, levels of institutionalization have remained low and electoral success elusive. Consequently, Golkar has been able to uphold and even strengthen its grip on the party system. To sum up, this book will argue that ten years after the fall of Suharto the former regime party Golkar is still the strongest party in Indonesia, yet not by virtue of its own power but rather by default.

Methodology

In order to properly assess Golkar's strengths and weaknesses, this book relies strongly on a conceptual framework developed by Vicky Randall and Lars Svåsand in their 2002 article 'Party Institutionalization in New Democracies.' In this article, the authors 'unpick some of the conceptual confusion' (Randall and Svåsand 2002a: 6) that has surrounded the idea of party institutionalization, especially the common 'tendency to elide the issue of party institutionalization with that of party *system* institutionalization' (Randall and Svåsand 2002a: 6). One of the main 'culprits' in this regard is Scott Mainwaring (1999) whose otherwise excellent work on party system institutionalization in Latin America falls into exactly this conceptual trap. Similarly, the only systematic study on party system institutionalization in Indonesia by Johnson (2002) also suffers from the same weaknesses as she applies Mainwaring's model without questioning the direct inclusion of issues of party institutionalization in her analysis of party system institutionalization. Randall and Svåsand's model, which will be explained in great detail in Chapter 2, avoids this trap as it proposes the use of

clear-cut criteria for party institutionalization, while developing a separate set of criteria for party system institutionalization.

While Randall and Svåsand have successfully overcome one major problem of party institutionalization theory, they have shied away from proposing solutions to the other key issue that has haunted studies on institutionalization: measurability. As a matter of fact, party institutionalization, as well as party system institutionalization, has long been criticized as basically immeasurable, and most of the criteria Randall and Svåsand describe as key components of their concept are also, as they concede, neither measurable nor quantifiable. This lack of measurability has always posed serious challenges to political scientists working on the subject. Of course, it is possible to make meaningful statements about a party's degree of institutionalization without measurable variables. But especially when the analysis extends to more than just one party (as this book does in Chapter 7), a set of measurable criteria would certainly enhance the analytical value of the comparison.⁸

While this book does not claim to square the circle of institutionalization theory and come up with the ultimate solution to this problem, it does propose to resort to Mainwaring and Scully's (1995) suggestion to measure the degree of institutionalization with the help of a ranking system, if only for reasons of illustration. Naturally, such a system is inherently subjective and it is certainly not meant to be the main point of reference for the results of this book. Yet, for the purpose of illustration, it should be considered as a useful tool and therefore the final chapter concludes with a matrix which shows in a simplified yet systematic manner the varying degrees of institutionalization for Indonesia's seven biggest parties.

The findings presented in this matrix are the result of a research project that relied on a broad diversity of sources. For the theoretical underpinnings of the argument the secondary literature on parties, party institutionalization and democratic transitions was reviewed and evaluated. For the empirical part of the analysis, on the other hand, the project relied mostly on information from the Indonesian and international press, as well as a number of primary sources, especially official party documents, data from personal observations during fieldwork, and a multitude of personal interviews that were conducted with politicians, political observers, journalists and civil society activists.⁹ Whenever useful, academic literature was consulted in order to support information obtained from the media or the various primary sources, but it should be noted that, owing to the sheer contemporariness of the topic, it was often difficult to find relevant secondary material.

Data collection in Indonesia was completed during two field trips in 2004 and 2005. The first draft of the manuscript was completed in 2006, but some new materials were added during the revision process. Nonetheless, the main focus of the analysis remains firmly on the 2004 elections. As far as geographical scope is concerned, the book deals primarily with politics on the national level in Jakarta. Wherever possible and useful, however, additional data from local political contexts have been supplied to further elucidate the argument. Most of

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these local data is derived from South Sulawesi where the researcher spent several weeks during his fieldwork in 2004. The province was chosen as a ‘mini’ case study for two reasons. First, it is one of Golkar’s most important strongholds, or, as the Indonesian media likes to put it, its ‘rice barn’ (*lumbung*).¹⁰ In 1999, South Sulawesi was one of the few provinces where Golkar still reached an absolute majority so that it was particularly interesting in 2004 to see how the party set out to defend this result. As it turned out, South Sulawesi became one of the provinces where Golkar sustained its highest losses, thereby vindicating the presumption that political developments in this province would be particularly interesting to analyse. Second, South Sulawesi provides an excellent setting for studying some of the key characteristics of Indonesian party politics such as personalism, factionalism, patron–clientelism and the prevalence of regional sentiment. All of these characteristics can be found in abundance in South Sulawesi, which makes it one of the most exciting places to study party politics. Of course, this researcher is fully aware that data from only one province are by no means representative of developments in other parts of Indonesia. Nonetheless, the data provided here help to underline certain internal developments within Golkar, and therefore contribute to a better understanding of the manifold dynamics in the party.

Structure

The book is divided into eight chapters. Following this brief introduction, Chapter 2 will elucidate the theoretical concept of party institutionalization and its relevance in explaining the enduring strength of Golkar. Moreover, this chapter further elaborates on the already mentioned difference between party institutionalization and party system institutionalization. Chapters 3 to 6 discuss in great detail Golkar’s development in four different dimensions of party institutionalization, termed systemness, decisional autonomy, value infusion and reification by Randall and Svåsand (2002a).

Chapter 3 on systemness is the longest chapter of this book, simply because this dimension covers some of those aspects of party institutionalization that are often mentioned as Golkar’s most effective strengths. In order to determine whether Golkar really possesses such a superior party machinery as is often assumed, this chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the party’s organizational features, with particular reference to the organizational infrastructure, the relationship between the party and its leader, and the role of factionalism within the party. Furthermore, the chapter discusses the importance of formal and informal institutions and explains why the party has been able to maintain excellent access to human and financial resources.

Chapter 4 on decisional autonomy examines whether Golkar is an independent party and to what extent it can make crucial policy and personnel decisions without interference from external forces. Due to historical bonds, the armed forces (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia*, TNI, formerly known as *Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*, ABRI) are a logical focus of this chapter. The second

part then moves away from tangible actors and looks at the role of corruption and money politics in influencing decision-making processes within the party. It also touches upon the tensions between external and internal threats to decisional autonomy.

Chapter 5 on value infusion answers the question of whether Golkar is infused with any political or cultural values that make people feel attached to the party. Against the background of the ongoing debate on whether Indonesian voting behaviour can still be explained with traditional *aliran* (literally, streams; in this context cleavages based on socio-cultural dividing lines) approaches, this chapter looks at both sociological and psychological factors that can influence party choices.

Chapter 6 on reification evaluates the patterns of political communication applied by Golkar in order to eradicate its stigma as a disgraced remnant of the New Order. Based on the assumption that Golkar entered the post-Suharto era as a highly reified party, this chapter examines how the party has transformed its public image by forging a double identity, somewhere between progressive reformism and conservative status quo attitudes. The role of the media is of particular importance for this analysis, but the politics of symbolism is also investigated.

Following the four comprehensive chapters on Golkar, Chapter 7 provides the vital comparative perspective by analysing the degree of institutionalization of the six other major parties in Indonesia. These include the three *reformasi* trailblazers PDI-P, PKB and PAN, the two surprise packages of the 2004 election, PKS and the Democrats Party (*Partai Demokrat*, PD), as well as the United Development Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*, PPP). While the analysis here cannot be as detailed as in the preceding chapters, it still sheds interesting light on some of the key institutional features of the other parties.

Finally, Chapter 8 presents the main conclusions and puts them into the broader context of party system institutionalization and democratization in Indonesia. A brief outlook of potential further developments rounds out this book.

2 Theoretical reflections

Protracted transitions, uneven party institutionalization and the special role of former hegemonic parties

Nor, finally, does it mean that we assume that parties are functional for democracy or its consolidation; on the contrary, it may be expected that in some circumstances they are part of the problem.

(Randall and Svåsand 2002b: 4)

Introduction

Political parties are widely considered to be an indispensable part of any modern political system, no matter if it is a Western-style liberal democracy, an authoritarian dictatorship or one of the various types of electoral regimes that have sprung up in the aftermath of what Huntington (1991) called the ‘third wave’ of democratization. However, ‘political parties are not what they used to be’ (Gunther and Diamond 2001: 3), as it has become increasingly clear that the types and functions of parties are changing. Especially in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, political parties rarely fulfil the ideal-type functions political scientists attribute to them. As Randall (2006) has pointed out, widespread poverty and the resultant lack of material and human resources, coupled with the manifold legacies of colonialism and subsequent authoritarianism have significantly impeded the development and, ultimately, the institutionalization of political parties.¹

The concept of institutionalization was pioneered by Samuel Huntington in the 1960s, but it was not before the 1990s that the specific notion of party and party system institutionalization rose to prominence in the academic literature. Spearheaded by Scott Mainwaring, more scholars began to link the ideas of party and party system institutionalization to problems of democratic consolidation in a growing number of countries that had joined the third wave of democratization in the 1980s and 1990s. In fact, the institutionalization of parties and party systems – or rather the lack thereof – was identified with increasing frequency as one of the key factors for the lack of progress towards democratic consolidation in many third wave countries including Indonesia, the subject of this case study.

In order to properly contextualize the Indonesian case within the current

academic debate about political parties and democratization processes, this chapter will first recap some of the latest developments in the study of comparative democratization. It will then move on to discuss in more detail the concept of party institutionalization and its significance for the subject of democratization studies. Towards the end, particular attention will be paid to the potentially ambivalent role that former regime parties can play in democratic transition processes, especially if they are allowed to continuously exploit long-established institutional advantages at the expense of new parties.

The transition paradigm revisited

Transitions from authoritarian regimes to more democratic forms of government have been the focus of analysis for political scientists ever since O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) published their seminal work on transitions in Latin America and Southern Europe. Soon afterwards, the wave of democratization had spread all over the world, prompting one scholar to enthusiastically declare 'the end of history' (Fukuyama 1992). By the turn of the millennium, however, the enthusiasm was gone, replaced by a growing awareness that the third wave had actually produced very few liberal democracies. Instead, a puzzling array of 'democracies with adjectives' (Collier and Levitsky 1997) and 'hybrid regimes' (Diamond 2002) had emerged, posing unprecedented conceptual challenges to scholars of comparative democratization.

Defining regime types

After O'Donnell and Schmitter's now famous transition paradigm had first entered the academic agenda, scholars soon scrambled to find a consensus about what actually constitutes a consolidated democracy. Early minimalist definitions referred to Schumpeter's (1947) procedural understanding of democracy and claimed that two consecutive changes of government by means of peacefully conducted elections are already sufficient to call a democratic regime consolidated (Huntington 1991). But the exclusive focus on elections as the sole decisive factor for determining democratic consolidation was quickly criticized as too simplistic. As Elklit (2001: 57) stressed, 'the holding of acceptable elections is only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for development towards fully fledged liberal democracies.'

Therefore, more sophisticated concepts of consolidation were soon formulated by scholars like Gunther *et al.* (1995), Linz and Stepan (1996) or Merkel (1998). In fact, Linz and Stepan's assertion that consolidation needs to combine constitutional, behavioural and attitudinal dimensions soon emerged as one of the most-frequently quoted concepts of democratic consolidation. According to the authors, a consolidated democracy is 'a political regime in which democracy as a complex system of institutions, rules and patterned incentives and disincentives has become, in a phrase "the only game in town"' (Linz and Stepan 1996: 15). This concept was further elaborated by Merkel (1998, 1999) who argued

that democratic consolidation includes not only the three dimensions as laid out by Linz and Stepan – constitutional, behavioural and attitudinal – but also a level of *representative* consolidation which comprises the territorial and functional representation of societal interests as articulated through political parties and interest groups.

The more sophisticated the concepts grew, the more apparent it became that only a very small number of third wave countries were actually progressing towards the normative ideal of liberal democracy that underpinned the definitions of Linz and Stepan or Merkel. By the turn of the millennium, it was widely acknowledged that despite the adoption of democratic constitutions and the holding of free and fair elections, the vast majority of countries that had commenced democratization processes in the 1980s and 1990s still suffered from several fundamental weaknesses. Typical problems included a lack of citizen participation in politics beyond election times, the poor enforcement of civil liberties, the enduring political influence of so-called veto actors such as the military, and the prevalence of conflicting responsibilities between executives and legislatures due to unclear constitutional arrangements.

In order to distinguish regimes with such democratic deficits from established liberal democracies, it has become common practice to describe them as ‘electoral democracies.’ According to Haynes (2001a: 8), electoral democracy is a rather pure form of elite democracy which typically involves ‘political competition or collaboration among groups of powerful elites, often exclusive oligarchies dominated by relatively small groups of powerful men (and rarely women).’ Effectively, electoral democracy is an umbrella term for all those regimes that conform to Huntington’s minimalist definition of democracy, but which may be lacking in several other characteristics of liberal democracy.²

More recently, however, an increasing number of scholars have suggested that even competitive elections may no longer be a sufficient indicator to call a regime democratic. As Levitsky and Way (forthcoming: 2) write in their scathing critique of what they call ‘a pronounced democratizing bias that pervaded the post-Cold War literature on regime change,’ elections in many countries today may be competitive, but they are not fair. Therefore, the authors argue that it is entirely inappropriate to use the term ‘democracy’ for these regimes. Instead, they propose to label them according to what they effectively are, namely authoritarian regimes. However, since countries like, for example, Singapore or Malaysia are still very different from closed authoritarian regimes like, for example, Myanmar, China or Saudi Arabia, the authors introduce the term ‘competitive authoritarianism’ (Levitsky and Way 2002; forthcoming) for more conceptual clarity.

Other scholars have echoed Levitsky and Way’s view, but have invented new labels for what is essentially the same phenomenon. Ottaway (2003), for example, calls these regimes ‘semi-authoritarian,’ while Schedler (2002, 2006) speaks of ‘electoral authoritarianism.’ Pointing to an extensive ‘menu of manipulation’ that governments use in order to sway election results in their favour, Schedler (2006: 3) has also criticized the overly optimistic view that elections are indicators of democracy.

Electoral authoritarian regimes play the game of multiparty elections by holding regular elections for the chief executive and a national legislative assembly. Yet they violate the liberal-democratic principles of freedom and fairness so profoundly and systematically as to render elections instruments of authoritarian rule rather than ‘instruments of democracy’ (Powell 2000). Under electoral authoritarian rule, elections are broadly inclusive [...] as well as minimally pluralistic [...], minimally competitive [...], and minimally open [...]. Overall, however, electoral contests are subject to state manipulation so severe, widespread, and systematic that they do not qualify as democratic.

(Schedler 2006: 3)

The new discourse highlights the fact that the widespread optimism that surrounded the study of comparative democratization in the 1990s has given way to a much more sober assessment of a reality in which democracy is actually very rarely the only game in town. At the same time, however, the ever-increasing number of conceptual categories has led to growing difficulty in determining precisely the boundaries between the various new regime types. Of course, textbook-style regime classifications never entirely match messy realities, but there is little doubt that the puzzling array of new regime types and especially the emergence of new forms of authoritarianism pose increasingly complex challenges to scholars of comparative politics. As more and more countries are entering a foggy ‘grey area’ (Diamond 2002) between the clearly defined analytical poles of liberal democracy and closed authoritarianism, the long-cherished transition paradigm of liberalization, democratization and consolidation appears to be increasingly obsolete (Carothers 2002).

Protracted transitions and the special role of former hegemonic parties

The growing scepticism towards the usefulness of the transition paradigm is based on the recognition that even though many countries initiated a transition in the 1980s or 1990s, they never really democratized. Levitsky and Way (forthcoming) are particularly critical of attempts to frame what are effectively authoritarian regimes as democratic, especially where authoritarian practices have continued over a prolonged period. Despite the perfectly valid criticism though, there are indeed cases where characterizations such as ‘evolving democracy’ or ‘protracted transition’ seem justified. In countries like Mexico, Taiwan, South Korea or Indonesia, for example, clear progress towards democracy has been made in recent years, albeit not necessarily in accordance with O’Donnell and Schmitter’s ideal-type mode of pact-making.³

Eisenstadt (2000) has argued that in these countries the transitions to democracy have been ‘protracted’ precisely because there was no opportunity for a pacted transition and there was a lack of consensus among elites about how exactly the political system should be changed. The uncertainty about the

outcome of negotiations between old regime forces and reformers then resulted in a distinctively slow process of reforming numerous small sectors of the polity instead of a general overhaul of all relevant political institutions. Owing to the protracted nature of the transition process, enclaves of authoritarianism remained intact not just immediately after the initiation of the transition to democracy, but long after the old regime had been replaced by a newly elected government. For several years, therefore, countries like Mexico or Taiwan would have qualified as competitive authoritarian regimes, but at the same time the political process during those years was far from static. Incrementally, these countries dismantled the remnants of authoritarianism and eventually progressed towards electoral democracy.

Mexico and Taiwan are archetypes of protracted transitions as their respective transition processes have been prolonged over decades. In these countries, the initial failure to abolish authoritarian practices has proven particularly beneficial for the old regime parties, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (*Partido Revolucionario Institucional*, PRI) and the Nationalist Party (*Kuomintang*, KMT), as they were given sufficient time to adjust to the changing political environment. Although the two parties played very different roles in their respective polities, the Mexican and the Taiwanese transition cases share a number of similarities. Both countries had conducted more or less blatantly rigged elections for years, and in both countries it was electoral reform that finally paved the way for the opposition to seize their chance. Rampant corruption, fraud and eventual splits in the ruling parties further weakened the regimes, so that charismatic opposition candidates were finally elected presidents in 2000 and hegemonic party rule came to an end in both countries (Solinger 2001). However, despite the loss of the presidency, both the PRI and the KMT have continued to wield immense influence over the political process even though they have lost their positions of absolute dominance.

The special roles of the PRI and the KMT in the course of the Mexican and Taiwanese transitions indicate that the possibilities for the growth and institutionalization of new parties may be severely limited as long as a former regime party maintains superior access to financial, material and human resources. 'Unequal resources invariably make for unequal political outcomes,' as Rigger (2000: 137) has aptly remarked. If these inequalities are not levelled over time, elections may remain restricted in their competitiveness and fairness, thereby jeopardizing the long-term prospects for democratic consolidation. As Chu (1999: 78–9) has argued for the Taiwanese case:

There is no doubt that the persistence of these holdover issues of regime transition will continue to obstruct, if not distort, the normal functioning of Taiwan's newly established representative democracy and pose a series of difficult challenges to the task of democratic consolidation.

The Indonesian transition to democracy: protracted, but on track

As previously mentioned, Indonesia has also been identified as a case of protracted transition. The Southeast Asian giant embarked on the democratization path in May 1998 when long-time President Suharto stepped down in the midst of economic turmoil and massive student protests.⁴ Writing in the early days of the post-Suharto era, Malley (2000) claimed that the oppositional forces in Indonesia had been unable to negotiate a pacted transition because they were not prepared to capitalize on the unexpected opportunities that opened up in front of them when the Suharto regime suddenly ruptured. Shortly after Suharto's resignation, interim president Habibie initiated the revision of electoral institutions and laws on parties and legislatures, yet there was little input from opposition forces as they were too preoccupied with establishing an organizational infrastructure for their newly founded parties (Malley 2000: 172).⁵

Not surprisingly then, the outcome of the negotiations between the Habibie government and the four old parliamentary fractions of the military, Golkar, PPP, and the old Indonesian Democratic Party (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia*, PDI) was little more than a 'half-hearted reform' (King 2003) and Indonesia's new political system at first remained laden with authoritarian leftovers. The successful holding of free and fair elections in June 1999 and the formation of a new government in October 1999 did little to change this impression. Pointing to structural advantages for Golkar enshrined in the reformulated election laws, the retention of the military's role in politics, the hesitation to fight corruption and the unwillingness to reappraise human rights violations by members of the old regime, Malley (2000: 177) concluded that 'Indonesia should be characterized as being on a protracted transition path rather than in a consolidation phase.' Similarly, Diamond (2002: 31) included Indonesia in his list of 'ambiguous regimes,' mainly because of the continued presence of non-elected representatives in parliament. But arguably the most critical assessment of Indonesia's early post-New Order trajectory came from Vedi Hadiz who maintained that the country was actually not in a protracted transition, but had in fact already completed a very rapid transition – just not into a democracy but rather into an obscure 'something else':

It is in fact erroneous to suggest that Indonesia is still in 'transition'. Instead, the new patterns and essential dynamics of the exercise of social, economic and political power have already become more or less established. [...] Thus, violence, money politics, alleged political murders and kidnappings [...] are not regarded in this essay as symptomatic of a painfully consolidating or maturing (liberal) democracy, but fundamental instead to the logic of a 'something else' already more or less entrenched.

(Hadiz 2003: 120–1)

A few years later it is obvious that many of the problems mentioned by Hadiz still persist. At the same time, however, it is clear that Indonesia has also taken

some significant steps towards democracy. Of course, as Malley (2000: 155) had predicted, this democratization process was characterized by ‘prolonged and repeated struggles to reform specific institutions’ and constant bickering between elites over how and to what extent the political system should be changed. In fact, between 1999 and 2002, Indonesia completed a painfully drawn-out series of constitutional amendments, leaving the once-sacred document with more new than old paragraphs. But despite this patchwork style of reform the overall results were quite remarkable. Among the most outstanding achievements were the introduction of direct presidential elections, direct gubernatorial and *bupati* elections (*pemilihan kepala daerah, pilkada*), the abolition of non-elected representatives in parliament (including the military), the formation of a second legislative chamber⁶ and the establishment of a Constitutional Court (Crouch 2003).

With these reforms in place, the country successfully conducted an unprecedented electoral marathon in 2004. The ‘year of voting dangerously’ (Emmerson 2004) started in April with parliamentary elections on three administrative levels (national, provincial and district) and elections to the newly established Regional Representatives Council, continued in July with the first round of presidential elections and finally ended in September with the election of former general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) as Indonesia’s sixth president. Every single round of voting has been described as free and fair and in overall accordance with democratic standards by academics (Qodari 2005) and international election monitors alike,⁷ so that Indonesia can now definitely be labelled an electoral democracy⁸ (see Table 2.1 for election results).

Following the success of the 2004 elections, Indonesia has further democratized its political system, especially in the arena of electoral politics where the introduction of the *pilkada* in 2005 has significantly enhanced the openness and competitiveness of voting processes in the regions. In view of these achievements the reputable non-governmental organization Freedom House, in its annual *Freedom in the World* survey, recently promoted Indonesia from being a ‘partly free’ country to a ‘free’ country (Freedom House 2005, 2006, 2007).

Yet, beyond the surface of democratic elections there is still a lot that remains to be done. Old, established patterns of thinking obviously still prevail among

Table 2.1 Results of the legislative elections 1999 and 2004 (in per cent)

<i>Party</i>	<i>1999</i>	<i>2004</i>	<i>Gained/lost</i>
Partai Golkar	22.44	21.58	-0.86
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (PDI-P)	33.74	18.53	-15.21
Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)	12.61	10.57	-2.04
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)	10.71	8.15	-2.56
Partai Demokrat (PD)	-	7.45	+7.45
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)	1.36	7.34	+5.98
Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)	7.12	6.44	-0.68

large parts of the political elite and few attempts have been made to address endemic problems such as corruption, collusion and nepotism (better known as *korupsi*, *kolusi*, *nepotisme* or KKN in Indonesia). As Robison and Hadiz (2004) have shown, many of the old oligarchic power networks between business and politics are still intact as they have successfully adapted to the new political environment without changing their predatory mentality. Despite continued efforts by democracy activists and non-governmental organizations to dismantle these networks, prospects for improvement appear slim as long as regulations about political finance are not sharpened and more strictly implemented. Furthermore, the problem of corruption has been exacerbated by the negative side effects of the well-intentioned decentralization programme as hundreds of regional parliamentarians, governors and *bupatis* have succumbed to the temptations of power and misused public funds for personal enrichment. Countless local politicians have been implicated in such cases since the start of regional autonomy in 2001 and have thus further contributed to the deterioration of public trust in elected officials.⁹

Apart from a lack of political will and determination at the highest political level in Jakarta, another – arguably closely related – key obstacle in the fight against corruption is the slow progress towards reform in the upper echelons of the judiciary. The very fact that no serious efforts were made to prosecute former president Suharto for his alleged embezzlement of billions of dollars during his time as head of state clearly underlines just how much remains to be done in this sector.¹⁰ Moreover, those few reform-minded judges that have emerged in the lower ranks of the system in recent years have seen their efforts being ridiculed on an almost regular basis when the judgements they had passed down on high-profile corruptors were later overturned at a higher level.¹¹ But it is not only contentious cases of corruption and collusion where the judiciary has been at the centre of criticism. Another arena of struggle between reformers and status quo forces has been the issue of past human rights violations by members of the New Order regime, especially former president Suharto himself and the armed forces. Several cases against members of the military have been brought to court in recent years, but rarely have the verdicts been in accordance with expectations of human rights campaigners (Sulistiyanto 2007).¹² The successful blocking of efforts to reassess the past sheds worrisome light on the role of the military in post-Suharto Indonesia. While the formal political power of the armed forces has been curbed after its reserved seats in parliament were abolished,¹³ the TNI does still wield considerable informal power. This became evident not only in the above-mentioned trials, but also in the resumption of military action in Aceh in 2003 (Jones 2004) and in the dispute about the TNI bill in 2004. In both cases, the military leadership exerted enormous pressure upon the government and lawmakers so that many of their demands were eventually granted.¹⁴

Apart from corruption and the role of the military, another urgent problem – and the one that is central to this book – is the performance of the political parties. Bestowed with high expectations in the early days of *reformasi*, the

parties have contributed fairly little to the consolidation of Indonesia's young democracy. To be fair, it was the representatives of the parties who crafted the new political format of Indonesia's post-authoritarian system, but apart from this achievement their overall parliamentary track record has been rather disappointing so far (Ziegenhain 2005). Moreover, outside parliament most of the parties that had won seats in the 1999 general election failed to undertake substantial efforts to strengthen their organizational infrastructures or to develop appealing party programmes.

The 2004 election results, however, indicate that these things may matter not only in abstract discussions about institutionalization, but also at the ballot box. The importance of a well-developed party infrastructure, for instance, was documented by the fact that the two parties which possess the most comprehensive networks of branch offices in the country, Golkar and PDI-P, remained the top vote-getters. Furthermore, the only party that had seriously endeavoured to actually enhance its organizational apparatus in recent years, PKS, reaped considerable benefits for its efforts and gained almost 6 per cent compared to 1999.

The good results of PKS and another new party, PD, were often interpreted as retribution for the established parties or, more generally, as proof of the rationalization of Indonesian voters and the overall maturation of Indonesian democracy. Yet the success of the two newcomers cannot disguise the fact that despite widespread disappointment with the status quo, big parties like Golkar and, to a lesser extent, PDI-P still received the lion's share of the vote. Thus, the results indicated that, just like in Taiwan and Mexico, Indonesia's former hegemonic party has also been able to exploit the slow progress of the democratization process to its own advantage.

The role of parties and the importance of party institutionalization

The pivotal role of Golkar in Indonesia's democratization process has drawn surprisingly little academic attention so far. Indeed, post-Suharto party politics in general was long overlooked by most scholars, even though some good contributions have been made recently.¹⁵ The lack of attention is surprising insofar as there is near-universal agreement that the role of political parties is of immense importance in newly democratizing countries (Burnell 2004, Mainwaring 1999, Merkel 1998). As organizations acting on the intermediate level between state and society, parties have the crucial function of linking the electorate to the government and the legislature. Their strategic position gives them a high responsibility not only for the legitimacy but also for the efficiency of a newly installed regime. Thus, the structure and performance of the parties have a direct impact on the prospects for democratic consolidation:

[I]deology, structure and behaviour of the parties are not only of utmost importance for the survival or breakdown of young democracies but they also constitute critical factors determining whether democracies consolidate

or instead remain in a grey zone [...], somewhere between functioning liberal democracies and plebiscitarian authoritarianism.

(Merkel 1998: 50)

Approaches to party institutionalization

The heightened awareness of the importance of political parties for processes of democratic consolidation goes hand in hand with the realization that traditional explanatory patterns of the formation and consolidation of parties and party systems are no longer sufficient to depict the ever-expanding variety of aspects that influence the functionality of modern parties and party systems. Factors like the nature of the regime type (presidential or parliamentary), the polarization along social cleavage structures or the type of electoral system continue to play a significant role, but in the context of analysing party politics in developing countries particular attention has recently been paid to the importance of party and party system institutionalization – and often the lack thereof as a key obstacle to meaningful progress towards democratic consolidation (Kuenzi and Lambright 2001, Levitsky 2003, Mainwaring 1999, Randall and Svåsand 2002a, Sahli 2003, Stockton 2001, Tan 2002, 2006, Ufen 2006).

Predictably, the strong focus on institutionalization approaches in recent years has drawn criticism from some scholars. Morgenstern and Vázquez-D'Elía (2007: 157), for example, have lamented that the bias towards party institutionalization has, at least in some cases, led scholars to overlook the immense influence electoral institutions continue to exert on the shape of parties and party systems in the developing world.¹⁶ Furthermore, a much more fundamental critique has come from proponents of social conflict theory who have argued that it is not simply the lack of properly institutionalized parties and party systems that derails the processes of democratic consolidation, but rather the capturing of political institutions by 'old predatory interests' (Hadiz 2003: 121). In this view, the whole transition paradigm is flawed because underlying constellations of power will always survive changes in the formal regime structure and reconstitute themselves within the confines of new institutions. Accordingly, political parties would only be able to fulfil their idealized democratic functions if society at large underwent a comprehensive social transformation.

These valid criticisms notwithstanding, the ever-growing literature on party and party system institutionalization suggests that the level of institutionalization does indeed play a crucially important role in explaining the complex interplay between political parties and democratization in non-Western countries. In fact, focusing on party institutionalization does not necessarily rule out the incorporation of so-called 'predatory interests' into the analysis. What makes party and party system institutionalization such an important object of analysis is the fact that in contrast to the mostly well-institutionalized party systems in the consolidated democracies of Western Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand, party systems in the developing world are often characterized by a high degree of volatility and poor legitimacy while the parties themselves tend

to suffer from weak roots in society and a lack of professionalism (Mainwaring 1999). As all these factors obstruct the institutionalization of the parties and the party system, they ultimately also impede prospects for the consolidation of democracy. In the words of Lindberg (2007: 218): ‘in order to fulfil their democratic functions to provide accountability, policy preference predictability and aggregation of interests in society, the configuration of political parties must be more durable and institutionalized rather than fluid electoral vehicles of power-seeking entrepreneurs.’ However, despite the growing number of studies dealing with the institutionalization of parties and party systems, the theoretical concept of institutionalization as such remains somewhat murky as it is ‘multifaceted, difficult to operationalize, and sometimes conducive to tautological argument’ (Gunther and Hopkin 2002: 192).

Arguably, the scholar who has most incessantly attempted to overcome prevailing scepticism towards the concept of institutionalization is Scott Mainwaring. Since the 1990s, this renowned expert of Latin American politics has published an impressive series of articles, books and papers on the issue of party system institutionalization. His works have inspired many other scholars, as is evident in the growing number of publications that have applied Mainwaring’s conceptual framework in countries outside Latin America, including Indonesia (Buehler and Tan 2007, Hicken 2006, Tan 2002, 2006). In one of his latest works, Mainwaring and his co-author Mariano Torcal have defined institutionalization as ‘a process by which a practice or organization becomes well established and widely known, if not universally accepted. Actors develop expectations, orientations, and behavior based on the premise that this practice or organization will prevail into the foreseeable future’ (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006: 206). They then proceed to classify an institutionalized party system as one ‘in which actors develop expectations and behavior based on the premise that the fundamental rules of party competition and behavior will prevail in the foreseeable future’ (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006: 206).

Mainwaring’s conceptualization of party system institutionalization has evolved over the years, but the key components have essentially remained the same: stability, rootedness, legitimacy and party organization. Thus, it seems as if Mainwaring regards party and party system institutionalization as two sides of the same coin. In other words, his model seems to entail the notion that in order for a party system to become institutionalized the parties that constitute the system must also be institutionalized.¹⁷ However, this notion has met with criticism from several writers. Bétoa (n.d.: 5), for example, has criticized the conflation of party and party system institutionalization in Mainwaring’s work, arguing that ‘it is not sufficient that individual parties become institutionalized, for they must also function in the established context of a party system.’

In a similar vein, Wolinetz (2006) has used examples from Central Europe to argue that party systems can actually be reasonably well institutionalized even if the parties themselves are weakly institutionalized. Borrowing from Smith (1989), he argues that all that is needed for a party system to institutionalize is a ‘discernible core’ of parties that interact with each other on a regular basis.

Significantly, he argues that this core can be developed with parties that do not necessarily have deep roots in society or strong party organizations.

Yet another critique of Mainwaring’s concept has come from Wallis (2003) who argued that the inclusion of Mainwaring’s last criterion (party organization) in the analysis of party system institutionalization is problematic, not only because party organization is generally more concerned with party than party system institutionalization, but also because the inclusion of this element can distort the results of the overall system analysis if the parties that make up the system are extremely unevenly institutionalized in this dimension. Wallis’s point draws on observations made earlier by Randall and Svåsand (2002a) who were indeed among the first to maintain that there is no automatic interdependence between party institutionalization and party system institutionalization. Like Bértó, Wallis and Wolinetz after them, these authors also stressed that ‘[p]arty system institutionalization is the outcome of a range of developments, only some of which have to do directly with the constituent parties themselves.’ While conceding that requirements for party institutionalization and party system institutionalization are in many respects ‘mutually supportive or at least compatible’ (Randall and Svåsand 2002a: 8), they pointed out that under special circumstances party institutionalization may in fact be counterproductive to party system institutionalization and consequently to democratic consolidation.

Before discussing the potential perils of party institutionalization, however, it is first of all necessary to take a closer look at Randall and Svåsand’s approach to party and party system institutionalization. Interestingly, and in contrast to Mainwaring and most other scholars working on institutionalization, these authors focus primarily on the institutionalization of parties rather than party systems. Starting from the assumption that parties do not only institutionalize in structural terms, but also in an attitudinal dimension, they define party institutionalization as ‘the process by which the party becomes established in terms both of integrated patterns of behaviour and of attitudes, or culture’ (Randall and Svåsand 2002a: 12). They suggest an innovative model of party institutionalization which consists of four interdependent, yet analytically autonomous dimensions that can be categorized along internal/external factors on the one hand and structural/attitudinal aspects on the other hand (see Figure 2.1).




Figure 2.1 Dimensions of party institutionalization (source: adapted from Randall and Svåsand 2002a and Randall 2006).

Systemness

First, *systemness*, a somewhat awkward term adopted from Panebianco,¹⁸ refers to the organizational infrastructure and internal dynamics of a party. To what extent a party institutionalizes in this dimension is not just determined by its 'genetic model' (Panebianco 1988), but also by the routinization of well-known and widely accepted rules and procedures within the party (O'Donnell 1996). Following the neo-institutionalist understanding of institutions (North 1990, Lowndes 2002), these rules and procedures can be formal (e.g. party constitution or other official party statutes and decrees) or informal (e.g. factionalism, clientelism, seniority principle), and their impact on systemness can be analysed in a variety of aspects, including internal power structures, succession regulations, decision-making processes, relations between the central leadership and regional branches, and the regularization of access to financial resources.

A party's genetic model, or the process of its formation and its subsequent organizational consolidation, plays an important role in its prospects for long-term institutionalization. Arguing from a European perspective, Panebianco (1988: 53) claims that parties which are created in the centre and then gradually spread to the periphery have a better chance of institutionalization than parties that come into existence as a result of 'spontaneous germination' in the regions. However, few parties in the developing world have had the chance to evolve gradually over time as they experienced frequent interruptions when authoritarian regimes arbitrarily changed crucial institutions like party laws or the election system (Randall and Svåsand 2002a: 18). Therefore, prospects for parties to continuously develop a coherent party apparatus have often been inhibited by structural confinements that are beyond the control of the parties themselves.

Moreover, parties in the developing world are rarely founded by a group of visionary elites with a persuasive ideology and an elaborate party platform. Instead, party politics in the Southern hemisphere is often dominated by charismatic leaders who establish parties with the sole intention of using them as their personal election vehicles. While in the early stages of party formation a certain degree of charisma is not necessarily antithetical to systemness, in the long-term a gradual transfer of decisional authority from the leader to the party as a collective actor is needed in order to facilitate party institutionalization as rules and regulations are more easily implemented without an almighty party patron.¹⁹

Another issue related to structural institutionalization is the access to financial resources. Mass parties with regular revenues from membership fees are almost non-existent outside Europe so that parties need to open up other channels for funding. Money is needed for a broad array of activities like election campaigns, the maintenance of permanent offices, policy research and political education, or the support for party-affiliated institutions such as think-tanks or so-called 'independent foundations,' to name but a few. Especially the escalating cost of election campaigns has increasingly forced parties to find new sources of revenue (Ferdinand 2003).²⁰ Many countries have regulated party finance in relevant laws, but often these laws are poorly enforced so that it is

sometimes hard to distinguish between political finance and political corruption (Pinto-Duschinsky 2002: 80).

In fact, political corruption is one of the most serious obstacles to formal party institutionalization.²¹ In many countries corruption is so common nowadays that some scholars have come to view it as an institution in its own right (Böröcz 2000). In contrast to formal institutions such as constitutions or other formally binding regulations, however, corruption does not take on a tangible form as it is not put down on paper for everyone to see. It is an *informal* institution which often deliberately undermines the enforcement of existing formal institutions. The negative implications of such informal institutions for processes of democratic consolidation were first highlighted by O'Donnell (1996) who saw them as one of the biggest obstacles to democracy in Latin America.

Defined as 'socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels' (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 727), informal institutions are often created as a surrogate where formal institutions are few in number or too weak to fulfil the security expectations of important actors. While some of these informal rules and regulations can actually help to enhance the efficiency of existing formal institutions,²² all too often they live at the expense of formal institutions and exploit the latter for their own needs, thereby making it very difficult for the formal rules of the game to fulfil their tasks. Lauth (2000: 26) has described these kinds of informal institutions as 'parasitic institutions' as they are 'either partially occupying or penetrating' formal institutions. Similarly, Helmke and Levitsky (2004) have called them 'competing informal institutions' as they diminish the effectiveness of formal institutions.

Apart from corruption, two other potentially dangerous informal institutions can be identified in the context of party institutionalization. One is the widespread phenomenon of factionalism, the other the prevalence of clientelism. Factionalism in particular has been described as diametrically opposed to party institutionalization because of the damaging impact it has on organizational coherence (Janda 1980, Panebianco 1988, Türsan 1995). In the context of democratic consolidation processes, factionalism within parties is often blamed for the emergence of highly volatile party systems, which in turn can have negative implications for the efficiency and effectiveness of both the executive and the legislature (Riedinger 1995, Croissant 1997). Other scholars, however, contest this gloomy view of factionalism and point to the positive contributions factions have made during democratic transitions (Waller and Gillespie 1995). Furthermore, long-established parties like the Japanese LDP or the Congress Party in India are evidence that factionalism is not necessarily a source of instability (Richardson 1997, Köllner 1999). In the light of these contrasting views, Sugianto (2006: 3) has stressed that 'it is necessary to emphasise that party factionalism can both facilitate and hinder the consolidation of the new party system.'

The divergent assessments of factionalism can be put down to the differing characteristics of factions in certain political, social and cultural settings. Beller and Belloni (1978), who are widely credited with the most frequently quoted

definition of factions,²³ point out that factionalism can not only have many causes, but it can also take on various forms. For instance, where factions come into being merely in response to a specific political issue or as a result of personalism or clientelism, they tend to be weakly organized and in most cases short-lived or of intermediate duration only. On the other hand, those factions that pursue more ideological goals or those which see themselves as the mouthpiece of a certain social or regional group, are often more institutionalized in their own right. These ‘institutionalized or organizational factions’ can have their own internal rulings and procedures as well as easily recognizable names and symbols (Beller and Belloni 1978: 427–30).²⁴ Where their existence within the host party is based on mutual tolerance, institutionalized factions can make a significant contribution to the aggregation, integration and representation of societal interests.

As indicated above, in some cases factionalism is closely associated with clientelistic relationships between a political patron and his followers (clients). In fact, clientelism remains a widespread phenomenon in large parts of the developing world and its influence on the formation and institutionalization of parties and party systems cannot be denied. Most scholars regard clientelism as inimical to party institutionalization as it prioritizes individual interests at the expense of the party. Accordingly, Randall and Svåsand (2002a: 20) have summarized the negative implications of clientelism for party institutionalization, arguing that it ‘undermines rules and regularized procedures, reducing the party constitution if there be one to a meaningless sham.’ However, the authors also point out that in the context of party politics clientelism should not only be understood in its traditional sense as a face-to-face relationship of personal exchange between an individual patron and his followers (Scott 1972). Rather, a party itself as a collective actor can be identified as a patron who offers and distributes to its electorate material or professional benefits such as government posts or positions in the party bureaucracy. Perceived in this way, clientelism may be seen as less threatening to the systemness of a party than in its traditional form (Randall and Svåsand 2002a: 21).²⁵

Decisional autonomy

Second, *decisional autonomy*, as conceptualized by Randall and Svåsand, looks at the party’s relations with its external environment. Huntington (1968) and Panebianco (1988) have both stressed the need for autonomy as a distinct dimension of institutionalization, whereas Janda (1980) and Levitsky (1998) have questioned the necessity to include the issue of autonomy in the context of party institutionalization.²⁶ The disagreement mainly revolves around hazy conceptions of when a party is dependent on another economic, political or social actor or when it is just closely linked to such an external sponsor. In other words, it is not always sufficiently clear what autonomy actually means. For Panebianco (1988: 55–6), crucial elements of autonomy are control over financial resources, domination of collateral organizations, a well-developed party

bureaucracy and the freedom to choose party leaders from within. On the other hand, he maintains that a party that is dependent on external actors for the provision of financial, material or human resources is weakly institutionalized as the party's constituency might be more closely affiliated with the external actor than with the party as such. But this view has been challenged by scholars like Jones (1997) or Janda (1980), who argue that parties like Peron's *Partido Justicialista* (PJ) in Argentina or the British Labour Party reached a high degree of institutionalization regardless of their close relations with the trade unions.

While acknowledging ambiguities in the concept of autonomy, Randall and Svåsand, in their attempt to accommodate differing views on institutionalization, have narrowed down the idea of autonomy to the crucial element of decision-making processes. They concede that close links to external forces do not necessarily weaken a party's degree of institutionalization as long as the party is still the dominant force in the relationship and as long as it is able to maintain 'a significant degree of *decisional autonomy*, or freedom from interference in determining its own policies and strategies' (Randall and Svåsand 2002a: 14). In fact, such links may even be conducive to party institutionalization, especially in times of democratic transitions when newly formed parties are in need of external sponsorship to counter the organizational advantages of the established ruling party.

The idea of concentrating on decisional autonomy rather than organizational autonomy in general is an innovative attempt to allow for a tightly focused investigation of a party's ability to forge its own destiny. Unfortunately, however, Randall and Svåsand's discussion of the subject matter falls short in a number of aspects. First, they fail to mention a number of critically important actors that have the potential to compromise a party's decisional autonomy. Second, they fail to acknowledge that it is not only actors, but also structural factors that can limit a party's decisional autonomy. And third, their focus on decision-making processes rather than organizational autonomy as a whole raises questions about the conceptualization of autonomy as an *external* dimension of party institutionalization. These issues are discussed in the following paragraphs.

To begin with, Randall and Svåsand only mention three different actors that can potentially compromise a party's decisional autonomy. First, in countries with strong class cleavages, trade unions have traditionally linked up with Labour and communist parties and supported them with material and human resources. In the context of Indonesia, for instance, the emergence of the Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*, PKI) as a strong political force in the 1960s was at least facilitated by the party's close ties with the country's largest trade-union federation (Mortimer 1974). Second, religious organizations have more or less actively supported the founding of political parties. Examples from Asia include India, where the radical Hindu organization *Rashtriya Sevak Sangh* (RSS) was heavily involved in the establishment of the *Jan Sangh* which was later revitalized as the *Bharatiya Janata Party* (BJP), and Indonesia, where the Muslim organization *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU), which itself

acted as a party for a limited time, sponsored the creation of the PKB.²⁷ Third, transnational party organizations like the *Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats* or the *Socialist International* may act as external sponsors as they assist parties in democratizing countries through workshops, training and funding. However, since programmatic parties are rare in large parts of the developing world, so far only a very few parties are linked through these networks and the impact of the assistance programmes, both in ideological and organizational terms, seems to be fairly limited (Randall and Svåsand 2002a: 23).

Apart from these three examples, however, there are several other societal forces that have the potential to constrain a party's decisional autonomy. The role of the military, for instance, cannot be excluded from this discussion. While in most countries the armed forces are not directly associated with party politics, there are certainly examples where the military has openly intervened in the formation of political parties. Africa has been particularly notorious in this regard (Sahli 2003: 19–27), but countries in other parts of the world have also been affected as the *Milli Demokrati Partisi* in Turkey (1983) or the *Samakkhi Tham Party* in Thailand (1992) show.²⁸ In Indonesia, the military was involved in the formation of the short-lived League of Supporters of Indonesian Independence (*Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia*, IPKI) in the 1950s. Later, of course, it initiated the establishment of Golkar.

At the other end of the extreme there are also various political parties who act or have acted as official or semi-official representatives of separatist or terrorist movements. *Sinn Fein* in Northern Ireland and *Herri Batasuna* in Spain are but two examples of parties that cannot be separated from the terrorist organizations behind them.²⁹ In Indonesia, it was long considered to be impossible to establish such parties because organizations such as the Acehese Independence Movement (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*, GAM) or the Free Papua Movement (*Organisasi Papua Merdeka*, OPM) used to be regarded as enemies of the state by the Indonesian authorities. With the signing of the 2005 Memorandum of Understanding between the Indonesian government and GAM, however, circumstances have changed. In fact, it now seems almost inevitable that not only one, but several political parties affiliated with GAM will emerge in the run-up to the 2009 general election (International Crisis Group 2007: 3).³⁰

Finally, the increasing importance of money as a pivotal factor in politics has opened up new space for organized or individual business actors to pursue their interests through political parties. In some cases, business tycoons simply form their own parties and use them as a political vehicle,³¹ but business actors more often act behind the scenes, from where they influence decision-making processes within parties without being formally involved in a particular party. However, it should be noted here that the growing influence of capital is not necessarily tied to the presence of businessmen. Any affluent actor can interfere in politics, regardless of his or her profession. Therefore, it is suggested here that in order to determine a party's degree of decisional autonomy it is imperative to not only look at the influence of specific actors or organizations, but also at the structural power of capital. As we shall see in Chapters 4 and 7, decision-

making processes in Indonesian parties are often determined by financial considerations rather than policy concerns. To make matters worse, these decisions are often made within extremely small elite circles in Jakarta, which deprives the party as a collective political organization of its decisional autonomy.

Of course, it could be argued that every large social organization needs to concentrate its decision-making processes at the top of its organizational infrastructure if it wants to operate effectively and efficiently. This natural trend towards oligarchy was already highlighted by Michels (1959) a long time ago. However, patterns of oligarchy in many Indonesian parties tend to be particularly pronounced, not least because they are often compounded by the absence of accountability mechanisms and consultation processes between the party elite and the grassroots. Parties with strong and charismatic leaders, in particular, often neglect the party organization. Such problems indicate that a party's decisional autonomy can be encroached upon by external actors and also by members of the party itself. An exclusive conceptualization of decisional autonomy as an external dimension of party institutionalization therefore appears somewhat inappropriate.

Value infusion

Turning to the attitudinal dimension of party institutionalization, value infusion concerns a party's popular base and the members' identification with and attachment to the party. In order to institutionalize in this dimension a party needs to acquire a reasonably large core group of followers (members or supporters) which commits itself to the party not only for its own self-interest but also for the sake of the party itself. Any party that claims to represent the aspirations of a certain societal group needs to be or become thoroughly infused with the social, cultural or political values of this particular group. If successful, the party eventually 'becomes valuable in and of itself, and its goals become inseparable and indistinguishable from it' (Panbianco 1988: 53). The creation of a distinctive value system can significantly contribute to party cohesion as it provides the basis for strong ties between the party as an organization and its members and supporters.

While sources of value infusion can be manifold, Randall and Svåsand (2002a: 21) note that '[v]alue infusion is likely to be strongest where the political party is identified with a broader social movement.' In a Western European context this correlation was famously described by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) who identified the four classic social cleavages *class*, *religion*, *region* and the *rural/urban divide* as key engines behind the formation and consolidation of Western European mass parties. To a certain extent these cleavages can also be found in the countries of the developing world, with the centre/periphery divide and religion being the most salient of the classic four.

Although the mere existence of cleavages does not necessarily entail the formation of political parties along these cleavages, some Asian and African countries have indeed witnessed the formation of regional and religious parties.

In addition, ethnic parties have also gained increasing prominence in recent years (Reilly 2006, Rüländ 2001),³² particularly but not only in Latin America where indigenous movements have formed a number of successful political parties (Van Cott 2005). While some observers see the potential contribution of such parties to democratic development in a positive light (Madrid 2005), others are more sceptical.³³ Gunther and Diamond (2001: 23–4), for instance, have argued that ‘the ethnic party’s particularistic, exclusivist, and often polarizing political appeals make its overall contribution to society divisive and even disintegrative.’

Many governments in the developing world apparently share Gunther and Diamond’s view and have resorted to a variety of means to contain the influence of not only ethnic, but also religious and regional parties. While in some cases existing parties were simply banned (e.g. *Masyumi* in Indonesia, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria or the *Refah Party* in Turkey), a more frequently used tool has been the creation of institutional regulations that seek to weaken the influence of exclusivist parties. As Reilly (2006, 2007) has shown, such political engineering measures can come in various disguises, ranging from electoral reform (for example the introduction of majoritarian electoral systems or electoral thresholds) to the formulation of requirements for parties to have a nationwide organizational apparatus. Many governments in the Asia-Pacific region have engaged in at least some form of political engineering in recent years, and while the main motivations have differed from country to country, it seems that an important consideration has always been to contain the polarization and fragmentation of the party system.³⁴

An inevitable and indeed often deliberately intended side effect of such measures is the strengthening of broad-based electoralist mainstream parties which, ironically, often lack any kind of distinctive values. In many ways, these parties resemble European-style catch-all parties with their often vague and superficial programmatic platforms, but despite the ‘drastic reduction of [...] ideological baggage’ (Ufen 2006: 23) many parties in the developing world have actually crafted their own distinct identity based on values which may not be linked to traditional cleavages, but which are nonetheless powerful tools for the mobilization of members and supporters.

Randall (2001), for example, points to the importance of nationalism as a driving force of party formation in many African countries. In Asia, the Indian Congress Party and the Indonesian National Party (*Partai Nasional Indonesia*, PNI) are further examples of aggregative, broad-based parties whose value infusion was primarily based on nationalism as a unifying ideology against the colonial powers. But nationalism as a source of value infusion is not confined to the period prior to and at the point of gaining independence. As the legacies of colonialism loom large in lengthy and often complicated nation-building processes, nationalism has never completely lost its momentum. On the contrary, in more recent years the negative consequences of globalization and free trade have triggered a resurgence of nationalist sentiment, often manifested in fierce anti-Western rhetoric. This trend is evident not only in developing countries but also in some parts of Eastern Europe (Von Beyme 1997).

Nationalism, however, rarely serves as a sole basis of value infusion. Often nationalist ideas are conveyed through a charismatic leader, so that the real sources of identification with and attachment to the party may blur. For example, the Indian Congress Party and the Indonesian PNI owed their support not only to the rising forces of nationalism, but also to the appeal of their charismatic leaders, Nehru and Sukarno. The two parties are proof that under special circumstances even personalism and clientelism can serve as sources of value infusion. In India, the Nehru family continued to dominate politics long after the death of Nehru, and in Indonesia the legacy of Sukarno was revived in the 1990s by his daughter Megawati Sukarnoputri. Her rise to the presidency – and her continuing popularity after the loss of it – show that the combination of personalism and nationalism can still be a very potent political force.

Finally, in many countries that have experienced periods of authoritarianism another historical factor that has significantly shaped the processes of party formation is the dividing line between forces aligned with or sympathetic to the old regime ('status quo') on the one hand, and reformist forces on the other hand (Randall 2001).³⁵ Von Beyme (1997) also mentions this additional cleavage in his discussion of the new democracies in Eastern Europe, but he also stresses the transitional character of this cleavage, implying that it is only a temporary phenomenon that does not qualify as a long-term source of value infusion.

Reification

The last dimension of party institutionalization, *reification*, reflects the ability of a party to establish itself as a household name in the political discourse of a country. For Janda (1980: 19) reification is *the* defining characteristic of an institutionalized party. He claims that 'an institutionalized party is one that is reified in the public mind so that "the party" exists as a social organization apart from its momentary leaders.' This definition clearly takes up notions of value infusion, but the important point in Janda's concept is that reification deals more with the perception of the party by the wider society than with the party's relations with its core constituency.

In order to establish itself in the public imagination, a party needs to create and develop effective means of interaction with the public. Therefore, regular access to the mass media is a vital necessity for any party that wants to disseminate its political message to the public. Contemporary politics is conveyed to the people primarily through the mass media and no party nowadays can afford to be shunned by the media. Similarly important for reification is the efficient use of well-known symbols and labels as they serve as tools for the public to structure their electoral preferences. As Mainwaring (1999: 12) has argued, '[i]t would be impossible to begin every election anew, with no established party labels, without shortcuts that tell the electorate who is who.' Voters naturally associate certain expectations with political parties. But usually only a small minority knows exact details about the programmes and policies of the parties. Instead, most people tend to 'rely on symbols and organizations to orient their

conceptual universe' (Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 3). A party's name plays a crucial role in this regard but traditional symbols, colours or catchy slogans can also be effective means to secure a place in the minds of the people.

Reification is a long process and can only be achieved in time. As Randall and Svåsand (2002a: 23) put it, 'party reification is finally and importantly a function of longevity, the party's ability to survive over time.' Needless to say that in countries that have just recently embarked on the path of democratization, reification is still a non-issue for many parties. While democratic transitions often bring about a mushrooming of new political parties, normally only a very few survive the initial euphoria surrounding the founding elections. Compared to the multitude of newcomers, those parties that already existed either before or under the ousted authoritarian regime enjoy a significant advantage in terms of reification. Interestingly, this can be true for both former regime and former opposition parties. In some cases, for instance, parties that had been banned under authoritarian rule have shown an amazing resilience in the face of prolonged repression. The African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa or the PJ in Argentina are just two examples of parties, which have successfully retained their place in the public consciousness during long phases of authoritarian rule. In Eastern Europe, on the other hand, 'historical parties' (Segert and Machos 1995) were far less successful. Instead, the successor parties of the formerly hegemonic communist parties emerged surprisingly strongly in many post-communist elections, especially in Russia (March 2002) and in the former 'national consensus regimes' (Ishiyama 1997) of Poland and Hungary.

The virtues of multidimensional models

The suggested model combines all important aspects of party institutionalization and integrates them into one comprehensive analytical framework. Accordingly, party institutionalization is a process that takes place in several dimensions, all of which need to be analysed and evaluated separately.³⁶ Levitsky (2003: 16–17) has objected that research based on such multidimensional models can have analytical costs when organizations reach different degrees of institutionalization in the individual dimensions, but arguably such problems can be avoided if the results in the respective dimensions are not just simply aggregated but accurately distinguished before final conclusions are drawn.

Of course, it is almost natural that parties do not institutionalize simultaneously in all dimensions. In practice certain parties may be highly institutionalized in one dimension while remaining weakly institutionalized in another (Morlino 1998).³⁷ But that does not mean that any of the four dimensions can simply be omitted from the analysis. As a matter of fact, theoretical models hardly ever match complex realities, but the more complex the model the better its chances of reflecting and explaining reality accurately. The conduct of one-dimensional research only leads to highly contrasting assessments of institutionalization as exemplified by the case of the Argentinian PJ. This party has been the focus of much scholarly research but there are huge discrepancies in the

assessments of institutionalization. Jones (1997: 272) for example characterizes the party as ‘highly institutionalized,’ whereas Levitsky (2003: 3) and McGuire (1997: 1) have described it as ‘weakly institutionalized’.

Party institutionalization versus party system institutionalization

The most significant feature of Randall and Svåsand’s institutionalization model, however, is not its multidimensionality (Huntington’s and Mainwaring’s models are also multidimensional), but its clear differentiation between party institutionalization and party system institutionalization. As was mentioned earlier, many authors fail to make this distinction, seemingly assuming an automatic interdependence between the two. Yet this assumption is erroneous. As Randall and Svåsand (2002a: 8) stress, ‘[p]arty system institutionalization is the outcome of a range of developments, only some of which have to do directly with the constituent parties themselves.’ While the authors concede that requirements for party institutionalization and party system institutionalization are in many respects ‘mutually supportive or at least compatible’ (Randall and Svåsand 2002a: 8), they suggest analysing party system institutionalization in four distinct categories, similarly structured as the party institutionalization model (shown in Figure 2.2).

First, continuity and stability are key elements of any competitive institutionalized party system.³⁸ In the words of Mainwaring and Scully (1995: 4–5), ‘where [...] *stability* does not exist, institutionalization is limited.’ In fact, some authors regard stability as so crucially important that they have limited their analysis of party system institutionalization to just this component (Lindberg 2007). To a certain extent, stability is a direct result of party institutionalization as only a stable number of institutionalized parties can prevent the system from becoming highly volatile. As long as the parties themselves are weakly institutionalized, disintegration and re-formation of new parties will remain common features of the party system. Consequently, volatility will remain high and the party system is unlikely to stabilize. However, continuity and stability do not only depend on institutionalized parties. Equally important are




Figure 2.2 Dimensions of party system institutionalization (source: adapted from Randall and Svåsand 2001: 91).

well-administered political institutions such as the form of government (presidential or parliamentary) and especially the electoral system (majoritarian/plurality or proportional representation). Thus, the nature of the electoral institutions should always be considered in the analysis of stability as a component of party system institutionalization.

Majoritarian or plurality systems are generally regarded as more conducive to the stability of party systems because they tend to foster the emergence of two-party systems. Proportional representation, however, which more often leads to multi-party systems and is therefore regarded as fairer than majoritarian systems, does not necessarily rule out stable party systems.³⁹ In view of the necessity for electoral systems to not only provide stability, but also fair and equal representation of all segments of society, Merkel (1998) dismisses both pure majoritarian/plurality and pure proportional representation systems as not suitable for democratizing countries. Instead, he argues in favour of either proportional representation with significant thresholds or mixed electoral systems with an 'almost equally weighted combination of PR [proportional representation] and plurality election elements' (Merkel 1998: 51).⁴⁰

Second, an institutionalized party system has to be protected from arbitrary interference from the state. According to Randall and Svåsand (2002a: 8), prospects for party system institutionalization improve when the individual parties 'are supported by public measures, such as public subsidies, access to media and legal protection for their existence, for instance in the constitution or in ordinary laws.' However, in many countries of the developing world these measures are far from guaranteed and even where the regulations exist, their implementation is often poor. This aspect of party system institutionalization is further complicated by the fact that state actors are often directly involved in the formation of new parties in order to ensure preferential treatment for their own parties (Mainwaring 1999). The Indonesian party system during the New Order was a prime example of a system that was weakly institutionalized in this dimension.

The third dimension, mutual acceptance of the parties that constitute the system, is a critical precondition for parties to accept the possibility of electoral defeat. In times of transition sentiments of suspicion and mistrust tend to run high, especially towards parties that are believed to maintain links to old regime elites. However, for a party system to institutionalize, the individual parties that make up the system need to fully respect the system and 'accept each other as legitimate competitors' (Randall and Svåsand 2001: 92). If this does not happen, the validity of electoral results will constantly be challenged and parties may not accept the role of parliamentary opposition.

Finally, the party system should be appreciated by the electorate. If parties and the competitive electoral process as a means of electing a legislature and a government are respected as taken-for-granted institutions, the party system as a whole can be regarded as institutionalized. However, in many democratizing countries political parties are among the least trusted political actors.⁴¹ While similar findings have also been noted for many Western democracies (Listhaug and Wiberg 1995), the implications for newly democratizing countries are far

more negative as widespread mistrust in the party system increases the possibility of an authoritarian backlash.

The potential perils of uneven party institutionalization

Implicit in most concepts of party system institutionalization, including Randall and Svåsand's, is the notion that prospects for a party system to institutionalize are likely to be enhanced by the institutionalization of individual parties. Yet Randall and Svåsand are to be credited for pointing out quite explicitly that there is no automatism between the two issues. On the contrary, under special circumstances party institutionalization may even be counterproductive to party system institutionalization and consequently to democratic consolidation. One example concerns the aspect of value infusion and its relation to party system institutionalization. As Randall and Svåsand (2002a: 9) rightly mention, cross-party competition could be restricted and the mutual respect and acceptance among parties severely undermined if large parts of the population identify with parties that are based on highly polarizing religious or ethnic values. The stronger and more institutionalized these exclusivist parties grow, the higher the danger of the democratic party system being dismantled. It is therefore hardly surprising that many countries have engaged in all sorts of political engineering in order to minimize the threats posed by such parties.

A second example, which is of particular interest to this book, is the uneven character of party institutionalization in times of democratic transitions. The commonly held view that party institutionalization is a crucial precondition for democratic consolidation is based on the assumption that all parties enjoy a relatively even degree of institutionalization. In established democracies, this may be true. In democratizing countries, however, degrees of party institutionalization often vary significantly between new parties and those with close connections to the preceding authoritarian regime (Wallis 2003). Especially in the early stages of a transition period, financial, material and human resources are often distributed very unevenly and this has implications for party institutionalization, particularly in the dimension of systemness where imbalances are likely to provide considerable advantages for former regime parties.

Indeed, the different degrees of institutionalization between old and new parties tend to be most clearly visible in the dimension of systemness where new opposition parties that have emerged during the transition often lack a strong organizational infrastructure and their inexperienced members rarely possess the professional skills that are needed to handle parliamentary or government affairs. On the other hand, old regime parties frequently capitalize on the existence of a well-organized party apparatus, better access to financial resources or the political shrewdness of their leading cadres. Organizational superiority has been named as one of the main reasons for the strong performance of ex-communist parties in Poland, Hungary or Russia (March 2002, Waller 1995), and it has also been an important factor in the transformation of other former hegemonic parties like the Taiwanese KMT or the Mexican PRI. While the

KMT's Leninist party structure resembles those of the Eastern European communist parties, the PRI is a different case as it was never a state party per se but rather an 'extension of the state machine and its tame corporatist organizations. It existed to reward loyalty and not to compete for power' (Philip 2002: 140). Nevertheless, in order to fulfil this 'primary goal' (Harmel and Janda 1994), the PRI was equipped with vast human, material and financial resources that, for a long time, made it difficult for the opposition to challenge the PRI's hegemony.

In the other dimensions of party institutionalization, former regime parties may also enjoy advantages, but to what extent that occurs – or whether it occurs at all – often depends on the nature of the preceding regime. As a matter of fact, even before the emergence of recent phenomena such as competitive or electoral authoritarianism, non-democratic regimes came in all shapes and sizes. It is therefore important to remember that 'not all authoritarian regimes are alike' (Rigger 2000: 143).⁴² In military-dominated or highly personalistic regimes, for example, ruling parties often possess little-to-no decisional autonomy and few meaningful political values. Once democratization commences in such regimes, the former regime parties may try to reinvent themselves by embracing democracy and denouncing their connections to the armed forces, but their prospects for institutionalization in the dimensions of decisional autonomy and value infusion are likely to remain low.

On the other hand, transitions from authoritarianism in regimes where a strong political party formed an integral part of the power structure can be expected to produce very different outcomes with regards to party institutionalization in these two dimensions. The Russian communist party (*Communist Party of the Russian Federation*, CPRF) or the Taiwanese KMT are but two examples of former regime parties that were and continue to be highly autonomous and infused with strong political values. In the case of the CPRF, for instance, the party's unrelenting commitment to communism after the end of the Cold War has helped it keep its place in the post-Soviet party system as it continues to benefit from people's enduring attachment to communism as an identity-providing ideology (March 2002, Miller and White 1998).⁴³

As far as reification is concerned, former regime parties are most likely to enjoy comparative advantages in countries where the authoritarian regime did not allow opposition parties to operate. Under such circumstances new parties founded during or after the transition often face an uphill battle to establish themselves in the public consciousness. This task is made even more difficult if old regime elites continue to maintain control over key means of communication like the mass media. In Taiwan, for instance, where opposition parties were banned until 1986, their legalization did not immediately provide them with equal opportunities to disseminate their political programme. Most of the country's TV stations were directly or indirectly owned by the ruling KMT so that media coverage continued to be biased in the KMT's favour for several years after the initiation of the transition to democracy. Only with the introduction of cable TV in the mid-1990s, was more neutral and critical coverage finally made possible, and today the opposition also owns its own media outlets (Chu 1999).

Generally, opposition parties have much better prospects of establishing themselves in the public mind if they have been allowed to operate during the authoritarian period. In Mexico, for example, the oldest opposition party was founded back in 1939, and other opposition parties existed throughout the era of hegemonic PRI rule. Under these circumstances, reification is not really an issue of inequality, even though advantages for the ruling party may be discernible in rural areas.⁴⁴ In addition, it should also be noted that reification may also offer advantages to the opposition in countries where repression under the authoritarian regime was extremely harsh. In this case, name recognition may backfire for old regime parties as their discredited names, symbols and logos could trigger such a strongly negative reaction by the public that this particular party may be forced into a low-profile role.

Final remarks

In sum, transitions from authoritarian rule can, depending on the characteristics of the outgoing authoritarian regime and the nature of the actual transition process, produce situations in which political parties that compete for power in the new political environment are not evenly institutionalized. This unevenness is often particularly pronounced in the dimension of systemness where old regime parties tend to enjoy vastly superior access to financial, material and human resources. Moreover, former regime parties also tend to have advantages in the dimension of reification as new parties often have difficulties matching the high levels of name recognition of their widely known competitors.

If this unevenness is highly pronounced and perpetuated for a long time, it may have negative implications for the institutionalization of the party system as a whole. Particularly vulnerable are the internal dimensions of stability and mutual acceptance, but the appreciation by the electorate may also remain low if old elites continue to control access to power. By jeopardizing party system institutionalization, uneven party institutionalization is also likely to further protract the overall transition to democracy because the competitiveness and fairness of elections might be compromised. Therefore, former regime parties might have to de-institutionalize first before the party system can become a level playing field. At the same time, however, it is equally important that new parties take active steps towards their own institutionalization so that they can actually benefit from the ensuing de-institutionalization of the former regime parties. If new parties remain passive, they are unlikely to become capable of challenging the dominance of the former regime party.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided the theoretical framework which will guide the empirical discussion in the following sections. The twin purpose of this chapter has been to emphasize the importance of political parties for processes of democratic consolidation and to highlight the necessity to distinguish between party

institutionalization and party system institutionalization as two distinct theoretical concepts. From the various institutionalization models developed by other scholars, Randall and Svåsand's model was chosen as the most suitable framework for this book because it was specifically designed as a tool to analyse the institutionalization of individual political parties rather than the party system.

Political parties remain, despite widespread dissatisfaction with their performance, at the centre of democratic politics. Nearly all established democracies in the world feature a number of institutionalized parties that operate in institutionalized party systems. In the developing world, however, parties with broadly accepted and widely applied formal rules and regulations are an exception rather than the norm, and there is a growing awareness in academic circles that this lack of institutionalization can at least partly explain why so few countries that initiated transitions from authoritarianism in the 1980s and 1990s have moved decisively towards democratic consolidation. In specific circumstances, democracy may in fact thrive without institutionalized parties, but as Randall (2006: 31) declared so succinctly, 'institutionalization helps' because it enhances prospects for stability in the party system and often improves the chances for parties to accept electoral defeat.

Having said that, the preceding discussion has also pointed out that if party institutionalization is very uneven in character, it can actually be harmful to party system institutionalization as well as to democratic consolidation as a whole. Where former regime parties can monopolize access to crucial resources to such an extent that they can not only maintain a strong position in the post-authoritarian party system but even dictate the course of the transition, prospects for democratic consolidation are likely to be compromised because elections will be lacking in fairness and competitiveness.

The following chapters will utilize these theoretical findings and apply them to the case of Indonesia where the former regime party Golkar continues to play a formidable role in the post-New Order era. Four topical chapters on each dimension of party institutionalization and one additional comparative chapter on the other main parties' degrees of institutionalization will help answer the question whether Golkar's enduring strength can indeed be explained as a result of uneven party institutionalization and whether the party's strong position poses a threat to party system institutionalization and democratic consolidation in Indonesia.